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# Bedouin, the Israeli state and insurgent planning: Globalization, localization or glocalization?

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**This paper analyzes the process of planning for the Israeli Bedouin of the Negev as a manifestation of the dialectics of globalization. The Negev region has been an arena for a civil struggle between the Bedouin and the state for control over territorial resources. Forced into an urban existence they begun a long-term campaign of resisting state plans. We show how they recruit their local cultural narrative to affect the planning process, how these processes may be viewed as a globalized impact and localized response, and the position this process takes on the globalization-localization scale.**

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## Introduction

A growing discussion has been devoted to the globalization process that has been sweeping Israel since the 1990s, and to its impact on Israeli society (e.g., Ram, 1999, 2003b). Yet, so far Israeli society has dealt with this only at the macro-scale.

Israel is a multi-ethnic society. The Bedouin of the Negev semi-arid southern region, with population of about 140,000 in 2004, is one of the most marginal ethnic groups statewide. Previously pastoral nomads, they were compelled to bridge the enormous social evolutionary gap to modern urban life during less than five decades. Consequently, rapid and far-reaching cultural and spatial changes within an urban environment have swept this social group in the last half century. These major processes have been coupled by two important ones: the enveloping Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which carries considerable implications for the Bedouin, and an internal bitter local conflict with the Israeli government over many issues that are fundamental and even critical to their present life.

These local processes have been the major parameters of the impact of the globalization process on

this society. The Bedouin are trapped within the dialectics of this process. On the one hand, their present life is conducted within a Westernized metropolitan culture and space, which is part of what Castells termed ‘the globalized network society’ (Castells, 1996). They cannot escape the impact of this environment as a transmitter of globalization effects. On the other hand, the Middle Eastern ‘olive tree’ culture (Friedman, 1999) applies with considerable gravity to them, as they are strongly inclined to a most orthodox Arab tradition of desert isolationism.

Within this dialectic, the issue of spatial planning has assumed considerable dimensions. In recent decades, the Negev region has been an arena for a civil struggle between the Bedouin and the state for control over territorial resources. This struggle is manifest in state plans for the Bedouin who, in response, have begun a long-term campaign of resisting state plans for this region (Meir, 2003). The objective of this paper is to analyze the process of planning for the Negev Bedouin as a manifestation of the dialectics of globalization. We will try to understand how the Bedouin recruit their local cultural narrative to transplant it into the state planning process and planning discourse, how these processes may be viewed as a globalized impact and localized response, and where can this process be positioned on the globalization–localization scale.

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### **The global–local tension, the state, ethnicity and planning**

The globalization process is primarily economic and technological in nature. Its commercial, communications, financial and technological sub-systems are organized and controlled by multinational corporations whose globally oriented interests are beyond those of the nation-state. In a nutshell, the process, as Giddens (1990) described it, creates intensification of worldwide social relations. This is done by bringing together remote places and individuals into a system in which local events are shaped considerably by ones that are remote and beyond their own control (see also Waters, 1995). It is this very reality that generates a counter response from some of the peoples in local places and regions. These responses, originating from within nation-states, are called localization processes. They aim at withstanding the effects of globalization by tightening up various kinds of identities that are under threat of being eroded by the global ones. These identities may be of regional, national, racial, religious, ethnic and of other cultural sources (Crook et al., 1992; Castells, 1997).

On the surface, these are two exclusive processes. That is, the global effect tends to erase or at least erode social, cultural and economic differences manifest by boundaries and identities. This erosion is counter-reacted upon locally through an attempt to precisely fixate and tighten these boundaries and identities. Yet, as shown by Swyngedouw (1997), these powers operate within the same system and cannot be separated. There are interactions between them, often these are paradoxical and counterproductive in terms of the interests involved. The real process that takes place is therefore ‘glocalization’, merging both processes into one. This produces powers that are capable of reshaping society and space such that the consequences of both effects are present at varying degrees of balance.

Looking into the global–local tension in general, we may adopt Massey’s approach that while the ‘local’ exists within the ‘global’ the ‘global’ also exists within the ‘local’ (Massey, 1991; see also Amin and Thrift, 1992). There are, however, two more specific approaches. The cultural imperialism approach (Tomlinson, 1991) views the local as disappearing in the face of the global through cultural unification towards the Western cultural model. The second approach submits that local forces guard cultural pluralism through merging the global and the local (Bhabha, 1994). Ram (2003b) has described the first approach as unidirectional and the second as bidirectional. Presumably, because glocalization does not provide a clear-cut coverage of both approaches, he argues that both are theoretically correct but that, empirically, the latter is contained within the former. That is, the global unidirectional process operates at the structural level. It contains the bidirectional

process that operates at the phenomenal level. Thus, contrary to popular belief, local and traditional cultures are not necessarily erased from the cultural scene. Rather, they absorb the global flows and digest them while being themselves transformed (see also Hannertz, 2000; Appadurai, 1996).

Quite often, the medium through which the global–local tension is examined is the nation-state, which may be viewed as being positioned between the global and the local. The central idea is that there are interactions between the status of the nation-state and the process of glocalization. Until the globalization era, the nation-state was in principle the central identity and organizational unit of reference for peoples, cultures and economies (Camilleri and Falk, 1993). In recent postmodern decades both the globalization process, which is supra-national by nature, and the localization process, which is sub-national by nature, have contributed to the erosion in the status and abilities of the nation-state. On the one hand, in the face of transnational forms of governance and the internationalization of capital, the ability of the nation-state to effectively practice its power, authority and sovereignty over its territory is weakened. This applies also to its ability to bar citizens from external influences. On the other hand, the rise of local sub-national forces, which have their own particular national agenda, also tends to erode the same powers of the state as do the external forces (Hobsbawm, 1990). Despite this acknowledged erosion in the power of the nation-state from both above and below, however, Hirst and Thompson (1996) suggest that the consensus among political scientists is that the state is still capable of exercising considerable power against these top–down and bottom–up erosive effects.

The state is thus central to the process of glocalization. Its role is not a passive one. It is quite plausible to regard it as an active agent itself, not just an entity that is being hurled between the global and local powers. This given, the question is where the state, represented by its government, may be positioned on the scale of the power balance between globalization and localization. We submit that the state may be positioned closer to the globalization power pole than it may to the localization power pole. The state, with its government, may be thought of as a big corporation. In the contemporary situation of interrelations between governments and international capital and technology, the state is strongly influenced by, and therefore highly oriented to, global market interests. It is strongly motivated by internal high echelon business interests that are themselves globally oriented (Ram, 2003a,b).

Often, these interests conflict with the interests of local peoples, groups and cultures. Therefore, the global–local tension that produces the process of glocalization is also a state–local tension. In this respect, the state can be viewed as an agent of the

global vis-à-vis the local. This notion is of course somewhat paradoxical, given that the state is being eroded itself by the global power. There seem thus to exist contradictions of scale (Amin and Thrift, 1992; Swyngedouw, 1997). At the global level, the nation in its broader definition may be regarded as the 'local' versus the 'global'. At the national scale the state is the 'global' versus the 'local', and in particular versus ethnic or indigenous groups.

