UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

The Citizens' Accord Forum between Jews & Arabs in Israel

THE JEWISH -ARAB CENTER

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

INDEX OF ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS IN ISRAEL 2004

2004

Sammy Smooha

UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

المنتدى للوفاق المدني
הפורום להסכמה אזרחית
The Citizens' Accord Forum between Jews & Arabs in Israel

THE JEWISH -ARAB CENTER

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

INDEX OF ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS IN ISRAEL 2004

2004

Sammy Smooha

Index of Arab-Jewish Relations 2004

Sammy Smooha

Editing: Tal Croitoru and Meyrav Shoham
Distribution: The Jewish-Arab Center
Cover Design: Lena Elnecave, The Publications Department
Printed in 2005, the University of Haifa

© Copyright by The Jewish-Arab Center, the Citizens Accord Forum between Jews and Arabs in Israel, and The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

The Jewish-Arab Center, University of Haifa
The Center was established during the 1970s at the University of Haifa, and has been headed since 2002 by Dr. Faisal Azaiza.
The activities of the Center are focused in three spheres – research, student activity, and social responsibility.
In the first sphere, the Center promotes research in multidisciplinary economic, political and cultural subjects concerning Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and in the Middle East, in cooperation with Israeli and Palestinian researchers, and those from Arab and other countries around the world. This sphere includes the holding of local and international conferences, seminars, study days, and lectures, as well as issuing various publications.
In the second sphere, the Center encourages and initiates joint Jewish-Arab activities in the campus with the aim of getting to "know the other", to develop understanding and dialogue, to examine positions through raising matters concerning Jewish-Arab relations. It also conducts various workshops in the field of leadership development among the students in the campus and trains them for activities outside it.
Both of these spheres are incorporated within the third sphere – social responsibility, which is due to the recognition that quality research and student activity outside the campus have an influence on community and social life and contribute towards changing thought patterns and behavior that result in inequality and a negative attitude towards the minority.
These spheres give the Center its unique character as an academic research center that combines research with student activity and communal work.
The website of the Center is: **http://research.haifa.ac.il/~jew-arab**

The Citizens Accord Forum between Jews and Arabs in Israel
This Forum envisages the creation of just and equal relationships of consensus and stability between Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel.
In the wake of the events of October 2000 and the growing polarization between Jews and Arabs, the need for regulation and normalization is of vital importance. The aim of the Forum is to bridge the gaps between the Jewish and Arab communities in Israel and to work towards systematic changes that will improve the status of the Arab citizens. There are five spheres in which the Forum operates to achieve this task: advocacy, education, local and communal development, networking and communication. Within the framework of communication activities, the quarterly magazine *Du-et* is distributed in three hundred thousand copies as a supplement of the large Hebrew and Arabic newspapers in Israel. The 2004 Index, which is the subject of this book, was published for the first time by this magazine. Forum activities also included the First Jaffa Conference for Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel that was held in cooperation with the Center. It is the intention of the Forum and the Jewish-Arab Center to establish this conference as a permanent institution in which annual discussions will be held on a number of subjects concerning the series of relationships between Jews and Arabs in Israel.
The Forum website is: **http://www.caf.org.il**

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation
This is a private non-profit German institution that works towards the realization of the basic values of democracy, social justice, peace and understanding among nations. It was founded in 1925 in accordance with the political will of Friedrich Ebert, the first German president to be chosen in democratic elections. Friedrich Ebert, a social democrat, began life as a simple

workman and attained the highest government position. Against the background of his personal political career he proposed to establish a fund with the following aims: to encourage socio-political education for people in all walks of life, in the spirit of democracy and pluralism; to grant scholarships to gifted youngsters in order to enable them to enter higher studies and to open doors to the world of research; to contribute towards international understanding and cooperation. The activities of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation were terminated by a law legislated by the Nazi regime in 1933. In 1947, the Foundation was reestablished. From the very beginning unto today, the Foundation has been true to its aims in all its various activities as a private cultural institution with non-profit intentions, funded mainly from public sources, and committed to the basic values of social democracy.
The Foundation website is: **http://www.fes.org.il**

Sammy Smooha
Sammy Smooha is Professor of Sociology at the University of Haifa, specializing in comparative ethnic relations and in research on Israeli society. His publications relate extensively to the internal rifts in Israeli society, especially in Arab-Jewish and Mizrahi-Ashkenazi relations. His recent studies deal with the ethnic character of Israeli society from a comparative perspective and with the implications of the peace process on Israeli society. His books include: *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, *Arabs and Jews in Israel* (2 vols.), and *Autonomy for Arabs in Israel?* (in Hebrew).
His personal website is: **http://soc.haifa.ac.il/~s.smooha**

Foreword

The subject of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel is a complex and essential issue with implications for all spheres of life. Much has been said about the rift in these relations and on the need for building bridges and making changes. The issue of discrimination between Jews and Arabs that exists in Israeli society has been raised in various forums – social organizations, representatives of foundations, businessmen, researchers and public figures. The goal is to construct another reality and to create a more just division of power and common resources.

The State of Israel is not just a Jewish state, but a state in which there is a Jewish majority and a large Arab minority that is active and alive, struggles for its rights and struggles to be a partner. A democratic state is tested, among other things, by its ability to grant rights to minorities and to cope with the issue of civic rights. The State of Israel must prove that the rights it grants to its Arab citizens enable it to enter the family of democratic states. The real challenge that faces us is to act together within an egalitarian society in which all citizens feel that this is their State and their society, and to give all citizens a sense that unlimited personal and professional opportunities are open to them.

It is important that all references to this subject are based on comprehensive and serious academic research that will present an up-to-date picture of the state of mind existing in Israeli society regarding central and essential matters for Jews and Arabs towards each other and towards governmental institutions. It is also necessary to consider creating objective standards and to include them within the framework of the annual index for Jewish-Arab relations, so as to make it possible to report on positive trends in closing the gaps between Arabs and Jews in Israeli society.

Professor Sammy Smooha presents us with a thorough and comprehensive study on the subject of the Arab-Jewish relations Index, and presents us with a vital key for examining the issues in this complex area. His research provides the knowledge and information on what is taking place in relations between the Jews and Arabs in Israel, and is a necessary measure in interpreting this complex issue at every point in time over the years. The interest different organizations have expressed in the research findings points to the need to continue developing the index in additional directions.

For the past two years the Jewish-Arab Center has held a conference at the University of Haifa focusing on the Index of Arab-Jewish relations and allowing for extensive discussion of its implications. In collaboration with the Citizens Accord Forum between Jews & Arabs in Israel, publisher of the Du-Et journal, the index and its results has been made available to the public.

It is the hope of the Jewish-Arab Center and the Citizens Accord Forum that the Index of Coexistence will reach the public at large and will influence policy decision-makers to move towards an egalitarian society, for the sake of all its members.

We wish to thank Professor Smooha for his research, for the professional support and for his partnership. We extend our gratitude to our partners who have funded this project: The University of Haifa's management, the Friedrich Ebert Fund and the European Union.

Dr. Faisal Azaiza
Director of the Jewish-Arab Center

Mr. Udi Cohen and Mr. Ibrahim Abu-Shindi
Co-Directors, the Citizens Accord Forum

Contents

Acknowledgements …… 10

Special Problematic Characteristics of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel…….. 11

Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel……..……..…. 15

Findings of the 2004 Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel ……..…… 19

Controversial Issues among the General Public and Public Figures.…… 64

Long-term Trends of Change of Arab and Jewish Public Attitudes ……. 91

Summary and Conclusions ….…….. 12

Appendix: Summary Tables of Arab-Jewish Relations Index 2004…….. 111

List of Charts

1. **Percentage Agreeing to Integration**
2. **Percentage Holding an Image of the Other**
3. **Percentage Feeling Alienation toward the Other Side**
4. **Percentage who do not have Distrust of Institutions**
5. **Percentage of Arabs Fearing of Threats from the State or Jews**
6. **Percentage of Jews Fearing of Threats from Arabs**
7. **Percentage of Arabs accepting Israel's Legitimacy**
8. **Percentage of Jews Accepting Arabs' Civic Legitimacy**
9. **Percentage of Jews Accepting Arabs' Rights and Restrictions of Arabs' Rights**
10. **Percentage of Jews Accepting Arabs' National Legitimacy**
11. **Percentage Agreeing to Solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict**
12. **Percentage Choosing the Most Important Personal Identity**
13. **Percentage of Arabs Choosing a Descriptor of Personal Identity**
14. **Percentage Indicating Arab Affinity to the Palestinians**
15. **Percentage Agreeing to the Representativeness of Arab Leadership**
16. **Percentage Agreeing to Cultural Autonomy for Arabs in Israel**
17. **Percentage Agreeing to Arabs' Use of Means of Struggle to Improve their Condition**
18. **Percentage Agreeing to Regime Shifts**
19. **Percentage Agreeing to Options for Moderate Change**
20. **Percentage Evaluating Arab-Jewish Relations Today and in the Future**
21. **Differences between Arab Groups in Percentage Agreeing to Integration and Identity**
22. **Differences between Arab groups in Percentage Feeling Alienation**
23. **Differences between Arab groups in Percentage Agreeing to Legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State**
24. **Differences between Arab groups in Percentage Agreeing to Legitimacy of Israel as a Zionist State**
25. **Differences between Arab groups in Percentage Feeling Affinity to the Palestinians and Agreeing to Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**
26. **Differences between Jewish groups in Percentage Agreeing to Integration**
27. **Differences between Jewish groups in Percentage Feeling Alienation toward Arabs**
28. **Differences between Jewish groups in Percentage Fearing of Threats from Arabs**
29. **Differences between Jewish groups in Percentage Agreeing to Civic and National Legitimacy**
30. **Differences between Jewish groups in Percentage Agreeing to Arabs' Rights and Restrictions of Arabs' Rights**
31. **Differences between Jewish groups in Percentage Agreeing to Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**
32. **Differences between Jewish groups in Percentage Disagreeing with the Or Commission**
33. **Percentage of Arabs Agreeing that Israel Within the Green Line has the Right to Exist, 1976-2004**
34. **Percentage of Arabs Agreeing that Israel Within the Green Line has the Right to Exist as a Jewish-Zionist, 1985-2004**
35. **Percentage of Arabs Choosing a Label as a Personal Identity, 1976-2004**
36. **Percentage of Arabs Holding Militant Attitudes, 1976-2004**

37. Percentage of Arabs Holding Rejectionist Attitudes, 1976-2004
38. Percentage of Jews Accepting the Existence of an Arab minority in Israel Today, 1985-2004
39. Percentage of Jews Accepting the right of Existence of an Arab Minority in Israel with Full Civic Rights, 1985-2004
40. Percentage of Jews Holding Rejectionist Attitudes, 1980-2004

Acknowledgements

This publication is a summary report of research on the Arab-Jewish Relations Index 2004, which is the second year of the Index. The Index was developed in 2002-2003 on the basis of experience accumulated in the series of previous surveys carried out during the years 1976-2002. In its new and present form, the Index was launched for the first time as Index 2003 in the conference hall of the Knesset and at a University of Haifa conference in May 2004.

Galit Gordoni and Nohad Ali contributed greatly to the development of Index 2003. Contributors also included a large number of public and academic figures who took part in a workshop held in June 2003 for the final formulation of the Index questionnaire. The development of the Index was funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation received through Israel Foundations Trustees. Additional assistance was received from the Idelstein Fund of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Haifa, a grant from the then President of University of Haifa, Professor Yehuda Hayuth, and a contribution from PEF (Israel Endowment Funds) received through its President, Mr. B. Harrison Frankel.

The surveys of Index 2004 were funded by a special grant from the President of Haifa University, Professor Aharon Ben-Ze'ev and by supplementary funds from the Citizens Accord Forum. In June 2005, the Forum and the Jewish-Arab Center held a conference at the University of Haifa and a conference in Jaffa in which the findings of the Index were presented and discussed. The first findings were also published in Issue No. 6 of the magazine *Du-Et*, which is published by the Citizens Accord Forum. Thanks are due to Udi Cohen, the Managing Director of the Forum, for his support of the Index, his financial assistance, and his indefatigable efforts in publicizing the Index.

The Index is conducted under the aegis of the Jewish-Arab Center at the University of Haifa. It would not have been realized without the unlimited support of the Director of the Center, Dr. Faisal Azaiza. He recognized the academic and public merit of the Index and worked unceasingly to raise the funds on its behalf. He was assisted in this by Dina Zvielli, the Administrative Director of the Center. Heartfelt thanks are due to them and as well as to the University presidents.

Thanks are also due to the thousands of Arabs and Jews of the general public and the public figures who agreed to be interviewed for the purposes of the research, and to the scores of interviewers who carried out the work.

Finally, thanks are extended to the Jewish-Arab Center, the Citizens Accord Forum and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for their support in producing this publication.

The Special Problematic Characteristics of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel

The importance of the index should be evaluated against the background of the special problematic characteristics of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and the bitter dispute regarding the tendencies of long-term changes in these relations. The rift between the Arabs and Jews is a deep one. The relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority were forged in 1948 in the tragic circumstances of war, destruction, evacuation and coercion. The Arab minority unwillingly became part of the enemy and was subjected to military rule for a period of 19 years. The Arabs and Jews saw themselves as the indigenous population and demanded almost exclusive rights over the same strip of land. The Arabs in Israel are a working class community within a middle-class society. About 90% of them live in Arab villages and towns and the other 10% live in separate neighborhoods in Jewish cities. The Arabs do not share power and suffer from discrimination in allocation of state budgets, in appointments and in obtaining work and housing in the private sector.[1]

In addition to these obvious gaps, relations between Arabs and Jews are overshadowed by serious disagreements regarding three main ideological issues: the Jewish-Zionist character of the State, the narrative and solution to the violent conflict between Jews and Palestinians, and the integration of Israel in the region or in the Western world. To put it bluntly, the Arab minority is a distinct national-religious-linguistic, non-assimilating and dissident minority, whose loyalty is suspect, who is discriminated against, does not accept its situation as a decree of fate, and is enlisted in a struggle to change its status.

These harsh components from which the system of Arab-Jewish relationships is formed provide a solid basis in support of the radicalization thesis that is widespread among the Jewish population, Jewish policy makers, and most academic researchers. According to this thesis, the Arabs and Jews are undergoing a historical process of mutual alienation, detachment and potential confrontation. The violent clash will certainly come, and the only question is when. The events of October 2000 presage the coming of the big bang. Both sides are subject to huge historical forces that push them to the extremes. The Arab citizens are undergoing a process of Palestinization and Islamicization that estranges them from the Jews. They are not prepared to acquiesce to their status as an Arab minority in a Jewish state because they percieve themselves as part of a regional majority, and as Moslems they are not ready to accept Jewish hegemony over the land that was conquered by Muhammad's army.

[1] A comprehensive review of Arab-Jewish relations can be found in my article: Sammy Smooha, "Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State", in *Trends in Israeli Society*, edited by Ephraim Ya'ar and Ze'ev Shavit, Tel Aviv: Open University, 2001, pp. 231-364, (Hebrew).

They are also frustrated by the partial modernization that they have experienced, which has raised their expectations without giving them enough opportunities to realize them. They are infuriated by the Israeli occupation, repression, humiliation and killing of their people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

According to the radicalization thesis, ever since the Six Day War the Jews have also been pulled in the direction of the political right wing and the radical right, whose attitude towards the Arabs is more hard-line and less pragmatic than the political left. The Jewish state, like every other modern democratic state that is supposed to moderate and manage conflicts between the majority and the minority, does not fulfill its function properly. Instead of maintaining neutrality, it stands on the side of the Jews, neglects the Arabs and even discriminates against them, and, in addition, it does not educate the two sides in the values of tolerance and coexistence.

The logic and the supporting evidence for the extremism thesis are so convincing that few dare to criticize and oppose it. In the early 1980s I formulated an alternative thesis, which I called the "Politicization Thesis".[2] According to this thesis, there are negative and positive forces acting upon the Arabs and Jews in Israel that create balances and prevent open conflicts between them. The politicization thesis does not overlook the forces distancing Arabs and Jews from each other, which are emphasized by the radicalization thesis, but claims that along with these negative forces, there are also positive forces that soften them, and the outcome is therefore not necessarily crisis and violence as foreseen by the radicalization thesis. The process of politicization strengthens the political awareness of the Arab citizens, their consciousness of discrimination and exclusion, and their fight for equality and peace.

This politicization is nourished by two basic processes that the Arabs are experiencing. One of these processes is an Israelization that binds the Arabs closely to the state and to the Jews in many spheres of life. The other process is the democratization of society and the regime in Israel that allows the Arabs to organize themselves independently, to protest and to conduct an energetic struggle without facing repression and violence by the government and Jews. The Arabs accept Israel not for lack of choice but because they are gradually adapting themselves to life in the country and finding advantages in it, especially high level of development, relatively good welfare services, and democracy. Even the dispute

[2] This thesis appeared for the first time in the book: Sammy Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*, Haifa: The Jewish-Arab Center, University of Haifa, 1984. Since then I have repeated this thesis in various publications.

between Israel and the Arab world has had a positive influence on the relations between Arabs and Jews: the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan give legitimacy to the existence of Israel and to conciliation with it. The Oslo process, despite the setbacks and crises, has also brought about a historical breakthrough of mutual recognition of the national rights of the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, along with a variety of programs to achieve a peace accord between them.

According to the politicization thesis, the processes undergone by the Jewish population with regard to the relations with the Arab citizens are also not too bad. The Jew is learning to distinguish between the Arab citizens and their non-citizen Palestinian brethren across the Green Line. He is more aware of the discrimination that they suffer and is prepared to grant them civil equality. The more the norms of individual rights and equality spread through Israeli society, the more the state is forced to gradually adopt a policy of greater equality towards it Arab citizens.

Each of these two contrary theses, radicalization and politicization, is grounded on empirical evidence. Despite the contradiction between them, there exists a consensus that the rift between Arabs and Jews is deep and fateful to the development of Israeli society. A rift as deep as the one which exists in Israel has brought other countries to civil war and regime collapse.[3] The problematic nature of the Arab minority status is especially significant in light of the fact that the Jews are proud of being the only democracy in the Middle East, and emphasize their high sensitivity to minority problems, because of their own past as one of the most discriminated against and repressed minorities in history.

All this indicates the centrality of the Arab-Jewish rift in Israel and engenders the need for scientific instrument to scrutinize and to follow its course closely and systematically. The new index of Arab-Jewish relations fills this need. It will not decide which of the two theses is correct, nor will it determine the extent to which Jews live up to their high moral standards vis-à-vis the Arabs, or rule whether the Arabs are fulfilling what is

[3] There is extensive literature on this subject. See, among others, the following:
Milton J. Esman, *An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000; Ted Gurr and Barbara Harrf, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
An ongoing follow-up on minorities in the world and the ethnic and national conflicts associated with them is being done in the framework of the Minorities at Risk Project at the University of Maryland (USA). See the Internet website: http://www/cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar, and the bi-annual reports that are published by this research institute. The report for the year 2005 is: Ted R. Gurr and Monty Marshall, *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy,* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005.
The reports also appear on the Internet website: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict.asp

expected of them as citizens. It will, however, produce new data that will challenge public discourse and policy regarding the status of the Arab-Palestinian minority in the Jewish and democratic state.

Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel

The new index was especially constructed for Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. It thus joins the three social indexes that exist today in Israel: the veteran Peace Index (Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University),[4] the National Strength Index (Center for National Security Research, University of Haifa)[5] and the Democracy Index (Israel Democracy Institute).[6] These four indexes, based on public opinion surveys conducted once or more a year, provide an updated picture of central spheres of life in Israel and allow for a follow-up of trends of change in Israeli society.

The Arab-Jewish Relations Index is intended to include two parts. The objective part will be comprised of indicators such as bilingualism of Arabs and Jews, socioeconomic equality, representation in the government, non-discrimination, protest actions, the use of violence, and more. The subjective part will focus on the attitudes of the general public as ascertained in public opinion surveys. Like the Peace Index and the National Strength Index, the new Arab-Jewish Relations Index will include only the subjective part.[7] In its first two years, it was based on public opinion surveys conducted in the autumn of 2003 and in the autumn of 2004.

Four surveys were conducted for the Arab-Jewish Relations Index of 2004. The Arab survey was based on face-to-face interviews with a nationwide representative sample of 700 Arab citizens (including Druze and Bedouin) aged 18 and over. The parallel Jewish survey was based on telephone interviews with a nationwide representative sample of 700 Jews (including settlers, immigrants, kibbutz members and residents of rural communities) aged 18 and over. The interviews with the Arabs were carried out in Arabic by Arab interviewers and the interviews with the Jews were performed in Hebrew or Russian by Jewish interviewers. The sample error was 3.7%. The interviews were conducted on the basis of a standard questionnaire, which included more than one hundred closed questions in various areas. The results of the surveys were weighted by the returns of the Knesset election on January 28, 2003, so the distribution of votes in the surveys and the actual election results are the same. In addition to these surveys of the general publics, face-to-face surveys with public

[4] The Peace Index was first published in 1994. Its directors are Prof. Efraim Ya'ar and Prof. Tamar Hermann. See: http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace.
[5] The National Strength Index was composed in 2000. Its director is Prof. Gabriel Ben-Dor. See: http://nssc.haifa.ac.il.
[6] The Democracy Index appeared in 2003. Its director is Prof. Asher Arian. See: http://www.idi.org.il.
[7] "Sikkuy-The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality in Israel" is developing an Equality Index that includes objective indicators of Arab-Jewish relations. See: www.sikkuy.org.il.

figures were held. The Arab survey included 85 public figures, 36 of whom were affiliated with the Jewish establishment, while 49 had no such affiliation. The Jewish survey included 63 public figures, 32 of whom defined themselves as being right-wing or moderately right-wing, while 31 defined themselves as left-wing or moderately left-wing. Interviews were conducted with public figures holding various public and political positions, including ministers, deputy ministers, Knesset members, heads of local authorities, members of top bodies in political parties and in public organizations, and leading journalists. The same questionnaire served as the basis for the interviews with the general public as well as with the public figures.

Every report on the findings of public opinion surveys of Arab citizens raises a number of questions. Many ask questions such as: Are Arabs willing to be interviewed? Is it possible to conduct face-to-face interviews with Arab women? Do Arabs respond frankly? Do not they say mainly what is expected of them? Are not they afraid to express their true opinion? Do not their responses reflect only their fleeting moods and not their real positions? Are they familiar with the complex issues of their relationships with the Jews and the state and are they able to make fine distinctions among questions on specific points? These questions are not usually posed regarding public opinion surveys of the Jews, because the assumption is that the information they provide is credible. It is true that information received on sensitive matters from minority groups whose loyalty is suspect and who have a relatively low level of education is liable to be of lesser quality than information obtained from dominant and educated majority groups. However, in the Israeli case, experience has shown that data given by Arabs in face-to-face surveys of Arab-Jewish relations are of a fairly good quality and not inferior to the information provided by Jews in telephone surveys.[8]

The main objectives of the Arab-Jewish Relations Index are:

1. To monitor the attitudes of Arabs and Jews regarding the relations between them.
2. To monitor the long-term trends of change in the mutual attitudes of Arabs and Jews.
3. To raise the level of public consciousness of the issues related to Arab-Jewish coexistence.
4. To enrich public discourse on Arab-Jewish relations.

[8] For an examination of the problem of the reliability and validity of Arab public surveys, see: Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel*, Vol. 2, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, Appendix A. The surveys of the Arab-Jewish Relations Index 2003 were accompanied by a methodological research that compared the face-to-face surveys with telephone surveys. Marked differences between the two kinds of surveys were found in the Arab responses. Therefore, the Arab survey for Index 2004 used face-to-face interviews in order to ensure a better quality of data.

5. To expose prejudice.
6. To publicize Arab public opinion.
7. To strengthen democracy.
8. To warn against possible deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations.
9. To provide information for policy-making.
10. To supply a teaching and educational material on the subject of Arab-Jewish coexistence.
11. To assist coexistence organizations.

The surveys examine a wide and varied array of issues in Arab-Jewish relations in order to obtain a comprehensive and detailed picture. They cover the following subjects:

1. Integration (social and cultural).
2. Images (stereotypes, distrust).
3. Alienation (feelings of estrangement between Arabs and Jews and towards the state).
4. Mistrust of institutions.
5. Fear of threats (fears about what Jews and Arabs might do to each other).
6. Deprivation (various forms of deprivation and discrimination against the Arabs).
7. Legitimacy of coexistence (recognition of Arabs' right to live as an equal minority in the state, recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state).
8. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the narrative and the solutions to the conflict).
9. Regional integration (integration of the state into the Middle East rather than into the West).
10. Identity (the relative importance of national, religious and civic identity; the affinity of the Arabs with the Palestinian people and the affinity of the Jews with the Jewish people).
11. Representativeness of Arab leadership (to what extent do the Arab political parties, the Higher Follow-Up Committee, and the Islamic Movement truly represent the interests of the Arabs in Israel).
12. Cultural autonomy.
13. Means of struggle (the degree of agreement to Arab use of general strikes, protest activities abroad, and illegal means of protest).
14. Options for change (regime shift or moderate improvements in the situation of the Arabs).
15. Evaluation of relations (the existing state of relations between Arabs and Jews and expectations for the future).

In addition to these 15 issues, the study examines two central questions. The first deals with the differences in attitude between several groups: between Arab voters for Jewish parties and Arab voters for Arab parties, between Jews who define themselves as right-wing and Jews who define themselves as left-wing, between Arab figures associated with the Jewish establishment and Arab figures who are not associated with it, between right-wing Jewish figures and left-wing Jewish figures, between Arab public figures and their supporters, and between Jewish public figures and their supporters. The second question regards the trends of long-term changes of Jewish-Arab attitudes as measured by a comparison of questions in the 2004 Index surveys with identical or parallel questions in surveys conducted during the years 1976-2003.

The findings of the surveys of the 2004 Index on these issues and questions are detailed below.[9]

[9] The development and the findings of the 2003 Arab-Israel Relations Index are summarized in a separate (unpublished) research report: Sammy Smooha, *A Minority-Majority Relations Index in Deeply Divided Societies and Its Application to Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel*, Final Research Report Submitted to Israel Foundations Trustees, March 2005.

Findings of the 2004 Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel

Integration

Arabs and Jews differ in language, culture, religion, level of secularity, nationality and nationalism, and as a result reject any assimilation between them. They are equipped with all the necessary means to preserve a separate existence and identity such as separate communities, education systems, and families. The question that arises is what degree of integration without assimilation is acceptable to each side. It might be expected that the Arabs would have a greater stake in integration because for them this would mean greater equality and access to resources available to the Jewish sector.

The readiness for institutional integration of Jews and Arabs is enormous, and as expected, it is greater among the Arabs (Chart 1) (Table 1, in which more details are provided about the wording of the question; all the tables are placed in the appendix).



A majority of 89.5% of the Arabs and 68.4% of the Jews agrees with the principle that "Arab and Jewish citizens live together in Israel". The rates of preparedness for integration in various frameworks are over 70% among the Arabs, but lower among the Jews. Although there is no Jewish majority in support of integration in residences, schools and

government coalitions, the percentage of Jews ready for integration in these sensitive areas is nonetheless impressive. For example, 42.5% of the Jews and 80.3% of the Arabs agree that Arab parties participate in government coalitions. The Arabs support participation of Arab parties in government coalitions even though Israeli governments are Zionist and most of the Arabs (69.7%, Chart 4, Table 8) have no confidence in them. In a society in which there is almost complete separation in places of residence and in educational institutions between members of the two peoples, there is certainly some significance to the finding that half of the Arabs reports meeting with Jews frequently, and two thirds of them even have Jewish friends (Table 2).

