Pride in One's Country and Citizenship Orientations in a Divided Society: The Case of Israeli Palestinian Arab and Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Jewish Israeli Youth

ORIT ICHILOV

Using data collected in Israel as part of the Civic Education Study of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), this study explores how the divide between Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinian Arabs is reflected in youngsters' citizenship orientations.[1] To put this case study in context, I first discuss issues related to pluralism and unity within multiethnic societies, and then provide an overview of the various dimensions of the national divide within Israeli society between Israeli Arabs and Jews and sketch some of the differences between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Israeli Jews.

Citizenship and National Unity in Multiethnic Societies

There has been a growing awareness of the potential tensions between multiculturalism and the virtues and practices of democratic citizenship and national unity.[2] Studies have shown that forming an affinity with one's country is often more problematic for minority national/ethnic group members than

[1] The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) is an independent international cooperative of national research institutions and comparative studies of educational achievement, and, since its inception in 1958, 18 cross-national studies have been done. The regular cycle of research projects encompasses learning in basic school subjects, as well as studies of particular interest to IEA member countries, such as civic education. The Israeli portion of the IEA study, on which this article is based, was financed by the Israeli Ministry of Education (Office of the Chief Scientist). The Arab citizens of Israel identify themselves as Israelis, Palestinians, and/or Arabs. In recent years the majority prefer to identify themselves as Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. See Nadim N. Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); A. Bishara, "The Israeli Arab: A Study in a Divided Political Discourse," in *Between "I" and "Me": The Construction of Identities and Israeli Identity* [in Hebrew], ed. A. Bishara (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1999); Moshe Barda, *Attitudes and Perceptions of Israeli Arabs concerning the State of Israel* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Knesset, Center for Research and Information, 2002). In this article I will use the term "Israeli Palestinian Arabs."

[2] Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds., *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Colin Samson, "The Dispossession of the Innu and the Colonial Magic of Canadian Liberalism," *Citizenship Studies* 3, no. 1 (1999): 5–25; Bhikhu Parekh, "Discourses on National Identity," *Political Studies* 42, no. 3 (1994): 492–504.

Comparative Education Review, vol. 49, no. 1.
© 2005 by the Comparative and International Education Society. All rights reserved.
0010-4086/2005/4901-0002$05.00

for majority or dominant group members.[3] Citizenship is considered one among many identities of an individual, which "helps to tame the divisive passions of other identities."[4] The unifying effect of citizenship was traditionally founded on a shared collective memory, cultural togetherness and nationality, and the collaborative sense of purpose in fraternity. These elements that bind people together with a common identity of citizenship have been eroding over the last decades, due to global changes, including multiculturalism, that is, the growing ethnic, national, and cultural heterogeneity within existing societies.[5]

Multiculturalism represents a new way of thinking about minority rights, and about coping with cultural pluralism.[6] After World War II, it was hoped that minority rights would be best resolved not by group-specific rights, but via the new emphasis on human rights as they were stated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Affirmative action for disadvantaged ethnic groups was acknowledged as a justifiable, temporary, and remedial measure, but the idea that specific ethnic or national groups should be given a permanent political identity or constitutional status was generally opposed.[7] Minorities were viewed by majority group members as striving to become fully integrated into the various social spheres of mainstream society.[8]

Current multiculturalism endorses social visions that do not necessarily value unity and cohesion, and is often associated with "politics of recognition." As Charles Taylor puts it: "The demand for recognition . . . is given urgency by the supposed link between recognition and identity . . . [that is,] our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others. . . . Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression."[9] While some contemporary political philosophers believe that the status of minorities can be resolved by supplementing

[3] Kymlicka and Norman, *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*; Robert D Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Tom W. Smith and Lars Jarkko, "National Pride in Cross-National Perspective," research report (National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 2001); John Coakley, "National Minorities and the Government of Divided Societies: A Comparative Analysis of Some European Evidence," *European Journal of Political Research* 18, no. 4 (1990): 437–56.

[4] Derek B. Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History* (London: Longman, 1990), 184.

[5] O. Ichilov, "Education and Democratic Citizenship in a Changing World," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. L. Jervis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Patrick Thornberry, *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Hurst Hannum, *Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).

[6] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*; Ichilov, "Education and Democratic Citizenship in a Changing World."

[7] Susan Dodds, "Citizenship, Justice and Indigenous Group-Specific Rights—Citizenship and Indigenous Australia," *Citizenship Studies* 2, no. 1 (1998): 105–21; Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*.

[8] Will Kymlicka, "Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity," *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence* 4, no. 2 (1991): 239–56, and *Multicultural Citizenship*; C. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[9] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25.

individual rights with special collective rights,[10] others have been suspicious of appeals for unity. "Good citizenship," for example, is seen as a demand that minorities should quietly learn to play by the majority's rules and acculturate to the majority culture.[11] It is, therefore, argued that the call for unity should be replaced by the empowerment of minorities that are "produced" within Western forms of hegemony, to enable them to dismantle their ideological scaffolding and develop strategies and practices of resistance.[12] Marion Young contests any attempt to bring multiplicity and heterogeneity into unity, arguing that such attempts entail a denial of difference and are, therefore, inherently oppressive. She advocates instead social life based on openness to unassimilated otherness, the "being together" of strangers.[13]

Multiculturalism may also nurture apathy, lead to a decline in political participation and associational life, and encourage and entrench passive, inward-looking and resentful forms of group identity that inhibit wider cooperation, dialogue, and solidarity.[14] For instance, Giovanni Sartori is concerned that radical claims for recognition could contradict the very idea of pluralism. He notes that "in practice, to the extent to which current multicultural demands are aggressive, intolerant, and divisive—multiculturalism is the very negation of pluralism."[15] Amitai Etzioni and Morris Janowitz emphasize that pluralism must fit within certain kind of overarching unity, and certain ultimate values must be shared, if the diversity in a society is to be managed democratically.[16] I concur with their view and argue that some consensus is needed even for establishing the rules of the game for the "being together" of strangers, and for any form of cross-group collective action.

