Viterbi Family Center
for Public Opinion
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THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX

2020

Tamar Hermann

Or Anabi / Ayelet Rubabshi-Shitrit / Avraham (Rami) Ritov / Ella Heller

THE ISRAEL
DEMOCRACY
INSTITUTE

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* Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 can be found on the website of the Israel Democracy Institute:
  www.idi.org.il

Figures

Principal Findings

Chapter 1 / How Is Israel Doing?

■ For the second consecutive year, our findings showed a drop—and a steep one this time—in the share of Israelis who characterize Israel's overall situation as good or very good (37.5% this year, compared with 50% in 2019). The decline was most pronounced among Jewish respondents on the Right, though the proportion in this camp who view the country in a positive light (52.5%) is still much greater than in the Center or on the Left (26% and 13%, respectively).

■ While a majority of Israelis (total sample, 61%; Jews, 62%; and Arabs, 54%) define their personal situation as good or very good, this marks a significant decline from the corresponding assessment two years ago (which stood at 80% of the total sample).

■ A large majority of the Jewish interviewees (84.5%) responded that they feel part of the State of Israel and its problems, as contrasted with less than half the Arab interviewees (44%).

■ In the opinion of most of the respondents (76%), Israel is able to safeguard the security of its citizens; however, less than one-third hold that it is successful in ensuring their welfare (31%).

■ A majority of both Jewish and Arab respondents (total sample, 77%) feel that Israel is a good place to live; nonetheless, we found sizeable differences between the three main political camps in the Jewish sample (Right, 84%; Center, 70.5%; Left, 55.5%).

■ When asked which economic issues should be addressed most urgently by the government, the Jewish interviewees specified bringing down the cost of living and housing prices, followed by improving the healthcare system, and lastly, reducing economic gaps and looking out for weaker groups. In the Arab sample, the interviewees placed reducing unemployment at the head of the list, after which they cited improving the education system, and finally, upgrading the healthcare system.

■ With regard to each of the above issues, a majority of interviewees hold that the state has failed to address them adequately; thus, the system is seen as foundering in all areas.

Chapter 2 / Israeli Democracy

- As in 2019, a majority of interviewees (53.5%) agreed once again with the statement that "the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger." Precisely half of the Jewish respondents subscribe to this view, compared with nearly three-quarters (73%) of the Arab interviewees. A substantial majority of Jewish respondents from the Left and Center hold that Israeli democracy is in great danger (85% and 63%, respectively), as contrasted with a minority of 35% who feel this way on the Right. That said, there was an increase in the share on the Right who hold this view, relative to last year's finding of 29%.

- Once again this year, we found a plurality of respondents who believe that the democratic and Jewish components in Israel are not well balanced, and that the Jewish aspect is overly strong (with 76% of Arabs and 41.5% of Jews taking this position). At the same time, among Haredi and national religious Jews, the most frequent opinion once again is that the democratic component is too dominant (72% and 50%, respectively).

- As in previous years (and to virtually the same extent), a majority of our interviewees hold that Israel's leadership is corrupt (total sample, 58%). In the Jewish sample, this perception is much more common among respondents from the Left and Center (at 87.5% and 74%, respectively) than it is among respondents on the Right (43%).

- Against the backdrop of the political turmoil of the past year and the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, at the time of our survey in June 2020, we found only a slight drop in public trust in the various state institutions in Israel.

- Once again, the IDF enjoys the highest level of trust (among Jewish respondents), while the political institutions—the Knesset, government, and political parties—earn the lowest (in both the Jewish and Arab samples). That said, the share who expressed confidence in the army is at its lowest ebb since 2008.

- Trust in the Supreme Court among Jewish interviewees has been steadily decreasing for nearly a decade, and stands at 52% this year, representing a decline of 2.5 percentage points from last year, and 20 percentage points since 2012. In the Arab sample, the degree of trust in this institution tends to fluctuate, apparently in response to circumstances; this year's score of 60% represents an increase of 4 percentage points over last year.

- Trust in the attorney general is moderate-to-low (42%), remaining stable over the past three years.

Chapter 3 / The Healthcare System

■ The rating of public healthcare in Israel is relatively high: roughly half of those surveyed ranked it as good to excellent; over one-third (36%), fair; and less than 15%, poor to very poor. Opinions among the Arab public were more positive than in the Jewish public, with 59% of the Arab sample rating the system as good to excellent, compared with 48% in the Jewish sample.

■ The degree of trust in the various health funds (HMOs) is even greater, with 78% of interviewees expressing confidence in the fund they belong to. The differences between the health funds in this regard are minor.

■ The vast majority of interviewees are satisfied with the quality of medical care (83.5%) and with the patient experience (83%) that they receive from their health fund.

■ Satisfaction with the quality of medical care at public hospitals is much lower (at 57%), with a substantial gap between Jews and Arabs on this question (54% versus 74.5%, respectively). We encountered similar findings with regard to patient experience: While a sizeable majority in the Arab sample (76%) are satisfied with the way that hospital personnel relate to patients, less than half the Jewish respondents (48%) share this view.

■ There is a very broad consensus (86%) regarding the need to increase the health budget even if this means reducing the budgets of other ministries.

■ If the health budget is increased, the Jewish interviewees hold that the two most important objectives should be adding positions for doctors and nursing staff, and increasing the number of available hospital beds. In the opinion of the Arab interviewees, the two most important goals should be establishing hospitals in outlying areas and purchasing advanced medical equipment.

■ In line with the high level of trust in the public healthcare system, only about one-quarter of the Israeli public (27%) believe that it is corrupt.

■ Some two-thirds of the Arab sample (67.5%) and over one-half of the Jewish sample (55.5%) think that the public healthcare system in Israel provides equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors. In the Jewish sample, agreement with this statement is higher on the Right (62%) than it is among respondents from the Center or Left (48%).

■ A considerable majority of interviewees (76%) were not sympathetic toward people who lash out at medical personnel.

Chapter 4 / The Israeli Police Force

- The most common assessment of overall police performance in Israel is fair (45%). Some 27% rate it as good or excellent, and a similar share (26%) characterize it as poor or very poor.

- The public assigned a low grade for police performance in specific areas (combatting drug use, fighting cybercrime, preventing road accidents, combatting organized crime, exposing corruption, and combatting domestic violence). For each of the above, only one-third—or even less—rated it as good or excellent.

- In the Jewish sample, the police received their lowest score for their handling of domestic violence, while the Arab sample gave them the lowest rating for the fight against organized crime.

- A large majority of the Arab sample (82%) believe that "the police make more effort to address crime in Jewish communities than in Arab ones." In the Jewish sample as well, a majority of 67% agree with this statement.

- Regarding the question of over-policing, a majority of both Jewish (62.5%) and Arab (56.5%) interviewees hold that Ethiopian Israelis are over-policed. The bulk of the Arab public feel that Arab Israelis and illegal Palestinian workers are victims of the same phenomenon (73% and 71.5%, respectively). Roughly one-half of the Arabs surveyed (50.5%) hold that Mizrahim suffer from over-zealous policing. By contrast, only a minority of Jewish respondents believe that Israeli Arabs, illegal Palestinian workers, foreign workers, Haredim, and Mizrahim are over-policed.

- A sizeable majority of the total sample (70%) believe that the police relate seriously to criticism of their performance only to a small extent or not at all.

Chapter 5 / Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel

- The vast majority of Arab interviewees (81%), and a smaller majority of Jews (56%), think that Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it. In the Jewish sample, nearly one-half of respondents on the Right (48.5%) disagree with this statement.

- A majority of Jewish interviewees hold that the regime in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens as well, while a majority of Arabs surveyed take the opposite view. Among Arab respondents, the share who agree with this statement has declined by 10 percentage points over the past three years.

- Three-quarters of the Jewish sample are of the opinion that decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority. The differences

between the political camps within this sample are considerable: On the Right (87%) and in the Center (71%), a majority agree with this statement, as contrasted with a minority on the Left (39%).

■ A majority of 77% in the Arab sample and 54% in the Jewish sample hold that it is not necessary for Jews and Arabs to live apart in order to preserve their respective national identities. In the Jewish public, the Haredim are the most strongly in favor of living separately (82%).

■ For a decisive majority of respondents (96% in the Arab sample, and 71% in the Jewish sample), it makes no difference whether they are treated by a Jewish or an Arab doctor. Here too, a breakdown of the Jewish sample shows that the preference for being treated by a Jewish rather than an Arab doctor is strongest among the Haredim (52%).

■ The overwhelming majority of Arab respondents (93%) are willing to be employed in a workplace in a Jewish community, as opposed to a minority of Jews (41%) who would be ready to work in an Arab locality.

■ The vast majority of Arab interviewees (91%) are willing to work under a Jewish boss, as contrasted with only two-thirds (67%) of Jewish respondents who are ready to work under an Arab boss.

■ A majority of Arab interviewees (83%) support legislation requiring Arab representation at all levels and in all institutions in proportion to their percentage of the country's population. Just over one-third of Jewish respondents favor such a move.

■ Only a minority of Jewish interviewees (36%) support including Arab parties in the governing coalition, as opposed to a majority (70%) of Arab interviewees.

■ In the opinion of 52% of the Arab interviewees, the primary reason for the low representation of Arab workers in senior positions in Israel's civil service is the desire of the Jewish majority to keep Arabs out of positions of power. Only a minority of Jewish interviewees (31%) agreed with this claim.

Chapter 6 / Israeli Society

■ The level of solidarity in Israeli society is rated by our interviewees as moderate or worse. The average score on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = a high level of solidarity, was 5.3 in the Jewish sample, and 4.8 in the Arab one.

■ Half of those interviewed are opposed to paying higher taxes even if they could be certain that the money would be put toward reducing Israel's socioeconomic gaps. A total of 37% agree in principle, depending on how much higher the taxes would be, while just 13% support the idea unconditionally. In the Jewish sample, agreement is stronger on the Left than in the Center or on the Right.

- We asked if private companies should be required by law to implement a policy of hiring employees from weaker or more vulnerable populations, namely, women, Haredim, people with physical or mental health disabilities, Arab citizens of Israel, and people over 50. In the Jewish sample, a majority supported such legislation for each of these groups. A similar picture emerged from the Arab sample as well, with the exception of people with mental health disabilities; in the case of this group, less than 40% of Arab interviewees supported enacting such a law.

- Once again this year, respondents in the Jewish sample ranked tensions between Right and Left as the most severe in Israeli society; by contrast, the Arab interviewees placed tensions between Jews and Arabs at the head of the list.

- The prevailing opinion is that the coronavirus pandemic has resulted in improved relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, but has worsened relations between Haredim and non-Haredim, between the public and the government, and between the public and the police.

Chapter 7 / International Indicators

We examined Israel's scores in various measures of democracy, and its ranking relative to the other countries surveyed and to its fellow members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), based on 15 international indicators.

- Israel's relative standing compared with last year improved in five of the indicators (egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, functioning of government, equal distribution of resources); it declined in three additional indicators (political rights, control of corruption, perception of corruption); and it registered virtually no change in almost half the indicators studied (civil liberties, freedom of the press, voice and accountability, political participation, democratic political culture, rule of law, regulatory quality).

- Israel's democratic performance over time is also mixed, when comparing this year's scores with its grades over the last decade. On the one hand, in the three indicators of democratic rights and freedoms as well as in the two corruption indicators, this year's scores are lower than its ten-year average (results for the political rights indicator are particularly disappointing, showing a drop of 20 places in two years). Yet on the other hand, there has been an upturn in both governance indicators, in four out of six measures of democratic process, and in the indicators of regulatory quality and equal distribution of resources.

- Once again this year, Israel is positioned above the midpoint in the global rankings in all indicators studied, and in eight of them, is even in the highest quartile. By contrast, when compared with the other 36 OECD states, Israel is situated toward the bottom of the list this year in most of the indicators.

Introduction

Last year's introduction to the Israeli Democracy Index opened with the sentence: "Israel experienced a politically tumultuous year in 2019." In retrospect, these words seem exaggerated, perhaps even ironic. At the time, no one could have imagined how last year would pale in comparison with the major upheavals of 2020 and their after-effects. In fact, it would be safe to say that no Democracy Index Survey has ever been conducted during a period of such jarring political, social, economic, and of course, health-related turmoil, both in Israel and globally. As one crisis follows another, old conceptual, organizational, and governmental paradigms are being fundamentally challenged, and entire communities are being forced to grapple with loss, danger, and unfamiliar anxieties. And the future remains a mystery.

The 2020 Israeli Democracy Index Survey was carried out in June of this year. This was shortly after Israel's third round of elections in under a year and the formation of its power-sharing government, and following the first lockdown, instituted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has sorely tested the powers that be. At the time the survey was conducted, it appeared that the country's leadership had passed the test, and with quite a respectable grade. But the survey findings summarized and presented in this report do not reflect the tremendous turbulence and collapse of public trust in Israel's leadership in subsequent months, nor the government's failures, which were fully exposed as the situation worsened. Thus, while some decline in the public's faith in the government is already discernible in the survey that forms the basis of this report, it was not yet as dramatic or pervasive as that which we found in the surveys we conducted in the summer and autumn months (the Israeli Voice Index, and the "Israel in the Time of Corona" series). Relations between the public and the government, and between the public and the police, which were already on troubled ground in mid-2020 in the opinion of the survey participants, deteriorated even further as the pandemic escalated, to the point where the decision-makers would likely be delighted to be able to turn back the clock in terms of public assessment of their performance.

Since there have been substantial shifts in public opinion in the months since we conducted the survey presented here, why, then, should we publish a collection of data some of which would seem to be out-of-date? There are several responses to this argument: First, the IDI's Democracy Surveys are intended to delineate long-term trends, and not only snapshots of a given moment in time. For this reason, it is important that 2020 also be represented properly in our database, which will be available to present and future scholars. Second, to be able to gauge where we are now, it is important to know what came before, in the distant past as well as more recently (namely, in mid-2020). Third, what seems to us today to be a historic turning point may ultimately prove fleeting with the hindsight of a few months or years, and once the storm has died down, at least some things may revert to how they once were. Fourth—and no less important; in fact, maybe more so—despite the trials and tribulations inflicted by the coronavirus, it seems that the underpinnings of public opinion in Israel have not changed, not

in the wake of the endless elections we have gone through (and may yet endure again), nor following the breakdown on so many fronts as a result of the pandemic.

At the head of the list in this regard is the rift between Right and Left, which we have been highlighting for several years now, and which is only intensifying in light of the fact that the Israeli Left has been virtually wiped out electorally, due not only to the results of the most recent elections (in March 2020) but, even more so, to the formation of the national unity government in May of this year. (This topic is deserving of deeper analysis that is beyond the purview of this report.) The longtime party framework of this camp has been replaced in recent months by stormy civil-political activity in extra-establishment settings exemplified mainly, but not exclusively, by the so-called Balfour and Bridge Protests (named for the locations of the demonstrations, near the prime minister's Balfour Street residence and on bridges throughout the country, respectively). Despite lacking a flagship party, a clear leadership, or an agreed agenda apart from opposition to the policies of Binyamin Netanyahu's government and to the prime minister himself, the Israeli Left continues to play an active role—perhaps even more than in the past—in the country's public discourse.