There is still another respect in which the state, and its government, may be viewed as an agent of the global. This is related to the concept of 'modernity' and one of its major components, 'rationality'. According to modernization theories (Peet, 1991; Rostow, 1960, 1978) societies across the globe are supposed eventually to adopt scientifically rational norms of thought and action and thus their dominant social order should become 'modern'. In a certain respect, such rationality is related to what Jay (1992, p. 516) described as the dominant 'scopic regime of modernity'. It implies the adoption and prevalence of a specific and mostly singular perspective on reality, in this case the Cartesian perspective. Such Western rationality (versus the non-Western or so-called 'non-rational') is characteristic also of Western governments. They find it very instrumental and attempt to impose it over the population governed within the state's territories, through the various state apparatuses. The underlying rationale works through minimization of differences and variance among people, and their convergence toward a central mode of thought and behavior (Gellner, 1983; Yiftachel, 2000). This facilitates minimized and little interrupted effort and maximum efficiency of governance, and thus increased governmental control over the population and resources.

The tendency of governments to promote convergence toward a central mode of thought and behavior converges with the similar tendency of global economic forces. The latter is geared primarily toward promoting and facilitating smoother performance of local markets under global standards. Both tendencies have thus similar interests in such convergence. Since the state and its government, as noted above, are strongly tied to and influenced by global forces, it is logical to submit that the role of the state as an agent of the globalization process is further enhanced.

It is at this juncture that the role of ethnic and particularly indigenous groups (such as the Bedouin) within this global-local-state tension should be introduced into the discussion. We refer here to both types of groups in conjunction, although a distinction should be made. Many Western nation-states contain ethnic groups by virtue of immigration. Indigenous peoples, in contrast, are ethnic groups in settler states (Perry, 1996). Nonetheless, ethnicity in general is a highly complex and debatable concept, having gone through several cycles of interest in the social sciences during the past century (Banks,

1996; Bonacich, 1972). Space is too short here for a detailed discussion of this debate. Risking over-generalization and simplification, we assume that ethnic groups or ethnic minorities within the Western cultural realm clearly represent the different, the 'other' or, in other words—the extreme local. This assumption is made based on these groups' very distinct culture, their marginal location at all spatial scales, and often their relative population size. The same can be said about indigenous peoples in settler states. In many cases, they are customarily positioned against the state that represents (or is strongly inclined toward) the mainstream western culture, the 'same' or 'similar', the majority, the core and through this—is linked also to the global (see also Fleras and Elliot, 1992; Maybury-Lewis, 1992).

It is for this reason that identity politics have become such a vivid arena for both socio-political action and academic discussion (Kimlicka, 1995; Fraser, 1997). Many ethnic groups, minorities and indigenous peoples struggle for recognition of their unique culture by the dominant population. The struggle usually revolves around cultural practices in education and arts. More critical theories of multiculturalism (Taylor, 1992) attempt to include in the struggle practices and institutions that relate to the whole of society as well. Concurrently, however, these groups struggle for redistributive justice (Harvey, 1996). These aims are thus somewhat contradictory. The former, the 'recognition' aim, promotes group differentiation, whereas the latter, the 'redistributive' aim, tends to undermine it. Nonetheless, this contradiction does not seem to reduce the intensity of the struggle.

In both aims of identity politics, the targets for struggle are usually the state government and its apparatuses, unless an international organization is involved too. In this arena, there are two opposing forces which have been long identified. Ethnic groups have a centrifugal tendency, which reflects their desire to express their identity in the sharpest manner possible, both functionally and spatially. The state, in contrast, is centripetally oriented. It seeks to aggregate, encapsulate and include or converge these identities in order to minimize differences and thus govern more effectively (Hartshorne, 1950; Bergman, 1975; Meir, 1988, 1997). The tension between the forces revolves around two axes: the rationale standing behind policies and programs produced for ethnic groups by the state in order to achieve its goals, and the method through which they are implemented.

These rationales and programs relate to all aspects of governance, and particularly to education and welfare. Yet, one of the most active arenas is the territorial struggle for control over territorial resources, namely land and natural assets within a territory (Howitt et al., 1996). It is at this juncture that spatial planning is introduced into our discussion. The state and its agents often strive to impose modernity over

its minorities. It does so through the production of an abstract, rationally planned space that generates alienation of the ethnic group from the particularities of its culture and place. In many respects, this is similar to past attempts by colonial powers to intensively produce colonial forms of spatiality overseas. In both cases, the agents of the state or the colonial power have been seeking to impose 'rational' metropolitan spaces over indigenous, supposedly 'non-rational' spaces (Mills, 1996; Berland, 1997). Yet, attempts to produce these 'rational' spaces have in many cases proved fictitious and futile (e.g., Jackson, 1997). Awareness of ethnic-indigenous groups to their cultural heritage has produced growing alienation from these spaces and from the external cultures and identities they represent. Instead, local attachment to familiar identities and to familiar homogenous communities and small spaces has always been preferred. In recent decades, such reactions have been yielding growing opposition to the 'rational' planning procedures and plans. In particular they have promoted the emergence of tension and conflict between the local peoples and the state over the status of universal 'rationality' versus what is *locally accepted* as rational in planning these spaces.

Thus, in addition to identity politics, territorial-resource politics too are manifest in a struggle over spatial, environmental and resource planning (Forster, 1989). The two types of politics are logically (and also empirically, as will be seen below) interrelated. The larger the potential impact of a state apparatus on the population, the more it may be subjected to the tension between the global and the local. As in many other state apparatuses, spatial and environmental planning at all scales (national, regional and local) is exposed to the globalization process too. As such it is being thrown into this arena as it embodies the tension between ethnic/indigenous groups and the state. This tension seems to be more intense the further the "local" is detached from Western culture. This may be true in so-called "Western" states, which contain old and more recent ethnic enclaves that are culturally distinct from the majority population (e.g., in Western Europe). It is particularly so when such countries are situated outside the "Western" realm. Israel is one such country: it is a "Western" cultural enclave situated amidst the Middle East cultural region. It is regarded as a settler state (Yiftachel, 2000). The tension between the state and the Bedouin of the southerly Negev semi-arid region has grown considerably in recent decades (Meir, 1997, 1999). In part, this is explained by the tension between the state and the entire Israeli-Arab community, but this is nourished by the more general Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict. The other part of the explanation relates to the more universal principle of conflict between pastoral nomadic peoples and the state (Kressel, 1993; Fratkin, 1997).

The Negev Bedouin population in Israel is thus a prototype of the 'local'. During the last half century, many attempts were made by the state to westernize and modernize them. Despite this, they have persistently carried with them and practiced considerable centrifugal components of their previous pastoral nomadic culture into their new life under the centripetal effect of the modern state (Meir, 1997). This process is typically representative of what Salzman referred to as recruitment of established cultural alternative lines of practice by a group from its traditional reservoir of alternatives (Salzman, 1980). It is also here that the 'local' is brought into effect in the planning arena by the Bedouin. The remainder of this article discusses this process in detail.