The large linguistic and cultural gap is bridged by the high proportion of bilingualism in Arabic and Hebrew and by considerable readiness for cultural integration on the part of the Arabs. Four fifths of the Arabs and a quarter of the Jews report knowledge of Hebrew and Arabic. This makes Hebrew the language for basic communication between most of the Arabs and the Jewish majority (Table 3). Three fifths of the Arabs and two fifths of the Jews think that the other side has many good and important values and customs that should be adopted. Over half of those questioned were in favor of creating common values and customs in addition to their own ones. Against a backdrop of contempt for Arab culture, the proportion of Jews who respect it is not negligible. This positive attitude among a fairly large proportion of Jews is surprising, since they tend to denigrate Arab culture as inferior, to be eradicated in Jews hailing from Islamic countries.

Religion, its observance and orientation towards it as a social movement, divides Arabs and Jews profoundly. There is a general agreement between both sides to refrain from mixed marriages.[10] About one third of the Arabs defined themselves as religious or very religious, and the proportion of those returning to religion compared to those becoming secular is 17.2% to 1.2% (Table 4). Even the degree of feeling close to the Islamic Movement is very high: about one third of the respondents are active members, rank and file members, or sympathizers, and the majority of them follow the radical northern faction rather than the southern faction (Table 5). On the other hand, about half of the Jews define

[10] In the 2004 Index the question on this matter was not raised. In the 1995 survey, Arabs were asked whether they would agree that their marriage partner, or the marriage partner of their brother, sister, son, or daughter should be of another religion. A majority of 76.1% objected, 16.1% agreed on certain conditions, and 7.9% agreed. The conditional agreement corresponds to the permission in Islam for a man to take a woman of another religion (but there is an absolute prohibition for a Muslim woman to marry someone of another religion), or that the foreign woman should covert to the religion of her husband. In any case, the percentage of those who would agree without any reservation is not significant. Only 0.9% of those questioned in the survey said that they were married to a person of another faith. One may assume that only a negligible number of them were married to Jews.

themselves as secular, a concept not acceptable by Arabs and one that even arouses their opposition. In addition, among the Jews, the proportion of those becoming secular is greater than those returning to religion.[11]

These and other findings reveal the nature of integration without assimilation between Arabs and Jews. The Arabs are interested in institutional and social integration more than the Jews. Most of the linguistic and cultural adaptation in Israel is done by the Arab minority. The Arabs' willingness for integration means obtaining the option for integration, which is the very lifeblood of a democratic, non-discriminating society**,** and not necessarily having the desire to realize this option. For example, the 70.7% of the Arabs who allow for Arabs living in Jewish neighborhoods desire openness and equality, but in practice only a few of them are prepared to move and live among Jews. Nor can one deduce from the willingness for cultural integration that Israel is a multiculturalist society in which there is equality and mutual respect between the cultures, but only that each side is ready to have partial social and cultural integration while holding on to its own separate culture, institutions and identity.

Image of the Other

The images that each group has of the other shape the relations between them. Negative images, especially those that turn into stereotypes regarding the other group, hinder good relations. It is difficult to fight against images and stereotypes because they have a kernel of truth in them despite their categorical and distorted application to entire groups. They tend to spread through Israeli society because of institutional separation, cultural differences, socioeconomic disparities and ideological disagreements between Arabs and Jews. In order to place strong emphasis on “images” and not on “stereotypes”, the relevant questions in the survey referred to “most of the Jews” and to “most of the Arabs” rather than to the “Jews” and to the “Arabs”.

About half of the Arabs harbor negative images of the Jews. They see the Jews as untrustworthy, as racist, as violent, and as lacking self-respect (Chart 2, Table 6). These are the negative images that reflect Arab fears of the strong and vindictive Jew. In Arabs' eyes, Jewish racism causes discrimination against them. The image of the violent Jew is fed by the continued use of military force against the Palestinians. The Arabs also perceive the Jews as more concerned with personal gain (that is, they are prepared to forgo self-respect for the

[11] In the 1995 survey, the ratio of those returning to and deserting religion among the Jews was 3.7% to 16.1% in comparison with the reverse ratio of 16.1% to 3.7% among the Arabs.

sake of comfort, money and personal advancement) than with their personal honor, in contrast with the Arab sensitivity to honor and shame.



The proportion of Jews who see most of the Arabs as not trustworthy and violent is similar to that of Arabs with a similar view of the Jews. For example, 48.2% of the Arabs and 57.8% of the Jews feel that it is impossible to trust most of the members of the other people. However, less than half of the Jews have additional negative images of the Arabs. Between 35.0% and 39.8% of the Jews think that most Arabs are not intelligent, are culturally backward, and are not law-abiding. Although these numbers are certainly significant, they are similar to those found among the Arabs. It would appear that the Jews have learned, over the years, to distinguish between the Arabs of Israel and Arabs in other places (Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and Arabs in Arab countries) and to attribute less negative qualities to Arab citizens thanks to the Israeli influence.[12]

Although Arabs have more contact with Jews and are more exposed to the internal differences in the Jewish population compared to the exposure of Jews to Arabs, their stereotypes and images are no less negative. This finding should correct the focus on the prejudices of majority groups in the scholarly literature and in the opinion of the

[12] In their book, Bar-Tal and Teichman survey and analyze the stereotypes and prejudices that Jews have on Arabs in general and also to some extent on Arabs in Israel. See: *Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

"enlightened" public, while neglecting the prejudices of the minorities. Even though one might justify this neglect by the fact that prejudices of majority groups are more damaging, good relations between the majority and the minority require that both sides hold realistic images of the other.

Alienation

Mutual alienation is unavoidable because of the distant relations between Jews and Arabs. However, the overall picture is a mixed one, and is not so bleak. If we begin with the brighter points, two thirds of the Arabs feel pride in Israel when it wins a great achievement and only two fifths of them are not satisfied with being Israeli citizens (Chart 3, Table 7). Additionally, a large number of them are willing to have Jewish friends and neighbors. On the other hand, half of the Arabs feel far removed from the Jews and sense themselves as being alien and rejected as Arab citizens in Israel.



Jewish feelings of rejection towards the Arabs confirm and reinforce the Arab sense of estrangement. 73.5% of the Jews feel afar from the Arabs, and 71.8% even refrain from entering Arab towns and villages in Israel, most probably due to fear. In addition, a third of the Jews are unwilling to have an Arab friend, about half of them are not willing to have an Arab neighbor, and more than two fifths are not willing to have an Arab as their work superior. These attitudes of the Jews are not only reflective of the rarity of situations in which

a Jew is subordinate to an Arab in Israeli society. Their objection also seems to derive from their distorted expectations that in a Jewish state, the Jews are entitled to be superior to the Arabs in all spheres, which is an expectation that runs counter to both democracy and Zionism.

Distrust of Institutions

Distrust of state and public institutions is a bad sign for democracy and society. Israelis make clear distinctions between institutions, as evidenced in their varying attitudes towards medical institutions, courts of law, the Knesset and the government.

Medical institutions merit the highest level of trust – only 3.5% of the Arabs and 16.3% of the Jews do not put their trust in them (Chart 4, Table 8). The general public appreciates the state medical insurance, the high medical standards, and the high ratio of doctors per capita in Israel, in spite of complaints about delays, fraud and bribery in medical institutions. Distrust of the courts is much greater, but it affects only a quarter to a third of the



population. Since the administration of the judicial system involves considerations beyond giving professional opinions, it is not surprising that it is less trusted than the medical system. The finding that less than a quarter of the Arabs and a third of the Jews do not trust the law

courts is very surprising, since research shows that there is appreciable discrimination in the law-enforcement system against the Arabs.[13]

Far more serious is the distrust that most of the Arabs and Jews show towards the political system. Over a half to two thirds of them have no trust in the Knesset and the government. There is no doubt that trust in political parties is even lower. The public suspects that politicians and political institutions do not faithfully represent public interests, but rather their own personal, partisan, or sectoral interests.

It is interesting to note that Arab distrust of institutions is not higher, and is even lower, than that of the Jews. This indicates a common "Israelization" that is reflected in the similarity of the services that both sides receive from public institutions. The similarity also shows that Arabs' estrangement from the state is not categorical and indiscriminate, but varies according to how they are treated by various public institutions.[14]

Fear of Threats

A distinct characteristic of deeply divided societies is the spread of mutual fears among the minority and majority. The widespread fears are of violence, loss of property, security risks, the undermining of political and economic stability, law and order violations and activities that subvert the character and territorial integrity of the state. It may also be expected that in a deeply divided Israel, fears will be prevalent, because the Arab minority is perceived as affiliated with the enemy and opposed to the regime.

The frequency and gravity of the threats feared by Arabs and Jews are acute and more excessive than expected. Between 63.5% and 81.0% of the Arabs are afraid of any infringements on their civil rights, of mass land expropriations, violence by the state and by the Jews, annexation of the Triangle to a Palestinian state, and expulsion of a portion of the Arab citizens (Chart 5, Table 9). These fears are fed by memories of the Naqba (the catastrophe that befell the Palestinians in 1948), the military government, the large-scale land confiscations during the first decade of statehood, and the killing of Arabs on the first Land Day in 1976 and the October 2000 unrest.

On the other hand, land expropriations have ceased, the use of physical violence against Arabs has been rare, since 1949 no deportation of Arab citizens has taken place, and

[13] See: Arye Rattner and Gideon Fishman, *Justice for All? Jews and Arabs in the Israeli Criminal Justice System,* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

[14] The surveys of the Index of National Strength show that Arabs give far less trust to the security system (Israel Defence Forces, General Security Service, and the police) than do the Jews. This distrust is a reflection of the lack of trust that the security system has in the Arab citizens.



on the whole, quiet prevails in Arab-Jewish relations. Nevertheless, over three-fifths of the Arabs fear the annexation of the Triangle to a Palestinian state, against the wishes of its inhabitants. This idea has been raised in the media, but it is not part of official policy, nor has it been mentioned as the declared intent of state leaders.[15] The fears of the Arabs reflect their existential dread of rejection and their strong desire to normalize their status in the state.

The Jews feel threatened to the same degree. Between 66.7% and 83.9% of them fear that the Arabs endanger the state because of their high birthrate, attempts to alter the Jewish character of the state, the danger of a popular revolt, possible collaboration with the enemy, and support for the struggle of the Palestinian people (Chart 6, Table 10). Like the fears of the Arabs, Jewish fears are baseless. The proportion of Arab citizens in the population (not

[15] On this matter, see: Ben Caspit and Amir Gilat, "Program for Disengagement from the Triangle", *Ma'ariv*, February 4, 2004 (Hebrew); Uzi Arad, "Swap Meet: Trading Land for Peace", *The New Republic*, November 28, 2005; and Arik Carmon, "Homogeneity? Ethnic Cleansing: The Idea of Excluding Arab Localities from the Boundaries of the State Is Racist and Dangerous", *Haaretz*, December 11, 2005. Encouragement of Arab citizens to leave the country is the idea of Jewish parties of the extreme right-wing such as Kach and Moledet. This idea was presented as part of the proposed solution to the Palestinian question by the leader of the radical right-wing party "Yisrael Beitenu". See: Avigdor Lieberman, *My Truth*, Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Ma'ariv, 2004 (Hebrew).

including the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the Druze in the Golan Heights) has stabilized over the past two decades to only 16% or so, and there is no chance of it doubling in the next two decades, despite of their high birthrate. However, this does not prevent certain politicians from presenting the Arabs of Israel as a demographic bomb.



This "danger" has been trumpeted by the Minister of Finance and former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Herzliya Conference in December 2003 in saying that: "We have a demographic problem – but it is not focused on the Palestinian Arabs but rather on the Israeli Arabs"; "If they integrate well and reach 35-40 percent, the Jewish state will cease to exist and become a bi-national state. If they remain at 20 percent, and even if [their proportion in the population] decreases, relations will be tough, quarrelsome and violent, and will also damage the democratic fabric. Therefore [we] need a policy that will balance these two things".[16] Many politicians, including Prime Minister Sharon, condemned this statement. However, a survey conducted soon after these comments were made showed that 71% of the

[16] *Haaretz*, December 18, 2003.

Jews believed Netanyahu that Israeli Arabs constituted a demographic threat, and 42% thought that his public pronouncement was appropriate.[17]

Other fears of the Jews are likewise exaggerated. The Arab citizens cannot deface Israel's Jewish character so long as the Jews are adamant in preserving it. The fear of a popular revolt is baseless, because Israel is a strong state, and Arab citizens are committed to non-violent democratic struggle. Even the collaboration of Arabs with the enemy was and is minimal, as demonstrated by their non-participation in the wars against Israel and in the two Palestinian Intifadas. Despite of all this, the Jews perceive Arab citizens not as a small and vulnerable minority, but rather as a part of the Palestinian people, the Arab states and the Islamic world, who are considered strong and hostile towards the rights of the Jews and their very presence in the region.

The existential fears felt by the Arabs and Jews severely damage the relations between them. These are very deep, long-standing and enduring fears. Coexistence requires the alleviation of these fears through policy change, declarations by leaders, and educational activities.

Deprivation

In order to give concrete form to the threats that the Arabs felt as a minority, they were asked about their experience of personal deprivation. About one fifth of the Arabs are from refugee families.[18] Being displaced from their villages and towns during the 1948 war, the government declared them to be "present absentees" and confiscated their property. Since most of them came from villages and towns that had been destroyed in the war, they were forced to reside in other Arab localities and to compete with the local residents for land and other resources. These internal refugees are not fully integrated within the communities they joined, and can be regarded as a deprived population group. In spite of the passage of decades since their displacement, they and their descendants still hope for and demand the return to their destroyed villages and towns or at least the receipt of adequate compensation.[19]

Another deprivation relates to ownership and loss of land. About one third of the Arab families do not own land (Table 11). Since most of them live in the Arab sector, they

[17] Ephraim Ya'ar and Tamar Hermann, "Nearly 60% Support Unilateral Disengagement", *Haaretz*, January 7, 2004. (Hebrew)
[18] In the 2004 survey, the proportion of displaced persons was 13.6%, but in all previous surveys it was about one fifth.
[19] Hillel Cohen, "The Internal Refugees in the State of Israel: The Struggle over Identity", *Hamizrah Hehadash*, 43 (2002): 83-101. (Hebrew)

are unable to allocate land to their sons who are of marriageable age in order to build houses. In addition to the landless, over two fifths of the Arab families lost land to the state. They constitute about three fifths of all the Arab families who once owned land. In other words, most of the Arab families who owned land suffered from expropriation. Because of this massive confiscation of land, only 3.5% of state land was left in Arab ownership and they have control over only 2.5% of the land under municipal jurisdiction. The state rarely allocates land to Arabs for municipal and economic development, and does not set up new Arab villages and towns, except those for resettling the Bedouin. This policy exposes the extreme sensitivity of the Arabs to land and the resentment they feel towards the state for its large-scale land expropriations.

Arabs were asked whether they suffer personally from discrimination and other offensive acts by the state or by the Jewish public. About two fifths reported on discrimination against them as Arabs by state institutions or Jews in stores, workplaces, places of entertainment, public transport, police stations and government offices (Table 12). In addition, 19.4% had also encountered personal discrimination as Arabs, suffering threats, humiliation, or beatings from Jews. It is interesting to note that in responding to the same questions, 18.0% of the Jews reported that they had personally, as Jews, been subjected to threats, humiliation, or beatings by Arab citizens (not by Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza). Given the fact that the adult population consists of six Jews to every Arab, the percentage of Jews attacked by Arab citizens is much larger than the percentage of Arabs attacked by Jews. This finding is evidence not only of the fears of Jews but also that the Arab minority itself, is not a submissive minority, does not acquiesce to an inferior status and is not afraid to attack Jews.

The Arabs were also asked whether they had been harassed by the authorities or whether their livelihood had been adversely affected because of their protest actions over the past three years. Only 3.1 % of the Arabs reported that the authorities had harassed them and 1.9% said that their livelihood was adversely affected because of protest actions (Table 13). About one-seventh of them, however, were afraid that protest actions on their part would lead to harassment by the authorities and badly affect their livelihood. Young Arab men express more fears than others. The large gap between injury in practice and fear of injury indicates effective surveillance over the Arabs. Since surveillance is selective, and neither sweeping nor random, but is aimed at “troublemakers” and not at the population in general, it works well as a deterrent.

There is also an appreciable disparity between the extreme threats that the Arabs feel as a collective and their personal experiences of discrimination, offenses, political harassment and economic suffering. This disparity shows that the Arabs feel much more satisfied and secure as individuals than as a group. In spite of the discrimination and deprivation that they suffer as a minority group, they manage to get along in Israeli society. Their greatest fears center upon their rights and achievements as a minority group. As a national minority, they feel restricted and threatened by the character, ideology, aims, and policies of the Jewish state.

In conclusion, a high degree of estrangement exists between both sides. The Arabs desire integration. They are proud of the great achievements of the State and are satisfied with their Israeli citizenship. The Jews are willing to allow the Arabs to become integrated in certain spheres, but do not want them in Jewish schools, in Jewish neighborhoods and in government coalitions. The impediments that inhibit Arab integration and good relations with Jews include negative images, basic distrust, existential fears, painful discrimination and personal offenses.

Legitimacy of Coexistence

The most important of all the issues under dispute between Arabs and Jews is the question of the legitimacy of coexistence. This is a difficult question for both sides as the Arab minority is part of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation that fought for decades against the establishment and existence of the Jewish state. Do the Arab citizens accept Israel's right to exist? Do they recognize its right to be a Jewish state? Do they acquiesce to its Zionist aims? The questions put to the Jews are: Do Jews accept the right of an Arab minority to exist among them? Do they recognize the right of a national Arab-Palestinian minority to exist with equal rights?

For Arabs, the question of Jewish legitimacy is divided into three parts: the legitimacy of the very existence of the State of Israel, the legitimacy of a Jewish and democratic state, and the legitimacy of a Zionist state. From the survey it appears that the Arabs accept the existence of the state and its character as a Jewish and democratic state, but deny its legitimacy as a Zionist state. An overwhelming majority of 84.9% of the Arabs agree that “Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as an independent state in which Jewish and Arabs live together” (Chart 7, Table 14). The phrasing of this question and other questions on the legitimacy of Israel as an independent state shows that the Arabs recognize this right on condition that Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders (they totally negate the idea

of Greater Israel) and allows them to continue living in it. The acceptance of Israel as a state by its Arab citizens is much more significant than the recognition of the fact of Israel's very existence or the viewing of Israel as a *fait accompli* that must be conceded to, as in the case of Egypt and Jordan that signed peace treaties with Israel. For most of the Arab citizens, this means that they want to be a part of Israel and do not share the dream of the non-Israeli Palestinians and Arabs in Arab countries that Israel will disappear from the map.



The second and intermediate degree of legitimacy in the eyes of Arab citizens is the acceptance of the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state as it proclaims itself to be. Most of them do recognize this right. A solid majority of 70% is of the opinion that "Israel has the right to exist within the Green Line as a Jewish and democratic state in which Jews and Arabs live together" (Table 15). This recognition is also conditioned upon the withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 borders and on allowing them to live in it as citizens.

The third and maximal degree of legitimacy is the acceptance of Israel as a Zionist state. The Arabs reject this right. Only a small minority of 13.8% think that "Israel has the right to exist within the Green Line as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state in which Jews and Arabs live together" (Table 16). They experience Zionism as a form of discrimination and exclusion against them. Most of the Arabs in the survey deny the right of Israel to be a Zionist state. While 96.5% of the Jews insist that "Israel must maintain a Jewish majority",

only 24% of the Arabs agree that “Israel is justified in maintaining a Jewish majority”. Most of the Arabs label the Zionist movement, the Zionist ideology and the Zionist state as racist. For example, a large majority of 72% says that: “Israel, as a Zionist state in which Jews and Arabs live together, is racist” (Table 17).

The fact that only a few Arabs negate the right of existence of the state, and that most of them accept it as a Jewish and democratic state, is remarkable and worth noting. This Arab recognition was given four years after the unrest of October 2000 and despite the continuation of the al-Aqsa Intifada with which the Arabs identify. It seems that the Arabs have come a long way towards recognizing not only the political and territorial integrity of the State of Israel, but also its character as a Jewish and democratic state. However, this recognition is restricted to Israel within the Green Line, and is denied to Israel as a Zionist state. By recognizing Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, Arab citizens have crossed the high threshold of the legitimacy of coexistence. Crossing the next threshold to the recognition of Israel as a Zionist state appears to be impossible for most Arab citizens, except for the Druze and some of the Christians and Moslems.

It appears that the Arabs make a clear distinction between a Jewish state and a Zionist state. In their view, a Jewish state has a Jewish majority and a Zionist state has a Law of Return to preserve and increase the Jewish majority. In a Jewish state, the Jews are a numerical majority, while a Zionist state is the state of the entire Jewish people (the Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora). In a Jewish state, there is equality between Jewish and Arab citizens, while in a Zionist state, extra rights are granted to the Jews. A Jewish state develops the country for the benefit of all its citizens, while a Zionist state holds a settlement policy that leads to the Jewish settlement in all parts of the country and to the marginalization of the Arabs. In a Jewish state all the citizens determine the fate of the country while in a Zionist state the right of Arabs to participate in fateful decisions on state's borders, character and objectives is denied. For this reason, the Arabs respond in the negative to every question in the survey in which the word “Zionism” appeared in any form. For them, “Zionism” is discrimination, rejection, racism, and exclusion. This is a word that is so highly charged that it is nearly impossible to conduct a dispassionate dialogue between Arabs and Jews on the meaning and implications of Zionism for their lives in Israel.

From the Jewish viewpoint, there is no value in the Arab distinction between a Jewish state and a Zionist state and in their acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state. The Jews want Israel to exist and to be accepted as a Zionist state by its Arab citizens, as it is recognized by the world at large. For them, the Arabs are dissident because they reject Zionism. The Jews

expect the Arabs to consent to being a minority in a state whose the character is and will be determined by the Jews as the dominant majority group. The Jews do not see the difference between Israel as a Jewish and democratic nation-state and any other Western nation-state, because in every nation-state it is the majority that determines the language, culture, symbols, laws and policies of the state, and this involves no contradiction with democracy.[20] The Supreme Court expressed this view in one of its rulings: "The existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people does not negate its democratic character, just as the Frenchness of France does not negate its democratic character".[21]

The non-distinction or opposition to the distinction between "a Jewish and democratic state" and "a Zionist state" can clarify the public debate over the constitution for Israel. In September 2004, the Israel Democracy Institute, the initiator of a "constitution by consensus", conducted a representative survey of Arabs in Israel, which found that 77.4% of those questioned reported that they would vote for "a constitution that defines Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and ensures the Arabs full equal rights" in a referendum. Rouhana rejects the constitution proposal, claiming that it was formulated without the participation of the Arabs and without their consent, and that it imposes and perpetuates a non-democratic regime ("a Jewish and democratic state") on the Arabs. He interprets the finding of the survey in the following manner: "One way to understand this finding is that an Israel which promises full equality to the Arabs will essentially be a democratic state, and will be Jewish because of the existence of a Jewish majority in it that will determine its character. This finding should not be confused with the acceptance of Israel as essentially a Jewish state (or the state of the Jewish people), which enjoys some democratic characteristics". According to this interpretation, the Arabs accept Israel as a Jewish state, but not as a Zionist state ("a Jewish state in essence"). In order to strengthen this interpretation, Rouhana presents data from a survey conducted by Mada – the Arab Center for Applied Social Research, which clearly shows that the Arabs negate the characteristics of Israel as a Zionist state, and gives his explanation and inference as follows: "The wider consensus provided by the survey of Israel Democracy Institute, and the additional data supplied by Mada-Al-Carmel, help in arriving at a valid interpretation of the findings: If Israel annuls the

[20] In their book, Jakobson and Rubinstein present Israel as a Jewish and democratic state that in every respect resembles a Western nation-state, while minimizing or ignoring its Zionist character and goals that are aberrant and non-commensurable in comparison with every other Western nation-state. See: Alexander Jakobson and Amnon Rubinstein, *Israel and the Family of Nations: A Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights,* Jerusalem: Shocken, 2003. (Hebrew)

[21] The Supreme Court, "Election Appeal No. 1/88", *Piskei Din*, Vol. 42, Pt. 4, pp. 177-197, 1988. The quotation is from p. 189.

Law of Return, stops Jewish immigration, accepts responsibility for the refugee problem and recognizes the Palestinians' right of return, provides full equality to the Arab citizens on a long series of issues and becomes a state of all its citizens, then most of them will be prepared to accept the definition of the state as 'Jewish and democratic'".[22] According to this explanation, the Arabs will be ready to accept Israel as a Jewish state if it stops being Zionist.

However, Rouhana and most of the Jews and Arabs participating in the debate over the constitution and in public discourse on the character of the state are not prepared to distinguish between a Jewish state and a Zionist state. Indeed, objectively speaking, it is difficult to make this distinction because the Zionist characteristics are prevalent and inherent within the Jewish characteristics. Jews refuse to make the distinction because it is easier for them to justify the Jewish character of the state than its Zionist character. The overriding principle in the "Constitution by Consensus" of the Israel Democracy Institute, for example, is the establishment of the regime as a Zionist state, above and beyond a Jewish and democratic state. The Arab spokespersons in the debate do not make the distinction since they reject Israel not only as a Zionist state but also as a Jewish state, because if Israel does what is demanded of her by Rouhana it will even cease being a Jewish state (by annulling the Law of Return and granting the right of return to Palestinian refugees).[23] Instead of a Jewish and democratic state, most of them and their post-Zionist supporters want a bi-national state and only a few of them prefer a civic, liberal, individualistic democracy.[24]

In this context, two reactions should be mentioned regarding the findings of the 2004 Index on the issue of Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state. Rubinstein welcomes the finding that the Arabs recognize this right, even though this does not imply recognition of Israel as a Zionist state.[25] By contrast, Rekhess sees

---

[22] Nadim Rouhana, "Constitution by Consensus: Consensus of Whom?" *Adalah Electronic Bulletin* No. 7 (November 2004): 1-6, quoted from pp. 4-6 (Hebrew).

[23] The lack of this distinction appears not only in the article by Rouhana but also in the response by the Israel Democracy Institute to the article and counter-response of Rouhana. See Amir Abramovitch, "'Constitution by Consensus" – Including, of Course, the Consent of the Israeli Arabs: Reponse to the Article 'Constitution by Consensus: Consensus of Whom?' by Prof. Nadim Rouhana", *Adalah Electronic Bulletin* No.8 (December 2004): 1-2 (Hebrew); Nadim Rouhana, "The Jewish Institute for Ethnic Democracy", *Adalah Electronic Bulletin* No.9 (January 2005): 1-2 (Hebrew).

[24] Kimmerling, for example, is prepared to accept Israel as a Jewish state only at the diminished declarative level. For the text of "Constitution by Consensus" with explanations, see: The Israel Democracy Institute, Constitution by Consensus: Proposal of the Israel Democracy Institute directed by Judge Meir Shamgar, Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2005 (Hebrew), http:www.idi.org.il/hebrew/article.asp?id=2668; for criticism in the Arab-Jewish connection, see: Baruch Kimmerling, "A Constitution that Will be a Laughingstock", *Adalah Electronic Bulletin* No.9 (January 2005): 1-5 (Hebrew); Hassan Jabarin, "Collective Rights and Conciliation in the Establishment of a Constitution: The Israeli Case", *Adalah Electronic Bulletin* No.12 (April 2005):1-8. (Hebrew)

[25] Amnon Rubinstein, "Door to Hope", *Du-Et* 7:16 (Hebrew),

the distinction as artificial and casts doubt on its relevance. He explains that the acceptance of the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state means "a state in which the religion of the majority is Jewish and no more", and that "concession and de facto recognition of the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. The data reflect the accommodation of the Arabs to an established fact that does not seem liable to change".[26] He finds support for this stance in the lack of distinction between a Jewish and Zionist state among the Arab elite.