Citizenship and Identity of Israeli Palestinian Arabs

Israel, according to its Declaration of Independence, was established in 1948 as a Jewish nation-state and a democracy. It is the only country in the Middle

[10] Kymlicka, "Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity," and *Multicultural Citizenship*; Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition."

[11] Samson, "The Dispossession of the Innu and the Colonial Magic of Canadian Liberalism"; Barry Kanpol and Peter McLaren, eds., *Critical Multiculturalism: Uncommon Voices in a Common Struggle* (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1995); Peter McLaren, *Revolutionary Multiculturalism: Pedagogues of Dissent for the New Millennium* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

[12] Kanpol and McLaren, *Critical Multiculturalism*; McLaren, *Revolutionary Multiculturalism.*

[13] I. M. Young, "The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference," in *Feminism/Postmodernism*, ed. L. Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990).

[14] Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 65–78; L. M. McDonnell, "Defining Democratic Purposes," in *Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education*, ed. L. M. McDonnell, M. P. Timpane, and R. Benjamine (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); Kymlicka and Norman, *Citizenship in Diverse Societies.*

[15] Giovanni Sartori, "Understanding Pluralism," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 4 (1997): 58–70, quotation on 62.

[16] A. Etzioni, "On the Place of Virtues in Pluralistic Democracy," in *Reexamining Democracy*, ed. G. Marks and L. Diamond (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992); Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

East where Arabs are a minority, constituting about 13 percent (in 1948) and 18 percent (more recently) of the entire Israeli population.[17] The presence of a large Arab minority within a Jewish state creates a sensitive situation for both Jews and Arabs inside and outside of Israel. The absence of a more general and more diffuse Israeli identity makes it difficult to create shared civic identity between Israeli Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish citizens.[18]

Israeli Palestinian Arabs find it difficult to form allegiance with the Jewish state.[19] The issue of identity is salient and problematic: they are torn between their affinity with Israel as Israeli citizens and their affinity with Palestinian Arabs as members of the Palestinian people.[20] The Israeli Islamic Movement—based on revivalism of strict Islamic codes of religious observance and conduct as well as on political militancy—also has gained a stronghold as a form of collective identity among wide segments of the Israeli Arab population.[21]

Recent surveys reveal the overwhelming primacy and salience of the Arab and Palestinian identities among Israeli Arabs. Respondents were asked: "Thinking about the three identities—'Israeli,' 'Arab' and 'Palestinian'—which one or which combination of any two of them describes you best?" About 52 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Arab, Palestinian, Palestinian-Arab, or Arab-Palestinian, 26 percent considered themselves Arab-Israelis, and about 5.7 percent described themselves as Israeli, Israeli Arab, or Israeli Palestinian. This tendency was significantly greater among Muslim Arabs as compared with Christian Arabs and Druze. These surveys also reveal that about 63 percent of the Jewish respondents doubt the loyalty of Arabs to the state of Israel, and expect that once a Palestinian State is founded, the Arabs' main allegiance will be with that state.[22]

Until recently, the optimal model for Arab integration into Israeli society was considered by both Jews and Arabs to be cultural pluralism, which en-

[17] M. Lissak, "Major Rifts within Israeli Society," in *Pluralism in Israel: From Melting Pot to Salad Bowl* [in Hebrew], interim report (Jerusalem: Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2000).

[18] Jacob M. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991: Political Aspects* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*; Sammy Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*, Monograph Series on the Middle East no. 2 (Haifa: University of Haifa, 1984); Bishara, "The Israeli Arab."

[19] The national symbols of the State of Israel represent Jewish themes that are not an acceptable form of Israeli identity for the Israeli Palestinian Arab minority. The flag shows the Star of David, and the national emblem exhibits the Menorah of the Temple. The national anthem describes the yearnings of the Jews during two thousands years of exile to return to their homeland. Its last verse is "to be an independent nation in our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem"; Elia Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); S. Smooha, "Existing and Alternative Policy toward the Arabs in Israel," in *Politics and Society in Israel*, vol. 2, ed. E. Krauz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1985); Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*; Lissak, "Major Rifts within Israeli Society."

[20] Lissak, "Major Rifts within Israeli Society."

[21] Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*; Lissak, "Major Rifts within Israeli Society."

[22] Barda, *Attitudes and Perceptions of Israeli Arabs*; Moshe Barda, *Perceptions of Israeli Jews of the Identity and Loyalty to Israel among Israeli Arabs* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Knesset, Center for Research and Information, 2002), and *Perceptions of Arabs and Jews of the Identity and Loyalty to the State among Israeli Arabs* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Knesset, Center for Research and Information, 2002).

couraged the creation of ethnic enclaves, allowing minorities to preserve their culture and allowing their partial or full participation in the affairs of the larger community.[23] An example would be that, unlike Jewish Israeli citizens for whom military service is obligatory and members of minority groups such as Druze and Bedouins who volunteer to serve in the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli Palestinian Arabs do not serve in the army.[24]

The cultural pluralist model of integration is no longer desirable for Israeli Palestinian Arabs. In recent years there has been a growing demand among them to be recognized as a national, not merely a cultural, minority—entitled to self-administration of its cultural affairs. Israeli Palestinian Arabs also wish to turn Israel into "a state for all its citizens." This term has been used by Israeli Palestinian Arab leaders as both a call for greater equality for the Arab citizens of Israel and a call to divest Israel of its Zionist-Jewish characteristics.[25] The latter means that Israel would no longer be exclusively the state of the Jewish people; eliminate the Law of Return, which acknowledges the right of all Jews to return to their ancestral homeland; and rid itself of all Jewish national symbols and the anthem.[26]