### **Bedouin and the Israeli state: major historical milestones**

The 1948 Israeli War of Independence carried immediate and long-term consequences for the 70,000 or so semi-nomadic, agro-pastoral Bedouin who inhabited the Negev. The warfare and its aftermath caused Bedouin flight and expulsion, that reduced their population size by about 85% to approximately 11,000. Many of the remaining Bedouin were relocated by the state into an area already long inhabited by other tribes, making it now a Bedouin enclosure (*seig*) (Figure 1). This act had dire consequences for an already economically and socially unsustainable nomadic pastoralism: it increased population density beyond the culturally and ecologically accepted tolerance levels of pastoral nomadic peoples. This area was militarily administered until 1966.

Two processes emerged then: a massive trend of Bedouins settling in rural hamlets, and an extremely high natural increase rate, peaking at around 5% annually. The state began to perceive these as a threat to its control over territorial resources in the Negev. This triggered the onset of a long and yet unresolved land dispute between the Bedouin and the state. The former have been relying on their traditional legal system as a source of legitimacy for land ownership. This system, however, has been in conflict with the state legal system, which considers all previous pastoral land as state-owned unless formal, state-accepted ownership can be proven (Ben-David, 1996).

Facing this threat in the mid-1960s, the government initiated a long term policy of further relocating Bedouin, this time into state-planned towns (see Figure 2). The long range territorial implication for the Bedouin was a gradual loss of control over their traditional pastoral and dry-farming territorial resources. This process produced a double-spaced Bedouin society within metropolitan Beer-Sheva, composed of two quite exclusive components. One component of this space is semi-urban—the towns that were planned by the state. These seven towns,







Figure 1 Bedouin enclosure, 1949–1965.



Source: Meir, 2002

Figure 2 Bedouin settlements.

established between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s, are inhabited by about 70,000 Bedouin, mostly of the previous class of the ‘landless’. Many of their inhabitants have traditionally been known as ‘annexed’ or ‘fellaheen’—tenant and share-cropper farmers. They arrived from surrounding regions in the Middle East in a long historical process that began in the mid-19th century and were annexed into Bedouin society (Kressel, 1993; Ben-David and Gonen, 2001). This urbanization plan aimed at putting Bedouin society on the modernization track with the hidden goal of weakening their ties to their traditional pastoral and farming territories (Meir, 1997).

The second component is a mostly undeveloped rural space, made of dozens of hamlets known as ‘the dispersion’, *pezura*. Their inhabitants (population about 70,000) are mostly real Bedouin, the previously genuine pastoral nomads who historically controlled the vast desert territories of the Negev. They refuse now to succumb to state demands to relocate into the towns, raising two sources of fear: (1) the towns are a risk to their traditional cultural

and social values (Ben-David, 1993); (2) loss of their claimed traditional land ownership rights in the ‘dispersion’ (Ben-David, 1996). In reaction the state has been refusing to formally recognize these hamlets, claiming they are illegal settlers on state land. Under this definition it has also been barring the provision of public services and infrastructures to their inhabitants in situ, making them available in most cases only in the nearby recognized Bedouin towns. It has taken several Supreme Court rulings to force the state to avail some of these services (particularly health services) to the ‘dispersion’.

During the last five decades, the Bedouin economy has been highly dependent upon the state, with high unemployment rates (Marx, 2002). This ushered in the emergence of large informal and illegal sectors in both urban and rural spaces. Together with the tense land ownership conflict, the stage was set for an intensive Bedouin protest, which was accompanied by the emergence of several grassroots development and empowerment struggles, and political and cultural centrifugal tendencies (Meir, 1997). In the process, spatial-environmental

planning has become a bitter arena. State plans that were prepared prior to the 1990s for settling all Bedouin in those seven large towns lacking an economic base have since been under strong attack and criticism. Many of the Bedouin tribes, particularly the landed ones in the 'dispersion', consistently rejected not only the idea of settling in few large towns that provide no economic opportunities for them, but the very idea of top-down planning in which they take no part. Even the minor attempts by the state to encourage participatory planning have been regarded by them as unsatisfactory. They have therefore begun to conduct various practices in order to make the planning process more democratic, so that more balanced plans reflect their view of themselves and their needs (Meir, 2003). It is here that the role of the Israeli state as an agent of globalization clashes with that of the Bedouin, who begin to introduce the 'local' into this global-local planning conflict. In a nutshell, the Bedouin have begun a process that may be termed 'insurgent planning' (following Sandercock, 1998, 1999; also: Geddick, 2001), which stands as an alternative to state planning.

### **Bedouin 'insurgent planning' and its effects**

Insurgent planning is a radical concept. It challenges the idea of participatory planning solicited by the state in state-initiated projects. Instead, it involves an oppositional planning practice initiated by the local population (indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities or marginal groups) who may feel either deprived by the present allocation of resources or dispossessed of resources controlled by them in the past. The practice is aimed at challenging conventional planning by the state, that is, in their eyes, a reflection of the structure of political power relations within the state.

Since the planning process is a conceptual activity (though carrying practical and legal implications), the practice conducted by the local population contains several elements that are conceptual too. These may include resistance, resilience and reconstruction (Sandercock, 1999). They are meant to put an end to their political inferiority vis-à-vis the state and the planning establishment. In the process, the group attempts to generate an alternative conceptual situation. The objective is to change the balance of power in space production and resource utilization so that the practice becomes a lever in their relationships with the state.

In order to demonstrate the insurgent planning among the Negev Bedouin, we return to the issue of the unrecognized settlements in the 'dispersion'. In 1996, the Bedouin established a voluntary organization called the Bedouin Committee for Strategic Planning (henceforward BCSP). It was based in Rahat, the biggest and one of the earliest Bedouin towns that were established in the early 1970s by the government. The objective of the BCSP, backed

by the larger Arab community in Israel, was to act as an independent internal Bedouin body before state authorities, and to voice Bedouin positions regarding their cultural, economic, social and civil needs. As an act of empowerment, the establishment of the BCSP was meant also as an infrastructure for preparing a long-term strategic plan for Bedouin society. The objective of this plan was that in time it would become a counter-balance for top-down state plans.