The findings contained in the 2020 Israeli Democracy Index offer persuasive testimony as to the depth of the differences of opinion between those who align themselves with the political Left, the Center, and certainly, the Right. The congruence between self-defined religiosity and political orientation—which we have identified in the past, and which we spotlight in the present report as well—has not only remained unchanged, even in these turbulent times, but appears to be increasing. In other words, even if we appear at first glance to be living in a world completely different from the one we knew just a few short months ago, in reality, a number of the core elements of Israeli politics and society still persist, for better or for worse.

To conclude, during 2020 we were honored to receive an extremely generous donation from the Viterbi Family Foundation in the United States—a contribution that will ensure the future of the Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. In coordination with the family of the late Louis Guttman, for whom the Center was originally named, it has therefore been decided to change the name of this body to the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. But the name of Prof. Guttman, the founding father of public opinion research in Israel, will not be forgotten. On the contrary—going forward, the Data Israel database, an endeavor for which he laid the groundwork, will carry his name and will henceforth be known as Data Israel: The Louis Guttman Social Research Database (at DataIsrael. idi.org.il). With the help of the funding secured, we hope to be able to expand our activities and contribute even further to civic discourse and professional knowledge about public opinion in Israel in all its diversity, on topics related to democratic values and the functioning of Israel's government institutions.

The Israeli Democracy Index Research Team
December 2020

Methodology

Part I of the report is based on a public opinion survey formulated by the staff of the Israel Democracy Institute's Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, who also analyzed the data collected.

Two polling firms carried out the field work for the survey: in Hebrew, Midgam Research & Consulting Ltd. (Bnei Brak); and in Arabic, Statnet Research Institute (Daliyat al-Karmel). The surveys were conducted between May 7 and May 15, 2020.

In Part II of the report, we present data from external sources in the form of scores in various indicators compiled by international institutes.

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's Democracy Index survey was assembled in May 2020. It consists of 82 content questions, some of them with multiple subsections. Several of the questions were adapted to the respondents: for example, interviewees from the Jewish public were asked about their willingness to work for an Arab boss, and from the Arab public, about their willingness to work for a Jewish boss. This is noted clearly in the relevant survey questions in Appendices 1 and 2. A total of 32 questions are recurring items from previous *Democracy Index* surveys or from the *Conditional Partnership* studies.[1] In addition to the content questions, 18 sociodemographic questions were posed in the Hebrew questionnaire, and 15 in the Arabic questionnaire. For all questions, the response "don't know / refuse to answer" was not read to the interviewees as a possible choice.

The questionnaire was translated into Arabic in advance, and the interviewers for this version were native Arabic speakers.

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1   Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2017); Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2019).

The sample

In total, 1,180 men and women aged 18 and over were interviewed:

- 1,001 interviewees constituting a representative sample of Jews and others[2]
- 179 interviewees forming a representative sample of Arab citizens of Israel

The Arab and Jewish samples were both weighted by religion, age, and sex to ensure that they were as representative as possible.

The maximum sampling error for a sample of this size is ±2.9% for the total sample (±3.1% for the Jewish sample, and ±7.3% for the Arab sample).

Data collection (%)

The data were collected primarily via an online questionnaire and through phone interviews. The Arabic survey was conducted solely by telephone.

	Internet	Telephone	Total
Hebrew survey sample	83.1	16.9	100
Arabic survey sample	–	100	100
Total (full sample)	70.4	29.6	100

The survey in Hebrew was conducted primarily via the Internet, with the exception of the Haredi public, who were interviewed mainly by telephone.

Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Internet	Telephone	Total
Secular	87.1	12.9	100
Traditional non-religious	93.7	6.3	100

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2   The category of "others" was adopted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics during the 1990s to denote people who are not Jewish according to halakha (Jewish religious law) but are not Arab. This relates mainly to immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return despite not being considered halakhically Jewish. In the present survey, we treat these people as part of the Jewish majority, and examine differences between the group of "Jews and others" and the sample of Arab Israelis.

Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Internet	Telephone	Total
Traditional religious	95.6	4.4	100
National religious	99.2	0.8	100
Haredim	22.4	77.6	100

Age	Internet	Telephone	Total
18–24	90.1	9.9	100
25–34	75.8	24.2	100
35–44	86.3	13.7	100
45–54	97.6	2.4	100
55–64	84.5	15.5	100
65+	65.4	34.6	100

How did we analyze the data? Along with the variables known from previous studies to shape Israeli public opinion on political and social issues of the type that we examine in the *Israeli Democracy Index*, which are included as a rule in our research (religiosity, nationality, etc.), we determine the specific additional factors that form the basis of our analysis in a given year only after completing our data collection and testing repeatedly by trial and error. In the 2020 report, we also analyzed the responses of the Jewish sample based on self-defined religiosity[3] and political orientation[4]; and in the Arab sample, on religion, and in certain cases, on voting patterns in the 2020 Knesset elections as well. For certain topics in both samples, we also examined how the findings correlated with social location (the respondents' sense of social

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3   The categories for this variable were: Haredi, national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular.

4   The categories for this variable were: Right, Center, and Left.

centrality or marginality),[5] education, sex, income, or age. As shown in appendix 3, in the Jewish sample there is a high degree of overlap between some of these variables, chiefly with regard to religiosity and political orientation; but as the congruence is not total, there is reason to examine each of these self-definitions separately.

Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two types of references have been inserted in the margins of the text. The first type, located next to every question discussed, refers the reader to the page where that question appears in appendix 1 (which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question in a three-part format: total sample, Jewish sample, Arab sample). The second type appears only for recurring questions, and refers the reader to appendix 2 (a multi-year comparison of data; this appendix can be found on the website of the Israel Democracy Institute). The references appear in the text as follows:

Israel's overall situation
Question 1

Appendix 1
Page 199

Appendix 2
(See IDI website)

Likewise, next to each question in appendices 1 and 2, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.

To make for easier reading, we present the data in whole numbers in the text and accompanying figures. In a small number of cases, we use half percentage points. In the appendices, however, the data are shown to a higher degree of precision—up to one decimal place. Due to this rounding (which, as stated, is used to assist the reader), there are occasionally very slight differences between the data in the main body of the report and in the appendices.

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5   The categories for this variable were: I feel I belong to a strong group [in society]; I feel I belong to a fairly strong group; I feel I belong to a fairly weak group; I feel I belong to a weak group.

Part One

Israel in the Eyes of its Citizens

Chapter 1 / How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

■ Israel's overall situation today
■ Respondents' personal situation
■ Israel's ability to ensure the security and welfare of its citizens
■ The most important socioeconomic issues, and how well they are being handled
■ Is Israel a good place to live?
■ Sense of belonging to the state and its problems

As we do every year, the first question we posed in the 2020 Democracy Survey was "How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?" Not surprisingly, this year's assessment was less positive than last year's, though we have not yet reached a state of total collapse. This, despite the fact that the survey was conducted three months into the coronavirus pandemic, with all its ramifications. In the total sample surveyed, the most frequent response was "so-so," followed by a positive opinion ("good" or "very good") and, in third place, a negative view ("bad" or "very bad"). It should be noted that in both the positive and negative categories, the largest share of respondents was found in the "soft" choices of good or bad, with fewer selecting the end categories of very good or very bad.

As shown in the figure below, this is the second consecutive year in which the total sample showed a decline in those who characterized the situation as good or very good. This year, the drop is very steep (12.5 percentage points). Consequently, there was a rise in the share who defined the situation as so-so or bad/very bad. In fact, this is the first time since 2016 that the proportion who labeled Israel's situation as so-so surpassed those who defined it as good or very good.

Figure 1.1 / Israel's overall situation, 2003–2020 (total sample; %)

Good or very good   So-so   Bad or very bad

Does everyone feel the same way? Apparently not, as shown when we break the data down by nationality: The most common response in both the Jewish and Arab samples was so-so; however, among Jewish respondents, the share of positive responses exceeded that of negative ones, whereas among Arab respondents, the pattern was reversed. In other words, the overall assessment of Israel's situation in the Jewish public is more positive than that in the Arab public, corresponding with our findings in past surveys.

Figure 1.2 / Israel's overall situation today (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political camp (as noted in the Methodology section, this refers to self-defined location on the political spectrum with regard to security and foreign policy issues) reveals that the share of respondents on the Left who take a negative view of Israel's overall situation is almost double that in the Center and close to four times that on the Right. This is the first indication of a trend that we will be encountering throughout this report: Irrespective of the personal situation of the respondents in all three camps, and in virtually every question of this type, the worldview on the Left is more negative and pessimistic than that of the other two camps.

Table 1.1 (Jewish sample; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Israel's situation is good or very good	13	26	52.5
Israel's situation is so-so	45	48	36
Israel's situation is bad or very bad	41	26	11
Don't know	1	–	0.5
Total	100	100	100

In a repeat of last year, the sex of the respondent was found to be a relevant variable, as the share of women who hold that Israel's situation is good or very good is significantly lower than that of the men, and the proportion of women who consider the country's state to be bad or very bad exceeds that of the men.

Table 1.2 (total sample; %)

	Women	Men
Israel's situation is good or very good	31.5	43.5
Israel's situation is so-so	44	36
Israel's situation is bad or very bad	24	19.5
Don't know	0.5	1
Total	100	100

Similarly, we found very sizeable differences when breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity (again, as self-defined). The more religious groups assess the country's situation much more positively than do the more secular ones.

Figure 1.3 / View Israel's situation today as good or very good (Jewish sample; %)

While we do not examine our interviewees' assessment of their personal state every year, in light of the upheaval caused by the pandemic and the high proportion of individuals who have suffered harm in terms of their health, finances, or emotional well-being, we saw reason to revisit this question. Hence we asked: "And what about your personal situation?" Unlike the state of the nation, and perhaps in contrast to the picture that emerges from the press and social media, we found that on an individual level, the positive outweighs the negative: Even at this time, a majority of Israelis define their personal situation as good or very good. This conforms with Israel's high ranking in the World Happiness Report, and can be explained by the strong social connections among most Israelis, which may somewhat alleviate or offset the hardships caused by the coronavirus in Israel and around the world.

Figure 1.4 / Personal situation today (total sample; %)

An analysis of the responses by nationality shows that a majority of Jews and Arabs alike characterize their personal situation as good or very good (Jews, 62%; Arabs, 54%). Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation also yielded a majority in all three camps who define their personal state as good or very good, though the share on the Right is noticeably higher than in the other camps (Left, 55%; Center, 56%; Right, 66.5%). The same holds true if we break down the total sample by income: In all income groups, a majority define their personal situation in positive terms; however, this share increases in tandem with the level of income (below-average income, 53%; average, 60%; above-average, 73%).

Nevertheless, there is a marked decline this year in the share who characterize their own situation as good or very good, compared with the previous surveys in which this question was posed:

Table 1.3 (total sample; %)

	Define their personal situation as good or very good
2020	61
2018	80
2017	73.5
2016	76
2015	75
2014	66

Is there a connection between the definition of one's personal situation and that of the country? It seems that they are strongly linked, as we found a clear association between these two assessments. Slightly over half of those who defined their personal situation as good or very good also gave a positive rating of Israel's overall situation, compared with just 7% of those who defined their own situation as bad or very bad. And vice versa: Only a small minority of those who labeled their personal situation as good or very good characterize the country's situation as bad or very bad, in contrast with almost 60% of those who defined their own situation as bad or very bad.

Table 1.4 (total sample; %)

	Personal situation is good or very good	Personal situation is so-so	Personal situation is bad or very bad
Israel's situation is good or very good	52	18	7
Israel's situation is so-so	36	50	35
Israel's situation is bad or very bad	11.5	31.5	58
Don't know	0.5	0.5	–
Total	100	100	100

We wished to examine to what extent the State of Israel is seen by the public as safeguarding the security and welfare of its citizens. In terms of security, the share of respondents who hold that Israel is successful in this regard is clearly greater than in 2019: This year, more than three-quarters of the total sample feel that the state is fulfilling this mission, as opposed to two-thirds last year. Nonetheless, this success is overshadowed by the extremely low percentage—less than one-third—who think that Israel is managing to ensure the welfare of its citizens. In this area, there has been a slight decline in the already-low share of respondents who felt this way last year. In other words, even more than in the past, we found that the state's successes in the field of security are seen as far greater than its achievements in the area of welfare.

Figure 1.5 / Think that Israel is able to ensure the security and welfare of its citizens, 2019 and 2020 (total sample; %)

Breaking down the data by nationality, we found that 80% of Jewish respondents consider the state successful in safeguarding the security of its citizens. This view is also shared by a majority of Arab respondents, albeit a much smaller one of just 56%. Perhaps this gap stems from a different understanding of the concept of security, which Arab citizens may take to encompass domestic security as well; from their perspective, the latter is being neglected given the high crime rate in the Arab community, which the state is not addressing as it should.

When we examined responses regarding the welfare of Israel's citizenry, again broken down by nationality, we discovered that the share of Jews who consider the state successful in this area is lower, for some reason, than it is among Arabs (28% and 50%, respectively). We found such a disparity last year as well, which raises the possibility of a gap in expectations, meaning that Jews expect the state to do more in this regard, and are therefore more disappointed when it underperforms.

An analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that, in all three camps, the vast majority hold that the state is successful in ensuring the security of its citizens, with slight but consistent gaps between them (Left, 70%; Center, 79%; Right, 84%). In terms of the welfare of Israeli citizens, a minority in all three camps think that the state is doing well in this regard, but here the differences are more substantial (Left, 6%; Center, 19%; Right, 38%). Somewhat surprisingly, we did not encounter differences on this question between respondents whose income is below average, average, or above average.

Still in the context of how well the state handles the well-being of its citizens, we wished to learn what the public considers to be the three most important socioeconomic issues in Israel today. The issue selected as most important by the greatest proportion of the total sample is lowering the cost of living and housing prices. In second place, presumably in light of the pandemic, is improving the healthcare system. This is followed (in descending order) by reducing economic gaps and looking out for weaker populations, lowering unemployment rates, improving the education system, and, lagging far behind, strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities (not a "classic" socioeconomic issue, but we included it here due to the outlay it would require at the expense of other national objectives), reducing traffic congestion, and improving police performance. This finding is especially interesting, given the respondents' harsh criticism of the police (see chapter 4).

Figure 1.6 / Most important socioeconomic issues (total sample; %)

Analyzing the results by nationality reveals certain differences between Jewish and Arab respondents. Among Arabs, reducing unemployment is at the top of the list, and among Jews, lowering the cost of living and housing prices. In the Arab sample, the smallest share chose reducing traffic congestion as a major issue, while in the Jewish sample, improving police performance ranked lowest in importance.

Table 1.5 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Two most important issues	Two least important issues
Jews	Lowering the cost of living and housing prices (21%)	Strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities (6%)
	Improving the healthcare system (18%)	Improving police performance (3%)
Arabs	Lowering unemployment (21%)	Strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities (6%)
	Improving the education system (19%)	Reducing traffic congestion (4%)

Figure 1.7 / Most important socioeconomic issues (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Jews / Arabs

Breaking down the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, in all three camps, improving the healthcare system is one of the two major problems selected, with strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities and improving police performance cited as secondary issues.