The demand that Israel should forgo its "Jewishness" raises concerns among many Jews that the Palestinian citizens of Israel are attempting to liquidate the Jewish state through the exercise of civil and political rights that are granted within Israel's democracy.[27] These fears culminated in an appeal of several Jewish Knesset members to the Central Elections Committee[28] to disqualify an Arab political party (BALAD, the National Demo-

[23] Smooha, "Existing and Alternative Policy toward the Arabs in Israel"; Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*; Eli Rekhess, "Israeli Arabs and Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Political Ties and National Identification," *Hamizrah Hehadash (The New East)* 32 (1989): 165–91; Eli Rekhess, *The Arabs in Israel after 1967: The Exacerbation of the Orientation of Problem* [in Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Shiloach Center, 1976).

[24] Ultra-Orthodox Jews can defer the draft until they complete their religious studies. In reality, they marry young, have children, and are rarely drafted. Some Orthodox females prefer to replace military service by community work. The policy that Israeli Palestinian Arabs do not serve in the army was adopted for both security reasons and in order to avoid a situation in which Israeli Arabs could find themselves fighting their own kin.

[25] Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*; Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*; Bishara, "The Israeli Arab"; Y. Porat, "What Is a State of All Its Citizens?" in *The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel: A Reader* [in Hebrew], ed. R. Gavison and D. Hacker (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2000).

[26] Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*; Rekhess, "Israeli Arabs and Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," and *The Arabs in Israel after 1967*; Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*; Bishara, "The Israeli Arab"; Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*; Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*.

[27] R. Gavison, "A Jewish-Democratic State?" in *The Arabs in Israeli Politics: Dilemmas of Identity*, ed. E. Rekhess (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1998); Adam D. Danèl, *A Jewish and Democratic State: A Multicultural View* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2003).

[28] According to Israeli law, the Central Election Committee can disallow the participation of a political party in the elections, if its objectives or actions, expressly or by implication, include one of the following: negation of the right of the State of Israel to exist as the state of the Jewish people, negation of the democratic character of the State, and racial incitement.

cratic Assembly) and its leader (Azmi Bishara) from participating in the January 2003 elections. The Central Elections Committee banned BALAD and its leader from participation in the January 2003 elections on the grounds that they negate the right of Israel to exist as a state of the Jewish people and support acts of aggression against Israel.[29] However, on appeal the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice reversed the committee's decision a few days later, arguing that Bishara's use of the term "a state for all its citizens" could be interpreted as referring to equality among all citizens and not necessarily as negating the Jewish essence of the state.[30]

Most Israeli Palestinian Arabs subscribe to the Palestinian national narrative, arguing that they are the descendents of the ancient people that inhabited the region in Biblical times (e.g., the Canaanites, Edomites, and Philistines).[31] They see themselves as the indigenous people that were displaced and occupied by the Israelites in ancient times, and by those who claim to be their descendents—Zionist Jews—in recent years.[32] As an illustration, Israeli Palestinian Arabs do not celebrate May 14 as Israel's "Independence Day" and instead commemorate it as a day of *Nakkba*, that is, their "national disaster."

Since the 1967 Six Days' War, Israeli Palestinian Arabs have undergone a radicalization process that involves the strengthening of the Palestinian national identity and a concomitant weakening of the Israeli civic identity.[33] The 1987 Palestinian uprising (or intifada) strengthened the Palestinian identity of most Israeli Palestinian Arabs, who sympathized with the Palestinian insurgents, sent food and medicines into the territories, held protest rallies, contributed to special emergency funds, and donated blood.[34] Survey findings among Israeli Palestinian Arabs reveal that already in 1984, prior to the intifada, 50 percent of Israeli Palestinian Arab respondents recognized unconditionally the right of Israel to exist, 21 percent categorically rejected this right, and 29 percent expressed "reservations." Similarly, 64 percent agreed that Zionism is a racist movement, about 64 percent agreed that the Law of Return should be repealed,

[29] Central Elections Committee, "Protocol of Meeting" [in Hebrew], Jerusalem, December 31, 2002 (http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections16/heb/protocols/prot311202.htm).

[30] Israeli Supreme Court, "Protocol of Meeting" [in Hebrew], Jerusalem, January 7, 2003.

[31] Frank C. Sakran, *Palestine, Still a Dilemma* (Washington, DC: American Council on the Middle East, 1976).

[32] Bernard Lewis, *History: Remembered, Recovered, Invented* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[33] Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*; M. Al-Haj, "Identity and Orientation among the Arabs in Israel: A Situation of a Dual Periphery," in *The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel: A Reader* [in Hebrew], ed. R. Gavison and D. Hacker (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2000); Rekhess, *Israeli Arabs and Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* and *The Arabs in Israel after 1967*; Eli Rekhess, "Editor's Corner" [in Hebrew], *Elections Update 2003*, no. 2; Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*; Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*.

[34] Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*; Al-Haj, "Identity and Orientation among the Arabs in Israel."

and about 47 percent doubted that "Arabs can be equal citizens in Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state and can identify themselves with the state."[35]

The radicalization of Israeli Palestinian Arabs thus stems from multiple sources, including the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts, Palestinian Arabs' desire for cultural autonomy, Palestinian nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, the Zionist-Jewish character of Israel, and large-scale socioeconomic inequalities and discriminatory policies and practices against Arabs.[36] The national divide is visible in the Israeli educational system as well. Arab educators and scholars claim that (*a*) Israel has used the educational system as a means of control of Israeli Palestinian Arab citizens and (*b*) the state-mandated curriculum does not have "any reference to Palestinian identity in history, literature, and social studies [but instead] . . . offers a detailed Zionist narrative of history."[37]

Under these circumstances, what are the prospects for containing the rift between Jews and Israeli Palestinian Arabs? Can a shared civic identity develop to bridge existing rifts? Some scholars claim that Israel can continue to be a Jewish democratic state just as France can be French and democratic, and that even politically and religiously Islamic fundamentalists seek to be integrated into Israeli society.[38] Yoav Peled is more skeptical about the feasibility of a multiethnic democracy. He claims that two de facto categories of citizenship emerged in Israel: republican for Israeli Jews and liberal for Israeli Palestinian Arabs. Republican citizenship means that Jewish citizens may actively participate in the definition of the common good and the moral aims

[35] Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*, 35, 36.