The very establishment of the BCSP points towards insurgent planning in the sense of an initiative being taken by the local population. The move was conducted, according to the Bedouin (Meir, 2003), in order to fill the void created by decades of state neglect and avoidance of taking a long-term approach for solving the land dispute. But the most practical objective of the move was solving the problem of the unrecognized settlements. In 1997 the BCSP announced its own 'formal recognition' of the hamlet of the Abu-Kaf tribe, one of the largest unrecognized settlements on the outskirts of the city of Beer-sheva. In addition, it decided to post village names at the entrance to each unrecognized settlement. This was a symbolic act. It was meant to attach a spatial identity to places that previously were identified by the authorities and referred to according to their tribal affiliation only. Soon after, the BCSP called for 'municipal' elections in these settlements, in which a 'council' was elected for each one of them. These 'councils' then convened to decide on establishing an organization, that was official in their eyes, called The Regional Council for Bedouin-Arab Unrecognized Villages (henceforward RCBUV). The RCBUV was established as an NGO. The model was adopted from the Israeli system of rural governance in which several villages are incorporated into a regional municipality. The BCSP referred to forty-five unrecognized settlements and these were 'incorporated' in this regional council. In May 1997, village delegates conducted elections for the 'council' of the RCBUV and for its 'mayor', and a special small fund was established to finance the activities of the RCBUV (Meir, 1999).

Needless to say, like the settlements themselves, the RCBUV has never received any official recognition by state bodies. From the start the Ministry of the Interior (henceforward Ministry) declared the elections illegal, reconfirmed its non-recognition of the settlements in the 'dispersion', and removed the village name signs. The BCSP reacted with a press release which regarded the Ministry's acts as a "... blatant attack on Bedouin right for social, geographical and historical identity. The name signs are the ID cards of these settlements, and the police should take measures against the intruders who removed them..." (Kol HaNegev, 1997).

Even the establishment of the RCBUV itself may be regarded an insurgent move which served to pass several messages to the state. First, this independent,

voluntary organization aims to fill in the governance and welfare void left by the state by its refusal to recognize the settlements and to provide for the needs of their inhabitants. The second message (Al-Huzayil, 2002) was that the state can no more repeat its past claims that the Bedouin community suffers from lack of authentic leadership and representation for purposes of dialogue. These are now provided by the RCBUV. Nor can it claim that the Bedouin fail to reach an internally agreed agenda. The RCBUV is supposed to fill these voids. Indeed, the RCBUV established an independent information infrastructure and begun to provide consulting services and moral and professional support to the local councils. The third message relates to public participation in planning: any Bedouin-related planning procedure should from its very start engage the Bedouin as leaders and not as mere participants.

In fact, the establishment of the RCBUV by the Bedouin was aimed at creating local, self-reliant municipal governance (though unrecognized and informal). Such a vehicle was needed to meet the formal requirements of regional and local planning in Israel and to play by the formal rules and procedures. Yet, the major practical move in terms of insurgent planning was the preparation and submission of “*A Master Plan for Deployment of the Unrecognized Settlements in the Negev*”. This was part of “*A Plan for Developing a Municipal Authority for the Bedouin-Arab Unrecognized Villages in the Negev*”. In this project, the RCBUV was joined by the Jewish-Arab Center for Economic Development (another NGO) and a planning firm, both of which contributed to the professional aspects of the move (RCBUV et al., 1999). The plan was submitted to the Southern District of the Ministry in late 1999.

The master plan includes four major principles: “(1) Recognition of each of the 45 villages as an independent settlement and all of them as a regional council according to the area designated by the plan regardless of the land entitlement process which the state has been refraining from completion. (2) Establishing and developing a municipal authority for the villages according the Israeli model of rural government. (3) Awarding the inhabitants with the right for local elections which was hitherto denied. (4) Provision of public services to the villages that is not contingent on a completed land entitlement process” (RCBUV et al., 1999).

An analysis of the plan reveals the three elements shown above that constitute insurgent planning: resistance, resilience and reconstruction.

### *Resistance*

Resistance takes here a legal-statutory form. The plan was submitted based on the 43rd Amendment to the Planning and Construction Law, 1999. Contrary to the past, this amendment allows not only a passive objection but an active submission of a full

objection plan. Indeed, the sub-titles of the plan were as follows: “Change to National Master Plan NMP-31, Change to District Master Plan DMP-4” as “...an objection plan to any national or district plan which contradicts its content and principles...” Based on this notion the plan further ‘ruled’ (a-la-the RCBUV) that its instructions should be prioritized and that any “...other plan that was approved for deposition with the planning authorities but was not yet deposited by the time this plan is approved, and is in conflict with the instructions of this plan, should be revised to meet these instructions”. This was the general, regional ‘instructions’. Processes at the local level follow those at the regional level. For example, when the planning of the new settlement of Beir-Hadaj begun, the local population submitted an objection plan with the assistance of the RCBUV (Meir, 2003).

Such presentation of ideas in the plan contained a latent statement whereby the Bedouin do not recognize existing plans, and as far as they are concerned their’s is the only acceptable statutory plan. Furthermore, in this initiative the Bedouin reacted to governmental refusal to recognize their settlements by their own denial of the state’s rights to further pursue its own statutory plans for the Bedouin.

### *Resilience*

This element of insurgent planning is interpreted here as insistence of the Bedouin (in a break with the past) on full realization of their civil rights as determined by law. Since the RCBUV regards all Bedouin settlements in the ‘dispersion’ as formal municipalities, it relies on the Local and Regional Municipal Authority Order, 1988. Two principles arise from this order: (1) the authority must provide municipal services to all inhabitants and maintain the necessary institutions according to its best judgment and the needs of its inhabitants; (2) the right to elect and be elected to the municipality’s institutions is restricted only to its own inhabitants.

The practice of the state in this regard needs explanation. In many cases, as shown above, the state conditioned the realization of the right of Bedouin in the ‘dispersion’ for services by ending the land conflict there. The only way acceptable to the state would be relocation into existing towns by receiving land there plus some monetary compensation (Ben-David, 1996). As for the second item, namely electoral rights, the position of the state has been that there are no Bedouin municipalities in the ‘dispersion’. Its territory belongs to the state and is administered directly by governmental ministries. Therefore, the Bedouin there cannot realize their local rights at all. Even those living within the territories of the surrounding Jewish regional municipalities are regarded by the latter as illegal intruders and are devoid of the right to elect, or be elected to, their institutions.

In a sophisticated manner, the Bedouin have now claimed (RCBUV et al., 1999) that realization of these rights is not contingent whatsoever on resolving the land dispute. By insisting thus on their civil rights, the Bedouin, in a conceptual insurgence, have initiated a disengagement between the issue of recognition of the settlements in the 'dispersion' (as practiced by the state until then), from that of land ownership. They have thus manifested their resilience by insisting on their most elementary civil rights as a vehicle for recognition. Using this practice of insistence on civil rights was previously conducted by the Bedouin only in matters related to the land ownership dispute.

### *Reconstruction*

Reconstruction is perhaps the most significant element of insurgent planning in the case of the Bedouin. It refers to reconstructing the planning discourse by the Bedouin as clients of the planning process. They attempted to present an interpretation of their historical and contemporary reality that is different from that presented by the planning establishment throughout the years. This interpretation was concerned with cultural, social and spatial realities as perceived by them. The objective was that it should be adopted by the planning establishment so that fulfilling their needs should become integrated in the planning process. Below is an analysis of the plan of the RCBUV, with excerpts exposing these issues.

*The cultural aspect* This aspect is concerned with cultural needs, and refers particularly to group identity. It is composed of three issues that may be arranged hierarchically from the macro-national to the micro-local level.