If these narrow interpretations by Rouhana and Rekhess of the finding of the 2004 Index, and the parallel index of the Israel Democracy Institute, that the Arabs accept Israel's right of existence as a Jewish and democratic state only because of the fact that the Jews are a demographic and religious majority, or by force of realistic circumstances and no more, how is one can explain the finding that most of the Arabs agree that "the refugees should receive suitable compensation and be permitted to return only to a Palestinian state"? (This finding will be presented below). It seems that there is a certain component of legitimacy that the Arab public is gradually adopting out of a sense of realism and not from any systematic ideological thinking that characterizes Arab elites.

From a Jewish viewpoint, the question of the legitimacy of the Arab minority is divided into two parts: civic legitimacy and national legitimacy. Civic legitimacy means that the Jews recognize the rights of the Arabs to live in the State as a minority with full civil rights, while national legitimacy means recognition of their right to be a national Palestinian minority with an explicit affiliation to the Palestinian people. Most of the Jews accept the civic legitimacy but not the national legitimacy of the Arabs. The recognition of the civic legitimacy of the Arabs is reflected in the fact that a majority of 75.4% of the Jews agree that "Arab citizens have the right to live in the State as a minority with full civil rights" and a majority of 68.1% agree that "equality should exist between Jews and Arabs with regard to individual rights, government budgets, and opportunities for education and employment" (Chart 8, Table 18).

However, the civic legitimacy that the Jews grant the Arab minority is a conditional one. The proportion of Jews who agree to allow Arabs to vote in Knesset elections is only 65.5%, to be appointed as ministers only 48.8%, to live in any residential quarter only 38.4% and to buy land wherever they want only 32.2% (Chart 9, Table 19). The Supreme Court has

[26] Elie Rekhess, "Separation of the Jewishness of the State from its Zionism is No Novelty", *Du-Et* 7:16-17 (Hebrew).

ruled against restrictions on residence and land acquisition,[27] but the Jewish public thinks otherwise.



Moreover, more than half of the Jews favor giving a certain preference to Jews over Arab citizens, and three-quarters are in favor of giving preference to Jews in the development of the Galilee (Table 20). The political intolerance of the Jews reaches its peak when 55.9% of them agree that the state should outlaw the Hadash Party, even though this is officially a veteran Arab-Jewish party that works on behalf of Arab-Jewish coexistence.[28]

[27] The Supreme Court, 6698/95, Adel and Iman Ka'dan vs. Israel Land Authority, Ministry of Construction and Housing, The Tal-Iron Local Council, the Jewish Agency for Eretz Israel, Katzir-Cooperative Association for Communal Settlement in Samaria, Ltd. and the Union of Farmers in Israel, Given on March 8, 2000. In order to overturn this decision of the Supreme Court, MK Handel presented a law proposal that permits the establishment of settlements of up to 500 families for one national entity (meaning Jewish families) only. The proposal, which was opposed by the government and defined as racist by the left-wing parties, failed to pass in a vote of 38 to 40 (*Haaretz*, December 2, 2004).

[28] A number of Arab associations keep track of Jewish racism and discriminatory policies in Israel and publishes annual reports on this matter. See, among others, the report of the Sikkuy Association, www.sikkuy.org.il; *Jewish Racism 2004*, Mossawa Center, http://www. mossawacenter.org/he/reports/2004.06/040601.pdf; Mada, *Annual Report, Israel and the Palestinian Minority 2004: Mada's Third Annual Political Monitoring Report*, by Nimer Sultany.



The other and more demanding degree of legitimacy of coexistence is Jewish acceptance of the Arabs as an Arab-Palestinian minority with national rights. Most of the Jews negate the national rights of the Arabs. Only 44.5% of the Jews agree that "the land between the Jordan River and the sea is the common homeland of Arabs and Jews" (Chart 10, Table 21).



Only a minority of 31.7% of the Jews agree that "Arab citizens have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights, whether they accept or do not accept the right of Israel to be a Jewish state". Similarly, a large majority of 80.8% of the Jews identifies with the view that "an Arab citizen who defines oneself as a 'Palestinian Arab in Israel' cannot be loyal to the state and its laws". A large majority of 80.4% of the Jews also accepts the view that "in the decisions regarding the character of the state and its borders, there should be a majority among the Jews, and a majority of all the citizens is insufficient". From these and other positions it appears that the Jews regard Israel as their homeland and demand exclusive national rights over it, and therefore they are prepared to grant the Arabs civil rights and the rights of a linguistic, cultural and religious group, but not national rights. From the Jews' viewpoint, the Arabs' right to exist as an equal minority is conditional upon their renunciation of their national rights to the country, the severance of their loyalty to the Palestinian people, their recognition of the exclusive national rights of the Jews to the state, and their acceptance of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, which is a fulfillment of the Zionist aims.

The balance of the legitimacy of coexistence is a mixed one. The Arabs took a big stride in recognizing Israel as a separate state and as a Jewish and democratic state, but this recognition still does not conform to the Jewish view that Israel is and should be a Zionist state. The Jews give qualified acceptance to the Arabs – as a civic minority but not as an Arab-Palestinian minority that is entitled to feel and act as an integral part of the Palestinian people and that has the right in a democratic state to oppose the Zionist goals of Israel.[29]

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Arab minority was formed by the Jewish-Palestinian conflict and still constitutes an inseparable part of it. This dispute is and continues to be the deepest controversy between the Arab and Jewish citizens. Both sides have different narratives and solutions to the dispute, and each side sees itself as the victim and the other as the aggressor.

The Arab-Israeli narrative resonates with the Palestinian narrative, while the Jewish narrative is Zionist. According to the Palestinian narrative, the Jews are colonial settlers who settled in Palestine to which they have no rights, dispossessed the Palestinians and turned

[29] See the analysis of the group rights of the Arabs in Israel: Ilan Saban, "The Group Rights of the Arab-Palestinian Minority: What Is and Is Not and the Taboo Area", *Iyunei Mishpat* 26 (1) (2002): 241-319 (Hebrew); Amal Jamal, "On the Morality of the Collective Rights of the Arabs in Israel", *Adalah Electronic Bulletin* No. 12 (April 2005): 1-9 (Hebrew).

them into refugees, and set up a racist Jewish state at the expense of the Palestinian people. On the other hand, according to the Zionist narrative, the Jews have historic and religious rights to the Land of Israel. They fled from European anti-Semitism, returned to their homeland, and developed the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants. They encountered vehement rejection and violence by the Palestinians, but managed to survive and established a Jewish and democratic state, leaving open the option of a separate Palestinian state.

These narratives still deeply divide the Arabs from the Jews in Israel. A majority of 70% of Arabs and Jews think that the other side is the one mainly to blame for the prolonged Jewish-Palestinian dispute (Table 22). Between two-thirds and three-quarters of them blame the other side for the Naqba.[30] But these findings also have another meaning, which is that a quarter to a third of each side rejects the narrative of their own people. It seems that there has been some erosion in these national narratives and that there is a growing acceptance of the idea that both sides are responsible and to blame for the blood-shedding conflict between them.

The Arabs and Jews are sharply divided on the solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most of the Arabs in Israel, under the influence of the Communist Party starting in the early 1970s, have adopted the idea of the partition of the country into two states, but most of the Jews were opposed to this settlement until this decade. The issue of the partition of the country in order to obtain peace was and still is the main bone of contention between the right-wing and the left-wing parties. The right wing has ruled the state in most of the years since the political upheaval of 1977 and obtained support for most of its ideas, including Greater Israel, the settlements in Judea and Samaria, and united Jerusalem, the no-return to the 1967 borders and the non-establishment of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel. This ideology was based on the conception that the Palestinians would not come to terms with a Jewish state and that Israel could exist only by military force and an alliance with global superpowers. The Oslo accords were a historical breakthrough in which the Government of Israel and the heads of the PLO recognized the national rights of the other side, accepted the principle of partition and agreed that the dispute would be settled by negotiation rather than through violence. But the Oslo accords were denounced by the right-wing as illegitimate because they were not supported by a Jewish majority, and the Rabin government did not have the political power to stop the building of settlements or to

[30] On the Naqba in the collective memory of the Palestinians and the Arabs in Israel, see: Hillel Frisch, "Ethnicity or Nationalism? Comparing the Nakba Narrative among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza", *Israel Affairs* 9, 1-2 (2003): 165-186; Ahmad Sa'di, "Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity", *Israel Studies* 7, 2 (Summer 2002): 175-198.

dismantle them, and to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians. The political impasse continued and in the summer and autumn of 2000, the peace process received two heavy blows – the breakdown of the Camp David talks towards a permanent agreement between the government of Barak and the heads of the Palestinian Authority, and the outbreak of the second Intifada, which was more violent and destructive than its predecessor. Casting full blame for this upon the Palestinians drove the Zionist left to deep disappointment with the Palestinians and to the spread of the belief among the Jewish public that Israel had no Palestinian partner for the peace process, that it was necessary to use force to halt the terror, and that Israel should disengage from the Palestinians unilaterally. The right-wing governments headed by Sharon instituted "a policy of unilateral disengagement" evident in the military repression of the intifada, the building of a fence, the pullout from Gaza without negotiation, and the refraining from peace talks with the Palestinians. The Jewish public supported the right-wing bloc, but under the influence of the disengagement policy of the right-wing government its position shifted to the center and even towards the left. The second Intifada made the Jews feel disgusted with the Palestinians to an extent that they were willing to pay a considerably higher price for disengagement from them. As long as the Intifada continued, the Jewish public was prepared to make more territorial and political concessions to the Palestinians in order to disengage from them, this without being convinced of the justice in the Palestinian position on the dispute and without wishing to reconcile with them.[31]

The surveys clearly show that in 2004 most people on both sides accept the solution of two states for two peoples, and agree that the return of the refugees will be restricted to the Palestinian state only, and that no claims by both sides will be made after the peace agreement between them (Chart 11, Table 23). This is an important agreement. On the one hand, there is still disagreement, but not polarization, over borders, the division of Jerusalem, the demilitarization of the Palestinian state and the separation fence.

[31] The changes in the position of the Jewish public are well reflected in the "Peace Index" since 1994 (see the Internet website of the Index: http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace). For a discussion with a historical perspective on the peace process, see: Baruch Kimmerling and Yoel Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. On the trends of change in the positions of the public, see: Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003*, Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2003; Jacob Shamir and Michal Shamir, *The Anatomy of Public Opinion*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000.



For example, only one-tenth of the Arabs, compared with three-quarters of the Jews, are in favor of the separation fence. The Arabs are opposed to the separation fence because in their view this is not a security fence but a wall that separates them from their people, dispossesses more Palestinians from their lands, and makes it difficult to establish a Palestinian state in the territories beyond the 1967 borders. A side issue of the dispute, but one which is central for the Arabs in Israel, is the transfer of some of the Arab localities in the Triangle to the future Palestinian state in order to reduce the Arab minority and to meet the need to compensate the Palestinians with land in exchange for the annexation of three settlement blocs across the Green Line but adjacent to it by Israel. Only 14.2% of the Arabs and 48.2% of the Jews supported this arrangement.[32] It is surprising that there is no Jewish majority in favor of this idea. It seems that many Jews who are aware of the strong opposition of the Arab population and leadership see this option as impractical and unfair.

The findings on the attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indicate a growing pragmatism among Arabs and Jews and a rapprochement between them in the consolidation of the narratives and finding solutions to the conflict.

Regional Integration

[32] No differences were found between the inhabitants of the Triangle and other Arabs on this issue. The Arabs see this as a national issue and not a regional one. If the Arabs of the Triangle are annexed to the West Bank, the Arab minority will be reduced and weakened. In addition, this arrangement will constitute a dangerous precedent to additional unilateral measures by the state that will impair the rights of the Arabs in Israel.

Israel sees itself as a Western state and projects that image to the world. The Western image of the Jews is supported by the stable and democratic regime, the post-industrial economy, the high standard of living, and the modern lifestyle.[33] For this reason, the Arab world denounces Israel as a foreign body and an imperialist beachhead in the Middle East. Many preach that Israel should integrate itself within the region in order to achieve peace and reconciliation with the unfriendly Arab environment.[34] However, such an undertaking would be very problematic because of the gaps in the level of development between Israel and its neighbors are enormous. In addition, if Israel were to become integrated in the Middle East system after entering an era of peace, it is bound to compete for regional hegemony and to arouse the opposition of Egypt, Syria and other states. Also, certain forces, both in Israel and in Arab states, are liable to oppose the integration of Israel within the region because of a lack of interest or fear of loss of culture and identity. However, it seems natural that the Arabs in Israel would enthusiastically support this possibility as it would balance their conflicting commitments to Israel and the Arab world, and because it would offer them the role of intermediaries and assistants in realizing this integration. They have an interest in a certain Arabization of Israel and in weakening its ties with the West by integrating it into the Arab region.[35]

The Jews, as expected, insist on the need to integrate with the West. A majority of 80.5% support total integration with the West against integration with Arab and Islamic countries in the region, and 66.3% prefer cultural integration in Europe-America than in the Middle East (Table 24). We would have expected differences among population groups. For example, that the ultra-orthodox (Haredim) and the Oriental communities (Mizrahim or Sephardim) would be less supportive of the cultural integration of Israel into the West. But no significant differences were found based on religious observance or ethnicity. This finding

---

[33] There is a profusion of statements by prominent Zionists and Jewish leaders against the integration of the Jews and Israel in the region, expressing fears of cultural deterioration that might be caused by immigration from eastern countries. Eban wrote, for example: "So far from regarding our immigrants from Oriental countries as a bridge toward our integration with the Arabic speaking world, our object should be to infuse them with an Occidental spirit, rather than to allow them to drag us into an unnatural Orinetalism", Abba Eban, *Voice of Israel*, New York: Horizon Press, 1969, p. 76. See declarations in this spirit by Jabotinsky and Ben Gurion in: Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 88.

[34] Nissim Rejwan holds this stand. See for example: Nissim Rejwan, *Israel's Place in the Middle East: A Pluralist Perspective*, Gainesville, FA: University Press of Florida, 1998.

[35] For a discussion of Israel's strong orientation towards the West and its not very Western character, see: Sammy Smooha, "Is Israel Western?", in *Comparing Modernities: Pluralism versus Homogeneity: Essays in Homage to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt,* edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg, Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005. On the subject of the role that the Arabs of Israel can play in the era following the achievement of peace with the Arab world, see: Sammy Smooha, "Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society", in *In the Name of Security: Sociology of Peace and War in Israel in a Changing Era*, edited by Majad al-Haj and Uri Ben-Eliezer, Haifa: Haifa University Press, 2003, pp. 455-488. (Hebrew)

indicates a commitment to the West that cuts across population groups of Jewish Israelis, and which derives from a variety of causes and considerations.

It is most interesting and curious that a small majority of the Arabs actually agree to integration into the West – 53% support cultural integration, and 57.5% support total integration. As with the Jews, this support for cultural integration with the West cuts across the different population groups. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the instability and suffering caused by the al-Aqsa Intifada has increased the estrangement of the Arab citizens from the region, and they, too, like the Jews, see the advantages of Israel's integration into the West. The support of the Arabs for Western integration is also strengthened by their perception of the West as more egalitarian, and therefore Israel's integration into it may ensure them greater equality.

Arabs and Jews are closer in their attitude toward the regional integration. The orientation and policy of Israel to increase its integration with the European Union and the United States are given wide support by the Jews and also receive increasing support from the Arabs in Israel. This seems to imply a significant softening in the ideological dispute between the two sides.

Identity

People in developed countries, all the more so in the West, have multiple identities and enjoy the freedom to develop certain identities in preference to others. This study addresses only the identities that are relevant to Arab-Jewish relations and disregards universal identities such as gender, age, generation, health (illness and disability), social status, religiosity, location (regional residence), and sexual orientation. It focuses on civic, religious and national identities.

Jewish Israelis enjoy convergent identities. They are Israeli by citizenship, Judaic by religion, Jewish by nation, and Zionist by ideology. These are the overlapping identities that are compatible with each other because the Jews are the dominant majority, Israel is a Jewish and Zionist state, and even if most of the Jews are not Orthodox, they do not have any religion other than Judaism. Population surveys clearly show that most of the Jews in the country identify themselves as Israeli, are proud of being Israeli and intend to live in Israel and not to emigrate from it. Most of them also observe a number of customs and traditions of Judaic origin such as circumcision, holidays and even fasting on the Day of Atonement. The surveys also find that a large majority of Jews identify themselves as belonging to world

Jewry, are proud of being Jews, their Jewishness is important to them and they feel a sense of brotherhood and common fate with the Jews in the Diaspora. The memory of the Holocaust of European Jewry is a unifying factor among most of the Jews in Israel. The surveys also point to the Zionist dimension in the Jewish worldview, as confirmed by their desire to preserve Israel as a Jewish state with a large and stable Jewish majority, a Hebrew language and culture, Jewish symbols and a strong affinity with Diaspora Jewry.[36]

This congruence of identities does not mean that the Jews do not have an identity conflict. On the contrary, they fight over the relative importance of their common identities. Since Zionist ideology is the unifying hub of Israeli Jewish identities, every variation or trend of change in it is an "identity forming" factor. Post-Zionism and anti-Zionism place almost exclusive emphasis on Israeli civic identity,[37] left-wing Zionists stress Israeli identity, while right-wing Zionists emphasize Jewish identity, and right-wing religious Zionists give precedence to their Judaism and its commitment to the settlement of Judea and Samaria. The main rift is between leftists, secularists and Ashkenazi Jews, who place the Israeli identity before the Jewish identity, and rightists, Orthodox Jews and Mizrahim who place the Jewish identity before the Israeli identity.[38]

The question arises whether the Israeli civic identity of the Jews that incorporates within it the components of Jewish religion, Jewish nationality and Zionist ideology allows them to maintain relations of coexistence with the Arabs. There is no doubt that this kind of identity estranges the Jews from the Arab citizens. However, there has been a trend since the beginning of the 1980s of a weakening of these components in identity. The historical processes which the Jews in Israel have been undergoing are globalization, growing

---

[36] On this subject see: Bernard Susser and Charles S. Liebman, *Choosing Survival: Strategies for a Jewish Future*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Uri Farago, "The Jewish Identity of Israeli Youth, 1965-1985", *Yahadut Zmanenu: Yearbookl for Theory and Research* 5 (1989): 259-285 (Hebrew); Yair Oron, *Jewish Israeli Identity: A Study of the Attitudes of Teaching Cadets in all Educational Tracks towards Contemporary Jewry and Zionism*, Tel Aviv, Sifriat Hapoalim, 1993 (Hebrew); Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn and Elihu Katz, *A Portrait of Israeli Jewry: Beliefs, Observances, and Values among Israeli Jews 2000: Highlights from an In-Depth Study Conducted by the Guttman Center of the Israel Democracy Institute for the AVI CHAI Foundation,* Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2002, also found in the website: www.d-say.com/guttman; Michal Shamir and Asher Arian, "Group Identity and the Elections of 1996", in *The Elections in Israel – 1996*, edited by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 1999, pp. 57-83 (Hebrew); Stephen Sharot, "Jewish and Other National and Ethnic Identities of Israeli Jews", in *National Variations in Jewish Identity: Implications for Jewish Education*, edited by Steven Cohen and Gabriel Horenczyk, Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1999, pp. 299-316.

[37] On the post-Zionist approach and its opponets, see Tuvia Frilling (ed.), *Reply to a Post-Zionist Colleague*, Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot Publications, 2003 (Hebrew); Ephraim Nimni (ed.), *The Challenge of Post-Zionism – Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics*, London: Zed Books, 2003.

[38] For a discussion of identity differences and public discourse between Jewish population groups, see: Yoav Peled and Gershon Shapir, *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Baruch Kimmerling, *The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military,* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001.

secularism, Westernization, Americanization, individualization, the privatization of society and state institutions, de-ideologization, and a significant increase in a consumer and material culture.[39] Thus the Israeli Jew has become less Jewish, less Judaic, and less Zionist. This universalization of the Jews creates an arena in which participation and cooperation with Arabs is feasible. However, the intensity and implications of these processes should not be over-exaggerated.[40] First, the decrease in the particularistic Jewish-Judaic-Zionist identity is still very small. Secondly, it is significant only for a certain segment of the Jewish population – Ashkenazim, leftists, secularists and members of the upper classes. Thirdly, it is these Westernized Jews who are most estranged on the personal level from the Arabs in their way of life, ways of thinking and social status, apart from their ideological development.

Like the Jews, Arab citizens also have a complex identity with an Israeli component, a pan-Arab component, a Palestinian component, and a religious component. But unlike the Jews, the Israeli-civic component does not conform to the national component (the pan-Arab and Palestinian) or to the religious component, because Israel is not an Arab or Islamic state. The Israeli component in the identity of the Arabs is highly disputed among scholars. Rouhana presents the approach in which the Israeli component stands in reverse relation to the Palestinian component, and evaluates it as weak, instrumental and non-emotional for the Arab citizen.[41] On the other hand, according to my approach the connection between the two components is loose, so that they can concur or can change independently of each other.[42] Apart from this dispute, there is agreement that the Palestinian component is the important and that it has strengthened since 1967.[43]

The 2004 Index shows that Arabs and Jews are indeed deeply divided on the national ideology that shapes their identities as Israeli citizens. The Jews are mostly Zionist, as 80.0%

---

[39] See: Sammy Smooha, "Changes in Israeli Society – after Fifty Years", *Alpayim* 17 (1999): 239-261 (Hebrew); Maoz Azaryahu, "'McIsrael?' On the Americanization of Israel", *Israel Studies* 5 1 (2000): 41-64.

[40] Excessive exaggeration of this kind can be found in the interpretation of Charles Liebman and Yaacov Yadgar who see in these developments the processes that most weaken the Israeli, Jewish, religious and Zionist identity of the Jews in Israel. See: Charles Liebman and Yaacov Yadgar, "Israeli Identity: The Jewish Component", in *Israeli Identity in Transition*, edited by Anita Shapira, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004, pp. 163-183; Charles Liebman, "Jewish Identity in the United States and Israel", in *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond*, edited by Zvi Gitelman, Barry Kosmin and András Kovács, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003, pp. 291-316.

[41] See: Nadim Rouhana, "Accentuated Identities in Protracted Conflicts: The Collective Identity of the Palestinian Citizens in Israel", *Asian and African Studies* 27, 1-2 (1993): 97-127; Nadim Rouhana, *Identities in Conflict: Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

[42] Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel, Vol. 2*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

[43] See Elie Rekhess, "Processes of Political-Nationalist Change among the Arabs in Israel as Background to the Events of October 2000", in *Or Testimonies: Seven Professional Opinions Presented to the Or Commission,* edited by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar and As'ad Ghanem, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 2003, pp. 13-49 (Hebrew).

of them define themselves (Table 25). Prominent among the non-Zionists (16.1%) and the anti-Zionists (2.7%) are two population groups: Russian immigrants who came during the years 1989-1999 (47.6% and 2.9% respectively), and the ultra-Orthodox (34.1% and 9.4% respectively). But these two groups will almost certainly become more Zionist as time passes. If the Jews were asked who they were, they would not present their Zionist identity, because most of the Jews in Israel take Zionism for granted and are unaware of their Zionism. Zionist identity is aroused in Jewish consciousness when faced with criticism and attacks against Zionism, such as the 1975 United Nations resolution that Zionism is a form of racism, the new anti-Semitism in the West, the shattering of myths by the post-Zionists, and the non-Zionist and anti-Zionist expressions and actions by the ultra-Orthodox and the Arabs, which the Jews see as insulting (such as, for example, refraining form singing the national anthem at official ceremonies). It surfaces whenever public figures react sharply to ignorance of Israeli history or to indifference to Zionist ideology by Jewish youth.

When Jews are asked to choose their most important identity, 42.5% choose nationality ("being a member of the Jewish people"), 29.8% choose citizenship ("being an Israeli citizen") and only 24.1% choose religion ("belonging to the Jewish faith") (Chart 12, Table 26). Even though these three identities are compatible and mutually-reinforcing, this ranking reflects a considerable secularization of Israeli Jews and the strong influence of Zionism that assumes Jewish national unity and sees all Jews as a single, united people world-wide, rather than as a collection of unrelated communities with a common religion. The population groups that select religion as their most important identity are the ultra-Orthodox (57.3%), the Orthodox (50.6%), the right-wingers (37.5%), the traditionalists (34.0%) and the Mizrahim or Sephardim (30.6%) (Table 27). By contrast, those who opt for Israeli identity as the most important identity are the secularists (55.7%), left-wingers (57.6%) and Ashkenazim (40.4%). All population groups show a more or less similar affinity to Jewish nationality.

Arabs can find common ground with a small minority of Jews (left-wingers, secularists, Ashkenazim) for whom Israeli citizenship is the most central one, but only on condition that these Arabs consider their civic identity as the most important one and keep silent about or muffle their rejection of Zionism because most of these Jews are Zionist. Although, as can be expected, the Arabs are not Zionist, it is interesting to note that 62.2% of them define themselves as "non-Zionist" and only 32.1% as "anti-Zionist" (Table 25). This ratio of 2 to 1 is a clear sign of understanding, by a significant number of Arabs that they

must cope with what the Jews regard as their national liberation movement and central identity.



In response to the question which of the three identities is the one most important to them, 47.6% of the Arabs choose religion, 25.9% choose Palestinian nationality, and 24.1% choose Israeli citizenship (Chart 12, Table 26). While for the Jews, there is considerable overlapping between being a citizen of the State of Israel, belonging to the Jewish faith, and being a member of the Jewish people, for the Arabs, being Israeli, Moslem and Palestinian are identities of wider, non-overlapping populations. The Arabs are attracted to religion as an identity anchor twice as much as the Jews, and its power of attraction as identity-forming is equal to the power of attraction of Palestinian nationality. The Arabs differ to a considerable degree in their most important identity. Those who have the highest Israeli civic identity are voters for Jewish parties, the non-religious, the Druze and the Christians (Table 28) Those who have the lowest national Palestinian identity are vote for Jewish parties, the Druze and Galilee Bedouins. Religion is the strongest identity among most of the Arab population groups (except the Christians), and is especially strong among the supporters of the northern faction of the Islamic Movement and Galilee Bedouins. It is clear that only a small proportion of the Arabs can share a common civic identity with a small proportion of the Jews.

The Arabs were asked to choose one identity out of nine that were composed from various combinations of “Arab”, “Palestinian” and “Israeli”. Two combinations emerged as the most popular ones: “Palestinian Arab in Israel” which gained 38.3% and “Israeli Arab”

which received 22.9% (Chart 13, Table 29). When these labels are grouped into three categories, it appears that the non-Palestinian Israeli identity (Arab, Israeli, Israeli Arab and Arab in Israel) (45.1%) and the Palestinian-Israeli identity (Palestinian Israeli, Palestinian in Israel, Arab Palestinian in Israel) (45.0%) are the most common and most attractive identities, while the non-Israeli Palestinian identity is marginal (8.6%). These instructive figures clearly show that the Israeli dimension in the identity of the Arabs is most central because it is shared by all of them. They also indicate the problematic nature of Palestinian identity, which nearly half of the Arabs refrain from declaring.