[36] Socioeconomic inequalities exacerbate the national divide between Arabs and Jews. See Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy: Patterns of Ethnic Inequality* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); Iris Jarbi and Gal Levi, *The Socio-Economic Rift in Israel* [in Hebrew], Position Paper no. 21 (Jerusalem: Israeli Institute for Democracy, 2000). The poverty rate among Arab families is almost double the rate among Jewish families. See Social Security Institute, *Annual Review 1996/97* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Social Security Institute, 1997). Discrepancies between Arabs and Jews are visible in the levels of educational attainment, positions in the employment ladder, occupational opportunities, and housing conditions. The government's policy and differential investment and allocation of resources between Arabs and Jews are important factors. For example, Arab settlements have never been defined as "development areas" deserving special investment and assistance. Allocation of land and water rations for agriculture also reflects great inequality between Arab and Jewish settlements. Some efforts have been made to address such inequalities: (*a*) between 1992 and 1996 the Israeli government included several Israeli Palestinian Arab settlements in what was called "areas of national priority," and (*b*) in1993 the government decided that large families would be entitled to child support allowances and that this benefit will cease to be exclusive for those who served in the military—thus, being available to Israeli Palestinian Arabs; Lissak, "Major Rifts within Israeli Society"; Baruch Kimmerling, *The Invention and Decline of Israeliness* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Rekhess, *Israeli Arabs and Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*; Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel;* Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).

[37] Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*, 86. The present state curriculum, however, compared to earlier versions, reflects some movement toward the inclusion of Arab identity and Arab's relationship to the Palestinian People. Majid Al-Haj, *Education, Empowerment and Control: The Case of the Arabs in Israel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

[38] Sammy Smooha and As'ad Ghanem, "Ethnic Religious and Political Islam among the Arabs in Israel," Working Paper no. 14 (University of Haifa, 1998); Sammy Smooha, "Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13, no. 3 (1990): 389–413.

of Zionism, while liberal citizenship guarantees formal civil and political rights but restricts the political participation of Israeli Palestinian Arabs in matters related to the nature of the state and its institutions.[39] Elia Zureik holds the opinion that unless Israel ceases to be a Zionist-Jewish state, there is no solution to the subordinate position of Israeli Palestinian Arabs.[40] Oren Yiftachel defines the Israeli situation as an instance of biethnic polity composed of two nonassimilating ethnic groups, both of whom consider the territory to be their homeland, and he concludes that the emergence of violent and acute conflicts between Israeli Jews and Israel Palestinian Arabs is probable.[41] Shafir arrives at a similar conclusion, drawing on studies of colonial societies, such as South Africa and Algeria.[42]

Citizenship and Identity of Orthodox and Non-Orthdox Israeli Jews

A major rift within the Jewish population of Israel concerns the place of religion in the public sphere, and the various perceptions of Judaism and of being Jewish. A broad typology identifies three variants of Israeli Judaism: secular, nationalist-Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox,[43] which form distinct yet diverse publics. Israelis who term themselves "secular" form the majority. They represent a vast, amorphous, and heterogeneous category. The nature of "secularism" itself has changed over the years. During the prestate period, most of the secular pioneers were raised in traditional or Orthodox families and were familiar with Jewish traditions. Most of them did not reject Jewish traditions but took the liberty of interpreting them from a nontheocentric perspective and infusing in them national, historical, socialist, humanistic, aesthetic, and universal meanings.[44] During the prestate period and the first years of statehood, a sizable share of the curriculum in the nonreligious schools was dedicated to Jewish studies (such as Bible and Talmud). The interpretation, however, was secular. Successive generations from nonobservant families gradually drifted away from Jewish traditions. In recent years,

[39] Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship," *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 4 (1992): 479–92.

[40] Elia Zureik, "Prospects of the Palestinians in Israel: I," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 3 (1993): 90–109, and "Prospects of the Palestinians in Israel: II," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 4 (1993): 73–93.

[41] Oren Yiftachel, "Power Disparities in the Planning of a Mixed Region: Arabs and Jews in the Galilee, Israel," *Urban Studies* 30, no. 1 (1993): 157–82, "The Concept of 'Ethnic Democracy' and Its Applicability in the Case of Israel," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15, no. 1 (1992): 125–36, and *Planning a Mixed Region in Israel: The Political Geography of Arab-Jewish Relations in the Galilee* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992).

[42] Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origin of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[43] Ultra-Orthodox schools do not follow state curriculum and, therefore, were not included in the IEA Civic Education Study. Thus, the ultra-Orthodox sector will not be discussed here. Generally speaking, however, most ultra-Orthodox communities are anti-Zionist and consider as heresy the rebuilding of Israel prior to the arrival of the Messiah.