The macro level: at the national level, the Negev Bedouin are willing to reconstruct their ethno-national identity. As shown above, the master plan for the unrecognized settlements was submitted as part of a plan for developing a municipal authority for the unrecognized Bedouin-Arab villages in the Negev. Adding the identity adjective 'Arab' indicates an attempt by the Bedouin to minimize and blur identity and affiliation gaps between them and the rest of the Arab minority in Israel. The adjective is meant to submit that there is only one, monolithic, ethno-Arab national entity in Israel. This entity is in conflict with the state concerning the fulfillment of its needs according to elementary civil rights. The addition of this identity adjective is symptomatic of a recent phenomenon evolving in the cultural-social-political discourse among the Bedouin. Until the early 1990s, the Negev Bedouin cared very little about this identity issue. They were indifferent to being regarded by the public as merely 'Negev Bedouin' who are different from, and separate from, the other Israeli Arabs. This public opinion was, to a

considerable degree, a consequence of statist co-optation policy at the national level. During the 1990s, and particularly after the first Palestinian Intifada, the issue of their identity has become core to their discourse. In the process, they struggle against state attempts to de-Arabize them (see also Yonah et al., 2004), and this is echoed in the plan too.

The meso-level: the identity issue relates here to the Negev regional-metropolitan level. Specifically, it refers to the place and role the unrecognized Bedouin settlements play within the Negev regional system and their relationship to its development plans. The 2020 Master Plan of Metropolitan Beer-Sheva (City of Beer-Sheva, 1998) deals with development of the northern Negev. This is also the region where most of the Bedouin live. The plan, which is part of the district master plan DMP-4, naturally refers to the seven already existing Bedouin towns in detail, but contains only a general statement about the need to establish new settlements for the Bedouin. It does not refer to the unrecognized Bedouin settlements in the same detailed manner as does the RCBUV's plan, but only to the population in the 'dispersion' in general. This population is thus incorporated into the metropolitan plan as a statistical, opaque and hidden entity, devoid of any characterization and uniqueness.

Reacting to this deficiency, one of the guiding principles of the RCBUV's plan for the unrecognized settlements is that of "bi-national metropolitan development". The principle is presented in the plan as a general statement and is not followed by a detailed explanation. Our interpretation of its significance is that it is related to the addition of the identity adjective 'Arab' to 'Negev Bedouin', as shown above. The principle is thus aimed at installing the Arab-Bedouin presence in the planning zone of metropolitan Beer-Sheva within the consciousness of the establishment and the public. Namely, this is a national Arab entity that lives there side by side with the Jewish entity and cannot be ignored.

Furthermore, the "bi-national metropolitan development" principle is submitted in order to demonstrate the reality of a multi-faceted Bedouin-Arab society. The hidden message is that the metropolitan plan should not refer only to an 'urban' Bedouin population, by planning only urban settlement options, as per state policy so far. Rather, the environment within which many Bedouin in the unrecognized settlements live is completely rural. Therefore, these peoples should be given free choice as to the environmental nature of the space inhabited by them, the nature of the settlements planned for them, and their economic ventures.

More specifically, although this is mentioned only in passing in the metropolitan plan, the Bedouin insist on "cultural pluralism". This, they argue, will ensure recognition of their cultural uniqueness within that plan both as Arabs and as members of a



previously pastoral-nomadic (and, presently, a partly farming) society. Such recognition may be reached through “cultural interbreeding”. It is only by realizing this goal that full integration of the unrecognized settlements can be reached within the proper functioning of the metropolitan region and allocation of resources in it. Their demand for putting “. . . the principle of social justice. . .” into effect, and closing the extremely deep development gaps within metropolitan Beer-Sheva, will thus be realized too.

Yet, according to the Bedouin, closing these gaps does not necessarily imply their own cultural self-denial. On the contrary, the principle of “cultural interbreeding” may be interpreted as a Bedouin argument that Bedouin culture in the unrecognized settlements of the ‘dispersion’ has not yet contracted the ills of urbanity that has already emerged in the Bedouin towns. Preservation of this culture may therefore contribute greatly to enriching the regional cultural diversity, beyond the existing reservoir that nourishes the cultural sources of the governmental modernization project. In this respect, in Bedouin eyes, their culture is supposed to become an active partner in shaping a regional multi-cultural system rather than a passive trailer of a unitary cultural one.

The micro-level: the micro-level of the identity issue refers to territorial identity at the local level. Specifically, we refer to the issue of place names that was already discussed above. The issue appears explicitly in the RCBUV’s plan, but not necessarily in a merely nominal context. The Bedouin demand “. . . recognition of the unrecognized villages. . . according to their historical identity and names. . .”. They argue that inhabitants of the ‘dispersion’ are divided into groups of several extended families each. Each such group lives in a certain place that bears an historical name that is common to all its families. The length of the historical period is not specified. Thus, even a short span of several decades is sufficient to them for awarding historical legitimacy to the territorial identity of these settlements. But a draft document, prepared in 1997 by the plan’s steering committee, argues that the spatial deployment of the unrecognized settlements is grounded in “. . . the historical fact that these places were inhabited by their place names before and after the establishment of the state of Israel. . .” (Al-Huzayil, 1997).

These place names, the Bedouin further argue, along with their official geographical co-ordinates, were used by the Ministry until 1974. The purpose was to identify Bedouin by their place of residence toward land entitlement. This practice was then abolished by a ministerial order. Instead, they were given tribal names according to contemporary tribal structure and tribal list prepared earlier by the Ministry. These are the official place names to date (RCBUV, 2001). It should be noted, however, that the official list of settlements in Israel, published annually by the Central Bureau of Statistics, has

never contained any information regarding the alleged Bedouin place names. It has always used tribal names exclusively.

Shortly after the initiation of the RCBUV, it prepared in 1999 an alternative map of the alleged territory of the regional council. The map, in both Hebrew and Arabic, includes all forty-five unrecognized villages with their place names. It was revised and republished in 2001, in Hebrew and English. On both maps, no tribal names are mentioned whatsoever. The maps stand, of course, in sharp contrast to the official maps of the State of Israel which include only the seven existing Bedouin towns. They also conflict with earlier maps of the British Mandate from the 1940s, which include even less information—only the eight Negev Bedouin clans, without any tribal specification.

This move by the Bedouin is very significant, regardless of the validity of historical information. From a cartographic perspective (see: Black, 1997), it uses the potential textual property of maps as a cartographic tool to transmit an ideological message. Furthermore, it contains fundamental cultural significance of inculcating, or retrieving, Bedouin nominal identity, namely personification, to a spatial spot that is non-existent under the prevailing administrative system. It is a maneuver of transforming the Euclidian spatial spot, which is abstract, to an identified place with known properties and an imagined past and memory. This is, in fact, a process of reconstructing place identity as a prerequisite to construction of a real place, culturally and physically. Therefore, an assemblage of several dozen such places in geographical proximity in the ‘dispersion’ constitutes an attempt by the RCBUV to culturally Bedouinize their abstract space. The goal is to transform this Bedouinized space into a real territory that provides their socio-cultural needs and with which they can identify very intimately.