Table 1.6 (Jewish sample; %)

	Two most important issues	Two least important issues
Left	Reducing economic gaps and caring for weaker groups (22%)	Strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities (3%)
	Improving the healthcare system (21%)	Improving police performance (1%)
Center	Lowering the cost of living and housing prices (19%)	Strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities (5%)
	Improving the healthcare system (19%)	Improving police performance (4.5%)
Right	Lowering the cost of living and housing prices (22%)	Strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities (6.5%)
	Improving the healthcare system (17%)	Improving police performance (4%)

A breakdown of the findings by income yields negligible differences between those with below-average, average, and above-average earnings, with all three groups prioritizing bringing down the cost of living and housing prices and improving the healthcare system. Stated otherwise, in spite of the sense that the various subgroups in Israeli society have little in common, ultimately their definitions of national socioeconomic objectives are very similar and could serve as the basis for formulating a new national consensus, if the leadership sees such a move as serving their political interests.

State's handling of each of the issues

Question 79-81

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Based on our survey data, the public's assessment of how well the state is handling each of the above issues is disturbingly low. Only the subject of strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities (which we included in the list despite being ostensibly unrelated) earns a high rating. In other words, the general consensus is that the system is failing in almost every area.

Figure 1.8 / Think that the state is handling each of these issues very well or quite well (total sample; %)

Since such a small proportion of respondents feel that the state is handling the issues we presented very well or quite well, there is no point in trying to break down these findings according to different variables.

Despite the misgivings, some of which we have already cited and others that we will be discussing later on, more than three-quarters of the interviewees answered that Israel is a good place to live. We did not find any real differences in this regard between the Jewish and Arab samples, nor between the various income levels and age groups. It is important to note that a high proportion of Arab interviewees (78%) believe that Israel is a good place to live—a finding that is worthy of note given these respondents' harsh criticism of Israeli democracy, which, in their view, does not treat them in a democratic fashion (see chapter 2).

Is Israel a good place to live?

Question 12

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Appendix 2
(See IDI website)

Figure 1.9 / "Israel is a good place to live" (total sample; %)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity as well as political orientation found a majority in all groups who feel that Israel is a good place to live; however, the size of this majority differs from group to group. As shown in the table below, the share of secular Jews who take this view is lower than that of all the other groups in this category. The same holds true for those who place themselves on the Left politically, in comparison with those who identify as Center or Right. Thus, in line with the trend we described earlier, even during the coronavirus pandemic, the more religious and right-wing groups are satisfied with life in Israel to a greater degree than the more secular and left-wing respondents.

Table 1.7 (Jewish sample; %)

		Agree that Israel is a good place to live
Religiosity	Haredim	92
	National religious	92
	Traditional religious	80
	Traditional non-religious	81
	Secular	65
Political orientation	Left	55
	Center	70.5
	Right	84

Notwithstanding the above, though a solid majority of respondents feel that Israel is a good place to live, this year has seen some decline in this area relative to two earlier surveys. Since at present there is only the one survey that skews lower, further assessments will be needed to determine if this represents a trend or a one-time finding, perhaps influenced by the pandemic.

Table 1.8 (total sample; %)

Year	Feel that Israel is a good place to live
2020	77
2019*	85
2017	85

If the majority of respondents think that Israel is a good place to live, does this mean they feel a sense of belonging to the country, with all its positive and negative aspects?

The answer to this question is complicated. A decisive majority of Jewish interviewees indicated that they feel part of the state and its problems; however, among Arab respondents, only a minority (though a considerable one) share this view, while a majority report that they feel this way "not so much" or "not at all."

Do you feel part of the state and its problems?

Question 3

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Appendix 2
(See IDI website)

*   Tamar Hermann, Or Anabi, William Cubbison, Ella Heller, and Fadi Omar, Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019, p. 31, figure 2.1 (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2019).

Figure 1.10 / Feel part of the state and its problems (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Interestingly enough, despite our findings in several other surveys that the coronavirus pandemic has brought Jewish and Arab citizens closer together, there has been no change since last year in the share of Arabs who responded that they feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (less than one-half). At the same time, a breakdown of Arab respondents by religion yields a majority who feel a sense of belonging among Christians and Druze, as contrasted with a minority—albeit sizeable—among Muslims:

Table 1.9 (Arab sample; %)

	Muslims	Christian	Druze
Feel part of the state and its problems	40	61	66

And what of the Jewish public? An analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation did not reveal substantial differences between camps, with 82% of the Left, 88% of the Center, and 86% of the Right feeling part of the state and its problems. A breakdown of the findings by age showed a majority in all age groups who feel this way, though the size of the majority increases with age:

Figure 1.11 / Feel part of the state and its problems very much or quite a lot (Jewish sample, by age; %)

Breaking down the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity yields the interesting finding that Haredi respondents—who are more inclined than the other groups to think that Israel is a good place to live and that the country's overall situation is good—feel less a part of the State of Israel and its problems than do the other groups in this category, though they too show a majority:

Table 1.10 (Jewish sample; %)

Feel part of the state and its problems	
Haredim	**68**
National religious	**89**
Traditional religious	**85**
Traditional non-religious	**90.5**
Secular	**85**

Chapter 2 / Israeli Democracy

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- The state of Israeli democracy
- Democratic and Jewish: the balance between them
- "They're all the same"
- Corruption at the top
- Trust in state institutions

On a number of occasions over the past several years, we have asked interviewees to express their opinion on the following statement: "The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger." Slightly over half of this year's respondents do indeed feel that Israel's democratic regime is under threat.

Figure 2.1 / "The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger" (total sample; %)

Legend:
- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

Values: 1.5, 21, 26, 24, 27.5

Given the recent volatile public discourse on this subject, we anticipated a significant rise this year in the sense of danger to democracy, but this expectation was not borne out. The findings this year were very similar to those in previous surveys, though a certain pattern (albeit not dramatic) of a growing sense of danger is discernible over the last two years.

Table 2.1 (total sample; %)

	Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger
2020	**53.5**
2019	**54**
2018	**46**
2017	**45**

This year as well, the difference between Jews and Arabs on this question is substantial, with half the Jewish interviewees agreeing with the statement as compared with roughly three-quarters of the Arab respondents. In other words, the Arabs surveyed see a greater threat to Israeli democracy than do the Jews.

Table 2.2 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Jewish sample	Arab sample
Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	**50**	**73**

An even greater difference was found when we broke down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation. A majority of respondents from the Left and Center agree that such a danger exists, but only a minority on the Right feel this way. Here as well, this year's findings are very similar to the past; however, as shown in the figure below, there is a slow but systematic rise in the share of interviewees on the Right who agree with the statement we presented. One question for which we are unable to offer a data-driven response is whether the reasons for this increase are similar to, or (presumably) different from, those that evoke concern among a majority of the Center and Left.

Figure 2.2 / "The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger," 2017–2020, by political orientation (strongly or somewhat agree; Jewish sample; %)

Interestingly, in the oldest age groups in the Jewish sample (55 and above), a clear majority (over 60%) see a danger to Israel's democratic system, whereas a smaller share (less than one-half) in the younger age groups show a similar concern. However, we cannot state whether the factor at play here is age itself or the higher proportion of Center and Left voters in the older age groups.

Cross-tabulating the question on Israel's overall situation today with that of the danger to the country's democratic system, we find that a majority of those who characterize Israel's situation as good or very good reject the claim that Israeli democracy is in grave danger. And the converse holds true as well: A majority of those who define the country's status as bad or very bad agree with the above statement. To clarify, this does not necessarily mean that each assessment directly influences the other; external variables such as religiosity or political orientation may affect both these positions, causing the association between them.

Table 2.3 (Jewish sample; %)

	Agree that democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	Disagree that democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	Don't know	Total
Israel's situation is good or very good	33	65	2	100
Israel's situation is so-so	58	40	2	100
Israel's situation is bad or very bad	79	20	1	100

We examined whether there is a connection between the belief that Israeli democracy is in serious danger and the feeling that it is good or bad to live in Israel. Among those who hold that Israel is a good place to live, we found that respondents were divided almost evenly between those who perceive the democratic system in Israel as being under threat and those who do not. By contrast, the vast majority of those who believe that Israel is not a good place to live are also of the opinion that the democratic system in Israel is in great danger.

Table 2.4 (total sample; %)

	Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	Disagree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	Don't know	Total
Israel is a good place to live	47	51	2	100
Israel is not a good place to live	72	27	1	100

In recent years, a recurring question in the Democracy Index surveys has concerned the balance between the democratic and Jewish elements of the State of Israel. The question is as follows: "Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?" Not surprisingly, the gaps between the Jewish and Arab respondents were considerable. For this reason, we present them separately in the figure below, despite the fact that the largest share in both groups hold that the Jewish component is overly dominant.

Figure 2.3 / "Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?" (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

As in past surveys, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that a majority of Haredi respondents hold that the democratic component is too strong, a view shared by the national religious. Among secular Jews, however, a clear majority see the Jewish component as too dominant, while in the traditional non-religious group, the largest share (though not a majority, at one-third) also feel this way. In contrast with the Haredi and secular respondents, we found relatively high percentages among the national religious, traditional religious, and traditional non-religious who hold that a good balance exists between the Jewish and democratic components.

Figure 2.4 / "Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?", by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)

■ There is a good balance between the two   ■ The Jewish component is too dominant
■ The democratic component is too dominant

The question arises of whether the changes in our findings over the years follow a consistent pattern. If the objective is to reach a consensus regarding the balance between Israel's Jewish and democratic aspects, the results this year are not encouraging: Compared with the two previous surveys, there has been a decline in the share of respondents who hold that the state strikes the right balance between the two components. At the same time, there has been a slight rise in the proportion who think that the democratic element is too strong.

Table 2.5 (total sample; %)

	2018	2019	2020
There is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components	28	28	20
The Jewish component is too dominant	45.5	47	47
The democratic component is too dominant	21	18	23
Don't know	5.5	7	10
Total	100	100	100

We wished to know if there is a connection between the sense that the democratic system is in grave danger, and opinions on the balance between the Jewish and democratic components. According to our findings, of those who hold that Israeli democracy is in serious danger, a sizeable majority believe that the Jewish aspect is too dominant, and only a small minority see a good balance between the two. By contrast, among those who think that Israeli democracy is not under threat, responses are split almost equally among the three options given, with nearly one-third citing a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components.

Table 2.6 (total sample; %)

	Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	Disagree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger
There is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components	11	32
The Jewish component is too dominant	65	27
The democratic component is to dominant	14	35
Don't know	10	6
Total	100	100

When speaking of political parties and politicians, it's common to hear Israelis say "they're all the same." Once again this year, we asked whether they really see no difference; that is, the situation is not one of "good guys" versus "bad guys," honest versus corrupt politicians, or committed representatives versus those with vested interests, and therefore, it doesn't matter who's in power—nothing is going to change. We found a small majority (53%) who disagree with the statement, "It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation." However, the share of respondents who agree is not much smaller (at 45%), meaning that the public is split almost down the middle on this subject.

Figure 2.5 / "It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation" (total sample; %)

Legend:
- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

This leads us to the question of whether opinions have shifted on this subject over the years. A comparison with past Democracy Surveys indicates that, when we posed this question for the first time in 2003, the distribution of responses was the same as this year's (with 53% disagreeing at the time). Opposition to this statement reached a peak in 2015, at 69%. The low percentage of disagreement this year may be due to disappointment with the formation of the national unity government following the March 2020 Knesset elections.

This year, we found no difference between the positions of Jews and Arabs on this question. The differences between political camps in the Jewish sample indicate that the greatest opposition to the statement lies on the Right (at 60%, compared with 42% in the Center, and 48% on the Left). In other words, the belief that there is a distinction between the various politicians and parties is more widespread among respondents from the Right than from the Center or Left, leading to the perception that voting for "suitable" candidates or parties can change the situation. Additionally, the feeling may be more prevalent on the Left that the act of voting has a limited—even negligible—effect, since the real driving forces behind the system do not change.

This year as well, we asked our interviewees to rate Israel's leadership with regard to corruption on a scale ranging from 1 (very corrupt) to 5 (not at all corrupt). As shown in the figure below, a majority of 58% (the same as last year) hold that the country's leadership is corrupt (scores 1–2), while only a minority of 16% think that its hands are clean. Roughly one-quarter (24%) rate the corruption level near the midpoint of the scale (with an average of 2.29).

Figure 2.6 / Corruption score of Israel's current leadership, from 1 = very corrupt to 5 = not at all corrupt (total sample; %)

Legend:
- 1=Very corrupt
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5=Not at all corrupt
- Don't know

We did not find differences in this assessment between the Jewish and Arab samples. On the other hand, there were sizeable differences between political camps in the Jewish sample: Among Left and Center respondents, the vast majority hold that the leadership is corrupt (scores 1–2), whereas on the Right, only a minority (though a sizeable one) feel this way.

Figure 2.7 / Hold that Israel's leadership is very corrupt or quite corrupt (scores 1–2), by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

A breakdown by voting pattern in the 2020 Knesset elections reveals that the share of respondents who consider Israel's leadership to be corrupt is highest among those who voted for Labor-Gesher-Meretz, and lowest among voters for Shas or Likud:

Figure 2.8 / Hold that Israel's leadership is very corrupt or quite corrupt (scores 1–2), by voting pattern in 2020 Knesset elections (total sample; %)

We looked at whether there is a connection between perceptions of the extent of corruption among Israel's leadership and assessments of the country's overall situation, and indeed found that there is one. Of those who hold that the leadership is corrupt (scores 1–2), only 23% think that Israel's situation is good or very good. By contrast, of those who believe that the leadership is not truly corrupt but is also not entirely untainted (score 3), the share who characterize the country's situation as good or very good rises to 55%. And among those who feel that Israel enjoys clean government (scores 4–5), this proportion soars to 64%.

A comparison of the average corruption scores over time shows that, despite all the upheaval in recent years, there are virtually no differences in the average yearly scores.

Table 2.7 (total sample; %)

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Average corruption score	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.3

Trust in Institutions

One of the major problems confronting democratic regimes today is erosion in the level of trust in the various state institutions. In this sense, Israel is not unusual. In fact, it is not even at the low end of the international rankings on this subject (as discussed later in this report), though neither is it near the top.

This year's findings indicate that, despite the political turmoil of the past year and the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, no major changes have taken place in the levels of trust in the various institutions among the Israeli public. The overall ranking has remained the same, though there have been slight declines here and there in comparison with past surveys.

Each year, along with the eight recurring institutions in our survey (the IDF, president of the state, Supreme Court, police, media, government, Knesset, and political parties) we include other individuals or interests selected for that year, usually in keeping with their prominence in the public discourse. This year, we added Israel's attorney general, the National Insurance Institute, the municipality/local authority in which the interviewee resides, and the health fund (HMO) that they belong to. Because of the great differences in levels of trust between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel, we once again present the findings from this question separately for both samples.