[44] Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Hannukkah and the Myth of the Maccabees in Zionist Ideology and Israeli Society," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 34, no. 1 (1992): 5–23; Orit Ichilov, *Citizenship Education in Israel* [in Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Sifrriat Poalim, 1993).

a majority of secular Jews attribute their Jewishness to living in Israel, speaking Hebrew, and serving in the army, not to religion. Similarly, they consider values that are mentioned in the Bible—such as honoring parents, caring for the needy, and refraining from murder and theft—to be part of their universal identity, not part of their Jewish identity.[45] Studies have shown that, nonetheless, a majority of the people of the secular category maintains numerous traditional practices, such as observing the Passover feast (Seder), marriage ceremonies, mourning rites, and circumcision.[46]

Religious Zionism attempted to combine Orthodox Judaism and Zionism. The religious kibbutz movement was considered a paragon of welding together religion and Jewish nationalism.[47] The religious dimension overlaps to some extent with political and ideological controversies within Israeli society. During the prestate period and the first years of statehood, the consideration of religion as the only source of authority and legitimacy in all spheres of life of both individuals and societies characterized almost exclusively ultra-Orthodox communities. However, since the Six Days' War and Israeli occupation of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), constituting the heart of the biblical land of Israel, Orthodox Jews became religiously and politically radicalized, and came to play a central role in political movements and parties on the right side of the Israeli political map. Many settlements on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were founded by nationalist-Orthodox groups, who spearheaded the opposition to territorial concessions and the evacuation of settlements as part of a peace treaty with the Palestinian Authority.[48] Mordechai Bar-Lev and Eliezer Don-Yehiya claim that religious education in high schools and in higher education religious institutions (Yeshivot Leumiot) produce the next generations of religiously and politically radicalized individuals.[49] Similarly, members of religious youth movements expressed more militant religious and more hawkish political views than religious youngsters who were not members of such movements.[50]

[45] Mordechai Bar-Lev and Peri Kedem, "Unity and Compartmentalization in Israeli Students' Perceptions of Their Jewish-Zionist Identity and Identification" [in Hebrew] *Hebetim Behinuch* 1 (1986): 155–77; Shlomit Levy, *The Structure of Social Values* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, 1986).

[46] Nissan Rubin, "Death Customs in a Non-religious Kibbutz: The Use of Sacred Symbols in a Secular Society," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 25, no. 3 (1986): 292–303; S. Deshen, "The Study of Religion in Israeli Social Sciences," in *Israeli Judaism*, ed. S. Deshen, C. S. Lieberman, and M. Shokeid (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995).

[47] Aryei Fishman, *Judaism and Modernization on the Religious Kibbutz* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[48] Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "The Book and the Sword: The Nationalist Yeshivot and Political Radicalism in Israel," in *Accounting for Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, ed. M. M. Marty and S. R. Appleby (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994).

[49] Mordechai Bar-Lev, "Graduates of Yeshiva High Schools in Israel: Between Tradition and Modernity" [in Hebrew] (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 1997); Don-Yehiya, "The Book and the Sword."

[50] Peri Kedem and Mordechai Bar-Lev, "Perceptions of the 'Good Citizen' by Israeli Adolescents," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 3 (1989): 361–76; M. Bar-Lev and P. Kedem, "Political Attitudes of National-

The Study's Focus

All the schools that were included in the study are state schools that follow state curriculum. However, the Israeli educational system is mainly comprised of three types of schools that cater to distinct sectors within Israeli society: (*a*) Hebrew religious state schools serve mainly Zionist Orthodox Israeli Jewish students, (*b*) Hebrew regular state schools serve mainly non-Orthodox and secular Israeli Jewish students, and (*c*) Arab state schools serve mainly Israeli Palestinian Arab students.[51] Thus, the climate of opinion in those schools, concerning divisive issues within Israeli society, could reflect the widespread views within the distinct segments of society from which students and teachers originate. The major purpose of the study is to examine similarities and differences between two groups of Israeli Jewish and Israeli Palestinian Arab youngsters on issues that could reflect rifts within Israeli society and in citizenship domains that could potentially bridge existing divides. In doing so, we distinguish between parochial citizenship orientations (e.g., identification with and pride in a country) and universalistic democratic orientations (e.g., political efficacy and trust).

Thus, the study addresses the general question, Are the Jewish-Arab and the Orthodox versus non-Orthodox Jewish divides mirrored in youngsters' citizenship orientations? More specific questions to which this study is addressed are How politicized are Israeli Palestinian Arab and Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish youngsters? How supportive of the parochial aspects of Israeli citizenship are students from the three groups? How supportive of universalistic democratic principles are students from the three groups?

Students' level of politicization was measured by students' tendency to discuss politics with parents, teachers, and friends, and by the nature of political actions in which they expect to engage as they become adult citizens. I expect Israeli Palestinian Arab and nationalist-Orthodox youth to be more politicized than students in regular state schools.

In the parochial domain, youngsters' feelings of national identity and pride will be explored. National identity is regarded as a cohesive force holding nations together and shaping their relations with other nations. National pride is the positive affect that citizens feel toward their country. It reflects both the sense of esteem that a person has for one's country and the pride or self-esteem that a person derives from one's national identity. National pride is often lower among national minorities.[52] I expect that Israeli Palestinian Arab youth will report lower levels of pride in Israel as a country than

Religious Youth in Israel," in *Religious Education and Religious Youth: Dilemmas and Tensions* [in Hebrew], ed. M. Bar-Lev (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, School of Education, and Massada Publishing House, 1992).

[51] The national curriculum can nevertheless be versatile with regard to what subjects are studied and at what depth—at a minimal required level, or more intensively. Students attending Arab state schools take the matriculation examinations in Arabic, while those attending Hebrew (religious or regular) state schools take the exams in Hebrew.

[52] Smith and Jarkko, *National Pride in Cross-National Perspective*.

either of the two Israeli Jewish groups, and that students in religious state schools will score highest on this dimension.