The fact that only one half of the Arabs chose Palestinian identities derives mainly from Jewish rejection. A majority of Jews (80.8%), as compared with a very small minority of Arabs (13.7%), thinks that "an Arab citizen who defines oneself as an 'Palestinian Arab in Israel' cannot be loyal to the state and its laws" (Table 30). At the same time, most of the two sides agree that the identity of "Palestinian Arab in Israel" is appropriate for most of Arab citizens. The Jews see Palestinian identity as linked to the enemy and subversive, so that attributing it to the Arabs is a way of expressing distrust of them. The rejection of Palestinian identity by the Jews and their fear of it deter Arabs from espousing it. Jewish negation of Palestinian identity turns it from being the normal identity of a national minority into an identity that is threatening and controversial in Jewish eyes and is detrimental to Arab-Jewish relations.

The two sides are deeply divided on the affiliation of the Arabs in Israel to the Palestinian people. Most Jews see Arab citizens as more similar in way of life and behavior to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip than to the Jews, and fear that the Arabs would be more loyal to a future Palestinian state than to Israel (Chart 14, Table 31). Nevertheless, more than half of the Jews (53.1%) recognize the Arab citizens' right to conduct a struggle on behalf of the Palestinian people as long as they do not break the law. Most Arabs disagree with Jews on these questions. They think that they resemble the Jews in their lifestyles and will be loyal to Israel. Most importantly, only 11.9% say that they are willing to move to a Palestinian state despite the fact that a half of them feel closer to the Palestinians than to the Jews (Table 32). Actually the rate of Arabs ready to move to Palestine is even lower because many who say so intend to express protest only and not a real wish to immigrate.



In summary, Israeli identity constitutes a common denominator for Arabs and Jews. It is relatively stronger in both groups. By contrast, the Zionist identity of the Jews and the Palestinian identity of the Arabs constitute impediments to normal relations because Arabs see Zionist identity as racist while Jews see the Palestinian identity they attribute to the Arabs as a sign of disloyalty. As long as hostile relations continue to exist between Israel and the Palestinians, it will be difficult to normalize Zionist identity in Arab eyes and Palestinian identity in Jewish eyes.

Representativeness of Arab Leadership

Changes in the leadership of the Arabs in Israel were already noticeable in the mid 1960s when the Communist Party split, and the Rakah party was established under Arab leadership. During the 1970s the heads of Hamulas disappeared as political representatives and were replaced by Arab nationalist leaders within and outside the Arab-Jewish Rakah Party. By the beginning of the 21st century, many Arab public organizations already active in the Arab sector provided a wide arena for the activities of nationalist and independent Arab leaders. Some of them continued to act in organizations and in Jewish parties, but they also became independent and critical in their views. Four Arab parties ran in the 2003 Knesset elections, and they obtained 70% of the Arab vote and eight mandates in the Knesset. The Jewish parties elected three more Arab Knesset members. In addition, the Higher Follow-Up Committee, the highest Arab body composed of all the most important Arab leaders (excluding the Druze) ran various subcommittees in 2005, convened at regular times, discussed and endorsed decisions on vital matters, called for general strikes and protest actions, published declarations, and actively represented the Arabs before the authorities and the Jewish majority.[44]

The Arab leadership is a highly controversial issue between Arabs and Jews. Many Jews see the Arab leaders as radical persons who incite and cause harm, and therefore have to be restricted and controlled. The authorities adopted various measures to check the activities of Arab leaders who they consider extremist. Steps were taken to prevent the Balad Party, and its leader Azmi Bishara, as well as the leader of Ta'al, Ahmed Tibi, from running in the 2003 Knesset elections. The Or Commission accused three Arab leaders of incitement in the unrest of October 2000.[45] The court indictment of five of the top leaders of the northern faction of the Islamic Movement ended in January 2005 with a plea bargain and convictions.[46] The charges and insults traded between Arab Knesset members and Jewish Knesset members from the radical right-wing reached extreme levels during the time of the al-Aqsa Intifada.

---

[44] See: Yitzhak Ritter and Reuven Aharoni, *The Political World of Israeli Arabs*, Bet Berl: Center for the Study of Arab Society in Israel, 1992 (Hebrew); As'ad Ghanem, *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel*, 1948-2000: *A Political Study*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001; Shany Payes, *Palestinian NGOs in Israel: The Politics of Civil Society*, London: I.B. Tauris Academic Studies, 2005.

[45] Or Commission, *Report: State Investigation Committee to Examine the Clashes between the SecurityForces and Israeli Citizens in October 2000,* 2 vols., Jerusalem: State Printer, 2003.

[46] *Haaretz*, January 12, 2005.

The surveys of the 2004 Index show that, on the whole, the Arabs trust their leadership. A three-fifths majority of the Arabs consider the Arab political parties, the Higher Follow-Up Committee, and the Islamic Movement to be true representatives of the Arabs in Israel (Chart 15, Table 33). The Islamic Movement receives a high degree of representativeness in spite of the fact that it is a sectarian and not an all-Arab body, and even though it gets low marks in representation from the Christians (112.7%), the Druze (20.4%), and Arabs who feel closest to Jewish parties (Labour – 38.5%, Meretz – 40.0%, Likud – 25.0%).[47]



The Jews were asked just one question about the representativeness of the Arab leadership because most of them are not familiar with Arab parties and organizations. More than half of them (54.3%) thought that Arab parties faithfully represented Arab citizens. While this attitude was a positive one in the case of the Arabs who were questioned, it had a negative significance in the case of many of the Jews. This is evident from the finding that of all the Jews who considered the Arab parties faithful representatives of the Arabs, 64.4%

[47] 45.2% of the non-religious Moslems think that the Islamic Movement represents the Arabs in Israel well. This is not a low percentage, but is smaller than the percentage of all Moslem Arabs (66.8%) who think so.

were in favor of outlawing the Hadash Party even though it was a veteran Arab-Jewish party, and 79.1% were in favor of banning the Islamic Movement.[48]

Cultural Autonomy

The Arabs in Israel have their own religious courts, the Moslem endowment (Waqf), schools, local authorities, and separate radio and television channels. These are state bodies that are staffed by Arabs and that are meant to serve Arabs, but the state and the Jews control them. The authorities are afraid lest truly independent Arab self-rule might empower the Arabs and impel them to launch a disruptive national struggle. The Council of Higher Education has rejected all requests by the Arabs to establish an Arab university. The Arabs desire cultural but not territorial autonomy, yet their parties and movements do not place these demands at the center of their struggle in order to avoid provoking the authorities.[49]

As expected, nearly all the Arabs who were questioned thought that "The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational and cultural institutions" and that "the state should recognize a top body that Arab citizens will choose to represent them" (Chart 16, Table 34). The election, by Arabs, of a body to represent all the Arabs and only them is commensurate with the election of a separate parliament for Arabs. The legality of this step, if it is done without explicit legislation by the Knesset, is questionable.

It is therefore surprising to find that between a little less than half to two-thirds of the Jews are in favor of cultural autonomy for the Arabs, including the election of a supreme Arab body that will control Arab schools and set up an Arab university on a par with existing universities in the country. This significant consent on the part of Jews reflects a mixture of naiveté, misunderstanding of the issues, a wish to separate from the Arabs, but also a frank recognition of the rights of the Arabs to cultural autonomy. In other words, we have here not a consistent ideological position but a mélange of contradictory considerations. A detailed examination of the data supports this explanation. It reveals that there is no consistent connection between the readiness to grant cultural autonomy to the Arabs and a more liberal attitude towards them. Thus, for example, 60.3% of the Jews who agree to the election of a

[48] The question of representativeness of the Arab leadership will be dealt with below in the discussion of the results of the comparison between the attitudes of the Arab public and the attitudes of Arab public figures.
[49] For a comprehensive discussion and review of the literature on this subject, seeL Sammy Smooha, *Autonomy for the Arabs in Israel?* Bet Berl: Center for the Study of Arab Society in Israel, 1999 (Hebrew); Sammy Smooha, "Cultural Autonomy for Arabs in a Jewish and Democratic Society", in *Dilemmas in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel*, edited by Yitzhak Ritter, Jerusalem: Schocken, 2005, pp. 97-108 (Hebrew).

top representative Arab body and 63.7% of those opposed to it are in favor of outlawing the Hadash party. Also, differences were not found between the percentage of right-wing Jews (54.5%) and the percentage of left-wing Jews (57.9%) who agreed to the election of a



representative Arab body. Even at the leadership level, the data from a survey of Jewish public figures show that there are no differences in attitudes on this issue, and that most of the leaders on the right and on the left are opposed to granting cultural autonomy to the Arabs. However, the picture is more complicated, because among the general public, the left-wing Jews are more supportive of the independent administration of Arab institutions and the establishment of an Arab university.

In any event, the authorities reject the various autonomous arrangements for the Arabs because they perceive them as serious threats to national security and to the Jewish-Zionist character of the state. This is the reason why we must treat this issue as a grave dispute that continues to divide Arabs and Jews in spite of the apparently positive attitude of the Jewish public.

Means of Struggle

There are three kinds of minority politics: parliamentary politics using means such as voting and litigation, extra-parliamentary politics employing means such as demonstrations and strikes, and non-legal politics that make use of means such as subversion and violence.

The more radical, illegal and violent the means that are used, the more dispute and disunity they create. Democracy is an important tool for conflict management in deeply divided democratic societies. It allows the taking of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary measures, but forbids the use of illegal actions. The fact that extra-parliamentary means are democratic does not necessarily mean that they are also effective, consensual or harmless to relations between a minority and a majority.

Israeli democracy serves as the main tool for regulating differences and disagreements between Arabs and Jews. For many years, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Arab minority used the strategy of working within the democratic ssystem in order to effect change. Clearly, democratic strategy emerged from the collective memory of the Naqba of 1948 and nineteen years of military rule, the lack of viable non-democratic methods, efficient control over the Arab minority and a sharp asymmetry in the balance of power between Jews and Arabs. The killing of thirteen Arab demonstrators by the police in October 2000 undermined the trust of the Arabs in Israeli democracy, but the appointment, public hearings and the report of the Or Commission partially restored Arab confidence. Later (after the surveys for the 2004 Index were conducted), this trust was once again severely damaged by the September 2005 decision of the Department for the Investigation of Policemen within the Ministry of Justice to close the investigation files against the policemen who had shot and killed Arab demonstrators in October 2000. This was done for lack of sufficient evidence, but the Attorney General decided to continue with the investigation under the pressure of Arab public opinion.[50] Certain Arab politicians weaken Arab trust in Israeli democracy by the indiscriminate use of the slogan "Israel is a democracy for the Jews and Jewish for the Arabs".[51] In addition, Arab academic figures and others belittle the trust in democracy by describing Israel as an "ethnocracy", that is to say, a non-democracy with a false democratic façade.[52]

Against this mixed backdrop, one should ask to what extent the Arab citizens support democratic means in their struggle to improve their standing in Israeli society. It is worth noting that 58.6% of the Arabs were in agreement that "Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is a democracy for the Arab citizens as well" (Chart 17, Table 35).

---

[50] See the news, reports and articles in the newspaper *Haaretz* from September 19, 2005 until the end of that month.

[51] See: Ahmed Tibi, "Democratic toward Jews and Jewish toward Arabs – a Conversation with Ahmed Tibi", *Bitterlemons-International*, Edition 24, Volume 2, June 24, 2004.
http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=45

[52] See: As'ad Ghanem, Nadim Rouhana and Oren Yiftachel, "Questioning 'Ethnic Democracy': A Response to Sammy Smooha", *Israel Studies* 3, 2 (1999): 253-267.



Furthermore, 83.9% supported the use of persuasion, pressure and voting for the sake of advancing their causes, means that are considered the very lifeblood of parliamentary politics. The high level of Arab confidence in parliamentary democracy is in line with two previous findings – the support of 80.3% of them toward the participation of Arab political parties in government coalitions (Table 1) and the recognition by 70.0% of them in Israel's right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together (Chart 7, Table 15).

The proportion of Arabs in favor of extra-parliamentary politics ranges from a quarter to three-quarters. These figures are not much higher for reasons of inefficiency rather than illegitimacy. Certain measures such as protests abroad and the boycott of Knesset elections would have been given more support and justification had they not been seen as unwise due to arousing counter-reactions and estrangement from the Jewish side. A small but not negligible minority of the Arabs favors the use of illegal demonstrations (12%) and violence (4.0%).

The participation of Arabs in protest actions and commemorative events is certainly impressive. The proportion of Arabs who report participation is 26.5% in legal demonstrations and processions, 25.5% in Land Day events, 16.0% in al-Naqba events, and 4.1% in illegal demonstrations and violent processions (Table 36). The participation of young male Arabs is significantly higher. These high proportions are a clear indication of

politicization, mobilization and activism on the part of the Arabs in their struggle for equal rights and peace. State authorities permit Arab protest. The Or Commission censured the police for its mishandling of the Arab protest of October 2000 and for provoking Arab riots. The Commission also called upon the police to institute reforms in the structure of its forces and their deployment in order to respect the basic rights of the Arabs to protest and to avoid violent confrontations in the future.

Two thirds of the Jewish public approved of the use of parliamentary politics by Arab citizens, but about two thirds rejected the use of extra-parliamentary politics (Chart 17, Table 35). The Jews naturally object to the use of illegal means by the Arabs. Most of the Jews believe that democracy works on behalf of the Arabs and agree that the Arabs should be given civil and political rights (Table 18). However, the political tolerance of the Jews is limited, as is evident from their readiness to ban the Hadash party and the Islamic Movement, which they perceive as being subversive. The Jews were shocked and terrified by the Arab uprising of October 2000. They accused the Arabs of illegal activities, violence and the violation of their basic duty, as citizens of the state, to preserve law and order.

Although the issue of the legitimacy of the means of struggle does not polarize Arabs and Jews, it continues to be divisive.

Options for Change

There are two main ways to study options for change in the relations between a majority and a minority. The radical way is to examine alternative types of regime. If the current regime is an ethnic democracy (Israel as a Jewish and democratic state), then the alternative regimes may include a bi-national state, a liberal democracy, an Islamic state, a Palestinian state in all of Palestine, and other possibilities. The moderate way to examine the question is to find out which measures will reduce the disputes between the minority and the majority within the existing framework without regime change. These methods are not revolutionary but are significant enough to lessen the conflict and to ameliorate the status of the minority. The Index surveys made use of both methods.[53]

It would be wrong to interpret the Arabs' recognition of the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state as if this were their preferred option. The correct meaning of this

[53] For an extensive discussion on the alternatives for regime change and the reorganization of Arab-Jewish relations, see: Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappe (eds.), *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel*, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999 (Hebrew); Shlomo Hasson and Khaled Abu-Osba (eds.), *Jews and Arabs in Israel in a Changing Reality: Problems, Trends, Scenarios and Recommendations*, Jerusalem: Florsheimer Institute for Policy Research, 2004 (Hebrew).

recognition is that they are prepared to come to terms with a regime of this kind. Their preferred option would undoubtedly be a bi-national state in which Arabs and Jews would be members of two equal peoples, Israel would cease being a Jewish state, and the Arabs would discard their minority status.[54] The expectation that this model of a state would serve them best is confirmed by the consent of 89.8% of the Arabs against 16.6% of the Jews that "Israel will cease being the state of the Jews and become a state of two peoples" (Chart 18, Table 37). On the other hand, the Jews want a Jewish and Zionist state, and reject bi-nationalism. The need and vision to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Zionist state is the driving force behind the consolidation, at the beginning of this century, of a Jewish majority in favor of two states for two peoples; that is, the understanding that it would not be possible to annex the West Bank and Gaza to Israel and to have a Jewish and democratic state.

Chart 18. Percentage Agreeing to Regime Shifts



The other genuine option is to turn Israel into a liberal democracy, in the spirit of the suggestion that "Israel will be a democratic state for all its citizens without any relation to the Jewish people and the Jewish religion". But this phrasing was apparently misunderstood by the Arabs and the Jews. The overwhelming majority of the Arabs (88.6%) supported this

[54] See the discussion by Nadim Rouhana on the possibility that Israel within the Green Line would become a bi-national state, "The Option of a Bi-national State", in *Seven Roads: Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel*, edited by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappe, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999, pp. 243-269 (Hebrew).

radical regime change. They were attracted to the idea of a state without nationality or religion, because such a state would be better than a Jewish state. A neutral state would also conform to the slogan, suggested and disseminated by the Balad Party, of a "state for all its citizens".[55] However, liberal democracies, such as France and the United States, impose a single language and a single public education system, deny collective rights to minorities, and produce high rates of intermarriage and social and cultural assimilation. Had the Arabs understood and internalized the meaning and implications of a liberal democracy, it is not clear whether they would have preferred it to an enhanced ethnic democracy.[56] Even the Jews did not interpret the question correctly. It may be assumed that of the Jews who supported this option (44.5%), the majority meant a state without religious coercion but one that is still Jewish.

A large two-thirds majority of the Arabs rejected the radical option of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine instead of Israel. This is because they accept the right of Israel to exist as an independent and separate state, and also to some extent as a Jewish and democratic state. It appears that the elimination of Israel is not viewed as a desirable option by the Arabs in Israel.[57]

At the same time, a majority of three-fifths to three-quarters of the Jews rejected the radical option of a transfer of the Arab population to other countries or the transformation of Israel into a "democracy of a master race" (Herrenvolk democracy) by denying political rights to the Arab citizens. But the proportion of those supporting these extreme measures

---

[55] Ilana Kofman,"Options of an Israeli State", in *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel,* edited by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappe, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999, pp. 201-241 (Hebrew).

[56] MK Tibi is well aware of this matter and therefore he usually attacks the slogan "a state for all its citizens" raised by his parliamentary rival Bishara. In a speech to the Knesset he demanded that the Arabs of Israel be recognized as a national minority, and explained: "Not a 'state for all its citizens' as most of you tend to think, which emphasizes the rights of the individual more than the rights of the collective, but if you so wish it 'a state for all it nationalities'. We, the representatives of the Arab minority in Israel, cry out against the superiority and humiliation. Let there be no more talk of victors and vanquished, of cultural threats and of cultures threatened. Let there be no more lordly Israeli arrogance, but conversation at eye-level, with the pride of one people towards another, a national majority to a national minority, a real, frank partnership without dictates and a lack of self-respect", quoted by Yair Ettinger, "Thus We Recognized the Collective Arab Identity", *Haaretz*, February 10, 2005. It is difficult to say from these words whether Tibi demands recognition for the Arabs as a "national minority" in a Jewish state, or a bi-national regime in a non-Jewish state.

[57] The survey did not pose the question of a single federal bi-national state in all the territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. See the discussion on this option: As'ad Ghanem, "A Bi-national State, Israeli-Palestinian, on all the territory of Eretz Israel/Falastin and the Place of the Arab Citizens of Israel in this System", in *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel*, edited by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem, and Ilan Pappe, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999, pp. 271-303 (Hebrew); Tamar Hermann, "The Bi-National Idea in Israel/Palestine: Past and Present", *Nations and Nationalism* 11, 3 (2005): 381-401.

(43.4% and 23.4% respectively) is striking for a state that takes pride in being Jewish and democratic.[58]

At a time when there is bitter controversy between Arabs and Jews regarding the change from the existing regime to a bi-national regime, they agree to steps that will bring both sides closer through moderate changes within the existing setup of a Jewish and democratic state. It should be especially noted that there is a majority among the Arabs (62.5%) and among the Jews (68.4%) for the option that "Arab citizens will enjoy democratic rights, receive their proportional share of the budgets and manage their religious, educational and cultural institutions by themselves" (Chart 19, Table 38). This means that the Arabs would be prepared to accept Israel as a democratic state if they are given greater equality with the Jews as well as control over their separate institutions (that is, the Israeli regime should be raised to the level of an enhanced ethnic democracy).[59]



[58] See the discussion of these non-democratic options: Muhammad Amara, "The Option of 'Rigid Status Quo': A Significant Worsening in the Status of the Arab Minority in Israel: Retreating from Democratic Dimensions and Approaching a Violent Crisis", in *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel*, edited by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappe, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999, pp. 123-154 (Hebrew); Rassam Hamaisi, "The Option of Separation: Irredentism or Transfer for the Arabs of Israel and their Significance", in *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel*, edited by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappe, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999, pp. 155-199 (Hebrew).

[59] For a discussion of the option of an enhancement of the Jewish and democratic state, see: Ilan Saban, "The Borderline Option of the Zionist Paradigm", in *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel*", edited by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem, and Ilan Pappe, Givat Haviva:The Institute for Peace Research, 1999, pp. 79-121 (Hebrew).

In addition, the Arabs and the Jews agree on a series of steps to reduce conflict between them. To the demand of the Jews that "Arab citizens should fulfil a duty of any kind of service to the state", 54.7% of the Arabs responded positively. Most of the Arabs (59.0%) concur with Jewish expectations that "Arab citizens should accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state". At the same time, over half of the Jews (51.9%) concur with the demands that "the state should grant Arab citizens lands or proper compensation for the lands expropriated from them as it is used to do with Jewish citizens", and about two- thirds (64.6%) agree that "the state should make it required by law that names of all streets and localities be written on signposts in both Hebrew and Arabic".

However, both sides are divided on the necessary steps to reduce tension between them. The state authorities and the Jewish public reject the Arab demand that "The state should allow displaced Arab citizens (internal refugees) to restore their destroyed villages as much as possible" (92.2% of the Arabs were in favor; the Jews were not asked this question but the assumption is that they and the state authorities would totally oppose such a step).[60] Only a small minority (12.3%) of the Jews agree to the wish of the Arabs that "the state should change its symbols, such as the flag and anthem, to enable Arab citizens to identify themselves with them".[61]

The recommendations of the Or Commission are steps for improving the relations between Arabs and Jews. The Or Commission was set up under the pressure of Arab public opinion in the wake of the October 2000 unrest, during which twelve Arab citizens and one Palestinian non-citizen were shot to death. This was the first state Commission of Enquiry established on an issue that centered upon the Arab minority, indicating a turning point in the long-standing policy of state disregard of complaints by the Arab population. After three years of work, the Commission presented a two-volume report in which it provided an analysis of the causes for the uprising, the course of events, the behavior of all those involved (the police, government ministers, the Arab leadership, and so forth), a series of personal recommendations regarding those who bore responsibility, and a number of recommendations for policy change. The Commission's report received government approval, and a ministerial committee was established to implement its recommendations.

---

[60] Support for this assumption is the fact that the state has not allowed the displaced residents of Biram and Ikrit to reconstruct part of their destroyed villages even though the Supreme Court and no small portion of the establishment itself were in favor of this step. See: Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, *Ikrit and Biram: The Full Story* (Surveys on the Arabs in Israel, No. 10), Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1993 (Hebrew).

[61] For the discussion in the Constitution, Legislation and Law Committee of the Knesset on a series of proposals for changing the state anthem in order to conciliate the Arab citizens, see: Shahar Ilan, "The Soul of a Jew Yearns", *Haaretz*, July 7, 2005.

Despite the criticism against the report by various members of the Arab sector, the attitude towards it was more positive than negative. The great disappointment came after the publication of a report by the Department for the Investigation of Policemen, which explained the circumstances and reasons that led to the closing of all the investigation files against the policemen who were involved in the shooting of Arab demonstrators, a decision that ran contrary to the recommendations of the Or Commission. However, as stated previously, it was decided under the pressure of Arab public opinion to continue with the investigation.

The Or Commission did not limit itself to the investigation of the events of October 2000 but also strove in its recommendations to bring about a change in government policy towards the Arab minority and in Arab-Jewish relations. Despite the widely publicized recommendations of the Commission, only a third of the Arabs and a third of the Jews said they had sufficient knowledge regarding the Commission, and about a third of the Arabs and half of the Jews considered the Commission as important (Table 39). The Jews were asked if they agreed with the recommendations of the Or Commission. Between two-fifths and two-thirds of them supported the recommendations that the guilty policemen should be found and brought to justice, that basic changes should be made in government policy towards the Arabs, that the guilty parties should be denied public office, and that substantial and urgent measures should be taken to bridge the gaps between Arabs and Jews (Table 40). On the assumption that the Arabs agree with the recommendations of the Commission, they were asked to evaluate the chances for their realization. Only about half of the Arabs estimated that these recommendations would actually be carried out (Table 41).

The options for change in Arab-Jewish relations are in dispute but there are certain moderate steps that each side is prepared to take to reduce the tension and conflict.

Evaluation of Relations

The evaluation of government policy towards minorities and the state of minority-majority relations can give us an insight into the depth of the rift and the chances for bridging it. Government authorities and the public must recognize the severity of the minority problem before a policy shift can be made and before change can lead to any fruitful results.

The Index surveys show that the general public in the state is well aware of the fact that Israel is a deeply divided society, that Arab-Jewish relations are bad, and that there is

discrimination against Arabs.[62] Only 4.0% of the Arabs and 21.6% of the Jews thought that the state treated the Arabs and the Jews equally (Chart 20, Table 42). But they differ on their estimate of the level of existing discrimination: 57.6% of the Arabs compared to 33.8% of the Jews blamed the government for treating the Arabs as second-class citizens or as hostile citizens that do not deserve equality. These are serious charges and complaints that indicate a severe problem.



A majority on both sides evaluate the present state of Arab-Jewish relations as bad. The evaluations of the Jews are more negative than those of the Arabs (81.9% compared to 56.4%) (Table 43). About half of each side share in the estimation that the relations will worsen even more during the next five years, with the Jews slightly more pessimistic (Table 44).

[62] In the surveys for the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations, no questions were posed regarding the quality of relations between other population groups in Israel. On the other hand, in the Democracy Index, the responders were asked to evaluate the relations between Orthodox and secular, Mizrahim and Ashkenazim, immigrants and veterans, poor and rich, in addition to the relations between Arabs and Jews. The evaluation of most of the responders was that the relations between the Arabs and Jews were not good, and that they were worse than the relations between other population groups. See: Asher Arian, David Nahmias, Doron Navot and Daniel Shani, *The Israeli Democracy Index 2003*, Jerusalem: Guttman Center, The Israel Democracy Institute, 2003, p. 24.

The brighter aspect of these gloomy assessments and expectations is that the Jews recognize the gravity of the Arab minority problem and do not delude themselves that it will disappear over time. This awareness will moderate the opposition of the Jewish public to a positive change in policy towards the Arabs if and when the government decides to do so.

Controversial Issues among the General Public and Public Figures

So far the discussion has centered upon the differences in attitude between the Arabs and the Jews, with no attention paid to the differences within each group. The intention was to sharpen the picture and to expose the various controversial issues between Arabs and Jews, apart from the internal differences in viewpoints. We shall now turn the focus from the differences between the groups to the differences within each group. The assumption is that the greater the intra-group differences are, the smaller the significance of the inter-group differences will be, and polarization will be prevented thanks to the intermediate positions that allow for dialogue and compromise between the two sides.

The discussion of the internal differences will be done on two levels: on the wider general public level and on the public figures level. The general public and the public figures will be divided into two groups according to their political orientation. This four-group division will allow for a comparison of attitudes regarding key issues in Arab-Jewish relations. Through this comparison it will be possible to discern not only the controversies among the public and within leadership, but also to clarify the degree of resemblance between the attitudes of the leadership and those of the public groups.