Figure 2.9 / Trust in state institutions and officials (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Institution	Jews	Arabs
IDF	82	35
Health fund	77	83.5
President of Israel	63	29
Municipality or local authority	63	48
Supreme Court	52	60
National Insurance Institute	44	58
Police	44	33
Attorney general	43.5	34
Media	33	35
Knesset	32	31
Government	29	25
Political parties	17	30

■ Jews ■ Arabs

This year, as in the past, the IDF holds first place in the Jewish sample in terms of trust, while the political parties come in last. In the Arab sample, the Supreme Court ranks highest, and the government, lowest. An interesting finding—though not a surprising one, as it repeats every year (and is common in many countries)—is that the key political institutions of a democracy

(the parliament,[6] executive branch, and political parties[7]) rank lowest in both our samples with regard to level of trust.

The Jewish and Arab populations differ not only in the percentages who express trust in a given individual or institution, but also in the overall ranking of these bodies, though in both cases, the Knesset, political parties, and the government feature toward the bottom of the list.

Table 2.8 (trust rankings)

	Jewish sample	Arab sample
1	IDF	Supreme Court
2	President of Israel	Media
3	Supreme Court	IDF
4	Police	Police
5	Media	Knesset
6	Knesset	Political parties
7	Government	President of Israel
8	Political parties	Government

The following table summarizes the differences in the levels of trust, and the changes from last year, in the recurring institutions:

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6   According to findings of the European Social Survey, the level of trust in the Knesset as compared with faith in the parliaments of other countries falls more or less at the midpoint (approximately 4–5 on a scale of 1 to 8), adjacent to France, Slovakia, and Hungary.

7   Based on the same polls, in virtually all the countries surveyed, the level of trust in the political parties is markedly lower than that in the parliament. The same holds true for Israel, where faith in political parties is ranked at around 3 in the above scale.

Table 2.9 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Jewish sample			Arab sample		
	2019	**2020**		**2019**	**2020**	
	Trust very much or quite a lot	**Trust very much or quite a lot**	**Change (up or down)**	**Trust very much or quite a lot**	**Trust very much or quite a lot**	**Change (up or down)**
IDF	90	82	⌄	41	35	⌄
President of Israel	71	63	⌄	37	29	⌄
Supreme Court	55	52	⌄	56	60	⌃
Police	44	44	=	38	33	⌄
Media	36	33	⌄	36	35	⌄
Knesset	30	32	⌃	24	31	⌃
Government	30	29	⌄	28	25	⌄
Political parties	14	17	⌃	20	30	⌃

Both the multi-year figures below reveal an interesting phenomenon: Whereas in the Jewish public we see clear and consistent differences between most of the institutions, in the Arab public (with the exception of the Supreme Court, which always ranks highest), the levels of trust in the other institutions are becoming closer and closer, to the point where there is almost no distinction between them (and in most cases, they rank lower than in the Jewish public). This gives us reason to suggest that the lack of trust in the Israeli system on the part of the Arab public is more fundamental and does not differentiate between individual institutions. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the Arab interviewees express greater faith in political parties than do the Jews. This may be a result of their satisfaction (which we have witnessed in other contexts) with the Joint List, which they see as "their party."

Figure 2.10 / Trust in state institutions and officials, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

IDF   President of Israel   Supreme Court   Police   Media   Government   Knesset   Political parties

Figure 2.11 / Trust in state institutions and officials, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Arab sample; %)

IDF   President of Israel   Supreme Court   Police   Media   Government   Knesset   Political parties

The steepest drops relative to last year were found in the Jewish public's trust in the IDF and the President of Israel. In the case of the IDF, this is actually the lowest level since 2008, when the army was still struggling under the weight of public criticism concerning its performance in the Second Lebanon War in 2006. With regard to the president, the decreased confidence may be the result of his controversial, and ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to chart a course that might have saved the country from a third election in less than a year. The Supreme Court also lost some of the Jewish public's trust in it as an institution.[8]

In the Arab public, the Supreme Court and the political parties currently enjoy a higher level of trust than they did last year (the latter, presumably because of the strong support for the reconstituted Joint List); however, the IDF, the President of Israel, the police, the media, and the government lost some of the Arab public's confidence compared with 2019.

As we do each year, we examined which institutions and official head the "hierarchy of trust" within each political camp in the Jewish sample. On the Left, the Supreme Court is in first place; in the Center, second place; and on the Right, it is nowhere near the top. The IDF is number one among respondents from the Center and Right, and in joint second place on the Left. The president takes second or joint second place in all three camps, but he earns a noticeably higher trust rating from the Left and Center than he does from the Right.

Table 2.10 (Jewish sample; %)

Left	Center	Right
Supreme Court (84)	IDF (80)	IDF (84)
President; IDF (78)	Supreme Court; President (70)	President (56)

Trust in the IDF

In the Jewish sample, it is impossible to ignore the decline from a 93.5% trust rating in the IDF five years ago to 82% today. The difference between the high level of trust in the army expressed by Jews, and the much lower level shown by Arabs, is self-explanatory. As shown in the following figure, it is also relatively consistent, though the fluctuations in the Arab public's faith in the IDF are greater than those of the Jewish public.

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8   A 2019 Gallup poll found that just 38% of Americans have faith in their Supreme Court, meaning that its Israeli counterpart is (still?) in a better position in terms of the trust accorded it by the public. Nonetheless, according to past IDI Democracy Surveys as well as the European Social Survey, there has been a consistent decline in Israelis' faith in this institution since the early 2000s.

Figure 2.12 / Trust in the IDF, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Jews ■   Arabs ■

This year too, we found only minor differences in trust based on our usual variables. For example, the distinctions between Jewish political camps when it comes to their faith in the army were truly minimal (Left, 78%; Center, 80%, and Right, 84%). As shown in the following figure, the same held true in the past as well.

Figure 2.13 / Trust in the IDF, 2003–2020, by political orientation (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

Left ■   Center ■   Right ■

A breakdown by religiosity reveals that a majority in all groups express trust in the IDF; however, in the Haredi public, this majority is much smaller (Haredim, 67%; national religious, 84%; traditional religious and traditional non-religious, 82%; and secular, 85%).

Figure 2.14 / Trust in the IDF, 2003–2020, by religiosity (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

At the same time, this year's survey shows a clear downturn in the public's faith in the IDF, with the exception of the Haredi respondents. When we examined where on the religious spectrum this decline was concentrated, we identified it primarily in the traditional and secular groups.

Table 2.11 (Jewish sample; %)

	2019	2020	Change
Haredim	63	67	⌃
National religious	93	84	⌄
Traditional religious	95	82	⌄
Traditional non-religious	96	82	⌄
Secular	91.5	85	⌄

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by age shows a lower level of trust in the IDF in all cohorts, though the older age groups clearly express greater faith in the army, as in past years.

Table 2.12 (Jewish sample; %)

	2019	2020
18–24	79.5	75
25–34	85	78
35–44	93	74
45–54	86.5	82
55–64	94	92
65 and over	96	90

Without a more comprehensive analysis, we cannot state with any certainty whether the pattern cited above stems from a shift in attitudes toward the IDF specifically, or is simply part of the prevailing trend of diminishing faith on the part of the public in state institutions in general. Thus, further surveys are needed to determine whether this signals the start of a downward trend or is only a one-time occurrence.

Trust in the Supreme Court

The changes in the level of trust in the Israeli Supreme Court over the years are presented in figure 2.15 below, revealing a gradual but persistent downturn in the faith placed in the Court by the Jewish public. In the Arab public, confidence in the Supreme Court is prone to fluctuations, apparently tied to circumstances.

Figure 2.15 / Trust in the Supreme Court, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Jews   Arabs

Looking at the data in terms of political orientation, we have already seen that the Supreme Court is at the top the list of trusted institutions in only two of the political camps in the Jewish public. While the share on the Right who express faith in the Supreme Court has always been lower than that in the other two camps, this gap has grown in recent years, as shown in the figure below. (A small rise in trust in this institution was measured on the Right this year, along with a slight drop in the Left and Center; however, it is very possible that these results represent an anomaly, meaning there is no reason at this point to theorize that the situation has improved.)

Figure 2.16 / Trust in the Supreme Court, 2003–2020, by political orientation (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

Left   Center   Right

In a breakdown of levels of trust by subgroup, in particular by religiosity, the Supreme Court presents as an extreme case of differentiation in levels of trust by subgroup. An institution that should serve as the keystone of Israel's democratic system earns little trust from the more religious sectors of the population, thus diminishing the chances that its rulings will serve as a beacon lighting the way for all Israelis.

Figure 2.17 / Trust in the Supreme Court, by religiosity (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

The above disparity is not new, as illustrated in the following figure:

Figure 2.18 / Trust in the Supreme Court, 2003–2020, by religiosity
(very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

In the table below, we see noticeable differences between income levels of respondents in the degree of trust they extend to the Supreme Court, with higher incomes translating into greater faith in the institution. At the lowest income level, a minority place their trust in the Supreme Court, but in the two higher income groups, a majority share this view (more precisely, a small majority for those with average incomes, and a solid one for those with above-average earnings). Obviously, education, political orientation, or even religiosity, all of which are closely linked with income level, may serve as mediating variables affecting levels of trust.

Table 2.13 (Jewish sample; %)

Income level	Trust the Supreme Court very much or quite a lot
Below average	44
Average	53
Above average	62

Trust in the police

As noted in earlier sections, this year we devoted an entire chapter to attitudes of Israelis toward the police. Here, we will focus solely on the matter of trust in this institution. Among the Jewish public, the police held steady at the level recorded last year (44%). In the Arab public, by contrast, confidence in the police is lower than last year, having dropped from 38% to 33%.

Figure 2.19 / Trust in the police, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

As in past years, breaking down the level of trust in the police in the Jewish sample by political orientation did not yield substantial distinctions; however, analyzing the findings by religiosity did reveal pronounced differences, with Haredim expressing the lowest level of trust in the police, and secular Jews, the highest.

Figure 2.20 / Trust in the police, by religiosity (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

Here too, this is not a new phenomenon, as a similar pattern has been found in every one of our surveys since 2003.

Trust in the media

There is no question today that both traditional and new media play a key role in shaping public discourse in democratic countries. Although the press is often referred to as "the watchdog of democracy," at present only about one-third of Jewish and Arab respondents place their faith in it. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows profound differences, with a majority on the Left showing confidence in the media as compared with roughly one-half in the Center and only a small minority on the Right.

Figure 2.21 / Trust in the media, 2019, 2020, by political orientation
(very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

As shown in the above figure, trust in the media among respondents on the Left remains the same as last year. On the Right, however, there has been a slight rise, though the difference remains significant: in the latter camp, roughly one-fifth have faith in the media, whereas in the former, some two-thirds feel this way. In the Center, meanwhile, we saw a decline from last year in the share of respondents who express trust the media.

What is the reason for the Right's lack of faith in the press, and perhaps the Center's lower level of trust as well? The following question offers a possible explanation.

A majority of the Israeli public—albeit a small one at 54.5%—hold that the media paint Israel in a bad light, describing its situation as much worse than it really is. The findings have not changed greatly from year to year in the surveys in which this question was presented. In other words, the perception of how the media conducts itself has remained largely consistent over time.

Do the Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is?

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Figure 2.22 / "Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is," 2017, 2018, 2020 (strongly agree or somewhat agree; total sample; %)

As shown in the following table, there is a marked similarity between Arabs and Jews on this question. Yet, within the Jewish sample the differences between political camps are considerable: On the Left, only a minority think that the media describe a bleaker situation than the reality, whereas in the Center, this view is held by roughly one-half, and on the Right, by a solid majority—precisely the mirror image of the level of trust in the media on the part of each of these three camps.

Table 2.14 / Agree that Israeli media portray the situation as much worse than it really is, by nationality and political orientation (%)

Nationality	Jews	**54**
	Arabs	**58.5**
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	**21.5**
	Center	**43**
	Right	**67**

Other variables such as age, education, sex, and income level were not found to be integral to this topic.

Trust in the Knesset and the government

As in the past, the level of trust in these two fundamental institutions of Israeli democracy was found to be low. Since 2016, less than one-third of Jewish interviewees have trusted them "very much" or "quite a lot." Among Arab interviewees, the share who express trust has been even lower, though at the moment it seems that the Knesset is enjoying a slight resurgence relative to previous years.

Figure 2.23 / Trust in the Knesset, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Jews   Arabs

In the Jewish public, as shown in the following figure, trust in the Knesset is a function of political orientation. The sharpest drops were recorded in the Left and Center camps in 2014, though the gaps between the various camps are not large, and the Right's faith in the Knesset is not high either.

Figure 2.24 / Trust in the Knesset, 2003–2020, by political orientation (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

Left   Center   Right

A breakdown of trust in the Knesset by voting pattern in the 2020 elections reveals that voters for the right-wing parties report a higher degree of trust in the Knesset; however, there seems to be a link between the extent of faith in the Knesset as an institution and trust in "their party's" parliamentary representatives.

Table 2.15 (total sample; %)

Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	Trust the Knesset very much or quite a lot
Yamina	58
Shas	47
Likud	44
United Torah Judaism	35
Joint List	32

Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	Trust the Knesset very much or quite a lot
Yisrael Beytenu	23
Blue and White	22
Labor-Gesher-Meretz	18

Trust in the government is even slightly lower than that in the Knesset, and its decline among the Jewish public over the years has been even more dramatic.

Figure 2.25 / Trust in the government, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Jews   Arabs

As shown in the following figure, the gap between political camps in the Jewish sample with regard to their faith in the government has widened over time, with the Right, whose level of trust is neither high nor low, contrasted with the Left and Center camps, whose confidence in the government is minimal. At the same time, this year has seen a slight reversal in this trend, due to the sharp decline in trust in the government on the Right.

Figure 2.26 / Trust in the government, 2003–2020, by political orientation (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

The following table depicts levels of trust in the government based on voting pattern in the most recent Knesset elections (March 2020). Interestingly, even among voters for the Likud—the linchpin of the coalition—only 52% place very much or quite a lot of faith in the government led by Binyamin Netanyahu. Among Blue and White voters, just 14% express trust in the government!

Table 2.16 (total sample; %)

Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	Trust the government very much or quite a lot
Likud	52
Shas	45
Yamina	38
United Torah Judaism	38
Yisrael Beytenu	25

Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	Trust the government very much or quite a lot
Joint List	18
Blue and White	14
Labor-Gesher-Meretz	9

Trust in the President of Israel

As noted earlier, in the total sample the President of Israel ranks second in level of trust, following the IDF. As illustrated by the following figure, this question is understood by interviewees as referring both to the president as an individual and to the institution of the presidency. This is evidenced, on the one hand, by the steep drop in trust in President Moshe Katsav in 2007 (in the Jewish sample) as a result of accusations of rape and sexual harassment, and on the other, by the persistent gap between Jews and Arabs in the degree of trust that they place in the president, which shifts only slightly depending on who holds the office.

Figure 2.27 / Trust in the President of Israel, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Jews   Arabs

Despite the non-partisan and largely ceremonial nature of the office of Israel's president, our findings show considerable differences over the years in the degree of trust in this office when broken down by political orientation. As shown in the following figure, trust in the president is particularly high among those who identify themselves as Left or Center. However, this year saw a downswing of sorts among these camps, perhaps as a result of President Rivlin's willingness to "get his hands dirty" and propose a course of action aimed at preventing yet another in the series of elections Israel has experienced over the past two years.