*The social aspect* The major issue here concerns the definition of the basic planning unit in the ‘dispersion’. As shown above, the state refers to Bedouin inhabitants there according to their tribal affiliation. This is based on the assumption that a tribe is a social entity. It follows the pattern of the remote past, when the Bedouin were still pastoral nomads that migrated over space as one coherent unit. It was characterized by close mutual agnatic relationship and by a hierarchical-gerontocratic structure, tightly maintained by the hegemony of the sheikhs and the elderly. These properties further supported the epistemological legitimacy of this view of the tribe by state authorities.

Planning of sedentary settlements for the Bedouin has so far accepted this view. The seven existing towns were planned, based on the assumption that tribal division within Bedouin society is apparently clear-cut. The overt and covert inter-tribal rivalries, and the assumption of tribal homogeneity, served as

a convenient background for the evolution of a detailed planning approach, that was reviewed by Stern and Gradus (1978). This approach maintained that an intertribal territorial separation should be reached between Bedouin towns, and even within towns—in quarters, neighborhoods and even local streets.

It is difficult to point towards a certain source of this approach to Bedouin society. One can hypothesize that it is rooted in old empirical generalizations in academic circles that infiltrated into the administrative and planning establishment in the pre-state period and settled there. However, quite a number of studies have dealt with the complicated issue of the tribal concept, its essence, genealogical homogeneity, formation, structural dynamics, coherence and socio-political endurance. These studies were conducted on pastoral-nomadic peoples worldwide. At least some of these studies submit that the tribal entity has always been more fluid and flexible than the accepted image, in both the academic and governmental circles (Marx, 1978; Salzman and Fabietti, 1996; Salzman, 2000).

Furthermore, this new approach to the tribal entity is complemented by recent changes in tribal structure among pastoral societies. These changes are due primarily to processes of modernization and globalization, and are more fundamental in countries like Israel that are closer to western culture. Another source of change is the growing intensive involvement of governments in pastoral peoples' affairs worldwide. From a historical perspective, this phenomenon is new to these peoples (Meir, 1997).

Despite these developments, the prevailing governmental discourse concerning the tribal entity has remained intact. In the appendix to the RCBUV's plan, the Bedouin refer to the use of the classic tribal entity as a basic planning unit by the state. They maintain that the state refers to an apparent "cultural tribal need" of the Bedouin in this respect. Thus, the practice of a tribe as a basic planning unit is regarded by the state as "...an answer to 'the cultural need' of the Bedouin to settle by 'tribes'..." so that "...the 'socio-cultural' problem of the Bedouin is solved...". Therefore, "...as long as the tribal framework is maintained..." the establishment does not regard any "...significance to physical attachment of the inhabitant to his place of residence..." (sub-quotes are original). It follows that, according to the Bedouin, even the inevitable massive branching-off of tribes into small groups at various locations since 1948 does not necessarily constitute an acceptable reality by the state.

This statist approach to defining the basic planning unit constitutes thus another target of Bedouin insurgent planning. The RCBUV's plan submits that "...this planning approach dismissed all connections between the inhabitants...and their places of residence and rendered house location unimportant,

thus providing the state with moral justification to relocate the Bedouin to the existing towns". In order to fully appreciate the significance of this statement, one must realize that in recent decades, following sedentarization and intensification of farming, the Bedouin have undergone far-reaching processes of territorialization. These have generated a new reality of attachment to specific geographical spaces and places that are defined, identified, familiar and accepted. Only in the remote history, when the Bedouin were still nomadic pastoralists and non-territorial, were they detached from such attachment (Meir, 1996). Yet, in Bedouin eyes, the state refuses to acknowledge these processes. It insists on the classical wisdom that the Bedouin, similar to other nomadic societies, were never attached to any fixed territory. The Bedouin thus suspect the state's insistence on referring to the tribe as a coherent unit and as a nomadic and non-territorial entity in the past. They regard it as a camouflage for state intentions to repel personal land ownership claims that are not based tribally.

In order to substantiate their case, the RCBUV's plan argues that each of the villages is composed of quite an old assemblage of families and is not necessarily homogenous with respect to ancient tribal origins. In each village "...the inhabitants are located according to their family key and land ownership." Therefore it is the village in its landed location that matters as a desired framework rather than the wider tribal affiliation. Hence each of the unrecognized villages "...is identified by its historical name that is common to several families and not by the names of the tribes whose members reside in its territory."

We may put these statements into the language of territoriality. From this language, it transpires that a major change is required in governmental definitions of society-environment relationships among the Bedouin. Such change will have to reflect the fundamental structural changes that have taken place in this society. *Social* definition of territorial relationships, that is affiliation with a tribe, was appropriate when the Bedouin were still nomadic with an undefined territory. This definition lost its relevance, and should be replaced by a *territorial* definition of social relationship, which is appropriate for a settled semi-urban society (Meir, 1997; Sack, 1986). Therefore the RCBUV's plan determines that the unrecognized individual village in the 'dispersion' should become the basic planning unit rather than the recognized tribe. This is their justification for transforming the status of the individual villages into recognized ones.

*The spatial aspect* The spatial aspect in Bedouin insurgent planning contains several elements: the unique nature of Bedouin society's spatial structure, its rootedness in Bedouin existence and its desired and sustainable socio-political form. The deep conflict

between the RCBUV and the planning establishment, reflecting the fundamental differences in discourses, is demonstrated here too. In the late 1990s, the Bedouin in the unrecognized settlements appealed several times to the Supreme Court of Justice regarding their right for provision of public services. Following several court rulings, the state, via its Administration for Advancement of the Bedouin, initiated the establishment of few service centers for the Bedouin in the 'dispersion'. Still, the RCBUV argues that the state continues to conduct the same old spatial strategy, namely spatial grouping of the Bedouin population into a minimal number of settlement foci from which all services are provided. They acknowledge that the state may be motivated by the criterion of economies of scale. However, they suggest this is a camouflage for "...administrative patterns and interests that are not a product of a democratic local municipal system". Therefore, they argue, such a strategy does not meet the real needs of the population. These are considerably wider than the issue of mere service provision.

The Bedouin thus proposed a different approach to the issue of the nature of their space. It may be characterized as an attempt for subjectivization of space, which stands in sharp contrast with state approaches to the objectivization of space. The latter aims at alienation of space from those human agents that are different from the ones with which the state is accustomed to deal. That is, space is not naturally well produced when such human agents are present there. But according to the Bedouin, it is precisely the existing village deployment in the 'dispersion' that constitutes the natural spatial structure desired by them. They regard such deployment as a product of long and short term historical developments. These were crystallized through time into a territorial complex that maintains internal Bedouin economic, social and political harmony.