The Arab Public and Arab Public Figures

Division into groups

In accordance with the procedures of the survey of the general Arab public, a leadership survey was carried out in which 85 Arab public figures were interviewed. They were chosen from among the representatives of the two factions within the Arab minority: those who are oriented towards the Jewish establishment and those who are not oriented towards it. Those who are oriented towards the Jewish establishment included 36 public figures who had served as Knesset members in Jewish political parties, as heads of Arab municipalities known for their affiliation with the authorities, Arabs members of the higher echelons in Jewish political parties, and other Arab public figures identified with the Jewish establishment. The leadership group which was not oriented towards the Jewish establishment included 49 public figures that held high positions in Arab political parties, the Islamic Movement and the Sons of the Village Movement. The most senior public positions

were held by Knesset members, Arab mayors, members of the higher echelons of political parties and Arab movements, media analysts, and others.[63]

A comparison between the two Arab leadership groups validates their affinity with different political factions. In response to the three questions regarding political orientation, 55.6% of the public figures affiliated with the Jewish establishment (hereinafter the "establishment public figures") responded that they were the closest to the Jewish political parties, 33.3% would vote for Jewish political parties in the next Knesset elections, and 36.1% voted for Jewish political parties in the 2003 Knesset elections, while the rest chose not to respond, but none of them indicated any affinity to Arab parties (Table 45). More than a third of them are Druze (22.2%) or of Bedouin descent (13.9%) (Table 46). Only a few of them sympathize with the Islamic Movement or are members in it, and two-thirds of them are university graduates. By contrast, public figures not affiliated with the Jewish establishment (hereinafter "non-establishment public figures") did not report affinities with Jewish political parties and did not vote for them, but only for Arab parties. There were no Druze among them, and only a few were of Bedouin descent, but about a quarter of them said they were members of displaced families. About a quarter of them defined themselves as religious and a quarter declared they were sympathizers, rank and file members, or active members in the Islamic Movement. 85.7% of them were university graduates. The two groups were also distinguishable in reporting on personal experience with discrimination and participation in protest actions. The percentage of non-establishment public figures had a higher rate of reporting of personal or family suffering (Table 47) and of personal involvement in public protests on behalf of the Arab minority (Table 48).

The general Arab public was also divided according to political orientation. The key used for classification was the question for which political party the respondent was intending to vote in the next Knesset elections. All 148 Arabs who indicated they would vote for a Jewish political party were placed in the category of "voters for Jewish parties" belonging to the faction oriented towards the Jewish establishment. They constituted 29.0% of all the responders in the sample who indicated the name of any kind of political party. This

[63] The question arises as to why we should confine ourselves to a dichotomous division. There is no doubt that an additional division of Arab leaders associated with the Jewish establishment according to political bloc (left versus right) and a division of Arab leaders who are not connected with the Jewish establishment according to political platform (Ra'am that declares its willingness to participate in government coalitions, the Arab-Jewish Hadash Party, the southern faction of the Islamic Movement that participates in Knesset elections as against the Balad Party, the Sons of the Village Movement and the northern faction of the Islamic Movement who boycott the Knesset elections) would have created more homogenous groups and would have contributed to the comparison. But owing to the small number of leaders, the groups would have been too small to allow for statistical analysis.

percentage corresponds to the percentage of Arabs who voted for Jewish parties in the 2003 elections. All 246 respondents who said they voted for an Arab political party (including parties that ran in the 2003 elections but did not pass the election threshold), were placed in the category of "voters for Arab parties" belonging to the faction not oriented towards the Jewish establishment. All the Arabs who did not respond to the question were removed from the analysis and discussion below. As with the two leadership groups, these two population groups differ in their personal background (Table 46). Nearly half of those voting for Jewish political parties are of Druze or Bedouin descent, compared to only one-tenth of the group voting for Arab political parties. There are also less religious people, less supporters of the Islamic Movement and more university graduates in the first group than in the second one. They also reported less experience with discrimination (Table 47) and less participation in protest actions (Table 48). For example, only 8.8% of those voting for Jewish political parties have ever participated in Land Day events as compared with 31.3% who voted for Arab political parties. These differences give validity to the classification of the respondents according to political faction.

The dichotomous classification of Arab public figures and the general Arab public does not assume that there is equality in the relative size of the groups. Clearly, that is not the case. In the Knesset elections of 1999 and 2003, about 30% of the Arabs voted for Jewish political parties, compared with 70% who voted for Arab political parties. Most of the Arab Knesset members and most of the members of the Higher Follow-Up Committee also belong to the faction not oriented towards the Jewish establishment. Although there is interest in the examination of the attitudes of all the four groups under discussion, the spotlight should be focused upon the non-establishment Arab public figures because this is the leadership group that is given support by most of the Arab public and that fights energetically to represent it and to shape its attitudes.

Expectations

The division into two leadership groups and two general public groups creates more or less homogenous groups, so that the comparison between them makes it easier to locate the main disputes within the Arab sector. It allows for the drawing up of three comparisons: the comparison between the two leadership groups, the comparison between the two general public groups, and the comparison between each leadership group and the general public group it is supposed to represent (that is, the establishment leaders with those voting for Jewish political parties, and non-establishment leaders with those voting for Arab political

parties). These comparisons can shed light on the differences in viewpoint regarding Arab-Jewish relations among the Arab minority.

The goal of the comparisons that were drawn was to answer two questions. The first question is: Are there any significant differences between the leadership groups based on their political orientation as well as between the general public groups based on their political orientation? My expectations were that significant and even salient differences would be found. Arab leaders who have positioned themselves within the Jewish establishment chose to do so because of their belief in the need to reach understanding and dialogue with the Jewish state and with the Jewish majority, due to their assessment that the sharp asymmetry in the relative strength of Arabs and Jews make it possible for the Arabs to obtain at the most certain improvements and concessions within the framework of the existing regime, and because of their desire to derive the maximum benefit from affiliation with the establishment (appointments, budgets, opportunities, favoritism) for themselves and their supporters. This is the ideological approach that is based on a realistic evaluation of what and how it is possible to achieve and to change things. The standard for success is the immediate gain of concessions and resources for the Arab sector, and not protest for its own sake. By contrast, the Arab leaders who chose to act in frameworks outside the Jewish establishment believe that criticism and struggle from the outside will generate more substantial change than activities from within, which imply the acceptance of the hated status quo. Activity within the establishment is equated with forgoing the desired change from the very start, or being satisfied with only marginal achievements. If activity outside the establishment fails in obtaining the desired change, at least it voices a cry, registers a protest, sounds a warning, makes it difficult for the authorities to continue with its adverse policies, and points to the right way. The intentions and the presentation of demands for change are in themselves symbolic achievements, and their value is higher than the minuscule achievements gained from activities within the establishment. Protest actions extract a high price from the establishment, as a kind of compensation for discrimination and rejection of the Arab minority, and they exert pressure for change. Success is measured not by short-term cosmetic changes but by major changes in the long run that will be achieved after vigorous and continuous Arab struggle that will cause the establishment to realize that the existing regime and policy will not succeed and the Arabs will not comply with them.

Each side has its own rationale and ideological basis, and one cannot say that the pro-establishment way is opportunistic while the non-establishment way is ideological. The establishment way will lead to the formation of more adjustable attitudes while the non-

establishment way will lead to more critical attitudes. Affiliation with the establishment creates moderate attitudes, restrains "destructive" criticism and censures its expression. Non-establishment affiliation encourages criticism, protest and struggle, and obstructs conciliation and agreement with the activities of the establishment.

These things are true not only for leaders who differ in their political orientation, but also for the general public. The Arabs who vote for Israeli political parties tend to think according to the rationale of the pro-establishment Arab leaders, while those who vote for Arab political parties tend to think according to the rationale of anti-establishment Arab leaders. The differences between the general public groups were expected to be more significant but less sharp than the differences between the leadership groups, because the leadership thinks in a more ideological manner than the general public.

The second question that the comparisons were meant to answer is: Are there any significant differences between the attitudes of the leadership group and the attitudes of the general public who are its supporters? The conformity of the leadership attitudes to those of the supporting public means that the leadership is trustworthy and faithfully represents the public whose support it desires, or that the supporting public agrees with the attitudes that the leadership represents. When there is no conformity, the leadership is liable to appear untrustworthy and non-representative and therefore is destined to lose public support.

In this regard, the situation of the two Arab leadership groups is different. One might expect much greater conformity between the attitudes of the pro-establishment Arab leaders and the attitudes of the Arab voters for Jewish political parties. They are subject to the same moderating pressures of an existing reality. A radicalization of their positions would lead to the loss of achievements and create a cognitive dissonance between attitude and orientation. Political or political orientation determines a limited range within an attitude and therefore any change that might take place within it would be small. The alternative is to break out of these narrow confines and move to some non-establishment framework in which there is greater scope for action.

On the other hand, one should not expect conformity between the attitudes of the non-establishment Arab leaders and the group of Arab voters for Arab political parties. There are a number of reasons for thinking that the non-establishment leaders would be more militant and radical than the public supporting them. One reason is "independent choice", that is to say, the leaders chose from the very outset to belong to a non-establishment framework because of their anti-establishment attitudes, and those few who had once been active in the establishment framework became disenchanted and went over to an non-establishment

framework. By contrast, most of the Arab public of the younger generation has shifted from a pro-establishment political orientation to a non-establishment orientation as measured by their shift from voting for Jewish political parties to voting for Arab political parties. Therefore, those who vote for Arab political parties are on average more moderate in their attitudes than the non-establishment leaders they support.

Another reason for the greater radicalization of the leaders is that their criticism of the establishment has a wider range of possibility, being flexible and not predetermined. The non-establishment framework is based on criticism against the establishment that can range from an attack on policy to a demand for regime change and as far as the desire to establish another state (such as Greater Palestine instead of the State of Israel within the Green Line). The range of the means of struggle is also wide and can cover all kinds of politics, including the use of non-democratic means. Since the gray area is sufficiently large, the non-establishment leaders have a broad base for action, for challenge and for testing the limits between what is permissible and what is forbidden. The range, of course, is not unlimited, because representation of extremist attitudes is liable to be defined as incitement, rebellion, support for terror, or some other illegal action, and to incur a harsh counter-reaction from the establishment and also place the backing of its supporters in danger. A further reason for the radical tendencies of the non-establishment leaders compared to their supporters is the strong competition between them for public support and the temptation to make use of outflanking tactics to gain an advantage. In such cases, the outflanking will be done by a radicalization of attitudes because non-establishment positioning is based upon criticism and protest, and the trend is therefore to aggravate them in order to gain an advantage over a rival leader. It should be remembered that the state of a non-establishment leader in Israel is one of constant opposition, and so all that he can promise his supporters is protest, and not any real change of policy or the acquisition of personal benefits. Thus the radicalization of attitudes is one way of obtaining an advantage over a rival leader.

These expectations are compatible with theoretical considerations and previous research findings. On the theoretical level, the basic premise is that the voting public for a certain bloc of political parties will have a different political culture and attitudes from those of a rival bloc. Thus the expectation that the Arabs who vote for Jewish political parties will be more moderate in their attitudes towards the issue of coexistence than those voting for Arab political parties certainly conforms to this premise. Empirical evidence supporting these differences was found in all the surveys I have conducted among Israeli Arabs since 1976. In all of them the bloc of political parties for which the Arab votes or with which he feels

aligned was found to be the best predictor of attitudes towards the state and the Jewish majority, and not such variables as education or age. As for the gap between the attitudes of the leaders and their supporters, it is not clear whether electoral theories of rational choice would confirm the expectation that non-establishment leaders will make use of radicalizing attitudes in order to maintain or even to increase their support in a deeply divided society in which the minority suffers from discrimination and rejection and its leaders are constantly being marginalized and pushed into the opposition. On the other hand, these theories would not support the tactics of attitude radicalization by pro-establishment Arab leaders, because this would be contrary to their political position in the system and may act as a boomerang. The radicalization of attitudes on their part would cause their ejection from the establishment, yet excessive moderation would greatly damage their credibility since they are in any case suspected of kowtowing to the authorities and of collaboration. In order to retain credibility and authenticity, they are obliged to walk a tightrope between constructive criticism from within and obtaining concessions for their supporters and policy improvement for the Arab public in general.

The thesis according to which Arab non-establishment leaders represent attitudes more radical than those of their supporters is accepted by the Jewish establishment on both the right and the left side of the political spectrum. These leaders are not regarded in a sympathetic manner by the establishment because of their constant criticism against the government, their struggle to change the character of the state, their open and unrestrained support for "Palestinian resistance" which is considered by the establishment and the Jews as hostile and encouraging terrorism, and because of their increasing protests abroad (including accusing the government of racism in front of foreign governments and international organizations), and stealing votes from Jewish political parties.

Comparisons

The comparison of the attitudes of the two Arab leadership groups indicates significant differences in 68 out of the 104 questions that were examined and in 14 out of 15 spheres.

In 42 out of the 68 questions, the differences came to as much as 25% and over on answers that were grouped into two answers per question (Tables 49-56). These are substantial differences that testify to disagreements and even to contradictory outlooks. Apart from the agreement on making it possible for Arabs to integrate into Jewish society, 91.7% of the establishment public figures compared with 53.1% of the non-establishment public

figures supported the participation of Arab political parties in government coalitions, and 72.2% as compared with 18.4% were in favor of Arabs fulfilling the duty of some form of service to the state (Chart 21, Table 49).



At a time when all of them feel a certain alienatoin from the state, 91.7% of the pro-establishment leaders compared with only 22.4% of the non-establishment leaders feel proud when Israel wins some type of great achievement, and only 25.0% compared with 87.8% feel alien and rejected as Israeli citizens (Chart 22, Table 50).

Most of the non-establishment leaders, compared with only a minority of the pro-establishment leaders, are afraid of all kinds of serious threats envisaged for the Arab citizens at the hands of the state and the Jews. For example, 73.5% as compared with 30.6% are afraid of the transfer of some of the Arab citizens, while a large majority, although different in size, of both sides are afraid of large-scale confiscations of land (Table 51).



The non-establishment leaders represent more radical attitudes than pro-establishment leaders in other areas as well. Their noticeable distrust of the courts, the Knesset and the Government shows both estrangement from the regime and rejection by it (Table 52). The question of the legitimacy of the character of the state is the most divisive one. The pro-establishment leaders accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state in which Jews and Arabs live together, while about half or a majority of the non-establishment leaders think that Israel is not a democracy for the Arabs, has no right to be a Jewish state, and as a state it is racist towards its Arab citizens (Chart 23, Table 53).

Chart 23. Differences between Arab Groups in Percentage Agreeing to Legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State



As for the Zionist character of the state, the non-establishment leaders negate it, while a sizable minority of up to about half of the pro-establishment leaders are willing to accept it (Chart 24, Table 54). For example, 69.4% of the pro-establishment leaders compared with 18.4% of the non-establishment leaders agree that the Arab citizens should accept Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state. Considerable disagreement is also evident in the attitude towards the Palestinians and the solution to the conflict with them. A decisive majority among the non-establishment leaders (81.6%) compared with a minority (25.0%) of the pro-establishment leaders feel closer to the Palestinians than to the Jews, while a large majority (77.8%) of the pro-establishment leaders compared with a minority of the non-establishment leaders (22.4%) are prepared to have the Arab refugees given suitable compensation and allowed to return to Palestine only (Chart 25, Table 55).

Chart 24. Differences between Arab Groups in Percentage Agreeing to Legitimacy of Israel as a Zionist State



Clear differences are also found in the support for protest actions in order to obtain equality between Arabs and Jews. While the non-establishment leaders are in favor of protests abroad, the pro-establishment leaders are divided on this question (Table 56). However, the most significant difference is the support of over a third of the non-establishment leaders for illegal demonstration as compared with a total rejection of this means by pro-establishment leaders. These differences are also compatible with the larger participation of non-establishment leaders in various protest actions, including illegal demonstrations and violent processions (Table 48).

Chart 25. Differences between Arab Groups in Percentage Feeling Affinity to the Palestinians and Agreeing to Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict



We shall now turn to a comparison between the two Arab general public groups which also indicates significant differences in their attitudes towards most of the issues related to Arab-Jewish relations. In nearly all the questions in which there were large differences in the attitudes of the two leadership groups, there were also marked differences in the attitudes of the two general public groups (Charts 21-25, Tables 49-56). If to note only a few differences for illustration, 79.7% of the voters for Jewish political parties define themselves as Arabs, Israeli Arabs, or Arabs in Israel, that is to say, without the Palestinian dimension in their personal identification, as compared with 32.1% of the voters for Arab political parties (Chart 21, Table 49). The fear of transfer is in a ratio of 37.8% to 67.9% among these two population groups (Table 51), the gap in the belief that Israel as a state in which Jews and Arabs live together is racist is in a ratio of 31.8% to 56.9% (Chart 23, Table 53), and the gap in the feeling of greater closeness to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is in a ratio of 29.7% to 52.4% (Chart 25, Table 55). However, the differences between the attitudes of the two general public groups are smaller than the differences between the attitudes of the two leadership groups.

The third, and final, comparison, which is the most important one, is between the leadership group and the general public group that supports it. The differences between the pro-establishment leaders and the voters for Jewish political parties are relatively small and inconsistent, which indicates good representation by these leaders of the public supporting them (Charts 21-25, Tables 49-56). At the same time, there is a lack of correspondence in

two important attitudes. Only a minority of 36.1% among the pro-establishment leaders compared to 79.7% of those voting for Jewish political parties define their identity as Arab Israeli and not as Israeli Palestinian (Chart 21, Table 49). The pro-establishment leaders do not only identify themselves in Palestinian terms but also define themselves as anti-Zionist in a ratio of 58.3% to 18.2% of their supporting public (Chart 24, Table 54).

On these two points the pro-establishment leaders are more daring in defining their identity and more opposed to the Zionist ideology that dominates the state than their constituents. However, this critical attitude is not a pervasive one and does not change their overall moderate attitude towards most of the issues in Arab-Jewish relations. These leaders and their supporters, who constitute less than a third of the Arab population in Israel, adopt a pragmatic orientation that recognizes the legitimacy of a Jewish and democratic state, is sensitive to and takes into account Jewish attitudes, and works together with Jewish groups within the establishment in order to improve the situation of the Arabs in the state.

Compared with the compatibility between the attitudes of the Arab leaders affiliated with the Jewish establishment and the attitudes of the Arabs voting for Jewish political parties, there is a clearcut discrepancy between the attitudes of the Arab leaders not affiliated with the Jewish establishment and the Arabs voting for Arab political parties (Charts 21-25, Tables 49-56). The non-establishment leaders are much more radical than their supporters on many issues. As a general rule, the leaders are divided in their attitude towards the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state, feel a deep sense of alienation toward the state, see Israel as a racist state, identify themselves as Palestinians in Israel, adhere totally to the Palestinian solution to the conflict with Israel, and are in favor of taking the most radical measures in the struggle to change the status of the Arab minority. Their supporters adopt only some of these positions and do so in a more restrained and less aggressive way. Here are some points to substantiate this general observation. Only 18.2% of the non-establishment leaders compared with 60.2% of the voters for Arab political parties agree that Arab citizens should accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (Chart 23, Table 53), 85.7% compared with 32.0%, respectively, define themselves as anti-Zionist (Chart 24, Table 54), only 22.4% compared with 65.4%, respectively, are ready to have Palestinians refugees receive suitable compensation and be allowed to return to a Palestinian state only (Chart 25, Table 55), and 34.7% compared with 7.3%, respectively, are in favor of using illegal demonstrations as a means of struggle (Table 56). In addition, it is interesting to note that only 44.9% of the non-establishment leaders, compared with a decisive majority of 82.1% of their supporters, agree that with the resolution of the Palestinian question, all the claims on both sides and the

conflict between them will end (Chart 25, Table 55). It can be assumed that the leaders expect a settlement of the conflict that the Palestinians will accept unwillingly and therefore there will be no final end to it. There is also the possibility that the intention is that the agreement reached will not be final because it will not take into account the claims of the Arabs in Israel.[64]

If the attitudes of the non-establishment leadership are more radical than the attitudes of the voters for Arab political parties, they are all the more radical in comparison with the more moderate attitudes of Arabs voting for Jewish parties and the attitudes of the Arab public in general (as reported in Tables 1-43). Most members of the Arab general public have attitudes that are more moderate and pragmatic than most of their leaders.[65] From the viewpoint of Jewish public figures, this gap in attitudes validates their opinion that the Arab leaders are extremist and inciting and do not truly represent the Arab public. A majority (62.6%) of right-wing Jewish public figures and a majority (67.7%) of left-wing Jewish public figures in the survey of Jewish leadership think that Arab political parties do not faithfully represent the Arab citizens in Israel.

In this context, I wish to present two reactions to the findings of the 2004Index. Rubinstein interprets the attitudes of the Arab public as moderate, and adds that: "Whoever listens to the harsh words of the Arab Knesset members will not find any expression, any echo, of these moderate views. This is the case for anyone listening or reading the expressions of Jewish anti-Zionist academics".[66] In this way he finds support for his estimation that the views of Arab public figures are extremist and that they do not truly and befittingly represent the attitudes of the Arab public. By contrast, Elie Rekhess enlists the views of the Arab leadership in order to question the survey findings that the Arabs accept Israel as a Jewish state, but not as a Zionist state. He thus writes: "Arab political and academic discourse, as it is published in Arabic in party platforms, publicist articles in local newspapers, and professional literature, hardly refers to the need to internalize the legitimacy of the State of Israel as a Jewish state of one kind or another. On the contrary: in recent years the discussion is focused upon the need to change the character of the State of Israel into a

[64] On this matter see: Alexander Bligh, "The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue and the Position of the Israeli Arab Leadership", *Israel Affairs* 9, 1-2 (2003): 290-308.
[65] With regard to attitudes, that are considered radical, of non-establishment Arab leaders, see: Dan Shiftan, "The New Identities of the Arab Knesset Members", *Tchele*t 13 (2002): 23-49 (Hebrew); Alexander Bligh, "Israeli Arab Members of eh 15th Knesset: Between Israeli Citizenship and Their Palestinian National Identity", *Israel Affairs* 9, 1-2 (2003): 3-15.
[66] Amnon Rubinstein, "Door to Hope", *Du-Et* 7 (2005):16. (Hebrew)

'state for all its citizens' (or 'all its nationalities')".[67] The research findings show that Rekhess is right in assuming that the non-establishment Arab leadership holds radical positions but he is not right if his intention is to hint that the overt attitudes of the leadership, which are aimed directly at the Arab public, reflect the attitudes of the Arab public more faithfully than the opinion of the Arab public is reflected in surveys.

In response to these interpretations, I should once again stress that there are clear differences both between groups of the Arab public and between groups of Arab public figures, and therefore one should be careful of making over-generalizations. However, if we examine the main faction of the non-establishment Arab leaders we will find that they make a distinction between legitimacy of a Jewish state and a legitimacy of a Zionist state. Below are the responses of non-establishment leaders to various aspects of Israel's right to exist:

- A huge majority of 86.8% agree that "The Jews in Israel are a people who have the right to a state".
- A huge majority of 85.7% agree that "Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as an independent state in which Jews and Arabs live together".
- A large but lower proportion of 51.1% agree that "Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Jews and Arabs live together".
- Only a negligible 2.0% agree that "Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state in which Jews and Arabs live together".

It is clear from these responses that the independent Arab leaders see the Jews in Israel as a people (but most probably not all the Jews in the world) who have the right to their own state. They apparently think that as a people, the Jews in Israel deserve to have a Jewish state, but a considerable number of them find it hard to accept this because the present Jewish state is also Zionist and therefore their acceptance of a Jewish state is liable to become distorted into a recognition of the right of the Jews to a Zionist state which they entirely negate.[68]

---

[67] Elie Rekhess, "Separation Between the Jewishness of the State and its Zionism is not New", Du-Et, 7 (2005):17 (Hebrew).

[68] The position of the non-establishment Arab leadership is not unequivocal but is rather context-dependent with regard to the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. For example, the Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education, which is a sub-committee of the Higher Follow-Up Committee, presented a formulation of the aims of Arab education to the Dovrat Committee, which adopted it. The formulation included the recognition of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state: "The aim of Arab education will include, in addition to general educational aims: (a) the development and promotion of personal identity and Arab group identity as an

The enormous gap between the attitudes of the non-establishment Arab leadership and the attitudes of the Jewish public as a whole (and especially the attitudes of the right-wing Jewish public which are more hard-line towards the Arab citizens) with regard to Arab-Jewish relations, gives validity to the widespread opinion among Jews and the establishment that the main Arab leadership is radical. In effect, the leadership of the Arab minority finds itself in an almost impossible situation – its attitudes go far beyond those of the Arab public, which it tries to represent and to recruit for struggle, and those of the Jewish public whose understanding and assistance it needs in order to bring about a change in policy and improve the status of the Arab minority.

The Jewish Public and Jewish Public Figures

Division into groups

The survey of Jewish public figures included 63 persons in face-to-face interviews using the closed questionnaire from the telephone survey of the Jewish public. They were chosen according to information about their political affiliation with the right-wing bloc and the left-wing bloc, but their final classification was done according to self-definition into political factions: right-wing, moderate right-wing, moderate left-wing, left-wing. Self-grading within one of the four categories was also imposed upon those who saw themselves in the center, the religious bloc, or some other affiliation. The final sample included 30 ministers and deputy ministers, 16 Knesset members (who were not ministers or deputy ministers), 5 mayors, 7 senior journalists, and 5 other public activists. They were divided into 32 right-wing public figures and 31 left-wing public figures. Because of the senior status of these Jewish public figures who participated in the survey, the sensitivity of the subject, and fearful apprehensions of public exposure, they were promised total confidentiality so that the research institute (The Dahaf Research Institute headed by Dr. Mina Zemach) that conducted the interviews did not divulge any identifying details regarding the interviewees to the researcher.

---

educational, spiritual and social anchorage for full integration into Israeli society and the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; (b) the knowledge and promotion of the Arabic language, and the acquaintance with Arab culture and heritage; (c) acquaintance with Jewish culture, the Hebrew language and the history of the Jewish people", Dovrat Committee, *National Task Force for the Advancement of Education in Israel. National Program for Education: Because Every Child Deserves More,* Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, January 2005, p. 211.

The two Jewish leadership groups are differentiated by their social background and their links with the Arab population. Among the right-wing figures, nearly all were men, half were Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox, two-fifths were of Mizrahi or Sephardi origin and three-fifths were university graduates (Table 57). Among the left-wing figures, a fifth were women, and nearly all were university graduates, secular, and of Ashkenazi origin. About a third of the right-wing public figures could speak Arabic, two thirds of them had Arab friends, but only two fifths of them met with Arabs on a regular basis (Table 58). The left-wing public figures had stronger ties with Arabs. While a quarter of the right-wing figures reported being personally attacked with threats, humiliation or beatings by Arab citizens, such incidents were hardly mentioned by the left-wingers.

The Jewish public was classified according to self-definition and political affiliation. Of a total of 708 respondents to the survey, 324 were Jews who defined themselves as right-wing or moderate right-wing, and 165 defined themselves as left-wing or moderate left-wing. All other respondents, who chose the category of center or did not respond, were removed from the data analysis. The validity of the correspondence between self-affiliation and political faction could be seen in the person's connection with a political party. Nearly all those who affiliated themselves with the right-wing, declared their closeness to right-wing political parties (Likud, religious parties, radical right-wing), stated that they would vote for them in the next elections, and reported voting for them in the 2003 elections (Table 59). Those who affiliated themselves with the left-wing also had direct links with left-wing parties (Labor, Meretz, Am Ehad). Like the leadership groups, these general public groups were differentiated by personal background and links with Arabs. The right-wing public was more religious, Mizrahi and less educated than the left-wing public (Table 57). They also knew a little more Arabic, met with more Arabs, and have suffered more attacks by them than the left-wing public (Table 58).

There is a clear asymmetry in the relative strength of the right and left wings. In the general public survey, 45.7% of the respondents classified themselves as right-wing or moderate right-wing compared to only 23.3% who classified themselves as left-wing or moderate left-wing (23.1% classified themselves as center and 7.8% did not respond). The results of the 2003 Knesset elections also indicated that the right-wing is stronger by a 2 to 1 ratio. Although the right-wing camp led in numerical and political strength, the left wing carries considerable weight because of its record as the founding political stream of Israeli society and its continued backing by the higher strata and the elite.