The study also explores the extent to which universalistic, democratic citizenship orientations are shared by Israeli Palestinian Arab youth and by Orthodox and non-Orthodox Israeli Jewish youth. These could foster a common civic identity that might bridge existing rifts, especially in situations where parochial citizenship orientations are problematic and contested. Included are levels of political efficacy and trust. These components are considered vital for the functioning of democratic societies. Citizens should feel competent and efficacious, believe in the responsiveness of the political system, and have faith in democratic institutions.

Concerning the universalistic aspect of citizenship, one may plausibly expect Israeli Palestinian Arab youngsters to be less as well as more supportive than either group of Israeli Jewish youngsters. The desire to transform Israel into a "nation of all its citizens" may reinforce support for universalistic, democratic principles. However, given that generally national/ethnic minorities tend to resent and distrust existing regimes,[53] one could plausibly predict that the position of marginality and exclusion among Israeli Palestinian Arabs would be associated with greater alienation and distrust of governmental institutions, and a low sense of efficacy. Students in state religious schools, who belong to a sector that is opposed to policies of compromise for peace, are expected to be less trustful of various governmental institutions compared with students in regular state schools. In other words, the more radicalized and politicized students (e.g., Israeli Palestinian Arabs and Orthodox Jews) are expected to be less efficacious and less trustful compared with non-Orthodox Jewish students.

The Israeli Citizenship Orientations Study

Israel participated as one of sixteen countries in the IEA study of civic knowledge and engagement among upper-secondary students. In Israel, data were collected from a representative sample of 4,430 eleventh graders in 76 Arab state schools, 151 Hebrew state schools, and 32 Hebrew religious state schools.[54]

The data were collected using a questionnaire that was administered to

[53] Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*; Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone"; McDonnell, "Defining Democratic Purposes"; Kymlicka and Norman, *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*.

[54] A two-stage stratified cluster design for sampling was employed. At the first stage, schools were sampled using a probability proportional to size. See P. Foy, K. Rust, and A. Schleicher, "TIMSS Sample Design," in *Third International Mathematics and Science Study Technical Report*, ed. M. O. Martin and D. J. Kelly, vol. 1 (Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 1996); Jo-Ann Amadeo, Judith Torney-Purta, Rainer Lehmann, Vera Husfeldt, and Roumiana Nikolova, *Civic Knowledge and Engagement: An IEA Study of Upper Secondary Students in Sixteen Countries* (Amsterdam: IEA, 2002). At the second stage the sample consisted of one intact classroom per school from the target grade (grade 11).

students in their classrooms.[55] One must keep in mind that the IEA questionnaire was not specifically designed to study rifts within Israeli society, and that a basically identical questionnaire was administered in all the participating countries. It included a knowledge test and survey items and was designed to measure "what young people know, believe and feel about domains of civics, political life, and civil society."[56]

One independent variable, School Type or Type of Students, was used across all statistical analyses: 1 = Regular Hebrew state school, 2 = Religious Hebrew state school, and 3 = Arab state school. (As mentioned above, this variable is highly related to the group membership of students surveyed, respectively, [1] non-Orthodox and secular Israeli Jewish, [2] Zionist Orthodox Israeli Jewish, and [3] Israeli Palestinian Arab.) The study also includes three dependent variables, Political Engagement, Parochial Citizenship Orientations, and Universalistic Citizenship Orientations, presented below.

Political Engagement

Frequency of engagement in discussions.—Frequency of discussions of national and international politics with peers, adult family members, and teachers: 1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, and 4 = often.

Anticipated political actions.—These were grouped into four categories based on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses:[57] Conventional Actions (e.g., voting), Involvement in Social Causes (e.g., community work), Illegal Protest Actions (e.g., blocking roads and occupying public buildings), and Active Participation (e.g., joining a political party). For each category of political action, 1 = I will certainly not do this, 2 = I will probably not do this, 3 = I will probably do this, and 4 = I will certainly do this.

Parochial Citizenship Orientations

National identification and pride.—This includes 12 statements about Israel that reflect the extent to which youngsters are proud, supportive, and fond of the country and its historical heritage.[58] Responses to each statement were scored as follows: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree.

[55] The questionnaire was developed by the International Steering Committee of the IEA in collaboration with the participating countries, and in Israel it was translated from English into both Hebrew and Arabic. The Hebrew version was administered to students in Hebrew schools, and the Arabic version was administered to students within the Arab school system. See Judith Torney-Purta, "The Second IEA Civic Education Project: Development of Content Guidelines and Items for a Cross-National Test and Survey," *Canadian and International Education* 25, no. 2 (1996): 199–215; Orit Ichilov, *Citizenhip Orientations of 11th Grade Students and Teachers in the Israeli Hebrew and Arab High Schools*, Israel's National Research Report, IEA Civic Education Study (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, School of Education, 2000).

[56] Torney-Purta, "The Second IEA Civic Education Project," 205.

[57] Ichilov, *Citizenship Orientations.*

[58] Items are listed in table 3.

Universalistic Citizenship Orientations

Trust in institutions.—Twelve institutions were listed, and respondents were asked "how much of the time" they can trust each of them, and their responses were scored as follows: 1 = never, 2 = only some of the time, 3 = most of the time, and 4 = always. The items were grouped into two categories: Trust in Public Institutions and Trust in the Media based on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses.[59] Our presentation will focus solely on Trust in Public Institutions.

Political efficacy.—This consists of responses to 10 statements reflecting individuals' sense of efficacy and perceptions concerning the responsiveness of the political system. Responses to these statements were scored as follows: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree. The items were grouped into two categories, Personal Efficacy and Belief in Government Openness and Receptiveness, using exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses.[60]

Findings

One-way analysis of variance by the type of school (i.e., type of students) was employed for each dimension and construct, usually together with multiple pairwise post hoc comparisons, using Holm's correction.[61]

Youngsters' Politicization

Discussing politics.—Youngsters' tendency to discuss politics with teachers, friends, and parents is shown in table 1.