Figure 2.28 / Trust in the President of Israel, 2003–2020, by political orientation (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

Left   Center   Right

A breakdown of trust in the President by voting pattern in the most recent Knesset elections (March 2020) shows that faith in the office is strongest mainly in the Center and on the Left, and is low primarily among voters for the Haredi parties and the Joint List.

Table 2.17 (total sample; %)

Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	Trust the president very much or quite a lot
Labor-Gesher-Meretz	79
Blue and White	76.5
Yisrael Beytenu	64

Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	Trust the president very much or quite a lot
Yamina	**57**
Likud	**57**
Shas	**43**
United Torah Judaism	**33**
Joint List	**24**

Trust in the political parties

As we saw earlier, for some time now Israel's political parties have garnered the lowest level of trust of all the institutions that we study each year. It should be stated that this phenomenon is not unique to Israel, though it is particularly pronounced here.[9] Unlike other institutions, here there is no consistent difference between Jews and Arabs.

Figure 2.29 / Trust in the political parties, 2003–2020 (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

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
9   Extensive data on this subject can be found in the World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.

From the following figure, we learn that there are also virtually no discernible differences in this area between the various political camps in the Jewish sample. Consequently, what we may be seeing is a "floor effect," meaning that the level of trust in the parties is so low that it is hard to distinguish variations by nationality, political orientation, and the like.

Figure 2.30 / Trust in the political parties, 2003–2020, by political orientation (very much or quite a lot; Jewish sample; %)

Trust in the other institutions studied in 2020

The four "guest" institutions in this survey—the attorney general, National Insurance Institute, health funds, and municipality/local authority in which the interviewee resides—are situated more or less at the midpoint or higher in the ranking, thereby raising the aggregate level of trust in the "non-party" institutions in Israel. This finding goes hand in hand with the current widespread disgust with establishment party politics.

In the total sample, **the health funds** earn the highest trust rating (78%), with almost identical findings for Jews and Arabs. (For a detailed analysis of attitudes toward the various healthcare providers, see chapter 3 below.) In second place in the Jewish sample are the municipalities (63%), with the National Insurance Institute (NII) and the attorney general sharing the third shot, each with a rating of 44%. In the Arab sample, the NII takes second place, with 58% expressing faith in it, followed by the municipalities at 48%, and finally, the attorney general, who earns the confidence of only 34% of those surveyed.

Despite the increasing prominence of **the attorney general** in recent years, and the fact that, here too (as with the Supreme Court), we found an extreme level of differentiation based on political orientation, the extent of trust in this office has remained relatively constant over time, though we did see some decline compared with last year.

Figure 2.31 / Trust in the attorney general, 2017, 2019, 2020 (very much or quite a lot; total sample; %)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yields substantial, though not surprising, differences: On the Left, the attorney general inspires a genuinely high degree of trust, while in the Center roughly one-half share this view, and on the Right, only a minority. Interestingly enough, just three years ago, there were only minor differences between the three camps on this subject.

Table 2.18 (Jewish sample; %)

	Left	Center	Right
2020	68	56	33
2019	56	58	46
2017	48	44	44

Also as expected, we found even greater differences in trust based on voting pattern in the most recent Knesset elections (March 2020). As shown in the following figure, only among voters for central and left-wing parties is there a majority who express confidence in the attorney general, with the lowest rate of trust found among voters for the Haredi parties.

Figure 2.32 / Trust in the attorney general, by voting pattern in 2020 Knesset elections (very much or quite a lot; total sample; %)

In the case of the **National Insurance Institute**, we expected to find differences between the various income groups, but were proven wrong. However, we did encounter differences based on the more subjective variable of social location, that is, the respondent's sense of belonging to a strong, quite strong, quite weak, or weak group in society: The stronger the group with which the interviewees identified, the greater their trust in the NII, perhaps because they are less in need of its services than those who feel they belong to the weaker groups; or, alternatively, because they receive better treatment when they do seek its services.

Figure 2.33 / Trust in the National Insurance Institute, by self-defined social location (very much or quite a lot; total sample; %)

As for the **municipalities/local authorities**, in the Jewish sample they earned the trust of a majority (63%) of respondents, and in the Arab sample, roughly one-half (48%). We did not find substantive differences between this year's findings and those of previous years.

Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics divides all localities in Israel into socioeconomic "clusters," ranked from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by official socioeconomic status of the respondent's locality shows, not surprisingly, that a low socioeconomic ranking is linked with lower levels of trust in the municipality. Thus, in the Jewish sample, 60% of those who reside in a community with the lowest status (clusters 1–3) have faith in their local authority, as contrasted with 73% in the case of communities with the highest status (clusters 8–10). We were unable to break down the findings in the Arab sample based on this variable due to the lack of Arab localities with high socioeconomic standing.

A breakdown of the total sample by self-defined social location yields a similar picture: The sense of belonging to a stronger group (which apparently often corresponds with living in a community with higher socioeconomic status) is coupled with a greater degree of trust in the local authority, and the reverse holds true for those who identify with a weaker group.

Figure 2.34 / Trust in the local authority, by self-defined social location (very much or quite a lot; total sample; %)

Chapter 3 / Israel's Healthcare System

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Performance of the public health system
- Trust in health funds (HMOs)
- Performance of the health funds (quality of medical care and attitude toward patients)
- Performance of the hospitals (quality of medical care and attitude toward patients)
- Funding the healthcare system
- Corruption in the health system?
- Raising doctors' salaries in exchange for a ban on accepting private patients
- Equal treatment in the healthcare system (hospitals and health funds)
- "Acceptability" of attacking medical personnel

In recent years, healthcare has become a highly prominent issue in public discourse in Israel, leading political parties of all stripes to declare their interest in the Health Ministry portfolio following the March 2020 elections. Its importance obviously skyrocketed with the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, with the attendant health and socioeconomic implications. In this chapter, then, we will attempt to explore what the public thinks of Israel's healthcare system.

To begin, we examined what rating the Israeli public assigns to the country's public health system. And in fact, its assessment is positive: Roughly one-half give it a good or excellent grade; over one-third, a grade of fair; and only a small minority (15%), a grade of poor or very poor.

Performance of the public health system

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Figure 3.1 / "How would you rate Israel's public healthcare system on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent?" (total sample; %)

Legend:
- 1 – Very poor
- 2
- 3 – Fair
- 4
- 5 – Excellent

Values: 5, 9.5, 14, 35.5, 36

The Arab public's assessment of the healthcare system is slightly more favorable than that of the Jewish public, with nearly 60% of the Arab sample rating the system as good or excellent, compared with less than half of the Jewish sample.

Table 3.1 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Overall average (1 = very poor, 5 = excellent)	Very poor or poor (1–2)	Fair (3)	Good or excellent (4–5)	Don't know	Total
Jewish sample	3.40	14.5	37	48	0.5	100
Arab sample	3.74	14	26	59	1	100

A breakdown of the Jewish public by religiosity shows that the Haredim assign the highest score to the healthcare system, with three-quarters rating its performance as good or excellent. This favorable assessment may stem from the fact that the post of health minister was held for the past several years by a Haredi politician (Yaakov Litzman). The secular respondents were much less generous: Only 40% of them gave the healthcare system a good or excellent grade. Among the national religious and traditional religious interviewees, slightly more than half rated the system as good or excellent, while slightly less than half of the traditional non-religious and secular respondents gave it a similar grade.

Figure 3.2 / Hold that the performance of Israel's public health system is good or excellent, by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)

A breakdown of attitudes toward the healthcare system by the socioeconomic status of respondents' place of residence revealed that those who live in localities in the lowest clusters (1–3) assigned a slightly higher grade to the public health system, while those in the highest clusters (6–10) gave the system a lower rating. Among the possible explanations for this finding are that those who reside in more affluent communities are more familiar with the private healthcare system and hence take a less favorable view of the public system; or that these communities tend to have greater numbers of secular Jews, who, as noted, are more critical of the public health system in general.

An analysis of performance ratings for the healthcare system by voting patterns in the March 2020 Knesset election shows that voters for the Haredi parties and for Yamina gave the highest grades, while the lowest scores came from Yisrael Beytenu, Labor-Gesher-Meretz, and Blue and White voters.

Table 3.2 (average score on a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent; total sample)

		Average score
Socioeconomic cluster of residential community	Low (1–3)	3.75
	Medium-low (4–5)	3.42
	Medium-high (6–7)	3.30
	High (8–10)	3.34
Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	United Torah Judaism	3.93
	Shas	3.81
	Yamina	3.63
	Joint List	3.61
	Likud	3.56
	Blue and White	3.19
	Labor-Gesher-Meretz	3.18
	Yisrael Beytenu	3.05

In keeping with the breakdown by voting pattern, an analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation found that the share of voters on the Right who rated the healthcare system as good or excellent was much higher than that among Center or Left voters.

Table 3.3 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Overall average (1 = very poor, 5 = excellent)	Very poor or poor (1–2)	Fair (3)	Good or excellent (4–5)	Don't know	Total
Right	3.53	12	33	55	0	100
Center	3.22	17	45	37	1	100
Left	3.26	17	42.5	40	0.5	100

For the bulk of the Israeli public, the most frequent point of contact with the healthcare system is through the health fund of which they are a member. In chapter 2, where we examined the extent of trust in various institutions, we saw that the health funds enjoy a very high level of public confidence. A decisive majority of Israelis (78%) express faith in their health fund. In comparison with the findings in 2015, the degree of trust in the health funds has even climbed slightly, from 72.5% that year.

Figure 3.3 / Trust in your health fund, 2015 and 2020 (total sample; %)

We did not find any real differences between the four health funds (Clalit, Maccabi, Meuhedet, and Leumit) in the level of public trust that they enjoy.

Table 3.4 (total sample; %)

	Trust their health fund quite a lot or very much
Leumit	84
Maccabi	79.5
Meuhedet	79
Clalit	77

The level of trust in their health fund was found to be linked to interviewees' perceptions of their personal situation. Though a majority in all five response groups for this question ("very good" to "very bad") expressed trust in their health fund, the majority was much larger among those who defined their personal situation as good or very good than among those who described it as bad or very bad.

Table 3.5 (total sample; %)

Personal situation	Trust their health fund quite a lot or very much
Very good	**85.5**
Good	**81**
So-so	**71.5**
Bad	**72**
Very bad	**68**

The level of trust in the health funds was also found to be linked with interviewees' overall assessment of the functioning of the public health system. Thus, of those who rated the system as performing poorly or very poorly, only about half expressed confidence in their health fund, while those who graded it as fair or good to excellent showed considerably greater trust in their health fund.

Table 3.6 (total sample; %)

		Trust their health fund quite a lot or very much
Rating of overall performance of public healthcare system	Good to excellent	**88**
	Fair	**74**
	Poor to very poor	**52**

The high level of confidence in the health funds can be linked to the responses we received to two additional questions, regarding the quality of medical care as well as the attitude toward patients. Satisfaction with the quality of medical care from the health funds is high, with over 80% of interviewees reporting that they are quite or very satisfied with the care they receive from their own fund. The extent of satisfaction with the approach to patients is virtually the same: More than 80% report being quite or very satisfied in this regard. Moreover, a cross-tabulation of the responses to the two questions shows a very high association between them.

Figure 3.4 / "How satisfied are you with the quality of medical care and the attitude toward patients at your health fund?" (total sample; %)

Although the level of satisfaction with respect to all the health funds is high, a breakdown by organization reveals that members of the Maccabi health fund are the most satisfied, with 84% of them indicating that they are pleased with the quality of medical care and with the attitude toward patients. A slightly smaller, though still very sizeable, share of Leumit members expressed satisfaction in both these areas. Among Meuhedet and Clalit members, the level of satisfaction is slightly lower: Some 75% are pleased with both the quality of medical care and the attitude toward patients.

Figure 3.5 / Satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of medical care and attitude toward patients, by health fund (total sample; %)

While the level of satisfaction with the medical care in Israel's public hospitals is lower than the corresponding figure for the health funds, we did find a majority (57%) who are quite or very satisfied. There is a substantial difference between Jews and Arabs on this question, with three-quarters of the Arab sample expressing satisfaction with the medical care in the public hospitals, compared with only about one-half of the Jewish sample. The gap between the two groups is most pronounced among interviewees who indicated being very satisfied with the quality of medical care—some 30% of Arabs, as contrasted with less than 10% of Jews.

Figure 3.6 / Satisfaction with the quality of medical care in public hospitals (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

The level of satisfaction with the attitude toward patients in public hospitals is slightly lower than it is with regard to the quality of medical care. Only about one-half of the total sample are pleased with the approach toward patients in public hospitals, with a particularly low share (12%) who report being "very satisfied." On this question as well, there is a marked disparity between the Jewish interviewees, less than half of whom are pleased with the attitude toward patients in public hospitals, and the Arab interviewees, of whom more than three-quarters are satisfied.

Figure 3.7 / Satisfaction with the attitude toward patients in public hospitals (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Breaking down the level of satisfaction with public hospitals in terms of both quality of medical care and attitude toward patients, based on religiosity, we found the Haredi respondents to be the most satisfied in both these areas, while the secular interviewees were the least satisfied.

Table 3.7 (Jewish sample; %)

Quite or very satisfied	With the quality of medical care in public hospitals	With the attitude toward patients in public hospitals
Haredim	70	72
National religious	60	53
Traditional religious	55	55
Traditional non-religious	55	45
Secular	49	41

The figure below summarizes the differences in level of satisfaction between the health funds and the public hospitals. It shows that for both parameters surveyed, the level of satisfaction with health funds is much higher than with hospitals.

Figure 3.8 / Satisfied or very satisfied with quality of medical care and attitude toward patients in health funds and public hospitals (total sample; %)

Hospitals **Health funds**

On the question of funding for the healthcare system—a subject that featured prominently in the most recent Knesset elections (March 2020), and has been even more salient since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic—there are signs of an emerging consensus: A sweeping majority of interviewees hold that the health system is underfunded and that the Health Ministry budget should be increased even at the expense of other ministries.

Increasing the Health Ministry budget

Question 32

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Figure 3.9 / "The government should increase the health budget even if this means reducing budgets for other ministries" (total sample; %)

Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don't know

A breakdown of the total sample by voting pattern in the 2020 Knesset elections shows that a majority of voters for all parties would support such a decision on the budget, but the size of this majority is not consistent. Thus, almost all voters for Labor-Gesher-Meretz favor increasing the health budget even if this necessitates cuts in funding for other ministries, as contrasted with roughly two-thirds of voters for Yamina and United Torah Judaism.

Figure 3.10 / "The government should increase the health budget even if this means reducing budgets for other ministries," somewhat or strongly agree, by voting pattern in 2020 Knesset election (total sample; %)

Given the public's overwhelming desire to see an increase in the healthcare budget, we asked further: "Assuming that the health budget is increased, what are the three most important areas to which the additional funds should be directed?" The following figure shows the public's priorities for the allocation of additional funds within the healthcare system (in descending order): adding positions for doctors and nursing staff, increasing the number of hospital beds, shortening waiting times at hospitals, purchasing advanced medical equipment, opening new hospitals in outlying areas, and improving conditions for hospitalized patients. Despite the fact that the data were collected at the height of the coronavirus outbreak, the proposal to allocate more funds toward preparing for epidemics of just this type placed last in importance.