Expectations

The expectation is that there would be large and significant differences in attitude between rightists and leftists regarding Jewish-Arab coexistence in Israel. Despite the fact that the relationship with the Arab minority is not an issue dividing left and right on the current national agenda, it is easy to deduce their different attitudes from their other attitudes and their political culture. Therefore, one might expect that the leftists, both among the public and at the leadership level, hold more positive attitudes towards Arab citizens than the rightists. In all the following value orientations, the leftists are closer to the Arab citizens than the rightists:

1. Both political sides agree that the Jewish identity and the Israeli identity of the Jews in the country must be integrated, but the rightists place greater emphasis on Jewish identity and the leftists emphasize the Israeli identity. Since only Israeli identity creates a common meeting ground between Arabs and Jews, the attitude of the leftists is closer to that of the Arabs.
2. Both political sides agree that Israel should be a Jewish and democratic state, but the rightists lay more stress on the Jewish character of the state while the leftists give more thought to its democratic character. The rightists believe in the priority of nationalism to democracy (in their view the Jewish aspect of Israel's character is more important than the democratic aspect), while the left believes in the priority of democracy to nationalism (the democratic aspect is more central). Emphasis on democracy means more equality among citizens, an attitude that brings the leftists closer to the Arab position.
3. Both political sides believe that Israel should be a welfare state, with a market economy, and integrate with the world capitalist economy, but the rightists place greater emphasis on market economy (competition, free initiative, privatization, limitations of the power of the trade unions) and populism (improving the living conditions of the masses, relieving poverty and distress) compared with the leftists who believe in a certain measures of restraint of the market forces (protection of the workers' rights, combating unemployment) and social-democracy (development of the welfare state, social rights, narrowing social gaps). Since most of the Arabs belong to the working and lower classes, the attitude of the left is more in line with their interests and positions.
4. Both political sides agree that there should be no separation between nationality, religion and state, but the rightists have a more positive relationship to religion and

see it as supporting nationality, while the leftists are averse to religion and attribute non-democratic tendencies to it. Although the Arabs are more closely related to religion than the Jews, the secularism of the state and society serves them better since it minimizes the power of Jewish religion in the state and especially reduces its ethnocentric implications (it should be remembered that religion in Israel appears in the versions of non-liberal Orthodoxy – the national-religious and the ultra-Orthodox). The attitude of the leftists conforms more to Arab interests.

5. Both political sides are suspicious of the Palestinians and are not yet prepared to pay the high price of settling the conflict, but the rightists are prepared to pay a higher price for continuing the occupation (damage to persons and property, international isolation, economic stagnation, moral corruption) and are interested in slowing the peace process, while the leftists are more conciliatory towards the Palestinians and are more concerned with international pressure. Rightist politics are more ideological, while leftist politics are more pragmatic. The rightists believe more in the use of force and military power, while leftists are more aware of their limitations and are less coercive and militaristic. The attitude of the leftists is closer to that of the Arabs for whom peace with the Palestinians is their top priority.
6. Both political sides see the future of Israel in integration with the Western world, and not in regional integration, but the leftists are prepared for regional cooperation and instrumental integration within the Arab world. The attitude of the leftists is more acceptable to the Arabs.

There are many attitudinal studies reinforcing the generalization that left-wing voters are more liberal than right-wing voters.[69] Also, in all the surveys the Jewish public that I have conducted, it was found that the best predictor of the orientation towards the Arab minority was the political party or movement that the respondent supported.

As for the comparison between the attitudes of the Jewish leaders and their supporters within the general public, both right-wing leaders and left-wing leaders are expected to be more liberal than their supporters in regard to the Arab minority. The elitist theory of democracy provides grounds for this assumption. According to this theory, which is applicable to majority groups in democratic regimes, the leaders are more liberal (democratic, tolerant) than the general public for two reasons. The first reason is "selective

[69] See: Yochanan Peres and Ephraim Yaar, *Between Agreement and Controversy*, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 1998 (Hebrew); Raphael Ventura and Michal Shamir, "'Left' and 'Right' in Israeli Politics", *Medina Memshal ve-Yahasim Ben-leumiyyim* 35 (1991): 21-50 (Hebrew).

recruitment" which means that in a democracy, whoever chooses to enter politics and to attain an elite standing is from the very outset more liberal in his views. He comes from a background that makes him more liberal (higher education, free profession, high income, exposure to the media, wider perspective on society and the world). The second reason is "political socialization". The integration into the political and non-political elite creates encounters with people who have different attitudes, negotiations and compromises with rival politicians, consideration of the interests of other groups, a sense of executive responsibility, and understanding that an extremist attitude can lead to estrangement and unrest by disadvantaged groups. In addition, the leaders would feel less threatened by unsympathetic groups or those who oppose the regime because they are more experienced and are able to assess situations more realistically than the public at large.[70]

Comparisons

A comparison between the right-wing public figures and left-wing public figures shows significant statistical differences in 58 of the 102 questions examining the attitudes towards Arab-Jewish relations. In 43 of the 58 questions in which the responses were grouped into two answers to each question, the differences in attitude were 30% and higher. These evident gaps attest to sharp differences of opinion. We shall focus below on these questions only.

Despite the state's declared policy of integration of the Arabs in Israel, in all areas concerning preservation of the separate existence and separate identity of the Jewish majority, there are disputes between right and left. Only 21.9% of right-wing public figures compared with 83.9% of left-wing public figures support the residence of Arabs in Jewish neighborhoods (Chart 26, Table 60). Only 34.4% compared with 80.6%, respectively, agree that Arabs have many good and important values that Jews should adopt. The left-wingers are more open to social and cultural mixing.

[70] See: John Sullivan, Pat Welsh, Michal Shamir, David Barnum and James Gibson, "Why Politicians Are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States", *British Journal of Political Science* 23, 1 (January 1993): 51-76; Michal Shamir, "Political Intolerance among Masses and Elites in Israel: A Reevaluation of the Elitist Theory of Democracy", *Journal of Politics* 53, 4 (November 1991): 1018-1043. In this article, Shamir presents data to show clearly that the political and non-political elite in Israel is more liberal and tolerant towards Arab citizens than the general public. However, during the 1980s, the Knesset enacted amendments to the law restricting the political activities of the Kach movement and the Progressive List for Peace. She sees these measures as testifying to political intolerance and explains it by the electoral considerations of Knesset members and their sense of being threatened by these two anti-regime groups. The fear of threats causes intolerance and blurs the differences between the attitudes of the leadership and those of the general public.



Right-wing public figures feel considerable alienation from Arab citizens compared with the lack of alienation among left-wing public figures. More than half of them are not prepared to have an Arab neighbor and feel a sense of distance from the Arabs in Israel (Chart 27, Table 60). A majority of 78.1% of the right-wing leaders compared with 19.4% of the left-wing leaders believe that most Arabs would be more loyal to a Palestinian state than to the State of Israel.



Between 40.6% and 78.1% of the right-wing leaders compared with only 3.2% to 12.9% of the left-wing leaders are afraid of various existential dangers to the Jews and the state by the Arab citizens, including high birth rate, struggle to change the Jewish character of the state, popular uprising and collaboration with the enemy (Chart 28, Table 62)

Chart 28. Differences between Jewish Groups in Percentage Fearing of Threats from Arabs



The dispute regarding the legitimacy of the civil and national status of the Arab minority can serve as a key to understanding the differences in attitude between right and left towards Arab citizens. Right-wing public figures see the country as the homeland of the Jews and the state as belonging to the Jews (Chart 29, Table 63). The right of the Arabs to live in the state is conditioned upon their acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state. Because Arab citizens have a strong link with the Palestinian people, who are considered to be the enemy, they are suspected of disloyalty. Most of the right-wing leaders think that only Jews should participate in fateful decisions on the character of the state and its borders, and give greater importance to the Jewish state than to Israeli democracy. On all these questions, the left-wing leaders adopt an attitude that accepts the Arabs as equal citizens, respects their right to be opposed to the regime and to participate in fateful decisions with regard to the state, and views their commitment to democracy as supreme. These differences in outlook are well expressed in the responses to the key question: “In case of a contradiction between the democratic character and the Jewish character of the state, what would you choose?” A

majority of 78.1% of the right-wing leaders as compared with a minority of 16.1% of the left-wing leaders chose the Jewish character.

Chart 29. Differences between Jewish Groups in Percentage Agreeing to Civil and National Legitimacy



The attitude of the right-wing leaders who give priority to a Jewish state rather than to democracy is also reflected in the sphere of policy towards the Arab minority. The right-wing leaders expect the state to give preference to the Jews and to ensure separation between them and the Arabs by preventing Arabs from residing in Jewish localities and from buying land in Jewish areas (Chart 30, Table 64).



They perceive the regime in Israel as "a defensive democracy" and are therefore in favor of outlawing the Islamic Movement. They view government policy towards the Arab citizens as egalitarian or with a little discrimination at the most, because in the existing situation of enmity between Israel and the Palestinian people and considering the potential disloyalty toward the state by Arab citizens, they do not deserve better treatment. The left-wing leaders reject all these positions and give priority to democracy. They maintain that Israel should be a state that gives equal treatment to its Arab citizens, while at present it treats them as second-class or hostile citizens, and that it should not restrict their rights of residence and land acquisition or give preference to Jews.

Contradictions in outlook in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still distinguish clearly between the two camps, in spite of the serious cracks in the right-wing position that sanctifies Grater Israel. The right-wing Zionist narrative puts the full blame for the historical and current situation on the Palestinians, compared to the left-wing Zionist narrative, which is a divided one (Table 65). The right-wing leaders in the survey demonstrate clearly hawkish attitudes regarding all left-wing solutions to the Palestinian question, including two states for two peoples, the pre-1967 borders with land swaps, the division of Jerusalem, the return of the refugees to a Palestinian state with the possibility of the return of a small number of them to Israel, demilitarization of Palestine, open borders between the two states, and the end to the conflict and to claims on both sides (Chart 31, Table 66).



The adamant position of the rightists regarding arrangements that could improve Arab-Jewish relations is well demonstrated in their attitude towards the Or Commission. The right-wing leaders do not see this Commission as important and reasonable, and reject its recommendations to bring to justice the policemen who shot and killed Arab demonstrators, to make basic reforms in police policy in the Arab sector, and to deny public office to all those that the Commission found to be guilty (Chart 32, Table 67). By contrast, the left-wing leaders take an opposing stand that calls for the implementation of the Or Commission recommendations.



As expected, there are significant differences between the attitudes of the right-wing public and those of the left-wing public on nearly all the questions on which the right-wing and left-wing public figures were divided. This shows that the dispute between right and left affects not only leaders who think in ideological terms, but also causes deep rifts in the Jewish general public, which is less ideological. We shall examine, for example, the key questions of the choice between the Jewish and democratic character of the state in case of a contradiction between them. The differences between right and left within the general public were by a ratio of 84.1% to 41.1% and among the public figures by a ratio of 78.1% to 16.1% (Chart 29, Table 63). These are enormous differences, although the differences between the two general public groups were smaller than those between the two leadership groups. This was also true for the other questions.

The comparison between the right-wing leaders and the right-wing public, and the parallel comparison between the left-wing leaders and the left-wing public, show that the leaders are more liberal in their attitude towards the Arab citizens than their supporters within the public. (Charts 26-32, Tables 60-67). For example, the support for the participation of Arab political parties in government coalitions is 59.4% among the right-wing leaders as compared with only 25.9% among the right-wing public, and it is 100.0% among the left-wing leaders as compared with 67.3% among the left-wing public (Chart 26, Table 60).

Similarly, the gaps between the leadership and the public in the ratio of those who think that fateful decisions should be made by a Jewish majority were 78.1% to 95.1% in the right-wing camp and 55.8% to 16.1% in the left-wing camp (Chart 29, Table 63). These typical numbers show that when it comes to the Jewish and Zionist character of the state, the left-wing public is significantly less liberal and democratic than its leaders. They also indicate that the right-wing public holds very hard-line positions, above and beyond those of its leaders. The attitudes of the right-wing leaders are relatively more complex because as leaders, they must be more considerate than their supporting public of the principles of democracy and the need for the state to ensure law and order and to prevent unrest by the Arab minority.

The deep rift between Arabs and Jews is expressed in the polarized attitudes of the non-establishment Arab leaders and the right-wing Jewish public. These are the two groups who are closest to the opposing poles in the scale of attitudes towards Arab-Jewish relations. The non-establishment Arab leaders, who receive the support of most of the Arab public even though their positions are far more radical than those of their supporters, present the Jewish public, which is to a large extent right-wing and anti-Arab, with radical attitudes that estrange and polarize them even more.

The question arises as to why the Arab leaders are more radical than the Arab public, while the Jewish leaders are more moderate than the Jewish public. It seems that the explanation for this is exclusion compared to inclusion in government. The non-establishment leaders are in a state of permanent opposition to the regime and are not partners in the decision-making and administration of the state. Detachment from responsibilities and governance makes it possible to preserve ideological purity and does not necessitate flexibility of stances and compromise. The leader who is denied ruling powers cannot provide real solutions for his supporting public and is therefore forced to fall back on marketing ideas in order to receive public support. The increasing competition between Arab leaders for the support of the Arab public (for example, in the 2003 Knesset elections, five Arab parties competed for the Arab vote, in addition to the Jewish parties) is a lever for the escalation of attitudes so long as all that they can give the public is protest, criticism of the government, support for the Palestinian people, and demands for changes in policy and regime change, and not appointments, budgets, changes in policy and other resources. By contrast, the moderation of the Jewish leaders compared to the Jewish general public lies in the pragmatism, weight of responsibility, and comprehensive perspective that is created by their participation in a democratic state.

Long-term Trend of Change of Arab and Jewish Public Attitudes

Included in the 2004 survey were a number of questions that were presented in previous surveys. These make it possible to discover long-term trends in the attitudes of Arabs and Jews, and to examine whether the trend among the Arabs is really towards radicalization and growing alienation, and whether the trend among the Jews is really towards intransigence and detachment, as many among the general public, the politicians, the national security staff, the press commentators and the academic researchers believe.

Arab Attitudes

The legitimacy of Israel as a state. Since the first survey in 1976, Arabs have been asked the simple and direct question: "Does Israel have the right to exist?" Three responses were offered to them: Yes, yes with reservations, and no. The answer "no" indicates unreserved negation of the legitimacy of Israel as a state. The proportion of Arabs who negate the right of the state to exist was less than 21.5% in all the surveys conducted during the years 1976-2004 (Chart 33, Table 68). This is a low rejection rate in view of the fact that the Arabs are a minority that is badly discriminated against, is opposed to the regime, is suspected of being affiliated with the enemy, and its forced inclusion in Israel is the result of the Palestinian Naqba of 1948.

Chart 33. Percentage of Arabs Agreeing that Israel within the Green Line Has a Right to Exist, 1976-2004



However, what is more significant and stands in contradiction to the thesis of Arab radicalization is the long-term trend. There is absolutely no evidence over the years for the growth in the percentage of Arabs who reject Israel's right to exist. The rejection rate of 20.5% in 1976 was the highest and the proportion of 6.8% in 1995 was the lowest. Even during the first year of the Intifada (1988 survey) and the years of the second Intifada (surveys of 2001-2004), the rejection rate was lower than the 1976 baseline of 20.5%. The peak in rejection that was measured in 1995 is most impressive. It indicates that the change in policy by the Rabin government in granting greater integration and equality to the Arab minority and in compromise and conciliation with the Palestinian people reduced the rate of rejection to nearly zero. The jump in the rejection rate from 6.8% in 1995 to 18.6% in 1999 also proved that the assassination of Rabin was the turning point in Arab orientation, in contrast to the widespread opinion that the October 2000 unrest was the watershed point. The rejection rates after 1995 returned to the average levels prior to 1995, and confirmed that the 1995 figure was an exceptional reaction to the favorable policy of the Rabin government. Although the dramatic reduction in rejection during the period of the Rabin government was eliminated after 1995, there are no signs that after the events of October 2000 any sharp turn for the worse occurred in the attitude of the Arabs towards the legitimacy of the state.

Legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state. For the first time in 1985, the question was posed regarding the legitimacy of the character of the state. It was formulated as follows: "Does Israel within the Green Line have the right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state?" The responses were: Yes, yes with reservations, and no. The responses of the Arabs clearly indicated the sharp distinction they make between the right of Israel to exist as a state and its right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state. The negation of the legitimacy of the character of the state ranged from 64.3% in 2002 to 35.3% in 1995 (Chart 34, Table 69). The previous findings, according to which there was no long-term consistent growth in the rejection rate, and the particularly low rejection rate of 1995, were given renewed confirmation. The Arabs of Israel feel rejection towards what they call "Zionist" and which they equate with colonialism, repression, ethnic cleansing, exclusion and discrimination. However, Israeli Arabs express an attitude less opposed to Zionism – a majority among them define themselves "non-Zionist" rather than "anti-Zionist", and this majority has remained more or less stable over time (Table 70).



Identity. The Arabs were asked to choose one term out of 7-9 terms that best defined their personal identity. These were Israeli, Arab, Palestinian and combinations of these terms. The long-term trend can be found by classifying these identities into three categories: An Israeli Arab identity (Israeli, Arab, Israeli Arab), a Palestinian Israeli identity (Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab in Israel), and a non-Israeli Palestinian identity (Palestinian, Arab Palestinian). Of the three categories, the non-Israeli Palestinian identity is essentially rejectionist because it indicates a purely Palestinian identity without any kind of Israeli component. If the radicalization thesis is correct, we might have expected a consistent long-term increase in this category, but the opposite is true. The rate of Arab citizens identifying themselves as Palestinians or Arab Palestinians decreased from 32.9% in 1976 to 8.7% in 2004 (Chart 35, Table 71). This category of identity came to 10.3% in 1995, went up surprisingly to about 20% in the years 1999-2001, and then went down again. It seems that the second intifada has once again fixed the boundaries of the Green Line and made clear the gap that separates the living conditions and fate of the Palestinians who are Israeli citizens from the non-citizen Palestinians. The Arabs in Israel were split in two between those who identified first and foremost as Israeli Arabs and those who saw themselves first of all as Palestinians in Israel.



Contrary to the radicalization thesis, the national Palestinian identity is not the most important identity to the Israeli Arabs. Religion was the most important identity throughout the years, except in 1999 (Table 72). The national identity (belonging to the Palestinian people) decreased to its lowest level in the years 2003-2004, a trend that indicates a distancing of the Israeli Arabs from the Palestinians as long as the Intifada continued and reached an impasse. Only about half of the Arabs in 2004 felt closer to the Palestinians than to the Jews, and this rate was lower than in the years 1999-2002 (Table 73).

Militancy. A militant orientation is composed of a series of attitudes and behaviors that challenge the existing system in democratic ways but without detaching from it. What it means in Israel is that the Arabs accept their status as a minority but fight in legal ways against the present character of the state, discrimination and exclusion. Militancy will be high among the Arabs, according to the politicization thesis. There are various expressions for the militancy of the Arabs and it appears that it has been increasing over the years (Chart 36, Table 74). Most of the Arabs negate the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state and see Zionism as a racist movement. The proportion of rejectionists stood at 62.1% in 1985, then went down, but went up again to a peak of 73.1% in 2004. The identity "Arab Palestinians in Israel" that had stood at 12.4% in 1976, and rose constantly to 45.6% in 2004.

A significant portion of the Arabs support the use of strong extra-parliamentary but legal means of protest, such as general strikes and protests abroad, in order to promote the cause of the Arabs in the country. A consensus was already created among the Arab citizens during the mid-1970s on the formation of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel at a time when this solution was totally unacceptable by the Israeli public. The support for the formation of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel went up from 74.7% in 1976 to 91.7% in 2004. These are changes in attitude that attest to an increase in political and national awareness of the Arabs and their intensified struggle for equality and peace.



Moreover, the proportion of Arabs who feel dissatisfied with their Israeli citizenship ranges from 26.2% during the golden years of the Rabin government to 62.3% during the period of the first Intifada, but went down considerably in the period of the second Intifada, despite the killing of 13 Arab demonstrators during it, which was interpreted as a severe blow to the status of the Arabs as Israeli citizens. As the number of Palestinians dead and wounded grew, and the more the situation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza worsened, so grew the value the Israeli Arabs attached to their Israeli citizenship as a shield and an asset.

Rejectionism. The series of attitudes and patterns of behavior that compose the rejectionist orientation indicate a rejection of the legitimacy of the state, non-acceptance of coexistence between minority and majority, distrust of democracy and abandonment of the system. The escalation of rejectionism is the central concept in the radicalization thesis,

unlike the politicization thesis. The findings of the survey attest that rejectionism among the Arabs in Israel is low and is on the decline (Chart 37, Table 75).

Chart 37. Percentage of Arabs Holding Rejectionist Attitudes, 1976-2004



The Arabs that reject the right of Israel to exist within the borders of the Green Line, and support the use of illegal means to improve their situation, or who are not prepared to have Jewish friends, are a small minority that is gradually decreasing. For example, the support for violence stood at 17.9% in 1976, went down to 6.0% in 1995 and went down further to 1.9% in 2004. The events of October 2000, the violent protest by the Arabs and its suppression by the authorities, have created a balance of fear between the sides that has since minimized the use of violence. The low proportion of Arabs holding rejectionist views and its gradual decrease over the years stand in clear contradiction to the noticeable proportion of Arabs holding militant views and an increase in this rate over the years (as shown in a comparison between Chart 36 and Chart 37, and between Table 74 and Table 75).

Types of Arab orientation. It is possible to classify the Arabs into four types according to their overall orientation towards the Jewish majority, the state, and their status as a minority within it. The "accommodationist" type accepts Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state and acts through the existing system to obtain concessions from the Jews and the state. The "reservationist" type navigates between the Jewish establishment and the national Arab parties in the opposition. This type has reservations concerning both sides, but does not enter into confrontation with them, assuming that change can be obtained through independent organization and negotiations with the authorities, instead of being in constant opposition to

the regime. The "oppositionist" type accepts Israel as a state but negates its Zionist character. Since his views are opposed to the Jewish consensus, the Jews do not see him as a political partner. This type is convinced that only by opposition from outside the Zionist establishment can he change Israeli society. The "rejectionist" type rejects Israel altogether and wants to replace it with a secular-democratic state or a Palestinian state in all of Palestine. The surveys show that the proportion of the rejectionist type is small and getting smaller (Table 76) among the Arabs. Their proportion remained negligible even at the peak of the second Intifada in 2001. In 1995 the reservationist type became the majority, with 62.9% of all the Arabs. The main change that occurred after 1995 was not in the rise of the number of rejectionist types but rather in the growth of the proportion of the oppositionist types.

Jewish Attitudes

The right of Arabs to live in Israel as a minority. The Arab radicalization thesis assumes that the Jewish majority has become more entrenched in their attitudes and more anti-Arab over the years. One of the indicators for this hardening of attitudes can be provided by the question: "Are you reconciled to the existence of an Arab minority in the State of Israel?" which was posed with three possible responses: Yes, yes with reservations, and no. The proportion of Jews who reject the basic right of the Arabs to live in the state as a minority was 15.9% in 1985 (when this question was posed for the first time) and 16.4% in 2004, percentages that attest to the fact that the rejectionist Jews constitute a small minority that has not risen over the years (Chart 38, Table 77).



The lack of a trend of hardening attitudes is worth noting in view of the fact that the Jewish public in these two decades had undergone anti-Arab changes – it moved noticeably rightward, a considerable portion of it came under the nationalistic religious influence of the Shas party, and it even received an added boost from the immigrants of the former Soviet Union, whose attitudes were more nationalistic than those of the average Israeli.[71]

The right of the Arabs to live in Israel as a minority with equal rights. The Jews were also presented with this question regarding the character of the Arab minority: "Does a national Arab minority have the right to exist in Israel with full civic rights?" with possible responses of: Yes, yes with reservations, and no. From the viewpoint of Jews who see Israel as the state of the Jewish people, there is perhaps no room for an additional national entity that might give the state a bi-national character. In fact, the proportion of Jews who reject the right of the Arabs to live in Israel as a national minority is smaller than the proportion of Jews who reject the right of the Arabs to live in Israel as a minority (without an indication of its national character) (one-fifth as compared to one-seventh). Not only is this a minority

[71] In connection with the less tolerant attitudes towards the Arab minority by the immigrants from the former Soviet Union, see: Dimitry Shumsky, "Post-Zionist Orientalism? Orientalist Discourse and Islamophobia among the Russian-Speaking Intelligentsia in Israel", *Social Identities* 10, 1 (2004): 1-18; Majid Al-Haj, "The Political Culture of the 1990s Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel and Their Views toward the Indigenous Arab Minority: A Case of Ethnocratic Multiculturalism", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30, 4 (2004): 681-696.

among the Jews but it is also a minority that has not grown larger since the mid-1980s – 21.6% in 1985 and 21.2% in 2004 (Chart 39, Table 78). These numbers do not support any long-term trend of entrenchment and hardening of Jewish attitudes towards the Arab citizens.

Chart 39. Percentage of Jews Accepting the Right of Existence of an Arab Minority with Full Civil Rights, 1985-2004



Rejectionism. In surveys conducted during the years 1980-2004, Jews were asked a number of identical questions that measured various aspects of rejectionist approach to Arab-Jewish coexistence, including revoking the rights of the Arabs to vote in Knesset elections and refusal to accept Arabs as personal friends. In fact, the ubiquity of anti-Arab attitudes is most significant. Nevertheless, there has not been any consistent rise in them in the long run (Chart 40, Table 79). For instance, in 2004, 43.8% of the Jews thought that the state should encourage Arab citizens to leave the country, but this high rate has fluctuated and has not increased over the years (for example, it stood in 1980 at 50.3% and in 1988 at 39.9%).



Types of Jewish orientation. As with the classification of the Arabs into four orientation types, the Jews were classified into reconciliationists, pragmatists, hardliners and exclusionists. The “reconciliationists” are the Jews who accept the attitude of the Zionist-secular left that the Arabs should be conciliated with various concessions to ensure them equality and maintain coexistence. The "pragmatists" are those who are prepared to make concessions to the Arabs in order to reduce tensions and to maintain quiet. The “hardliners” adopt the attitude of the Jewish right, that the duty of the Arabs as citizens is to adapt themselves to the Jewish majority and to accept Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state. The “exclusionists” are the Jews who negate the right of the Arabs to live in Israel as a minority. In spite of these distinctions between the Jewish orientation types, the differences between them are in accordance with the acceptance-rejection continuum. The division of the Jews into four types of orientation for the period 1980-2001 clearly shows a positive trend in an increased percentage of reconciliationists and pragmatists and a decrease in the percentage of the hardliners and exclusionists (Table 80). For example, the proportion of reconciliationists rose from 7.7% in 1980 to 35.1% in 2004. This is a general trend in the liberalization of Jewish attitudes.

The thesis positing a hardening of Jewish attitudes over the long term is not confirmed by the data. There is a hardening of attitudes among a small portion of the Jews but not among the majority. The unrest of October 2000 caused a complex reaction among the Jews: on one hand, an increasing fear of the Arab citizens and rising support for control over them, and on the other hand, a greater willingness to grant them civic equality and allow

them to integrate into Israeli society. The Jews continue to retain the concept of Jewish hegemony in that Israel must be a Jewish and democratic state, but they are ready to have the state respond more to the needs of the Arabs.[72]

[72] Sagiv-Shifter and Shamir present an analysis of Jewish attitudes based on five surveys conducted from January 2000 to June 2002. They indicate a low level of tolerance towards the Arabs in Israel and a rising trend in intolerance towards them during this period, and explain the change by the October 2000 unrest and the continuation of the Intifada. However, the surveys that have been presented here on data for a much longer period of time, do not show a clear trend of increased intolerance towards the Arabs in Israel. See: Tami Sagiv-Shifter and Michal Shamir, "Israel as a Laboratory for the Study of Political Tolerance", *De'ot Ba'am* 6 (October 2002): 1-16. On the other hand, First and Avraham compare the image of the Israeli Arab in the media coverage of the first Intifada and the second Intifada, and reveal the clear intolerance in both Intifadas, yet also an unambiguous trend of rising tolerance and understanding by Jews during the course of the second Intifada. See: Anat First and Eli Avraham, *Portrayal of the Arab Population in the Media: Comparison Between the Review of the First "Land Day" (1976) and the Review of the "al-Aqsa Intifada" (2000)*, Research Series 18, Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, University of Tel Aviv, 2004.