Thus, this structure is the essence of post-nomadic Bedouin society's existence in the 'dispersion' and constitutes a highly significant socio-political need. Its fulfillment is vital for maintaining the highly sensitive internal order and balance of a society situated amidst far-reaching transitions. This need must overpower those of the state, they submit. Thus, the "...present deployment of settlements...", rather than the notion of 'spatial grouping structure', must be maintained as a vital spatial strategy for the local population.

Two principles of the planning discourse by the Bedouin are demonstrated here. The first one is overt. It is expressed openly in the RCBUV's plan: the "...principle of spatial justice..." in the Negev that, similar to the principle of social justice shown above, was not practiced yet. The second, covert principle is one of multi-spatiality. That is, there is no need to adopt a unitary approach that calls for a single type of Bedouin space—an urbanized space. In the case of the unrecognized settlements, there is

also room for a ruralized space, namely they will be formally recognized as rural settlements. Even this, they maintain, must not necessarily be restricted to farming—the major option that is customary in rural Israel. There are various spatial options available. These may reflect the accepted contemporary research wisdom (Meir, 1997), which maintains that present Bedouin society contains all elements of the continuum in varying proportions. These range from pastoral nomadism to rural sedentarism to urbanism. Recent processes do not necessarily make any part of this continuum redundant.

The principle of multi-spatiality may be viewed as part of the principle of social justice. Both constitute an attempt by the Bedouin to subjectivize their space by presenting their different, self-view of it. Subsequently, the state can no longer demand urbanization in few large settlements as the only possible spatial option open to the Bedouin.

*The effects of Bedouin insurgent planning* The reconstruction of the planning discourse reflects several major concepts that emerged in recent years in academic discourse. The first is 'politics of place and identity' (Harvey, 1996). It is related to 'politics of difference' (Benhabib, 1996). In their geographical and social meaning these political concepts relate to earlier and more fundamental ones from the 1970s, such as 'sense of place' (Relph, 1976; Entrikin, 1990) and Bourdieu's 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 1977; Hillier and Rooksby, 2002). When transformed into a planning language, they underline the struggle of the Bedouin in the 'dispersion' for appropriate ethno-territorial manifestations of their self-perspective on the longevity of their habitation. Such manifestations are essential for understanding their deep sense of place in the unrecognized settlements and are crucial in the planning process.

In reconstructing the planning discourse, the Bedouin have in fact generated an alternative knowledge. It serves the RCBUV as raw material for representation of processes of development of Bedouin society and its present state. In their eyes, it is the only possible way this society should be viewed by the state and its planning establishment. The inevitable question now is—how effective has the insurgent planning of the RCBUV been in transmitting this alternative knowledge to the state, and has the state acknowledged it to the extent of changing its approach toward the unrecognized settlements and their planning?

It is difficult to choose a single criterion to answer such a question, which is complicated further by others (Meir, 2003). However, reviewing the major events that followed the submission of the plan by the RCBUV may be useful. First, the state has decided in 2000 to establish for the first time a steering committee for the district planning committee whenever a planning procedure for a new Bedouin settlement is initiated. This committee must include

local Bedouin representatives. The implication is that for the first time the Bedouin are given access to the state planning authorities, albeit at a low level. Second, a while later, the Bedouin were also given access to the Planning Administration of the Ministry and the National Council of Planning and Construction, the supreme bodies of the planning system in Israel, for the first time. This was made possible when representatives of the RCBUV were allowed to appear there in 2001 and present their case. An agreement was even signed between the two sides concerning a Bedouin-oriented revision of the district plan (Al-Huzayil, 2002). The Bedouin were thus successful in bypassing the Administration for Advancement of the Bedouin, a state body belonging to the Israeli Land Administration, which hitherto was responsible for all planning for the Bedouin and was the highest state body they could ever reach. In Yiftachel's terms, they were successful in breaking through the procedural exclusion barrier (1998).

Third, the access given to the planning establishment was one of the most significant manifestations of state recognition in the unrecognized settlements in the 'dispersion', albeit yet informal. Together with many other signs, it signifies what might be termed 'creeping recognition' in these settlements (Meir, 2003) even if the RCBUV is not recognized formally by the state. Perhaps the most significant events took place during 2003–2004. First, the RCBUV maintains that, following the previous events, the state has also begun to change its fundamental planning concepts regarding these settlements (Al-Huzayil, 2002). These refer to the notion of relocating all Bedouin into the existing seven towns that are exclusively urban by nature without consulting with the Bedouin. In fact, given the huge Bedouin natural increase rate, the state has already earlier realized it could not avoid adding new settlements. Thus, by 2003 a new district plan was prepared (DMM-4/24/1) which contains seven new Bedouin settlements to be planned and recognized (an additional one was added a year later) (see *Figure 2*). This plan was not contingent on resolving the land ownership conflict, which has been a state barrier so far. Moreover, the plan realizes the diversity of settlement options needed along an urban-rural continuum.

Finally, in 2003, the Ministry decided to establish a regional council for the new eight settlements, and in 2004, the Abu-Basma Regional Council was established formally. Its objective is to begin the process of planning and formalizing these settlements and to provide municipal services to its approximately 21,000 inhabitants. This population constitutes about a third of the 'dispersion'. The remainder of the 'dispersion' will receive education and welfare services from the regional council too (Abu-Basma Regional Council, 2004). Following the normal practice for new municipalities in Israel, no elections were called yet. Temporarily, the coun-

cil is composed of government officials and Bedouin representatives and is headed by a senior officer of the Ministry. The first settlement that received recognition was Derieyat, in August, 2004. This is the first new Arab settlement to be established and receive recognition in Israel in two decades.

Judging from this sequence of events, it is possible to conclude that the Bedouin were successful in transmitting to the state the alternative knowledge generated by the process of insurgent planning, and that the state has reacted positively. Such reaction has followed almost two decades of Bedouin struggle, ever since the first wave of Bedouin settlement in towns that ended in the mid-1980s. It should be noted, however, that recently there has been a debate over the question of who deserves the credit for this success: is it the Bedouin, the state or other actors involved in this arena? And if it is the Bedouin, is it the RCBUV or other Bedouin actors? These questions, interesting by themselves, are discussed in more detail by Meir (2003) but are beyond the scope of this article.

## **Discussion**

We may now begin to return to our opening questions of this paper. In the previous section we have shown how the Bedouin have recruited their local cultural-social-spatial narrative and in order to transplant it into the state planning process and planning discourse. We now turn to see how these processes may be viewed as a 'globalized' impact and 'localized' response.

The practice of the Israeli state, similar to other states, was to minimize the differences between the Bedouin and western culture and to converge them toward this central, and also Israeli, mode of thought and behavior. The western values of urbanism and modernism, which have been spreading worldwide, were thus interpreted by the state as universal. Thus the project of urbanizing the Negev Bedouin reflects (as was shown earlier in Meir, 1997), an attempt by the state to modernize them first. Modernization was used as a lever to detach the Bedouin from their traditional culture, and thus also from their traditional territories. All planning efforts until the late 1990s have been directed towards attaining these goals, namely relocating the Bedouin into few large towns.