Figure 3.11 / The three most important targets for additional health spending (total sample; %)

The priorities for budgetary allocations differed somewhat between the Jewish and Arab samples: At the top of the list in the Arab public is opening new hospitals in outlying areas, followed by purchasing advanced medical equipment. In the Jewish public, the two most important concerns are adding positions for doctors and nursing staff, and increasing the number of hospital beds, with setting up hospitals in outlying areas placing only second-to-last.

Table 3.8 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Jewish sample	Arab sample
1	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (56)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (70)
2	Increasing the number of hospital beds (50)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (62)
3	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (48)	Preparing for epidemics such as coronavirus (43)

	Jewish sample	Arab sample
4	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (39)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (42)
5	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (38)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (36)
6	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (38)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (23)
7	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (16)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (23)

A breakdown of the findings by socioeconomic cluster of residential community shows that the primary objectives in the lowest cluster (1–3) are opening new hospitals in outlying areas and purchasing advanced medical equipment; in the other clusters, by contrast, the first priority is adding positions for doctors and nursing staff. In the low-medium cluster (4–5), shortening waiting times at hospitals ranked second in importance, and in the two highest clusters, increasing the number of hospital beds came in second place.

Table 3.9 (total sample, by socioeconomic status of residential community; %)

	Low cluster (1–3)	Medium-low cluster (4–5)	Medium-high cluster (6–7)	High cluster (8–10)
1	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (56)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (46)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (57.5)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (63)
2	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (49)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (44)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (53)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (55)
3	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (46)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (43)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (46)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (51)

	Low cluster (1–3)	Medium-low cluster (4–5)	Medium-high cluster (6–7)	High cluster (8–10)
4	Increasing the number of hospital beds (40)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (43)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (43)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (37)
5	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (37)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (41)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (38)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (36)
6	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (30)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (40)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (36)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (35)
7	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (30)	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (26)	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (14)	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (12)

An analysis of priorities by religiosity also shows differences between groups. Among Haredi respondents, shortening waiting times at hospitals and opening new hospitals in outlying areas head the list of preferred allocations for additional funds, while in the national religious public, the top two priorities are adding positions for doctors and nursing staff followed by increasing the number of hospital beds. The latter objective is seen as the most important by traditional religious respondents, with the purchase of advanced medical equipment in second place. The traditional non-religious and secular interviewees consider adding positions for doctors and nursing staff to be the most pressing objective, with the traditional non-religious selecting the shortening of waiting times at hospitals to be next in importance, and the secular respondents, increasing the number of hospital beds. In each of the five groups, preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus was ranked lowest in priority.

Table 3.10 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
1	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (58)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (56)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (53)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (61)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (61)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
2	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (46)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (45)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (45.5)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (49)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (54)
3	Increasing the number of hospital beds (44)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (45)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (45)	Increasing the number of hospital beds (47)	Shortening waiting times at hospitals (48)
4	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (41)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (44.5)	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff (42.5)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (43)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (38)
5	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (34)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (42)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (40)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (41)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (37.5)
6	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (32)	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients (33)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (39)	Opening new hospitals in outlying areas (30)	Purchasing advanced medical equipment (36)
7	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (18)	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (22)	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (18)	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (15)	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus (14)

Raising the health tax?

Question 34

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Despite the widespread support for expanding the health budget, over two-thirds of the total sample believe that such an increase should not come out of taxpayers' pockets through a rise in the cost of health insurance (in Israel, a direct health tax is levied as a percentage of income). Opposition to enlarging the health budget through a tax imposed on the public is noticeably stronger among Jews (71%) than it is among Arabs (49%).

Figure 3.12 / "Citizens should pay more for health insurance, and the additional funds should be invested in improving the public healthcare system" (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

We also encountered differences on this question between voters for the various parties in the 2020 Knesset elections: Those who voted for the Joint List and parties on the Left are less opposed than voters for the Haredi parties to raising the health tax so as to improve the public healthcare system.

Table 3.11 (total sample; %)

	Somewhat or strongly disagree with proposal to raise citizens' health insurance payments
Joint List	45
Labor-Gesher-Meretz	59
Yamina	66
Yisrael Beytenu	69
Likud	70

	Somewhat or strongly disagree with proposal to raise citizens' health insurance payments
Blue and White	**73**
Shas	**74.5**
United Torah Judaism	**76**

While a majority of the Israeli public thinks that the country's leadership is corrupt (see discussion in chapter 2), and there are frequent reports in the media of senior members of the medical establishment accepting bribes, only about one-quarter of those surveyed characterized Israel's health system as corrupt. A sizeable majority of over two-thirds hold that this is not the case.

Figure 3.13 / "Do you agree with the statement that Israel's healthcare system is corrupt?" (total sample; %)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

We found an association between performance ratings of the public health system and perceptions of it as corrupt: A majority of those who assigned a low grade (1–2) to the system consider it corrupt to some degree, as opposed to just 16% who share this view among those who give it a performance score of good to excellent (4–5).

Figure 3.14 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Israel's healthcare system is corrupt, by performance rating of public health system (total sample; %)

Grade awarded to public health system

Interviewees' assessments of Israel's overall situation today were also found to be closely linked to their perception of the healthcare system as corrupt: Almost one-half of those who hold that Israel's situation is very bad also consider the public health system to be corrupt, as contrasted with only 16% who feel this way among those who think that Israel's situation is very good.

Figure 3.15 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Israel's healthcare system is corrupt, by assessment of Israel's overall situation today (total sample; %)

We asked: "Do you agree or disagree that senior doctors should be paid more but be barred from accepting private patients?" The total sample is split more or less evenly on this question, with a slightly greater share supporting the statement.

Figure 3.16 / Should senior doctors should be paid more but be barred from accepting private patients? (total sample; %)

In the Arab sample, we found a majority who agree with the proposal to raise the pay of senior physicians but bar them from accepting private patients, while slightly less than half the Jewish respondents take this view.

Table 3.12 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Agree somewhat or strongly that senior doctors should be paid more but barred from accepting private patients
Jews	48
Arabs	54

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority of respondents from the Left and Center support increasing the salaries of senior physicians while prohibiting them from accepting private patients, whereas on the Right, the majority are opposed to such a move.

Table 3.13 (Jewish sample, by political camp; %)

	Agree somewhat or strongly that senior doctors should be paid more but barred from accepting private patients
Left	59
Center	55
Right	44

A breakdown by religiosity also revealed differences between the groups: Among Haredi and national religious respondents, a majority disagree with the notion of raising doctors' wages while barring them from accepting private patients; by contrast, in the traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular groups, a majority support the idea.

Table 3.14 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Agree somewhat or strongly that senior doctors should be paid more but barred from accepting private patients
Haredim	35
National religious	40

➤

	Agree somewhat or strongly that senior doctors should be paid more but barred from accepting private patients
Traditional religious	**52**
Traditional non-religious	**53**
Secular	**51**

As shown in the following figure, agreement with increasing the salary of senior physicians in exchange for a ban on accepting private patients rises in tandem with age. In the youngest age group surveyed (18–24), the majority do not support such a move, in contrast with the older age groups, who largely favor it.

Figure 3.17 / Should senior doctors should be paid more but be barred from accepting private patients?, by age (total sample; %)

Agree   Disagree   Don't know

The public healthcare system is expected to provide equal treatment for all. But in the opinion of the public, does it in fact do so? Here too—not for the first time—we found that the share of Arab interviewees who think that medical care is offered on an equal basis exceeds that of the Jews. The greatest gap between Jews and Arabs is in the proportion who are certain that the public health system offers equal treatment to all: Some 40% of Arab interviewees indicated that they are "certain it does," as opposed to just over 11% of Jews who felt likewise.

Figure 3.18 / "Does the public healthcare system in Israel provide equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors?" (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates that opinions on the Right on this issue are similar to those of the Arab public: A sizeable majority think that the public health system in Israel provides equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors, as contrasted with less than half who feel this way among those from the Center and Left.

Table 3.15 (Jewish sample; %)

	Think or are certain that the healthcare system provides equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors
Right	**62**
Center	**48**
Left	**48**

Over the last few years, there have been several reports in the media of patients and their family members who verbally or physically attacked medical staff at hospitals and clinics. We sought to find out if the public agrees or disagrees with the statement that it is understandable when people lash out at medical personnel. True, the vast majority of interviewees did not sympathize with such behavior; however, one out of every five held that it is possible to understand outbursts of this type.

Figure 3.19 / "It's understandable when people lash out at medical personnel" (total sample; %)

Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don't know

The extent of agreement with the statement that it is understandable for people to lash out at medical staff is similar in the Jewish and Arab samples. We found further that the degree of tolerance for such behavior is tied to opinions on whether or not the healthcare system is corrupt. Almost 40% of those who strongly agree that the system is corrupt responded that such outbursts are understandable, as contrasted with 14% who feel this way among those who think that the healthcare system is not at all corrupt.

Figure 3.20 / Somewhat or strongly agree that it's understandable when people lash out at medical personnel, by extent of agreement that the healthcare system is corrupt (total sample; %)

Chapter 4 / The Israeli Police

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Overall police performance
- Police performance in specific areas
- Handling of crime in Jewish and in Arab communities
- Over-policing of various groups in society
- Attitude of the police toward criticism of their performance

Over the past year, the roles and the performance of police forces in Israel and around the world have taken center stage in public discourse and been closely scrutinized by the media. The coronavirus pandemic has created a growing need to enforce new emergency regulations, and mass protests have led to clashes between police and citizens. At the same time, police commanders and officers on the street have had to adjust to unfamiliar roles and more frequent interactions with the public. Accordingly, we saw fit to devote a special chapter in this year's report to Israel's police force. As part of our survey, we asked interviewees to evaluate police performance, both in general and in specific areas—for example, with regard to over-policing[5] or under-policing[6] of certain groups in society. We began with an assessment of police performance as a whole.

We asked the interviewees to rate overall police performance in Israel on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very poor, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, and 5 = excellent. In the total sample, the average score was 2.9 (slightly below fair). Another way of looking at these findings is that roughly one-quarter of the respondents (26%) assigned scores below the midpoint of 3 on the

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5   The term "over-policing" relates to the tendency of police to enforce the law disproportionately among minority populations. This results in unfair practices that generally take the form of excessive and undue use of force to carry out discriminatory policies, as suspicions of criminal activity are based on skin color, ethnicity, or any other identifying feature, leading to selective arrests and searches of members of certain groups. Pinhas Yehezkeli, "Over-Policing: The Path to Loss of Police Legitimacy," *Yitzur Yeda* website, April 5, 2014 (Hebrew).

6   "Under-policing" refers to the tendency of police forces to neglect minorities and their needs, to devote fewer police resources to serving them, and to treat crime differently in areas where they live. This attitude can lead to the creation of a *de facto* policy or prioritization that "tolerates" crime in these areas, and to the investment of resources in maintaining law and order in other locations. As a result, law-abiding citizens who reside in these areas suffer from a high crime rate, and see the police force not as a solution to their distress but as one of the factors enabling it to exist (ibid.).

scale (that is, poor or very poor), while a similar proportion rated police performance as being above the midpoint (good or excellent).

Figure 4.1 / Rating of overall police performance in Israel (total sample; %)

In the Arab sample, the police were twice as likely as in the Jewish sample to receive a score below the midpoint, while 28% of Jews awarded high scores for overall police performance compared with just 19% of Arabs.

Figure 4.2 / Rating of overall police performance in Israel (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

In chapter 2, we asked about citizens' level of trust in various state institutions, including the police. The following figure shows the association between trust in the police and overall performance rating. About three-quarters of those who reported having no trust in the police gave them scores below the midpoint (poor or very poor), whereas roughly two-thirds of those who stated that they trust the police very much awarded them a score above the midpoint (good or excellent). In other words, those who expressed greater confidence in the police also gave them a higher overall performance rating. Of course, the converse also holds true: Those who have less faith in the police assigned them lower scores for overall performance.

Figure 4.3 / Rating of overall police performance in Israel, by level of trust (total sample; %)

From police performance in general, we moved on to specific spheres of activity.

The interviewees were asked to rate police performance in six separate areas, once again on a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent. In the total sample, the **highest** average score was assigned for the police's work in fighting drug use, and the **lowest** average score, for its efforts to combat domestic violence. The figure below summarizes the total sample's assessment of police performance in the six areas surveyed. As shown, there is not a single area in which a majority of the public gave the police a high rating.

Figure 4.4 / Police performance in various areas (total sample; %)

Legend: Good and excellent — Fair — Poor and very poor — Don't know

When the responses to this group of questions are broken down by nationality, we find marked differences between the ratings assigned by Jewish and by Arab interviewees. In four areas (combatting drug use, fighting organized crime, exposing corruption, and combatting cybercrime), the average scores awarded by Jewish interviewees were higher than those given by Arab respondents. With regard to combatting domestic violence and preventing road accidents, the Arab interviewees assigned a higher average score than did the Jews.

Table 4.1 / Average scores for police performance in various areas, on a scale of 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent (Jewish and Arab samples)

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Combatting cybercrime	3.0	3.1	2.7
Combatting drug use	3.1	3.1	2.7
Combatting organized crime	2.7	2.8	2.2

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Preventing road accidents	2.8	2.8	3.0
Exposing corruption	2.6	2.7	2.4
Combatting domestic violence	2.4	2.7	2.7

The two areas that earned the highest score from Jewish interviewees—that is, the most favorable assessment—with an average of 3.1 (above fair, but less than good) were combatting cybercrime (for which one-third awarded high scores of good or very good) and the fight against drug use.

The areas that received the highest scores among Arab interviewees were combatting cybercrime (as with the Jewish respondents) and combatting domestic violence, with an average score of 2.7 (just below fair)—and above both of these, with a middling average score of 3.0, preventing road accidents.

Figure 4.5 / Police performance in fighting cybercrime (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Figure 4.6 / Police performance in combatting drug use (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Not surprisingly, given the greater presence of organized crime in localities with high Arab populations, and the police's inability to curb its spread, Arab interviewees assigned the lowest average score (2.2) to combatting organized crime, with 60% rating police performance as poor or very poor in this area. By contrast, only about one-third of Jewish interviewees gave the police force a low rating in this sphere, giving it a higher average score of 2.8 (roughly one-quarter ranked it as good or excellent).

Figure 4.7 / Police performance in combatting organized crime (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Police performance in preventing road accidents received the highest average score from the Arab interviewees: Over one-third rated it as good or excellent; however, here too, the average score is middling, at 3.0. In the Jewish sample, the average score in prevention of traffic accidents is 2.8, though in contrast with the results from the Arab sample, this is one of the lower scores awarded by Jewish interviewees for police performance.

Figure 4.8 / Police performance in preventing road accidents (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Roughly one-half of Arab interviewees rated police performance in exposing corruption as either poor or very poor, with an average score of 2.4, or below the midpoint. Of the Jewish interviewees, only 41% assigned the police low scores in this area, translating into a slightly higher average score of 2.7, but still below the midpoint.

Figure 4.9 / Police performance in exposing corruption (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

The area in which the police received their lowest rating from Jewish interviewees was combatting domestic violence; here, the average score was 2.4, with roughly one-half labeling police performance as poor or very poor. Among Arab interviewees, the average score was slightly higher, at 2.7, with 45% assigning a low rating (poor or very poor).