Summary and Conclusions

The Arab-Jewish Relations Index examines the attitudes of the Arab and Jewish citizens towards each other and towards the state. The Index is a scientific tool providing a continuous follow-up on the attitudes of the general public in Israel regarding the various issues of majority and minority relations and the long-term changes in them. The scientific information that they furnish is intended to expose prejudices, to enrich public discourse, to give expression to Arab public opinion, to serve as a basis for the shaping of policies, and to strengthen democracy.

The Index was first launched in 2003. The present Index for 2004, the second in the series, is based on a survey done during the autumn of 2004, in which face-to-face interviews were held with 700 Arabs and 700 Jews interviewed by phone. The survey samples represent the total adult population in Israel, with an error margin of 3.7%. In addition to the general public surveys, leadership surveys were carried out, which included 36 interviews with Arab public figures associated with the Jewish establishment, 49 interviews with Arab public figures not associated with the Jewish establishment, 32 interviews with Jewish public figures of the right-wing political bloc and 31 Jewish public figures of the left-wing political bloc. All interviews were conducted based on a closed questionnaire that covered 15 issues concerning Arab-Jewish relations and included additional questions taken from previous surveys carried out during the years 1976-2002, for the purpose of examining long-term trends in the attitudes of the two sides.

The starting point of the research into the mutual attitudes of Jews and Arabs was the standard thesis according to which the attitudes were polarized and had undergone radicalization over the years, a process that led to confrontation and violence between the two groups. The alternative thesis asserts that besides the estrangement and dispute, there are factors that bring the two sides closer and soften the conflict between them, and therefore the process is not one of radicalization but of mutual rapprochement.

An analysis of the survey findings reveals a complex picture of agreements and disputes between the Arab public and the Jewish public. There is considerable readiness for integration between Arabs and Jews. A majority of 89.5% of the Arabs and 68.4% of the Jews agree on principle that Arab and Jewish citizens live together in Israel. A large majority of Arabs are prepared to be integrated in nearly all spheres, while only a minority of the Jews is ready for the integration of Arabs in Jewish residential areas (34.3%), in high schools

(47.8%) and in government coalitions (42.5%). Most of the Arabs, compared with a minority of Jews, are bi-lingual in Arabic and Hebrew. From about one third to a half of the Arabs and Jews have negative images, such as untrustworthiness and violence, of the other side. Feelings of estrangement are widespread – 51.0% of the Arabs and 73.5% of the Jews feel afar from the other side, 53.4 % of the Arabs feel alien and rejected in Israel, and 71.8% of the Jews refrain from entering Arab localities. In addition, 52.5% of the Jews are not prepared to have an Arab neighbor and 43.3% are not prepared to have an Arab boss. One-fifth of the Arabs and Jews have personally encountered threats, humiliation, or beatings by the other side, a symmetry that confutes the widespread view that it is the Jews who injure and the Arabs who are injured. However, 64.2% of the Arabs are proud of the state when it wins great achievements and only 39.0% of them are not satisfied with being Israeli citizens.

Both sides have a distrust of state institutions and serious apprehensions of the other side. 55.1% of the Arabs and 69.4% of the Jews do not place trust in the Knesset. 71.9% of the Arabs are fearful of violence against them by the state and most of them are also afraid of serious damage to their civic rights, of the annexation of the Triangle to a Palestinian state when it is established, and of transfer. The fears of Jews concerning what the Arabs might do to them are no less serious: the high birth-rate (66.7%), the struggle to change the character of the state (71.8%), the eruption of a popular rebellion (71.7%), assistance to the enemy (78.7%) and support for the struggle of the Palestinian people (83.9%). These are very high levels of mutual suspicions and fears that seriously harm the chances of attaining normal relations between Arabs and Jews.

The Arabs recognize the right of Israel to exist as an independent state (84.9%) and as a Jewish and democratic state (70.0%), but only a small minority of them accepts its right to exist as a Zionist state (13.8%). A Jewish state is a state in which there is a Jewish majority and which grants equal rights to its Jewish and Arab citizens, while a Zionist state is a state that preserves its Jewish majority and gives various preferences to Jews. The Jews see a Zionist state as their heart's desire, while the Arabs see it as a racist state. The Jews recognize the right of an Arab minority to live in Israel (75.4%), but only a minority of them accepts the legitimacy of a national Arab-Palestinian minority (31.7%). Most of them think that Arabs should not be allowed to reside in any place they please and to buy land wherever they want, and that they should be prevented from participating in decisions regarding the character of the state and its borders. 55.9% of the Jews are in favor of outlawing the Hadash Party. Hadash is a veteran Jewish-Arab political party that is not considered nationalistic, but

apparently the Jewish public is not tolerant of the expressions used by the heads of the party, as reported in the Hebrew press.

There is a bitter dispute regarding the narratives and the solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Arabs believe that the Jews are to blame for the conflict with the Palestinians, while the Jews place the blame on the Palestinians. There is agreement on the principle of two states for two peoples in settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but there is disagreement on the ways to realize it. The Arabs adopt the Palestinian view that Israel must retreat to the pre-1967 borders with all that this implies, including the dismantling of Jewish settlements, the division of Jerusalem, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state which is not demilitarized and has open borders with Israel, and for their part this will end the conflict. The Jews are prepared to compromise in order to reach an arrangement, but reject all these demands. However, 65.1% of the Arabs agree that the Palestinian refugees will receive suitable compensation and return to Palestine only, which conforms with their readiness to accept Israel as a Jewish state. Also, more than half of the Arabs are in favor of the integration of Israel into the Western world in general (53.8%) and in cultural in particular (57.5%).The second Intifada and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism have raised the value of the Western world in the eyes of the Arabs and brought them closer to the Western orientation of the Jewish majority.

The Arabs are divided between a personal Arab Israeli identity (45.1%), a Palestinian in Israel identity (45.0%), and a Palestinian identity without affiliation to Israel (8.6%). They see the Palestinian component in the identity of the Arab citizens as an appropriate component, but many of them are reluctant to adopt it because a decisive majority of the Jews (80.8%) think that this is in contradiction with loyalty to the state and its laws. Since religious and national identity is more important than civic identity for both Arabs and Jews, there is no common civic identity between the majorities of both sides. In Jewish identity there is a Jewish-religious component, a Jewish-national component and an ideological-Zionist component, components that alienate the Arab minority from the Jewish majority. The Jews perceive the Arabs as being closer to the Palestinians in their culture and way of life and also in their loyalty to a future Palestinian state, perceptions that contradict the positions of most of the Arab citizens.

The Arab political parties, the Higher Follow-Up Committee, and the Islamic Movement are seen by the Arabs as trustworthy bodies that faithfully represent Arab interests, while the agreement of a large portion of the Jewish public to this view derives from an attribution of radicalism to the Arabs, such as seeing the Islamic Movement as

representative but also as radical and as inciting, so that it should be outlawed. The Arabs desire cultural autonomy, while the Jews are prepared to grant them self-rule in certain spheres but not full autonomy. The Arabs agree that Israel is a democracy for them as well (58.6%) and believe that through it they can advance their affairs. They support the use of general strikes (74.0%) and protests abroad (59.2%), and a minority of them also supports boycotting the elections and illegal demonstrations, while the majority of the Jews are opposed to these extra-parliamentary means of protest.

In order to improve their lot, the Arabs in Israel want Israel to become a bi-national state (89.8%) and to grant them absolute equality, which is a basic change in the regime that the Jews entirely negate. Some of the Jews are in favor of encouraging the Arabs to leave the country (43.4%) and of depriving them of their democratic rights (23.4%). The requirement for the Arabs to do some kind of service for the state is acceptable to a majority, though a small one, of the Arabs (54.7%) and, of course, to a large majority of the Jews (81.4%). A majority of the Arabs (59.0%) agree to the demands of the Jews (95.2%) that the Arabs should accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The Jews for their part agree (64.6%) that the signposts in the country should be in Hebrew and Arabic. Only about half of the Jews support the recommendations of the Or Commission, and only about half of the Arabs believe that these recommendations will indeed be implemented. However, most of the Jews (67.4%) agree with the recommendation that the government should take great and urgent measures in order to close the gaps between Arabs and Jews.

Most of the Arabs (57.6%) think that the state treats them as second-class or hostile citizens who do not deserve equality, while most of the Jews (63.5%) think that the state treats the Arabs as equal citizens or as equal citizens who are discriminated against in certain spheres. Most of the Arabs (56.4%) and most of the Jews (81.9%) evaluate the relations between them as not good.

These differences in attitudes indicate a deep rift between Jews and Arabs. However, this rift is moderated by the differences in attitudes within each of the sides. The vote in the 2003 election by 30% of the Arabs for Jewish political parties and 70% for Arab political parties reflects not only differences of interest, but also differences of views. These two Arab groups differ in their attitudes on nearly all the issues concerning Arab-Jewish relations. Compared to the Arabs who vote for Arab political parties, the Arabs who vote for Jewish political parties have a non-Palestinian Israeli identity, support greater integration in Jewish institutions, feel far less estrangement and mistrust towards the state and the Jews, feel less threatened, recognize to a greater extent the legitimacy of the state and its right to exist as a

Jewish state, feel less close to the Palestinians, find the Palestinian solutions to the conflict less acceptable, and less support protest actions. At the same time, there are clear differences of attitude between Jews who define themselves as rightists and those who define themselves as leftists. Compared to the Jews who are right-wing supporters, the Jews who are left-wing supporters are far less supportive of restricting Arab rights (that is, they are willing to let Arabs live everywhere, buy land anywhere and take part in fateful decisions), are less afraid of possible harm that might come to them from the Arab side, are more flexible in accepting solutions to the conflict with the Palestinians, and give more support to measures for improving the situation of the Arabs, including the recommendations of the Or Commission.

The differences in attitude among the Arab leaders and among the Jewish leaders confirm and sharpen the differences in the attitudes found among the Arab public and the Jewish public. The attitudes of the leaders are more ideological, systematic and consistent than those of the general public. The considerable gap between the attitudes of the Arab leaders associated with the Jewish establishment and the attitudes of Arab leaders not associated with it, and the noticeable gap between the attitudes of the Jewish right-wing leaders and those of the left-wing leaders, show that the political rift within the Arabs and within the Jews encompasses not only the Palestinian question but also that of the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens and many other questions.

Comparisons between the attitudes of the leaders and those of their supporting public indicate differences in patterns. The right-wing Jewish leaders are more moderate in their attitudes towards the Arab citizens than right-wing Jewish voters, and left-wing Jewish leaders are also more moderate in their attitudes than left-wing Jewish voters. The explanation for this is that in a democratic society, people who are more liberal in their attitudes attain elitist and government positions more easily than others, and placement among the elite and participation in government promote a more liberal and responsible perspective. For the Arabs, the situation is otherwise. The Arab leaders who are associated with the Jewish establishment do not differ in their moderate attitudes from the Arabs who vote for Jewish political parties. In contrast, the Arab leaders who are not associated with the Jewish establishment hold positions that are far more radical than the Arab public who vote for Arab political parties. It appears that from the very start, Arabs who have particularly critical attitudes will choose to act in frameworks that are not associated with the Jewish establishment, and their integration in non-establishment frameworks strengthens their critical attitudes even more. The radicalism of the non-establishment Arab leaders is also nourished by their permanent exclusion from governing positions and by the strong

competition between them for the support of the Arab public. There is a special significance to the fact that the Arabs who vote for Arab political parties and their leaders are the majority in the Arab sector. These independent Arab leaders represent very critical positions that do not moderate the Arab public. These attitudes are perceived by the Jewish public and the Jewish leadership as extremist and inciting, and are cast against the entire Arab public. This is a link in the process exacerbating the rift between Arabs and Jews.

In the survey of 2004, a number of questions were included that had been posed in earlier surveys. These make it possible to discover long-term trends in the attitudes of the Arabs and the Jews. The comparison of attitudes was made for two types of questions: those questions that examined "militancy", that is, a critical approach within the commitment for coexistence, and those questions that examined "rejectionism", that is, an approach that indicates rejection of coexistence.

There is a rising trend towards militancy among the Arabs over the years. The proportion of Arabs who reject the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state stands at 62.1% in 1985, then went down, but rose again and reached the peak of 73.1% in 2004. The identity of "Arab Palestinians in Israel" that stood at 12.4% in 1976 gradually rose, to the level of 45.6% in 2004. The support for the establishment of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel also rose from 74.7% in 1976 to 91.7% in 2004. These are changes in attitude that attest to an increase in political and national consciousness among the Arabs and an intensification of their struggle for equality and peace.

On the other hand, there is a decrease in the indicators of Arab rejectionism. The rate of those who reject the right of Israel to exist ranges from between 20.5% in 1976, 6.8% in 1995, and 10.2% in 2004. The support for violence in order to advance the interests of the Israeli Arabs stood at 17.9% in 1976, went down to 6.0% in 1995, and descended to the lowest level of 1.9% in 2004. The events of October 2000, the violent Arab protest and its suppression by the authorities, created a balance of fear between the two sides that has reduced the use of violence ever since. Additional evidence of a regression in the proportion of those with rejectionist attitudes is expressed by the reduction in the percentage of Arabs who chose the non-Israeli Palestinian identity, which stood at 32.9% in 1976 and has gradually gone down, even during the Intifada period, until it reached the low point of 8.7% in 2004. The proportion of Arabs who are not prepared to have any Jewish friends was 21.2% in 1976, and has since been reduced, to 12.5% in 2004. These figures show that the Arabs are not undergoing a radicalization in their attitudes over the long term. They are reinforced by the lack of change in the percentage of Arabs belonging to the four types of orientation

towards the Jews and the state: accommodationist, reservationist, oppositionist, and rejectionist. The percentage of rejectionists is small and has become even smaller over the years.

There is also no consistent trend among the Jews of radicalization or entrenchment in positions. The proportion of those rejecting the right of the Arabs to live as a minority in Israel has undergone variations between the years 1985-2004, beginning with 15.9% in 1985, going on to 9.8% in 1995, and reverting to 16.4% in 2004. Similarly, no real change has occurred in the percentage of Jews who are not prepared to have Arab friends, which has stood at about a third over the years. There has apparently been a certain hardening of attitudes among the Jews during the period of the Intifada, but there is no evidence of this as a general trend since 1985. In any case, there are no data that indicate radicalization over the years in the attitudes of the Jews towards the Arab citizens. The classification of the Jews into orientation types shows that during the years 1980-2001 there has been an increase in the percentage of Jews who are reconciliationist and a decrease in the percentage of those who are pragmatists, hardliners and exclusionists. This is a general trend of liberalization in the attitudes of the Jews.

If we go back and examine the findings of the 2004 Index we shall see that the deep rift between the attitudes of the Arabs and those of the Jews has become more easily bridged by common understandings and agreements. These include the agreement to integrate Arabs within various frameworks and public institutions, the recognition by the Arabs of Israel's right to exist as a state, and even as a Jewish and democratic state, the recognition by the Jews of the right of the Arabs to live in Israel as a minority with equal civic rights, a large minority within both sides that rejects the narrative that the main guilty party in the conflict is the other side, a majority within both sides that accept the idea of two states for two peoples and the return of refugees to Palestine only, agreement that Israel should mainly integrate into the Western world, agreement that Israel should act to close the gaps between Arabs and Jews, agreement that Israel is a democracy for the Arabs as well, and that they can improve their situation by parliamentary politics, and the agreement that Arab-Jewish relations are bad and likely to deteriorate even further.

Furthermore, the differences of opinion among the Arabs and Jews soften the breach between them by creating more moderate groups on either side. There is compatibility between the Arab public voting for Jewish political parties and the Jewish left-wing public, while there is polarization between the Arab public voting for Arab political parties and the Jewish public voting for right-wing political parties. Since the moderate groups that are close

in their positions constitute a minority within each side (about a third), the softening is limited, but it has influence and importance.

The differences in position at the leadership level also have a significance that is not negligible. There is considerable closeness between Arab leaders who are associated with the establishment and the Jewish left-wing leaders, but there is bitter controversy between Arab leaders who are not associated with the establishment and Jewish right-wing leaders. The Jewish leaders on the right and left hold positions that are more moderate than their supporting public, so that they moderate the attitudes of the Jewish public. By contrast, the non-establishment Arab leaders hold positions that are more radical than their supporting public, and this has the effect of keeping the Arab public more distanced from the Jewish public and the state. Again, since the Jewish right-wing leaders and the non-establishment Arab leaders are the foremost ones for their public, their general influence is not a moderating one.

A long-term comparison of the attitudes of the Arabs and the Jews does not indicate a radicalization trend. Since 1976, the Arabs have not radicalized their positions, although the moderating trend that reached its peak during the period of the Rabin government, and was reflected in the exceptional data of the 1995 survey has been halted. Among the Jews as well, since 1985, there has not been any trend in the hardening of attitudes towards Arabs. The findings of the 2004 survey and the surveys that preceded it as well as other evidence tend to support the politicization thesis and the mutual rapprochement between Arabs and Jews, and not the standard thesis of mutual alienation, Arab radicalization and Jewish intransigence.

The Arab-Jewish rift in Israel is serious and has severe consequences for the democratic stability and strength of Israeli society. However, unlike other deeply divided societies who have suffered from popular uprisings and regime collapse, Israel maintains relative quiet, to which a number of factors contribute. The power of the state vis-à-vis the Arab minority plays a major role. The state operates a control system and punishes all hostile activities. It provides well-developed welfare services, from employment and income insurance, to allocations for children, and educational and health services of a high standard. Although the Arabs are discriminated against in receiving these services, they benefit from them and are dependent upon them. The state establishes a democratic regime that grants civic rights to Arabs, although they are inferior to those of the Jews, and grant Arabs basic equality, though not full equality. In addition to individual rights, the state gives Arabs collective rights that assure them of the preservation of their language, religion, culture and separate identity, and prevent assimilation. These rights are not full rights and do not include

national rights and cultural autonomy, but provide the defense needed by an non-assimilating minority. The individual and collective rights allow the Arab minority to conduct an intense struggle for the improvement of their status and for the benefit of the Palestinian people, without encountering repression and violence by the authorities. Three generations of living in the state has brought Arabs and Jews closer in language, culture, way of life and ways of thinking, and have supplied them with an Israeli dimension. Israelization is important to them and determines their lives no less than Palestinization. And finally, Israel is the lesser evil, because the Arabs do not have a better alternative, not in an Arab state, not in Palestine, and not in the West that is closed to most of them.

Contrary to the Palestinian question that can be treated by disengagement (two states for two peoples), this is an internal problem that must be coped with only by internal methods. The findings of the 2004 Index show without ambiguity that the Arabs in Israel are closely connected to life in Israel, see their future as part of the state, and are by no means willing to be annexed to a Palestinian state. Resolution of the Palestinian question and policy changes of the government towards the Arab minority are liable to greatly improve Arab-Jewish relations. Since for the Jews, a Jewish-Zionist state ensures a hegemony that they refuse to forgo, the question is what version of a Jewish-Zionist state can be acceptable to the Jews and fair to the Arabs.

Appendix. Summary Tables of Arab-Jewish Relations Index 2004

Note. If not otherwise indicated, figures refer to agreement percentages (agree, tend to agree) with a given opinion or sentence, or corresponding to a given description. The base for computing the percentages includes don't know, so that the sum total can be less than 100.

Table 1. Social Integration

	Arabs	**Jews**
Arab citizens and Jews will live together in Israel	89.5	68.4
There will be friendly relations between Arabs and Jews	93.6	74.0
Arabs will live in Jewish neighborhoods	70.7	34.3
Arabs will study in Jewish high schools	72.6	47.8
There will be contrived encounters between Arab and Jewish youth	90.4	71.9
Arabs will spend time in parks and swimming pools in the Jewish sector	80.6	57.4
There will be joint organizations of Arabs and Jews	89.1	68.1
Arab parties will participate in government coalitions	80.3	42.5

Table 2. Personal Integration

	Arabs	**Jews**
Meet Jews/Arabs daily or often	70.5	52.5
Jewish/Arab friends		
Have no Jewish/Arab friends	35.9	65.4
Have Jewish/Arab friends but have not visited them	25.6	18.1
Have Jewish/Arab friends and have visited their homes over the past two years	35.1	16.3
Don't know	3.4	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 3. Cultural Integration

	Arabs	**Jews**
Know Hebrew/Arabic enough to conduct a conversation on different topics with an Israeli Jew/Arab	79.5	24.8
Jews/Arabs have many good and important values and customs that Arabs/Jews should adopt	57.8	43.2
Arab citizens and Jews must create together new common values and practices in addition to their own values and practices	73.3	51.3

Table 4. Religious Observance

	Arabs	Jews
Self-definition on religious observance		
Very religious/ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	8.7	10.8
Religious/Orthodox	24.0	12.7
Somewhat religious/traditional	30.6	28.3
Not religious/secular	35.9	47.5
Don't know	0.8	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0
Have made a turning point in life with regard to religious observance		
No	81.0	
Yes, deserted religion	1.2	
Yes, returned to religion	17.2	
Don't know	0.6	
Total	100.0	

Table 5. Feeling Closest to the Islamic Movement

	Arabs
The party or movement to which one feels closest	
The southern faction of the Islamic Movement headed by Ibrahim Tzartzur	1.3
The northern faction of the Islamic Movement headed by Raid Salah	16.6
Attitude toward the Islamic Movement in Israel	
Active member	2.0
Rank and file member	3.5
Sympathizer	27.1
Neither sympathizer nor opponent	53.1
Opponent	12.9
Don't know	1.4
Total	100.0

Table 6. Image of the Other

	Arabs	Jews
It is impossible to trust most Jews/Arabs in Israel	48.2	57.8
Most Jews/Arabs in Israel are disposed to violent behavior	40.5	42.5
Most Jews in Israel are ready to give up self-respect for comfort, money and personal advancement	53.7	
Most Jews in Israel are racist	54.2	
Most Arab citizens are not intelligent		35.0
Most Arab citizens would never achieve the cultural level of the Jews		36.1
Most Arab citizens are not law-abiding		39.8

Table 7. Alienation

	Arabs	Jews
I feel afar from Jews/Arabs in Israel	51.0	73.5
As an Israeli citizen I feel alien and rejected in Israel	53.4	
When Israel wins an achievement in any area like sports, science and economy, I feel proud of the state	64.2	
I am not satisfied with life as an Israeli citizen	39.0	24.1
I am not ready to have a Jewish/Arab friend	12.5	34.0
I am not ready to have a Jewish/Arab neighbor	25.7	52.5
I am not ready to have an Arab as a superior in a job		43.3
I refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel		71.8

Table 8. Distrust of Institutions

	Arabs	Jews
Medical institutions	3.5	16.3
The courts	23.4	34.7
The Knesset	55.1	69.4
The state government	69.7	65.1

Table 9. Arabs' Fear of Threats

	Arabs
Fear of severe infringement of the rights of Arab citizens	81.0
Fear of numerous confiscations of Arab lands	79.1
Fear of state violence against Arabs	71.9
Fear of Jewish violence against Arabs	70.6
Fear of the annexation of the Triangle to a Palestinian state against the will of its Arab residents	63.6
Fear of population transfer (mass expulsion) of some Arab citizens	63.5

Table 10. Jews' Fear of Threats

	Jews
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their high birthrate	66.7
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character	71.8
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because they may start a popular revolt	71.7
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because they may help the enemy	78.7
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their support for the struggle of the Palestinian people	83.9

Table 11. Arabs' Endurance of Displacement and Land Expropriations

	Arabs
Of a displaced family (internal refugee origin)	13.6
Of a family who has suffered from land expropriations	
Family did not own land	30.0
Family has not suffered from land expropriations	25.6
Family has lost some land	20.8
Family has lost a lot of land	21.8
Don't know	1.8
Total	100.0

Table 12. Endurance of Discrimination and Offensive Acts

	Arabs	Jews
Have personally, as Arabs, encountered discrimination by Jews or state institutions in any area (shops, workplaces, leisure places, public transportation, police, government offices)	42.4	
Have personally, as Arabs, encountered threats, insults, or blows by Jews against Arabs	19.4	
Have personally, as Jews, encountered threats, insults, or blows by Arab citizens against Jews		18.0

Table 13. Arabs Endured or Fearing of Political Harassment and Economic Suffering

	Arabs
In the past three years have endured harassment by the authorities as a result of participation in protest actions	3.1
In the past three years have endured economic suffering as a result of participation in protest actions	1.9
Fear harassment by the authorities as a result of participation in protest actions	14.2
Fear economic suffering as a result of participation in protest actions	14.6

Table 14. Legitimacy of the State of Israel's Existence in Arab Eyes

	Arabs
Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as an independent state in which Arabs and Jews live together	84.9
Israel has a right to exist (with or without reservation)	87.5

Table 15. Legitimacy of Jewish and Democratic State in Arab Eyes

	Arabs
The country between the Jordan river and the sea is a common homeland	67.5

for Arabs and Jews	
The Jews in Israel are a people who have a right to a state	74.9
Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together	70.0
Arab citizens will have a status of a national minority with equal civil rights in a Jewish and democratic state and will come to terms with it	63.3

Table 16. Legitimacy of Zionist State in Arab and Jewish Eyes

	Arabs	**Jews**
Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together	13.8	
Israel has the right to be the state of the Jewish people	30.4	
It is justified that Israel keeps a Jewish majority	24.0	
Israel should keep a Jewish majority		96.5
The Law of Return (the law that grants every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and to obtain citizenship) should be retained		93.5

Table 17. Attribution of Racism to Israel by Arabs

	Arabs
Israel as a state in which Arabs and Jews live is racist	47.4
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live is racist	52.2
Israel as a Zionist state in which Arabs and Jews live is racist	72.0

Table 18. Civic Legitimacy of the Arabs in Israel in Jewish Eyes

	Jews
There should be equality between Arab citizens and Jews in individual rights, state budgets and opportunities for education and employment	68.1
Arab citizens have a right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights	75.4
Arab citizens will have a status of a minority with equal civil rights in a Jewish and democratic state and will come to terms with it	78.4
I accept Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society	61.2

Table 19. Recognition of Arabs' Civil Rights by Jews

	Jews
Allow Arab citizens to vote to the Knesset	65.5
Allow Arab citizens to live in any locality they would like	38.4
Allow Arab citizens to buy land in any area they would like	32.2
Allow Arab citizens to be appointed as government ministers	48.8

Table 20. Restriction of Arabs' Civil Rights by Jews

	Jews
The state should give Jews some preference to Arab citizens	53.0
The state should prefer Jews in the development of the Galilee	73.1
The state should expropriate Arab lands for development in favour of the Jews	34.7
The state should outlaw the Islamic Movement	74.7
The state should outlaw the Hadash Party	55.9