The state used its hegemonic power in this regard to impose the scientific rationality of the planning process. Thereby, planning was employed in its classic traditional mode, that is a technical rational and objective activity viewing all human agents in space as one type. By regarding the western style of urban life as the only viable option for the Bedouin, and by excluding them from participating in decision making, the state in fact considered its knowledge superior to that of the Bedouin. It acknowledged no 'otherness' in this respect. Viewed from this perspec-



tive, this tendency of the Israeli government towards cultural uniformity converges with the similar tendency of global economic forces; that is, promoting and facilitating smoother performance of local markets under global standards through reducing cultural diversity for the benefit of international business corporations. The Israeli state and its government, like many other states, is strongly tied to and influenced by global forces (Ram, 2003b). Its role as an agent of the globalization process vis-à-vis the Bedouin, in planning their space and environment, is thus strongly manifested.

On the face of it, it seems that the reactions of the Bedouin as described in the previous section are entirely 'local' in nature. Indeed, the very term 'insurgent planning' points toward such nature. We may review this process to reveal the actual extent of the 'local' within it. In order to do this, we refer to the previous section as a source of 'data'. In searching for evidence we divide the actions taken by the Bedouin in submitting the RCBUV plan into two types: procedural, that is the *process* of planning, and conceptual—its *epistemological* nature.

The following steps initiated by the RCBUV may be regarded as procedural:

- announcement by the BCSP of its own recognition of the Bedouin settlements in the 'dispersion' and demanding the police to stop the Ministry from removing village name signs;
- the elections called for the committees of individual settlements;
- the establishment of the RCBUV;
- the elections for the council and mayor of the RCBUV;
- relying on Israeli law regarding the duty of a regional council to provide services to all its inhabitants;
- preparing the development plan and the master plan for the regional council and its 45 settlements;
- submission of the master plan as an opposing 'change' plan according to Israeli law and announcing it as the only acceptable statutory plan regarding the 'dispersion'.

These actions, categorized above as resistance and resilience, were mirroring those needed, as if they were indeed to be formally conducted by the planning establishment or by the Ministry. In fact the Bedouin created here a 'shadow' formal planning process by following all the necessary steps and imitating the formal state apparatuses. Yiftachel (1998) has shown the significance of the procedural aspect of planning in assessing the degree of exclusion of a group from decision-making circles. It is precisely this aspect that was apparently leveraged by the Bedouin as crucial for being included in these circles and for influencing planning decisions. This strategy of community empowerment and civil struggle was

preferred by the Bedouin over civil disobedience (Al-Huzayil, 2004, Ha-Aretz).

The procedural actions were accompanied by conceptual content. This content refers to the master plan itself. In the plan the Bedouin maneuvered to challenge the *conventional* planning discourse of the state, shown above, by presenting their *alternative* planning discourse. It contains three elements of reconstructing this discourse: the cultural element, that refers to Bedouin identity at the national, the regional-metropolitan, and the local levels; the social element, in which they submit an alternative view of the dilemma of the tribe versus the village; and the spatial element, dealing with the way space is actually produced and designed in traditional Bedouin society.

In this reconstruction of the planning discourse the Bedouin have set out to create an alternative reality that is different from the one imagined by the state. To attain this goal they employed, as ex-pastoral nomads, their own traditional cultural apparatus, or cultural alternatives, as Salzman (1980) would have put it. This is based on their own narratives, those that have been produced and crystallized in a long history of a unique mode of coexistence with their space and environmental resources. It is this history upon which an alien epistemology has been imposed by the Israeli state planning establishment. In the process, they have carried the notions of their 'uniqueness' and 'being the other', that is—the 'local', to their most extreme manifestations. In Bedouin eyes recent processes of modernization, that have inevitably eroded these notions considerably, do not necessarily change their essence.

The Bedouin have thus been using two tactical modes: conventional planning as the procedural framework and alternative, insurgent planning as the conceptual content. It is difficult to assess which mode is superior. Perhaps it would be best to describe this as an interdependent double-mode tactic, in which neither could perform alone. Yet it appears that the procedural tactic was the engine that triggered the recent change in state policy towards the 'dispersion', whereas the conceptual tactic was the fuel that made it work. The choice of this combination, as shown above, proved successful.

### **Conclusion: globalization, localization or glocalization?**

We may now conclude by returning to our final question: where is this process positioned on the globalization-localization scale? The process discussed above has, in many respects, mirrored the general pattern of relationships between the Bedouin and the Israeli government over the years. Using an analogy from physics, the process of planning for the Bedouin and their subsequent reactions may be framed within the tension between

centripetal and centrifugal forces. That is, the state and its practices represent the centripetal forces, whereas the Bedouin and their actions reflect the centrifugal forces. In this analogy, by using the final outcome as the ultimate decisive criterion, it turns out that the centrifugal force applied by the Bedouin draws the pendulum strongly toward them. They have managed to maneuver the state into a process of recognition of hitherto unrecognized settlements and establishing a regional municipality for provision of services to the hitherto ill-served 'dispersion'.

Judged from this indirect perspective, the answer to the above question would be that the planning dynamics analyzed in this paper represent localization in its clearest possible form. Yet, these state-Bedouin relationships may be interpreted somewhat differently when looked upon from the direct globalization-localization perspective. Here again, we use the final outcome as the ultimate decisive criterion. Indeed, both global and local forces have been manifested quite strongly in this process, albeit each in its due time. On their face, and looked at whole, the state planning and development approach toward the Bedouin reflects purely the global pole, whereas the insurgent planning of the Bedouin reflects the local pole to the same degree. However, more careful scrutiny of the process may reveal that the procedural mode of action is a significant component that should not be underestimated. Adopted informally by the Bedouin, it imitates almost completely the formal model of governance practiced by the state. That is, the Bedouin rely on the apparatus developed by the state. This apparatus constitutes a solid and stable structural framework with regard to state governance. It bears universal components of hierarchical relationships between the national and the local levels of government, including its planning apparatus. Being an agent of globalization, the state thus injects its global impact into the local people through planning.

The Bedouin have willingly and consciously chosen to informally adopt this structural framework, with all the baggage that it may carry, as a vehicle of formalizing the 'dispersion'. Yet the local and traditional Bedouin culture, as an ex-pastoral nomadic society, has by no means been erased from the cultural scene of Israel. Rather, as an ethnic minority within a westernized culture, it has absorbed these global flows of planning and digested them, while attempting to phenomenally maintain the most fundamental elements of their culture. In this respect, the Bedouin process of insurgent planning as a whole, while containing significant localized components of their culture, leans quite strongly towards the universally oriented globalization pole. It is a global process only to a degree.

This interpretation illustrates the complexity of the concept of 'glocalization'. Similar to the evolution of many other concepts in human history, this

one has become multi-faceted too, leading to a variety of possible interpretations concerning the dynamic balance and tension between the 'global' and the 'local', concepts that are quite complex by themselves.

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