Figure 4.10 / Police performance in combatting domestic violence (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Breaking down the responses by sex in both the Jewish and Arab samples, we found differences in this area, with women interviewees granting the police lower scores than men. Thus, in the Jewish sample, some 56% of women compared with 46% of men gave the police a rating of poor or very poor in combatting domestic violence. In the Arab sample, the gap is somewhat narrower, though a larger share of women (47%) than men (43%) still rate police handling of domestic violence as poor or very poor. Interestingly, a rather high proportion of men (41%) gave the police a performance rating of good or excellent in this area. Indeed, this was the highest score given by Arab men to any of the six areas of police performance we asked about.

Figure 4.11 / Police performance in combatting domestic violence, by sex (Jewish sample; %)

Figure 4.12 / Police performance in combatting domestic violence, by sex (Arab sample; %)

■ Excellent　■ Good　■ Fair　■ Poor　■ Very poor　■ Don't know

There is reason to assume that the differences between Jews and Arabs in their rating of police performance overall and in the specific areas surveyed stems, at least in part, from the fact that they do not encounter "the same police" under the same circumstances. We examined whether the public feels that the police act differently in Arab communities than in Jewish ones.

We asked: "Do you agree with the claim that the police make more effort to address crime in Jewish communities than in Arab ones?" A very large majority of interviewees agreed with this claim; however, we found this majority to be more substantial in the Arab sample (82%) than in the Jewish one (67%).

Figure 4.13 / "The police make more effort to address crime in Jewish communities than in Arab ones" (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation yields a relatively similar picture: A sizeable majority of interviewees in each of the camps expressed agreement with the statement as presented, though the majority on the Left is greater than that in the Center or on the Right.

Figure 4.14 / "The police make more effort to address crime in Jewish communities than in Arab ones," by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree

In Israel, as in numerous other countries, the question of whether certain vulnerable or excluded groups are over-policed has been debated in recent years in the public arena as well as in professional circles. We therefore presented the same question for each group in turn: "Do you agree with the claim that Israel's police force "over-polices": Arab Israelis, Mizrahim, Ethiopian Israelis, Haredim, foreign workers, illegal Palestinian workers?"

We found differences between Jewish and Arab interviewees on the question of whether certain groups in Israel are over-policed. The Arab respondents were more inclined than the Jews to hold that over-policing does take place. Thus, over one-half of Arab interviewees agreed that four out of the six groups presented are subject to excessive policing: Arab Israelis, 73%; illegal Palestinian workers, 71.5%; Ethiopian Israelis, 56.5%; Mizrahim, 50.5%. And regarding the other two groups—foreign workers and Haredim—a greater share of Arabs (roughly 43% in both cases) than of Jews agreed with the original statement. Among Jewish interviewees, the only group for which there was a broad consensus (62.5%) that they are over-policed was Ethiopian Jews. With reference to illegal Palestinian workers, foreign workers, and Arab Israelis, only a minority—albeit a rather sizeable one of some 40%—agreed that these groups suffer from over-policing. Concerning Haredim, just 36% of Jewish interviewees agreed that over-policing takes place. And finally, slightly less than one-quarter (24%) held that the same is true for Mizrahim.

Figure 4.15 / Somewhat or strongly agree that each of these groups is over-policed (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Are Ethiopian Israelis over-policed?

Apparently in response to increasing debate on the subject, as well as the protests that erupted following the lethal shooting of Solomon Teka in 2019 and other incidents in which Ethiopian Israelis were injured by the police (and perhaps also inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States), a majority of the total sample somewhat or strongly agree with the claim that Ethiopian Israelis are over-policed.

Figure 4.16 / Are Ethiopian Israelis over-policed? (total sample; %)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

In this case, we did not encounter substantial differences between Jewish and Arab interviewees. Over one-half of all respondents in each sample agreed with the claim that Ethiopian Israelis are over-policed.

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority in each camp agree with the statement, though there are differences in the size of this majority: Those who identify with the Left expressed agreement virtually across the board, compared with slightly over half who felt this way among respondents on the Right.

Figure 4.17 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Ethiopian Israelis are over-policed, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

Breaking down the responses by education, we found that the higher the level of schooling, the greater the extent of agreement that Ethiopian Israelis are over-policed.

Figure 4.18 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Ethiopian Israelis are over-policed, by level of education (total sample; %)

Are illegal Palestinian workers over-policed?

On the question of whether illegal Palestinian workers are over-policed, the total sample is split almost down the middle, though the share who agree with this claim is slightly greater than those who reject it.

Figure 4.19 / Are illegal Palestinian workers over-policed? (total sample; %)

A breakdown of the responses by nationality reveals, as expected, a substantial difference between Jewish and Arab interviewees. Of the Jewish respondents, roughly 44% agreed with the statement and 48% disagreed with it; by contrast, 71.5% of Arab respondents expressed agreement.

Figure 4.20 / Are illegal Palestinian workers over-policed? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Analyzing the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that only just above one-third of respondents on the Right, exactly one-half in the Center, and about two-thirds on the Left agreed with the claim that illegal Palestinian workers are over-policed.

Figure 4.21 / Somewhat or strongly agree that illegal Palestinian workers are over-policed, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

Strongly agree   Somewhat agree

Are Arab citizens of Israel over-policed?

With regard to over-policing of Arab citizens of Israel, the responses of the Jewish and the Arab samples were almost completely the inverse of one another: A majority (albeit small) of Jewish interviewees do not agree with this claim, whereas almost three-quarters of Arab interviewees hold that Arab Israeli citizens are in fact victims of over-policing.

Figure 4.22 / Are Arab Israeli citizens over-policed? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

In the Arab sample, we found significant differences in the breakdown by self-defined religious affiliation, with 55% of Christians agreeing with the claim, as contrasted with roughly 75% of Muslims and 77% of Druze. In other words, the Christians feel to a lesser degree than do the Muslims and Druze that Arab Israelis are over-policed.

A breakdown of the Jewish interviewees by political orientation points to sizeable differences between those who identify with the Right and those who align themselves with the Center or Left. Whereas less than one-third (30%) of those on the Right agree somewhat or strongly with the claim that Arab Israelis are over-policed, one-half (50%) in the Center and 74% on the Left share this view.

Figure 4.23 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Arab Israeli citizens are over-policed, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity indicates that the secular interviewees agree the most strongly with the claim that Arab citizens of Israel are over-policed (figure 4.24), and are the least accepting of claims of over-policing of Haredim (as shown in figure 4.30 below).

Figure 4.24 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Arab Israeli citizens are over-policed, by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)

Are foreign workers over-policed?

In the total sample, the public was split almost evenly on this question, with a slight tilt toward rejecting the claim that foreign workers experience over-policing: 48% disagreed with the statement, compared with 42% who agreed with it.

Figure 4.25 / Are foreign workers over-policed? (total sample; %)

A breakdown by nationality yields virtually the same picture in both the Jewish and Arab samples, though a slightly greater share of the Jewish interviewees disagreed with the statement, while almost equal percentages agreed and disagreed among the Arab respondents: 42% of the Jews and 43% of the Arabs agreed that foreign workers are over-policed, compared with 48% of Jews and 43% of Arabs who disagreed.

Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found more significant differences: On the Left, a large majority (70%) agree with the statement presented, in common with 51% in the Center and a minority of just 32% on the Right. The responses to this question were presumably influenced by the interviewees' differing opinions in general on the subject of foreign workers.

Figure 4.26 / Somewhat or strongly agree that foreign workers are over-policed, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

A breakdown of the responses by socioeconomic status (using the Central Bureau of Statistics division of localities into clusters) shows that interviewees whose place of residence is classified as belonging to the lowest clusters are less inclined to agree with the claim that foreign workers are over-policed than are those who live in the highest socioeconomic clusters.

Figure 4.27 / Are foreign workers over-policed?, by socioeconomic status of residential community (total sample; %)

Are Haredim over-policed?

A majority of interviewees in the total sample disagreed with the statement that Haredim are over-policed.

Figure 4.28 / Are Haredim over-policed? (total sample; %)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

In the breakdown by nationality (Jews and Arabs) as well, neither group shows a majority who support the claim that Haredim are over-policed, though it was somewhat surprising to discover that the share of Jewish interviewees who agree with the statement is smaller than the corresponding share of Arab interviewees.

Figure 4.29 / Are Haredim over-policed? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

As expected, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that the higher the level of religiosity, the greater the proportion who agree that Haredim are subject to over-policing. Whereas among secular interviewees only about one-fifth agree with this claim, nearly three-quarters of those who classify themselves as Haredim, and only a slightly lower share of national religious respondents, support it.

Figure 4.30 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Haredim are over-policed, by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)

Predictably enough, we also found an association between voting patterns in the March 2020 Knesset elections and opinions on the statement in question. Of those who reported voting for United Torah Judaism or Shas, 77% and 71% (respectively) agreed that Israel's police force over-polices Haredim. By contrast, among voters for Labor-Gesher-Meretz and for Blue and White, only about 25% voiced their agreement with the claim, while the corresponding share among Yisrael Beytenu voters is just 11%.

Table 4.2 (total sample; %)

Vote in 2020 Knesset elections	Somewhat or strongly agree	Somewhat or strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
United Torah Judaism	77	19	4	100
Shas	71	23	6	100
Yamina	50	43	7	100
Joint List	41	55	4	100
Likud	36	57	7	100
Blue and White	25	71	4	100
Labor-Gesher-Meretz	22	67	11	100
Yisrael Beytenu	11	87	2	100

Are Mizrahim over-policed?

The next group we asked about were Jewish citizens of Mizrahi descent. In the total sample, roughly two-thirds (65%) of interviewees disagreed with the claim that Mizrahim are victims of over-policing, while slightly more than one-quarter (28%) agreed with it.

Figure 4.31 / Are Mizrahim over-policed? (total sample; %)

Breaking down the responses by ethnic origin, we found a majority in all groups who somewhat or strongly disagreed with the statement we proposed: FSU immigrants, 76%; Ashkenazim, 74%; Mizrahim, 63%; mixed (Ashkenazi and Mizrahi), 65%. The Mizrahim themselves showed the highest proportion of interviewees who agreed with the claim (32%, almost double the percentage of Ashkenazim who agreed with this statement).

Figure 4.32 / Somewhat or strongly agree that Mizrahim are over-policed, by ethnicity (Jewish sample; %)

In further analyses by political orientation, socioeconomic status, and income, we did not encounter substantial differences between groups on this question; however, we did find an interesting difference between Jewish and Arab respondents. Half of the Arab interviewees stated that they somewhat or strongly agree with the claim that Mizrahim are over-policed, whereas less than one-quarter of the Jewish interviewees felt this way.

Figure 4.33 / Are Mizrahim over-policed? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

To conclude the topic of over-policing: Looking at the positions of the total sample regarding the six groups presented in our survey, it emerges that 18% of the interviewees hold that none of these groups is over-policed, while 8% believe that each of the six groups suffers from this practice. Upon closer examination, there are differences between the samples; for example, about 20% of the Jewish interviewees disagree with the suggestion of over-policing in relation to all six groups, compared with just 7% of the Arab interviewees. By contrast, roughly 13% of the Arab respondents agree with this proposition regarding all six groups, as opposed to only 6% of the Jewish respondents who share this view.

Figure 4.34 / Somewhat or strongly agree that 0–6 of the groups presented are over-policed (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

We also found considerable differences when breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, with 25% of interviewees on the Right holding that none of the groups studied is over-policed, as contrasted with just 6% on the Left.

Figure 4.35 / Somewhat or strongly agree that 0–6 of the groups presented are over-policed, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

As shown above, the Israeli public is highly critical of its police force. Moreover, a substantial majority of interviewees from the total sample (70%) believe that the police relate seriously to criticism of their performance to only a small extent or not at all (49% and 21%, respectively). Only about one-quarter (26%) responded that the police take such criticism seriously to a large or very large extent. The responses of all the interviewees were similar when broken down by most of the parameters surveyed (nationality, religiosity, and age group). These findings should be of the utmost concern to the country's police force, since, as we have seen, their image in the eyes of the public is not favorable, and a demonstrable willingness to learn from constructive criticism could go a long way toward improving this impression.

The police's attitude to criticism of their performance

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Figure 4.36 / "To what extent do the police take criticism of their performance seriously?" (total sample; %)

Very much — 3.5
To a large extent — 20
To a small extent — 49
Not at all — 21.5
Don't know — 6

An analysis of the findings shows a very strong association between the perception that the police treat criticism of their performance as crucial, and the extent of trust in the police force. When the public feels that the police do not relate seriously to criticism, they are less inclined to show faith in this institution.

Figure 4.37 / Trust in the police, by how seriously they relate to criticism of their performance (total sample; %)

Do not take criticism seriously at all	15
Take criticism seriously to a small extent	43.5
Take criticism seriously to a large extent	66
Take criticism seriously to a very large extent	59

Chapter 5 / Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Willingness of Arab citizens to integrate into Israeli society
- Is the regime in Israel democratic toward Arab citizens as well?
- Should crucial decisions be made strictly by a Jewish majority?
- Better together or apart?
- Preference for treatment by a Jewish / Arab doctor?
- Willingness to work in a Jewish / Arab community
- Willingness to work under a Jewish / Arab boss
- Steps to improve the status of Arabs in Israel
- Reasons for the low number of Arabs in high-ranking civil service positions

One of the pivotal areas in any discussion of Israeli democracy and the directions it is taking are relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.[7] In chapter 1, we showed that Arab citizens feel less a part of the state and its problems than do Jewish citizens (44% as opposed to 84.5%, respectively). In chapter 2, we saw further that a sizeable proportion of the Arab public, as contrasted with the Jewish public, hold that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger (73% of Arab respondents versus 50% of Jews). With respect to the definition of Israel as "a Jewish and democratic state," the Arab public is more inclined to hold that the Jewish aspect is too dominant (76% of Arabs feel this way compared with 41.5% of Jews). In the same chapter, we saw also that the degree of trust of Arab Israeli citizens in nearly all the state institutions, with the exception of the Supreme Court, is less than that of Jewish citizens of the state. In chapter 6, we will be demonstrating that, in the eyes of the Arab public, Jews and Arabs have the highest level of tension between them of all the groups cited, unlike the widespread opinion among the Jewish public that the tensions between Right and Left are the most severe. Moreover, the level of solidarity in Israeli society, in the assessment of Arab citizens, is lower than that seen by Jewish citizens.

In other words, these are two communities with deep gaps in perception between them on fundamental questions concerning the State of Israel and Israeli society. In this chapter, we will be focusing on relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel from various perspectives. Where we

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7   This topic has been discussed extensively every two years in publications of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute: *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017* and *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019*.

have past findings to draw on, we will attempt to identify any shifts in thinking, or likewise, cases where the situation has remained unchanged, for better or for worse.

We asked the interviewees whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it." As shown in the figure below, a limited majority of Jewish interviewees agreed with the statement, along with a large majority of Arabs. However, it should be noted that among those who agree, the greater share of Jewish respondents were only in the "somewhat agree" category, whereas most Arab respondents said that they "strongly agree" with the statement. Stated otherwise, although a majority in both groups agreed, the Arab interviewees were more decisive in their position.