Table 21. National Legitimacy of Arabs in Israel by Jews

	Jews
The country between the Jordan river and the sea is a common homeland for Arabs and Jews	44.5
Arab citizens have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights, whether they accept or do not accept Israel's right to be a Jewish state	31.7
An Arab citizen who is not ready to serve in the army cannot be a full Israeli	59.5
An Arab citizen who defines oneself as "a Palestinian Arab in Israel" cannot be loyal to the state and to its laws	80.8
Arab citizens are part of the Palestinian people and have the right to conduct a struggle on its behalf as long as they do not break the law	53.1
In decisions on the character and borders of the state there should be a majority from among the Jews and it is not sufficient to have a majority from among the population at large	80.4
In case of contradiction between the democratic character and the Jewish character of the state, I would prefer the Jewish character	67.8

Table 22. The Narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

	Arabs	**Jews**
The Jews/Palestinians are the main guilty for the protracted conflict between the Palestinians and Jews	69.9	68.4
The Jews/Palestinians are the main guilty for the disaster (al-Naqba) that occurred to the Palestinians in 1948	75.4	65.8

Table 23. The Solution to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

	Arabs	**Jews**
Two states to two peoples	91.3	68.4
The pre-1967 boundaries will be the boundaries between the two states with an option of land swaps	86.2	43.4
Jerusalem will be the capital of the two states	69.0	27.1

Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab	61.0	23.3
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the state of Palestine only	65.1	61.7
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation, will be allowed to return to the state of Palestine and with Israel's consent a small portion of them will be allowed to return to Israel	71.4	29.4
The state of Palestine will be demilitarized (without heavy weapons)	39.0	82.5
After the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will be over	75.2	62.7
The Arab localities in the Triangle will be annexed to a Palestinian state	14.2	48.2
The borders between Israel and the Palestinian state will be open borders	80.0	29.8
In favour of the fence that is being built between Israel and the territories	9.8	76.2

Table 24. Israel's Regional Integration

	Arabs	**Jews**
Israel should integrate into the Western world more than into the Arab and Moslem states in the region	53.8	80.5
In the area of culture, Israel should integrate more into Europe-America than into the Middle East	57.5	66.3

Table 25. Self-Definition on Zionism

	Arabs	**Jews**
Self-definition on Zionism		
Very Zionist	2.8	36.0
Zionist	0.5	44.0
Non-Zionist	62.2	16.1
Anti-Zionist	32.1	2.7
Do not know	2.4	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 26. The Most Important Personal Identity

	Arabs	**Jews**
The most important personal identity		
Being an Israeli citizen	24.1	29.8
Being Moslem, Christian, or Druze/belonging to Jewish religion	47.6	24.1
Being a member of the Palestinian/Jewish people	25.9	42.5
Don't know	2.4	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 27. Jews' Most Important Personal Identity by Population Groups

	Religion (Judaism)	Israeli Citizen-ship	Jewish People	Total
Self-definition by political stream				
Right	37.5	15.6	46.9	100.0
Moderate right	32.7	20.8	46.5	100.0
Center	17.8	36.9	45.2	100.0
Moderate left	12.2	46.9	40.8	100.0
Left	10.6	57.6	32.2	100.0
Self- definition by religious observance				
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	57.3	1.3	41.3	100.0
Religious (Dati)	50.6	2.3	47.1	100.0
Traditional (Masorti)	34.0	14.1	51.8	100.0
Secular (Heloni)	5.8	55.7	38.5	100.0
Self- definition by ethnicity				
Mizrahi, Sephardi	30.6	20.3	29.1	100.0
Ashkenazi	17.0	40.4	42.6	100.0
Mixed	23.5	34.6	42.0	100.0

Table 28. Arabs' Most Important Personal Identity by Population Groups

	Religion	Israeli Citizen-ship	Palest-inian People	Total
Feel closest to				
Balad	50.6	17.6	31.8	100.0
Hadash	35.5	22.7	41.8	100.0
Ta'al	32.4	26.5	41.2	100.0
Ra'am	71.1	0.0	28.9	100.0
Northern faction of the Islamic Movement	63.8	11.2	25.0	100.0
Labor	42.1	47.1	5.9	100.0
Meretz	53.3	36.7	10.0	100.0
Likud	48.1	48.1	3.7	100.0
Self- definition by religious observance				
Very religious	72.1	6.6	21.3	100.0
Religious	60.0	13.9	26.1	100.0
Religious to some extent	45.0	24.2	30.8	100.0
Not religious	38.9	36.4	24.7	100.0
Community				
Druze	58.5	41.5	0.0	100.0
Christian	15.1	49.1	35.8	100.0
Galilee Bedouin Moslem	76.9	12.8	10.3	100.0
Negev Bedouin Moslem	43.4	17.0	39.0	100.0
Non-Bedouin Moslem	50.1	21.9	28.0	100.0

Table 29. Arabs' Personal Identity

	Arabs
Choice of personal identity out nine identities offered	
Arab	8.9
Israeli Arab	22.9
Arab in Israel	9.9
Israeli	3.4
Israeli Palestinian	3.0
Palestinian in Israel	3.7
Palestinian Arab in Israel	38.3
Palestinian	3.2
Palestinian Arab	5.4
Don't know	1.3
Total	100.0
Classification of above self-identities	
Arab, Israeli Arab, Arab in Israel, Israeli	45.1
Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab in Israel	45.0
Palestinian, Palestinian Arab	8.6
Don't know	1.3
Total	100.0

Table 30. Appropriateness of Arabs' Palestinian Identity

	Arabs	Jews
The identity "Palestinian Arabs in Israel" is appropriate to most Arab citizens in Israel	63.1	63.7
An Arab citizen who defines oneself as "a Palestinian Arab in Israel" cannot be loyal to the state and to its laws	13.7	80.8

Table 31. Affinity to the Palestinians

	Arabs	Jews
In their way of life and behavior, Arab citizens are more similar to the Jews in Israel than to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	71.1	44.0
Most Arab citizens will be more loyal to a Palestinian state in which they do not live than to Israel	30.2	65.9
Arab citizens have a right to support an armed struggle by the Palestinians also within the Green Line	23.8	
Arab citizens are part of the Palestinian people and have the right to conduct a struggle on its behalf as long as they do not break the law		53.1

Table 32. Arabs' Feelings toward the Palestinians

	Arabs

I feel closer to the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza than to the Jews in Israel	52.0
I am ready to move to a Palestinian state	11.9

Table 33. Representativeness of the Leadership of Arabs in Israel

	Arabs	**Jews**
The Arab parties truly represent Arab citizens	62.8	54.3
The Higher Follow-Up Committee truly represents Arab citizens	60.2	
The Islamic Movement truly represents Arab citizens	58.2	

Table 34. Cultural Autonomy for Arabs in Israel

	Arabs	**Jews**
The state should recognize a top body that Arab citizens will choose to represent them	93.1	45.8
The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational and cultural institutions	92.9	64.2
The state should recognize and support an Arab university on a par with the universities in Israel		50.7

Table 35. Means of Struggle Endorsed by Arabs to Improve Arab Condition in Israel

	Arabs	**Jews**
Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is a democracy for the Arab citizens as well	58.6	75.2
Persuasion, political pressures and voting	83.9	64.8
General strikes	74.0	38.0
Protest abroad	59.2	33.6
Boycott of Knesset elections	24.9	
Illegal demonstrations	12.0	
All means, including violence	4.0	

Table 36. Arabs' Participation in Protest Actions and Commemoration Events

	Arabs
Have ever participated in protest actions such as legal demonstrations and processions	26.5
Have ever participated in protest actions such as illegal demonstrations and violent processions	4.1
Have ever participated in Land Day events	25.5
Have ever participated in Al-Naqba commemoration events	16.0

Table 37. Options for Regime Shift

	Arabs	**Jews**
Israel will cease to be a state of the Jews and will be a state of two peoples	89.8	16.6

Israel will be a democratic state of all its citizens without any connection to the Jewish people and Jewish religion	88.6	44.5
A Palestinian state should arise in all of Palestine instead of Israel	32.4	
Arab citizens should leave the country and receive proper compensation		43.4
Jews should rule and Arab citizens should not be given democratic rights		23.4

Table 38. Options for Moderate Change

	Arabs	**Jews**
Arab citizens will enjoy democratic rights, receive their proportional share of the budgets and manage their religious, educational and cultural institutions by themselves	62.5	68.4
The state should allow displaced Arab citizens (internal refugees) to restore their destroyed villages as much as possible	92.2	
Arab citizens should fulfil a duty of any kind of service to the state	54.7	81.4
Arab citizens should accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state	59.0	95.2
Arab citizens should refrain from a struggle to change the Jewish-Zionist character of the state	17.0	90.5
The state should grant Arab citizens lands or proper compensation for the lands expropriated from them as it is used to do with Jewish citizens		51.9
The state should make it required by law that names of all streets and localities be written on signposts in both Hebrew and Arabic		64.6
The state should change its symbols, such as the flag and anthem, to enable Arab citizens to identify themselves with them		12.3

Table 39. Knowledge and Evaluation of the Or Commission

	Arabs	**Jews**
Know enough or a lot about the Or Commission	37.9	35.8
The Or Commission is an important commission that acted fairly and submitted vital recommendations to the government	34.3	48.5

Table 40. Jews' Acceptance of the Or Commission Recommendations

	Jews
Finding and indicting the policemen who fired at the Arab protesters to a death	42.9
Making basic change of the police policy toward Arab citizens	51.9
Denying public office to anyone the Commission found guilty	48.0
Adopting large-scale and urgent steps by the government for bridging the gaps between Arab citizens and Jews	67.4

Table 41. Arabs' Evaluation the Chances to Implement the Or Commission Recommendations as Good or Very Good

	Arabs
Finding and indicting the policemen who fired at the Arab protesters to a death	49.1
Making basic change of the police policy toward Arab citizens	47.1
Denying public office to anyone the Commission found guilty	47.6
Adopting large-scale and urgent steps by the government for bridging the gaps between Arab citizens and Jews	47.1

Table 42. Evaluation of Government Policy toward Arab Citizens

	Arabs	Jews
The government treats the Arabs in Israel		
As equal citizens	4.0	21.6
As equal citizens that are discriminated against in certain areas	36.9	41.9
As second class citizens	41.9	24.5
As hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	15.7	9.3
Don't know	1.5	2.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 43. Evaluation of the Present Situation of Arab-Jewish Relations

	Arabs	Jews
The relations today between Arab citizens and Jews are		
Very good	2.3	0.4
Sufficiently good	40.1	16.6
Not sufficiently good	43.6	47.9
Not good at all	12.8	34.0
Don't know	1.2	1.1
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 44. Expectation Regarding the Future Situation of Arab-Jewish Relations

	Arabs	Jews
Expectation regarding the relations between Arab citizens and Jews in the course of the coming five years	3.4	3.2
Much improvement	48.6	25.7
Some improvement	37.5	32.6
Some worsening	9.0	21.3
Much worsening	1.5	7.2
Don't know	100.0	100.0
Total		

Table 45. Political Orientation, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
Feel closest to Jewish parties	88.5	55.6	2.0	4.1
Will vote for Jewish parties in the next Knesset elections	52.0	33.3	0.0	0.0
Voted for Jewish parties in the 2003 Knesset elections	42.6	36.1	1.2	0.0

Table 46. Personal Background, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
Very religious, religious	21.6	16.7	25.6	25.6
Sympathizer, rank and file member, active member in the Islamic Movement	14.2	5.6	26.4	26.5
Druze	32.4	22.2	0.8	0.0
Of Bedouin descent	14.9	13.9	8.9	6.1
Of displaced family	14.2	8.3	14.6	26.5
University graduate	10.1	63.9	14.6	85.7

Table 47. Endurance of Discrimination, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
One's or parents' family suffered from land expropriations	35.1	55.6	48.0	79.6
Have personally, as Arabs, encountered discrimination by Jews or state institutions in any area (shops, workplaces, leisure places, public transportation, police, government offices)	27.0	50.0	50.8	79.6
Have personally, as Arabs, encountered threats, insults, or blows by Jews against Arabs	14.2	19.4	22.8	73.5

Table 48. Participation in Protest Actions, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
Have ever participated in Land Day events	8.8	72.2	31.3	98.0
Have ever participated in Al-Naqba commemoration events	8.1	55.6	17.9	95.9
Have ever participated in protest actions such as illegal demonstrations and violent processions	1.4	19.4	2.8	53.1

Table 49. Integration and Identity, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
Arabs will study in Jewish high schools	89.9	91.7	72.4	65.3
Arab parties will participate in government coalitions	89.2	91.7	84.6	53.1

Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of any kind of service to the state	77.0	72.2	54.9	18.4
The most important identity is citizenship (as compared to religion and nationality)	51.4	52.8	22.4	2.0
Define oneself as Arab, Israeli Arab, Arab in Israel, Israeli	79.7	36.1	32.1	2.0

Table 50. Alienation, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
When Israel wins an achievement in any area like sports, science and economy, I feel proud of the state	86.5	91.7	65.0	22.4
I am not satisfied with life as an Israeli citizen	11.5	27.8	42.3	85.7
Most Jews in Israel are racist	38.5	33.3	50.8	61.2
I feel afar from Jews in Israel	31.8	19.4	57.7	46.9
As an Israeli citizen I feel alien and rejected in Israel	33.1	25.0	63.8	87.8

Table 51. Fears of Threats, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
Fear of numerous confiscations of Arab lands	62.8	72.2	80.5	98.0
Fear of the annexation of the Triangle to a Palestinian state against the will of its Arab residents	43.2	41.7	69.7	69.4
Fear of population transfer (mass expulsion) of some Arab citizens	37.8	30.6	67.9	73.5
The government treats Arabs as second class citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	43.2	66.7	60.2	93.9
Expect worsening of relations between Arab citizens and Jews in the course of the coming five years	32.4	27.8	40.7	61.2

Table 52. Trust of Institutions, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
The courts	12.2	0.0	19.1	40.8
The Knesset	35.8	30.6	63.4	77.6
The government	44.6	55.6	80.5	100.0

Table 53. Legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
Despite its shortcomings, the regime in	74.3	72.2	58.5	44.9

Israel is a democracy for the Arab citizens as well				
Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together	90.5	94.4	70.3	51.0
Arab citizens should accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state	81.1	69.4	60.2	18.4
Israel as a state in which Arabs and Jews live together is racist	31.8	19.4	56.9	49.0
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together is racist	35.8	19.4	61.0	61.2

Table 54. Legitimacy of Israel as a Zionist State, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together	27.7	30.6	13.0	2.0
Israel has the right to exist as the state of the Jewish people	50.7	52.8	24.8	22.4
It is justified that Israel keeps a Jewish majority	47.3	41.7	17.9	6.1
Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state	48.0	41.7	23.2	8.2
Define oneself as anti-Zionist	18.2	58.3	32.0	85.7

Table 55. Affinity to the Palestinians and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
I feel closer the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip than to the Jews in Israel	29.7	25.0	52.4	81.6
The Jews are the main guilty for the protracted conflict between the Palestinians and Jews	45.9	50.0	72.8	87.8
The Jews are the main guilty for the disaster (al-Naqba) that occurred to the Palestinians in 1948	54.7	58.3	83.3	79.8
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the state of Palestine only	73.6	77.8	65.4	22.4
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation, will be allowed to return to the state of Palestine and with Israel's consent a small portion of them will be allowed to return to Israel	64.2	77.8	77.2	49.0
The state of Palestine will be demilitarized (without heavy weapons)	57.4	58.3	37.4	26.5

After the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will be over	81.1	72.2	82.1	44.9

Table 56. Support of Protest Actions, Arab Public and Public Figures

	Voters for Jewish Parties	Establishment Public Figures	Voters for Arab Parties	Non-Establishment Public Figures
In favour of protest abroad	45.3	55.6	59.8	95.9
In favour of illegal demonstrations	4.1	2.8	7.3	34.7

Table 57. Personal Background, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Woman	47.6	6.3	59.6	22.6
Aged 18-35	46.0	3.1	32.1	0.0
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) or religious (Dati)	41.7	53.1	2.6	12.9
Of Sephardic or Mizrahi origin	39.0	40.6	21.0	12.9
University graduate	32.7	62.5	53.4	83.9

Table 58. Connection to Arabs in Israel, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Know Arabic enough to conduct a conversation on different topics with an Israeli Arab	27.7	31.3	17.5	25.8
Meet Arabs daily or often	53.4	21.9	44.9	96.8
Have Arab friends	25.4	68.8	37.5	93.5
Have personally, as Jews, encountered threats, insults, or blows by Arab citizens against Jews	26.2	25.0	6.5	6.5

Table 59. Political Orientation, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Feel closest to parties on the				
Right	70.7	*	3.3	*
Left	2.3		60.7	
Will vote for parties on the				
Right	60.7	*	1.8	*
Left	2.9		50.6	
Voted in the 2003 Knesset elections for parties on the				
Right	69.4	*	7.7	*
Left	1.1		49.2	

*No information was provided for confidentiality reasons.

Table 60. Social and Cultural Integration, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Arabs will live in Jewish neighborhoods	14.2	21.9	66.4	83.9
Arabs will study in Jewish high schools	23.8	40.6	83.4	87.1

Arab parties will participate in government coalitions	25.9	59.4	67.3	100.0
Arabs have many good and important values and customs that Jews should adopt	34.5	34.4	52.7	80.6
My most important personal identity is being an Israeli citizen	18.1	6.3	48.7	51.6

Table 61. Alienation, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
I am not ready to have an Arab neighbor	74.3	53.1	18.9	0.0
I refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel	78.7	34.4	57.2	3.2
I feel afar from Arabs in Israel	82.6	56.3	60.8	19.4
Most Arab citizens will be more loyal to a Palestinian state in which they do not live than to Israel	81.7	78.1	47.0	19.4

Table 62. Fear of Threat, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their high birthrate	76.7	40.6	44.8	3.2
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character	84.9	68.8	48.2	12.9
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because they may start a popular revolt	94.1	78.1	61.5	12.9
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because they may help the enemy	86.8	43.8	49.6	6.5
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their support for the struggle of the Palestinian people	89.9	56.3	56.1	3.2

Table 63. Civil and National Legitimacy, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
The country between the Jordan river and the sea is a common homeland for Arabs and Jews	28.0	12.5	67.2	77.4
Arab citizens have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights, whether they accept or do not accept Israel's right to be a Jewish state	22.7	37.5	48.4	74.2
An Arab citizen who defines oneself as "a Palestinian Arab in Israel" cannot be loyal to the state and to its laws	90.9	53.1	63.0	3.2
Arab citizens are part of the Palestinian people and have the right to conduct a struggle on its behalf as long as they do not break the law	43.7	50.0	66.1	90.3

In decisions on the character and borders of the state there should be a majority from among the Jews and it is not sufficient to have a majority from among the population at large	95.1	78.1	55.8	16.1
In case of contradiction between the democratic character and the Jewish character of the state, I would prefer the Jewish character	84.1	78.1	41.1	16.1
The state should make it required by law that names of all streets and localities be written on signs in both Hebrew and Arabic	49.9	46.9	85.7	90.3

Table 64. Recognition of Arabs' Rights and Restrictions of Arabs' Rights, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Allow Arab citizens to live in any locality they would like	19.1	25.0	67.2	96.8
Allow Arab citizens to buy land in any area they would like	15.5	6.3	60.6	83.9
The state should give Jews some preference to Arab citizens	74.7	59.4	28.9	12.9
The state should prefer Jews in the development of the Galilee	86.3	93.8	56.7	25.8
The state should outlaw the Islamic Movement	86.5	87.5	55.7	6.5
The government treats the Arabs in Israel as second class citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	25.4	12.5	55.0	71.0

Table 65. Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
The Jews are the main guilty for the protracted conflict between the Palestinians and Jews	83.6	81.3	36.5	48.4
The Jews are the main guilty for the disaster (al-Naqba) that occurred to the Palestinians in 1948	76.5	93.8	45.2	58.1

Table 66. Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Two states to two peoples	53.4	34.4	86.6	100.0
The pre-1967 boundaries will be the boundaries between the two states with an option of land swaps	29.4	31.3	71.5	90.3
Jerusalem will be the capital of the two states	12.1	3.1	54.1	80.6

Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab	9.9	3.1	42.1	74.2
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the state of Palestine only	56.0	40.6	73.4	100.0
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation, will be allowed to return to the state of Palestine and with Israel's consent a small portion of them will be allowed to return to Israel	19.7	3.1	51.6	58.1
The state of Palestine will be demilitarized (without heavy weapons)	74.8	62.5	90.2	100.0
After the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will be over	52.3	40.6	81.3	93.5
The borders between Israel and a Palestinian state will be open borders	17.5	40.6	48.1	83.9

Table 67. Or Commission, Jewish Public and Public Figures

	Public on the Right	Public Figures on the Right	Public on the Left	Public Figures on the Left
Disagree that the Or Commission is an important commission that acted fairly and submitted vital recommendations to the government	39.2	62.5	18.4	0.0
Disagree with the recommendation to find and indict the policemen who fired at the Arab protesters to a death	61.7	75.0	26.7	6.5
Disagree with the recommendation to make basic change of the police policy toward Arab citizens	51.4	56.3	19.8	9.7
Disagree with the recommendation to deny public office to anyone the Commission found guilty	54.2	71.9	20.2	19.4

Table 68. Does Israel within the Green Line Have a Right to Exist? Arabs, 1976-2004

	1976	1980	1985	1988	1995	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Yes	51.1	58.8	51.4	51.4	62.1	46.9	50.7	54.7	66.4	66.7
Yes with reservations	28.4	30.3	31.0	35.2	31.2	34.5	33.7	29.5	23.4	23.1
No	20.5	11.0	17.6	13.5	6.8	18.6	15.6	15.8	10.2	10.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 69. Does Israel within the Green Line Have a Right to Exist a Jewish-Zionist State? Arabs, 1985-2004

	1985	1988	1995	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Yes	14.7	14.2	30.6	23.4	27.0	10.4	13.2	7.1
Yes with reservations	23.2	22.6	34.2	31.5	26.9	25.4	25.5	19.8
No	62.1	63.1	35.3	45.1	46.1	64.3	61.4	73.1

Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 70. Self-Definition on Zionism, Arabs, 1985-2004

	1985	1995	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Very Zionist, Zionist	0.8	1.7	1.5	1.4	0.5	1.2	3.4
Non-Zionist	52.1	73.6	68.3	65.5	68.2	78.8	63.7
Anti-Zionist	47.1	24.7	30.1	33.1	31.3	20.0	32.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 71. Classification of Personal Identities, Arabs, 1976-2004

	1976	1980	1985	1988	1995	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Israeli, Arab, Israeli Arab	54.7	45.4	32.1	33.2	53.6	35.8	34.2	41.8	53.0	45.7
Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel	12.4	28.8	38.7	39.7	36.1	44.8	45.8	46.8	41.4	45.6
Palestinian Arab, Palestinian	32.9	25.7	29.2	27.1	10.3	19.6	20.0	11.5	5.6	8.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 72. The Most Important Personal Identity, Arabs, 1976-2004

	1995	1999	2001	2003	2004
Being an Israeli citizen	31.4	19.4	20.2	31.2	24.7
Being a Moslem/Christian/Druze	45.6	30.5	40.3	48.6	48.8
Being a member of the Palestinian people	23.0	50.1	39.5	20.2	26.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 73. Feeling Close, Arabs, 1976-2004

	1995	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Feel closer to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip	50.4	69.2	64.5	69.4	54.9	52.8
Feel closer to Jews in Israel	49.6	30.8	35.5	30.6	45.1	47.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 74. Selected Militant Attitudes, Arabs, 1976-2004

	1976	1980	1985	1988	1995	2001	2002	2003	2004
Deny Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state	*	*	62.1	63.1	35.3	45.1	46.1	61.7	73.1
Think that the Zionist Movement is racist	63.5	60.7	65.3	70.0	50.3	62.4	67.5	*	*
Think that the Committee of Heads of Arab Local Governments is representative of	48.0	55.3	62.7	78.8	72.2	78.0	56.9	*	*

Arabs									
Support protest abroad	63.6	51.9	55.4	67.1	46.2	42.9	56.2	47.7	56.0
Support general strikes	62.6	54.6	61.2	73.8	56.4	55.5	61.4	59.6	70.8
Define oneself as Palestinian in Israel	12.4	28.8	38.7	39.7	36.1	45.8	46.8	40.6	45.6
Support the formation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel	74.7	64.0	67.2	76.5	84.4	82.1	88.9	89.2	91.7
Not satisfied with one's Israeli citizenship	48.7	55.3	57.9	62.3	26.2	48.5	46.1	35.3	39.8

*The question was not asked.

Table 75. Selected Rejectionist Attitudes, Arabs, 1976-2004

	1976	1980	1985	1988	1995	2001	2002	2003	2004
Deny Israel's right to exist as a state	20.5	11.0	17.6	13.5	6.8	15.6	15.8	11.2	10.2
Support a Palestinian state in all of Palestine instead of Israel or in the 1947 borders	58.7	38.1	32.3	29.5	16.6	29.1	17.9	19.7	33.3
Do not believe in acceptable democratic means	16.3	17.6	8.9	10.6	4.4	6.4	8.2	*	*
Support illegal demonstrations	17.1	7.0	10.8	13.1	6.0	9.5	8.3	4.9	6.0
Support use of violence	17.9	7.5	8.1	8.0	6.0	4.5	5.4	3.1	1.9
Define oneself as Palestinian (not Israeli)	32.9	25.7	29.2	27.1	10.3	20.0	11.5	5.7	8.7
Not willing at all to have Jewish friends	21.2	13.6	15.5	14.2	10.3	7.1	9.3	15.8	12.5

*The question was not asked.

Table 76. Orientation Types, Arabs, 1976-2001

	1980	1985	1988	1995	2001	2002
Accommodationist	13.3	11.3	6.5	17.7	18.0	10.5
Reservationist	43.9	38.9	36.6	62.9	43.4	40.3
Oppositionist	38.3	39.8	48.7	17.9	34.9	44.0
Rejectionist	6.5	9.9	8.1	1.5	3.7	5.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of cases	1,017	1,058	1,084	1,068	1,072	561

Table 77. Do You Accept the Existence of an Arab Minority in Israel Today? Jews, 1985-2004

	1985	1988	1995	2001	2003	2004
Yes	50.8	41.8	55.4	79.0	54.3	52.5

Yes with reservations	33.3	38.7	34.8	9.7	26.9	31.1
No	15.9	19.4	9.8	11.3	18.8	16.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 78. Is There a Right of Existence of an Arab Minority with Full Civil Rights in Israel? Jews, 1985-2004

	1985	1988	1995	2001	2003	2004
Yes	38.7	34.5	47.5	67.8	41.4	40.9
Yes with reservations	39.7	46.2	35.9	14.7	35.3	37.8
No	21.6	19.3	16.5	17.5	23.3	21.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 79. Selected Rejectionist Attitudes, Jews, 1985-2004

	1980	1985	1988	1995	2001	2003	2004
Deny Arabs' right to live in Israel as a minority		15.9	19.4	9.8	11.3	17.4	16.4
Deny the Arabs the right to vote to the Knesset		24.1	42.8	30.9	26.6	34.1	33.9
Think that Israel should encourage Arab citizens to leave the country**	50.3	42.4	39.9	36.7	41.7	39.5	43.8
Think that Israel is doing too much for the Arabs	36.4	32.9	37.4	20.7	22.9	*	*
Not willing at all to have Arab friends	39.1	37.4	40.5	32.2	27.0	31.3	34.0

*Question was not asked. **Wording is not identical.

Table 80. Orientation Types, Jews, 1980-2001

	1980	1985	1988	1995	2001
Reconciliationist	7.7	9.5	10.9	14.2	35.1
Pragmatist	33.5	35.9	37.4	43.0	23.9
Hardliner	36.7	35.4	30.1	29.4	27.3
Exclusionist	22.2	19.2	21.6	13.4	13.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of cases	1,081	1,035	979	1,020	510