TABLE 1
FREQUENCY OF DISCUSSING POLITICS

Type of School	*M*	SD	*N*	df	*F* ($p < .001$)	η^2 (%)
With peers (α = .71):				2, 5,481	30.68	1.1
State	2.42	.76	2,931			
Religious	2.55	.72	727			
Arab	2.60	.84	1,826			
With parents (α = .76):				2, 5,483	11.80	.4
State	2.76	.80	2,929			
Religious	2.75	.77	728			
Arab	2.87	.84	1,829			
With teachers (α = .79):				2, 5,450	163.56	5.7
State	2.13	.81	2,927			
Religious	2.14	.78	725			
Arab	2.56	.84	1,801			

[59] Ichilov, *Citizenship Orientations.*

[60] Ibid.

[61] Sture Holm, "A Simple Sequentially Rejective Multiple Test Procedure," *Scandinavian Journal of Statistics* 6, no. 2 (1979): 65–70.

The data reveal that overall, politics is not frequently discussed with peers, teachers, and family members. However, Israeli Palestinian Arab students discuss politics with friends, teachers, and parents somewhat more often than either group of Jewish students.

Anticipated political actions.—Table 2 presents data on the extent to which youngsters expect to be engaged in a variety of political and protest activities as adults.

The data reveal that overall students expect to take part mainly in conventional actions. This trend was stronger among Jewish Orthodox and non-Orthodox students than among Israeli Palestinian Arab students. The latter scored significantly higher than Jewish Orthodox and non-Orthodox students on the active participation scale, involvement in social causes scale, and illegal protest actions scale. Jewish Orthodox students scored higher than their Jewish non-Orthodox counterparts on the active participation and involvement in causes scales.

Parochial Citizenship Orientations

National pride.—Data concerning youngsters' positive feelings about specific characteristics and achievements of Israel, as well as their overall support for the state, are shown in table 3.

Reviewing this table, one can see the alienation of Israeli Palestinian Arab youngsters, who tend not to identify with Israel's national anthem and flag, not to be proud of the country's history and achievements, and not to express love for the country. Additional analyses reveal that the more politically engaged Israeli Palestinian Arab youngsters are, the less supportive of Israel

TABLE 2
Anticipated Political Actions

Type of School	*M*	SD	*N*	df	*F* ($p < .001$)	η^2 (%)
Conventional actions (α = .58):				2, 5,319	70.43	2.6
State	3.34	.65	2,861			
Religious	3.39	.61	713			
Arab	3.10	.89	1,748			
Active participation (α = .76):				2, 5,020	80.90	3.1
State	1.76	.65	2,710			
Religious	1.82	.64	635			
Arab	2.03	.78	1,678			
Involvement in social causes (α = .74):				2, 4,883	179.83	6.9
State	2.53	.64	2,592			
Religious	2.77	.60	621			
Arab	2.91	.64	1,673			
Illegal protest actions (α = .80):				2, 5,249	19.51	.7
State	1.45	.63	2,811			
Religious	1.44	.60	687			
Arab	1.57	.73	1,754			

TABLE 3
National Pride

Type of School	*M*	SD	*N*	df	*F* ($p < .001$)	η^2 (%)
1. To help protect jobs we should buy products made in Israel:				2, 5,173	59.23	2.2
State	2.62	.86	2,816			
Religious	2.86	.87	698			
Arab	2.44	.94	1,662			
2. We should keep other countries from trying to influence political decisions in Israel:				2, 5,447	66.62	2.4
State	2.88	.86	2,884			
Religious	3.29	.85	725			
Arab	2.89	.95	1,841			
3. The flag of Israel is important to me:				2, 5,529	1,266.98	31.4
State	3.55	.70	2,974			
Religious	3.78	.49	740			
Arab	2.39	1.13	1,818			
4. We should always be alert and stop threats from other countries to Israel's political independence:				2, 5,432	1,311.36	32.6
State	3.72	.57	2,959			
Religious	3.82	.50	732			
Arab	2.62	1.06	1,744			
5. Israel deserves respect from other countries for what we have accomplished:				2, 5,425	548.16	16.8
State	3.34	.74	2,915			
Religious	3.47	.68	729			
Arab	2.58	.99	1,784			
6. There is little to be proud of in Israel's history:				2, 5,493	735.61	21.1
State	3.36	.78	2,961			
Religious	3.57	.69	737			
Arab	2.47	1.03	1,798			
7. I have great love for Israel:				2, 5,475	1,568.91	36.4
State	3.48	.73	2,951			
Religious	3.71	.57	737			
Arab	2.18	1.08	1,790			
8. People should support their country even if they think their country is doing something wrong:				2, 5,553	1,581.86	36.3
State	3.01	.80	2,957			
Religious	3.26	.73	737			
Arab	1.76	.89	1,862			
9. Israel should be proud of what it has achieved:				2, 5,485	784.36	22.2
State	3.33	.67	2,950			
Religious	3.47	.63	730			
Arab	2.48	.97	1,808			
10. The national anthem of Israel is important to me:				2, 5,486	2,287.54	45.5
State	3.47	.76	2,951			
Religious	3.67	.61	731			
Arab	1.90	1.00	1,807			
11. I would prefer to live permanently in another country:				2, 5,362	326.43	10.9
State	3.08	.88	2,835			
Religious	3.50	.77	721			
Arab	2.53	1.11	1,809			

TABLE 3 (*Continued*)

Type of School	*M*	SD	*N*	df	*F* ($p < .001$)	η^2 (%)
12. We should stop outsiders from influencing Israel's traditions and culture:				2, 5,143	70.01	2.7
State	2.64	.92	2,805			
Religious	3.08	.90	699			
Arab	2.64	.96	1,642			
Overall support for Israel ($\alpha = .90$):					2,574.21	52.1
State	3.41	3.41	2,589			
Religious	3.61	3.61	663	2, 4,731		
Arab	2.32	2.32	1,482			

NOTE.—In item 6, the greater values show more positive views of Israel's history, and in item 11, the greater values show less preference for living in a country other than Israel.

they are, while intensified politicization among Jewish youngsters was positively related to their support for the state and their national pride.

Universalistic Citizenship Orientations

Political trust and efficacy.—The findings regarding youngsters' trust in political institutions are presented in table 4, and those pertaining to their sense of political efficacy are shown in table 5.

One observes that overall the level of trust in institutions among respondents is moderate, and additional data reveal that the courts are most trusted, and political parties are least trusted.[62] Moreover, no significant differences with respect to trust in institutions were observed across Israeli Palestinian Arab and Jewish Orthodox and non-Orthodox youngsters.

Youngsters' efficacy level was moderate, on both personal efficacy and belief in government scales. However, Israeli Palestinian Arab students were more efficacious than either group of Jewish students on both scales. The scores of Jewish Orthodox and non-Orthodox students on both efficacy scales were virtually identical.

Conclusion

The study demonstrates how existing rifts within Israeli society penetrate the schools and are visible in students' citizenship orientations. International comparisons revealed that growing up in a divided society, where political issues are salient, Israeli youngsters appear to be more politicized than their counterparts in a variety of other countries.[63] The present study shows, furthermore, that Israeli Palestinian Arab and Jewish Orthodox students, who belong to politically and religiously radicalized sectors within Israeli society, were more politicized than Jewish non-Orthodox students. Israeli Palestinian Arabs were the most politicized. Compared to their Orthodox and non-

[62] Ichilov, *Citizenship Orientations.*

[63] Amadeo et al., *Civic Knowledge and Engagement*, 138.

TABLE 4
TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Type of School	*M*	SD	*N*	df	*F*	η^2 (%)
Trust in institutions (α = .74):				2, 4,747	1.71	.1
State	2.53	.47	2,534			
Religious	2.50	.50	581			
Arab	2.55	.56	1,635			

Orthodox Jewish counterparts, Israeli Palestinian Arab youth reported being more intensively engaged in political discussions and anticipated being more active participants as adults in social causes and illegal protest actions as well as more conventional civic actions. The major rifts within Israeli society between Jews and Arabs became visible concerning the parochial dimension of citizenship. Israeli Palestinian Arab youth were the least supportive of Israel and of its history, achievements, and national symbols, in comparison with either group of Jewish youngsters.

I argue that some consensus is needed for any form of cross-group collective action. Yet the data suggest that universalistic citizenship orientations that could provide a measure of cohesion, bridging existing rifts, namely, trust in political institutions, belief in the responsiveness of governmental institutions, and a sense of personal efficacy, were moderately low. Surprisingly, Israeli Palestinian Arab youngsters felt more competent and efficacious, and expressed a stronger belief in the responsiveness of the political system, than members of either Jewish group. A possible explanation is that a peace process was still in progress at the time the data were collected.

The combination among youngsters of high politicization, divergence on the parochial dimension, and moderately low scores on political efficacy and trust suggests that national divisions are reproduced across generations within Israeli society. It is evident that educating the younger generation for citizenship in a deeply divided society is an extremely sensitive and difficult task.[64] Can the schools play a role in inculcating a common sense of citizenship that would bridge the controversies and rifts among the various segments within Israeli society?

Attempts have been made to bridge rifts within Israeli society via a range of curricular and extracurricular school activities. A new civics curriculum and new curricular materials were implemented in 2001 in all state high schools. These were developed through the collaboration of scholars, and Israeli Palestinian Arab and Jewish religious and nonreligious educators. The aims of the new curriculum and curricular materials were "to inculcate a

[64] O. Ichilov, "Citizenship Education in a Divided Society: The Case of Israel," in *Civic Education across Countries: Twenty-four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project*, ed. J. Torney-Putra, J. Schwille, and J. A. Amadeo (Amsterdam: IEA, 1999); Sean Byrne, *Growing Up in a Divided Society* (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press and Associated University Press, 1997).

TABLE 5
Political Efficacy Scales

Type of School	*M*	SD	*N*	df	*F* ($p < .001$)	η^2 (%)
Belief in government ($\alpha = .56$):				2, 5,109	33.77	1.3
State	2.56	.63	2,737			
Religious	2.52	.65	670			
Arab	2.71	.73	1,705			
Personal efficacy ($\alpha = .74$):				2, 4,731	19.00	.8
State	2.58	.66	2,533			
Religious	2.59	.63	601			
Arab	2.70	.63	1,600			

common Israeli civic identity, together with the development of distinct national identities, and to impart to students the values of pluralism and tolerance, educate students to accept the diversity that exists within Israeli society, and to respect those who are different from one-self."[65] Extracurricular programs dealing with education for coexistence and democracy are offered by the Ministry of Education and by numerous nongovernmental voluntary organizations. These programs have been implemented through a great variety of activities, including individual and group work, discussions, simulations and role-play, and encounters between religious and nonreligious and between Jewish and Israeli Palestinian Arab youngsters.

The adoption of these activities depends on the decision of school principals, and there is no reliable information concerning their implementation in schools. Moreover, the effect of most of these programs has not been evaluated systematically. It would, therefore, be premature to conclude that programs geared at promoting coexistence and tolerance are ineffective. Schools are not insulated from their social surroundings. However, a more vigorous implementation of programs aimed at bridging divides could, perhaps, promote better understanding of and some empathy for "others."

[65] Ministry of Education, Curriculum Department, *Leaflet for Civics Teachers No. 16* [Teacher's guide for academic high schools; in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 2001), 10.