Figure 5.1 / "Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it" (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A comparison with last year's distribution of responses on this question shows virtually no change: This year, 81% of Arab respondents agreed with the statement that most Arabs wish to integrate into Israeli society, compared with 83% who agreed last year. Among Jewish respondents as well, the results were almost unchanged. In 2019, 57% agreed with the statement, and this year, 56%. However, the share of Jewish interviewees who agreed strongly with the statement dropped from 26% last year to just 14% this year.

This leads to the question of which groups in the Jewish sample **do not** agree with the statement (among Arab interviewees, we are speaking of a minority too small to be analyzed). As demonstrated in the following table, roughly one-third of those who align themselves with

the Center, and almost one-half of whose who identify with the Right, disagree with the claim that Arab citizens of Israel are striving to integrate. A breakdown of the responses by religiosity shows that the national religious are the group with the largest share (over one-half!) who disagree with the above statement, and the secular are the group with the smallest proportion who disagree.

Table 5.1 (Jewish sample; %)

Do not agree with the statement that most Arabs want to integrate into Israeli society		
Political orientation	Left	**15**
	Center	**32.5**
	Right	**48.5**
Religiosity	Haredim	**48**
	National religious	**58**
	Traditional religious	**44**
	Traditional non-religious	**39**
	Secular	**31**

In a truly democratic system, democracy is applied equally to all sectors of the population. However, it has long been argued in certain quarters that Israel does not treat its Arab citizens as democratically as it does its Jewish citizens. We therefore asked the interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "The regime in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens as well." It emerges that, while a majority of Jews hold that this is indeed the case, among Arab respondents only about one-third feel this way. This finding coincides with the perception held by the Arab public, which we have already noted, that the Jewish component in the definition of the State of Israel is too predominant.

Is Israel democratic toward Arabs as well?

Question 49

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Figure 5.2 / "The regime in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens as well" (agree somewhat or strongly; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates that only about one-third of those who identify with the Left hold that Israel's regime is democratic towards its Arab citizens as well (very similar to the proportion who share this view among Arab interviewees), as contrasted with a majority of those who align themselves with the Center or Right.

Table 5.2 (Jewish sample; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Somewhat or strongly agree that the regime in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens as well	34.5	59	76

While a majority of Jews and a minority of Arabs consistently hold that the regime in Israel is also democratic to Arabs, this year we encountered a noticeable decline in the share of Arabs who agree with this statement (from 43% last year to 35% this year). We did not find disparities on this question between Muslim, Christian, and Druze Arabs. Nonetheless, we did come across one interesting difference: Cross-referencing the statement here with the question of whether the interviewee feels a part of Israel and its problems yielded the finding that 70% of Arab respondents who agree strongly with the claim that Israel's regime is democratic toward Arabs also feel a part of the state and its problems. By contrast, of those who strongly disagree with the statement in question, just 27% indicate a sense of belonging to the state.

Table 5.3 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Somewhat or strongly agree that the regime in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens as well	2017	2019	2020
Jews	71	71	65.5
Arabs	45	43	35

We looked for links between the question of whether Israel extends democratic treatment to its Arab citizens and the perception that Israel's democratic system is in grave danger, and we found the following association: Among those who think that Israel is democratic to its Arab citizens, fewer than half (43%) hold that Israeli democracy is under threat, as opposed to nearly three-quarters (72.5%) who see such a danger among those who believe that Israel does not treat its Arab citizens democratically.

The exclusion of a certain group of citizens from decision-making circles at the national level is inconsistent with the principles of democratic equality and of involvement of all citizens in determining their fate. However, we have found over the years (and this year as well) that a majority of the Jewish public agree with the statement that decisions crucial to the state on matters of peace and security should rest on a Jewish majority; that is to say, an overall majority of the country's citizens is not enough. Naturally, a substantial majority of the Arab public (75%) are opposed to such a stance this year, as in the past.

Figure 5.3 / "Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority," 2010–2020 (agree somewhat or strongly; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

The differences on this topic between the various political camps in the Jewish sample are sizeable: On the Right and in the Center, a majority agree with the statement that crucial decisions on issues of peace and security should be based on a Jewish majority, whereas on the Left, only a minority (though over one-third) side with this proposition.

Table 5.4 (Jewish sample; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Somewhat or strongly agree that crucial decisions on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority	**39**	**71**	**87**

Physical separation between different groups in Israeli society is thought to facilitate the spread of racist and anti-democratic views. We wanted to know to what extent Jews and Arabs in Israel wish to live separately from one another. Once again, we asked Jewish interviewees whether they agree with the statement: "To preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately," posing the same question to Arab interviewees on living apart from Jews in order to preserve Arab identity.

As shown in the following figure, a very large majority of Arabs (77.5%) are opposed to living apart from Jews, even for the purpose of maintaining a unique Arab identity. Among Jewish interviewees, a small majority (54%) are opposed to such a separation. As in the previous question, the Arab respondents are far more strident in their opposition to this idea: 68.5% strongly disagree with the statement, compared with 18% of the Jewish respondents.

Figure 5.4 / "To preserve Jewish / Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately" (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

The pattern of responses this year is very similar to that in previous years, with Jews consistently favoring separation to a greater extent than do Arabs.

Table 5.5 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Somewhat or strongly disagree that it is better to live apart to preserve a unique national identity	2017	2018	2019	2020
Jews	45	53	47	54
Arabs	77	70.5	81	77.5

Which groups among the Jewish respondents are more supportive of separation? This position is clearly more widespread among the more religious respondents.

Table 5.6 (Jewish sample; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Somewhat or strongly agree that it is better for Jews and Arabs to live separately to preserve Jewish national identity	82	62	48	42.5	25

In the younger age groups in the Jewish sample, there is also greater support for living separately: Among respondents aged 18–34, 52% are in favor, as compared with 44% in the 35–44 cohort, 39.5% in the 45–64 age group, and just 24% in the group aged 65 and over.

Unlike the realm of political decision-making presented earlier, it appears that in the medical arena many barriers between Jews and Arabs have already fallen. This year too, as in previous surveys, a majority of the Jewish public and an even greater majority of the Arab public responded that it makes no difference whether they are treated by a Jewish or by an Arab doctor.

Medical treatment by a Jewish / Arab doctor?

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Table 5.7 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Prefer a doctor from their nationality (Jew for Jews, and Arab for Arabs)	Prefer a doctor from the other nationality (Arab for Jews, and Jew for Arabs)	Doesn't matter	Don't know	Total
Jews	27	–	71	2	100
Arabs	3	1	96	–	100

We did not encounter significant differences on the basis of sex, for example; however, when we broke down the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity, we did find very substantial differences: In the more religious groups, there is a clearer preference than in the other groups for treatment by a Jewish doctor.

Figure 5.5 / Prefer a Jewish doctor (Jewish sample; %)

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that on the Left a negligible minority of 3%, and in the Center a larger proportion of 18%, would prefer a Jewish doctor, while on the Right, over one-third (37%) express such a preference.

And what about when it comes to earning a living? It seems that here the picture is less rosy, perhaps due to concerns about personal security. We asked: "Assuming that the working conditions and salary met your expectations, would you be willing to take a job in an Arab / Jewish community?" On this subject, we found considerable differences between the Jewish and the Arab interviewees. In the former group, only a minority (though a sizeable one, at 41.5%) indicated their willingness to work in an Arab community, as opposed to the vast majority of Arab interviewees (93%) who would be willing to work in a Jewish community. Moreover, while a decisive majority of 83% of Arabs are **certain** they would be willing to work in a Jewish community, among Jews, the corresponding response is 13.5%.

Figure 5.6 / "Assuming that the working conditions and salary met your expectations, would you be willing to take a job in an Arab / Jewish community?" (certain or think they would; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of responses in the Arab sample by religion (Muslim, Christian, Druze) did not yield any real differences. By contrast, in the Jewish sample, the gaps between subgroups were considerable on this question as well, as shown in the following table: The more religious respondents, and those on the Right, are more hesitant to work in an Arab community, even if the employment conditions suit them in general.

Table 5.8 (Jewish sample; %)

		Willing to work in an Arab community
Political orientation	Left	68
	Center	54
	Right	30
Religiosity	Haredim	12
	National religious	29
	Traditional religious	31
	Traditional non-religious	42
	Secular	54

In past surveys, we have found that working together has been characterized by both Jews and Arabs as a very positive experience.[8] This time, we asked about attitudes toward hierarchies in the workplace: "Would you be willing to work under an Arab boss (Jews) / a Jewish boss (Arabs)?" In this case, a majority of both Jews and Arabs expressed willingness to do so, though the majority was larger and more substantial among Arab respondents than among Jewish ones, as shown in the following figure:

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8   Tamar Hermann, Or Anabi, William Cubbison, Ella Heller, and Fadi Omar, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2019), p. 77 (Hebrew).

Figure 5.7 / Willing to work under an Arab boss (Jewish sample) /
a Jewish boss (Arab sample) (%)

We found the same pattern of responses in the Jewish sample here as in the question of working in an Arab community; however, the percentages of agreement were higher across all categories, suggesting that the personal security factor may play a significant role in deciding where to work, but has less of an impact when it comes to the national identity of one's immediate supervisor.

Table 5.9 (Jewish sample; %)

		Willing to work under an Arab boss
Political orientation	Left	90
	Center	78
	Right	57
Religiosity	Haredim	37
	National religious	48.5
	Traditional religious	68
	Traditional non-religious	68
	Secular	78.5

We examined this supposition about the influence of locality-related security concerns by cross-tabulating the last two questions, and found that in the Jewish sample, of those who are willing to work under an Arab boss, a small majority (56%) are also willing to work in an Arab community, while 40% are unwilling to do so. Here, presumably, is where the intervening variable of concerns for personal safety enters the picture. By contrast, of those who are unwilling to work under an Arab boss, just 13% are prepared to work in an Arab community, with the vast majority (87%) expressing unwillingness to work in an Arab locality—a position that, at the very least, implies a negative attitude in general toward Arabs.

We presented the survey participants with a list of possible steps, and asked them how helpful they might be in protecting the rights and interests of the Arab population in Israel. As shown in the following table, these proposals are much more appealing to the Arab public than to the Jewish public, although a majority of Jews do think it would be helpful to appoint an Arab minister to promote the interests of the Arab population, and to include Arab Knesset members in formulating legislation that affects the Arab public. Nevertheless, the distribution shown in the table below suggests that the responses of the Jewish interviewees tend more toward agreement or disagreement with these moves from a Jewish perspective than with a dispassionate analysis of whether or not they would be helpful in advancing the interests of the Arab public in Israel.

We found particularly low levels of support among Jewish interviewees (as in the past) for bringing Arab parties into the governing coalition, as well as for legislation requiring Arab representation at all levels and in all institutions in proportion to their percentage of the population. As shown below, a majority of Arab respondents are in favor of each of these proposals. The greatest support is for legislation requiring proportional representation of Arabs in all positions and institutions, and for a law requiring ongoing consultation with Arab civil-society organizations on matters of concern to the Arab public.

Table 5.10 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Think or are certain that this can help protect the rights and interests of the Arab population in Israel	
	Jews	**Arabs**
Appointing a professional Arab minister to safeguard the rights and interests of the Arab population	59	67
Including Arab Knesset members in developing any legislation that affects the Arab public	56.5	78

	Think or are certain that this can help protect the rights and interests of the Arab population in Israel	
	Jews	**Arabs**
Enacting a law requiring ongoing government consultations with Arab civil-society organizations	**47**	**82**
Bringing Arab parties into the governing coalition	**36**	**70**
Enacting a law requiring Arab representation at all levels and in all institutions in proportion to their percentage of the population	**38**	**83**

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish interviewees by political orientation shows a solid majority on the Left who favor each of the suggestions, while the Center is "on the fence" in terms of these proposals, with close to one-half supporting them and one-half opposing. On the Right, meanwhile, only a minority favor each of the proposals; this minority is largest in the case of appointing an Arab minister to handle matters related to the Arab public and its rights, and smallest, regarding bringing Arab parties into the coalition.

Figure 5.8 / Position on different steps to protect the rights and interests of the Arab population in Israel, by political orientation (think or are certain that these can help; Jewish sample; %)

Left   Center   Right

We have noted the marked opposition in the Jewish public to legislation requiring Arab representation in all institutions, positions, and official echelons in proportion to their percentage of the population. In this context, we wished to explore what respondents consider to be the primary reason for the relatively low number of Arabs in senior positions in the civil service in Israel. The figure below shows that Jews are aware that Arabs are sidelined: A plurality (31.5%) selected as the key factor for this low representation the desire of the Jewish majority to keep Arabs out of positions of power (we have no way of knowing whether those who chose this option condemn or support this situation). In second place as a possible explanation is the lack of desire of Arab citizens to be part of Israel's civil service.

Among Arab respondents, a clearer picture emerges: A majority claim that the primary reason for the low representation of Arabs in the civil service is the desire of the Jewish majority to shut them out of positions of power.

Figure 5.9 / Reasons for the low representation of Arabs in Israel's civil service (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yields a complex portrait: The Left (even more so than the Arab respondents) hold the Jewish majority responsible for Arab exclusion from the civil service. This is also the most common opinion in the Center. The Right, however, cast the blame equally on both groups, even though Jewish majority is clearly much more capable of improving the situation. A very high percentage of interviewees on the Right and in the Center chose "don't know" or "other factors" as their responses.

Figure 5.10 / Reasons for the low representation of Arabs in Israel's civil service, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

Chapter 6 / Israeli Society

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- The level of solidarity in Israeli society
- Willingness to pay higher taxes to reduce inequality
- Integrating disadvantaged groups into the workplace
- Primary sources of tension in Israeli society
- Impact of coronavirus pandemic on relations between groups in Israeli society

Since democratic regimes are grounded on broad agreements among and between citizens and their leaders regarding foundational principles and the "rules of the game," a prerequisite for democratic stability is a visible degree of social solidarity. We therefore asked: "How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens)?" on a scale from 1 = no solidarity at all to 10 = a high level of solidarity. In the total sample, the average score for social solidarity in Israel was a not-very-impressive 5.35, slightly below the midpoint of the range. Over the years, we have repeatedly found that Arab respondents perceive the solidarity of Israeli society as being lower than do Jewish respondents—a finding obviously linked to the former's sense of alienation and exclusion.

As shown in the following table, there have not been major changes in this rating since we began to measure the level of solidarity in 2011. The slight and gradual shift that has taken place over the years shows an upswing in the Jewish sample, with a higher average this year than in previous surveys—a solid empirical finding that casts some doubt on the frequent talk in recent months of the fragmentation of Israeli society. Likewise, we see that the Arab interviewees' perception of Israel's social solidarity is consistently lower than that of the Jewish interviewees; however, the difference between the samples is not all that large, despite the Arab public's negative perceptions of its civil status, as described in chapter 5. Nonetheless, this year saw the highest average in the Arab sample in all our surveys through the years.

Level of solidarity in Israeli society

Question 4

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Table 6.1 (average solidarity score; Jewish and Arab samples)

	2011	2014	2015	2020
Jews	4.8	4.8	5.3	5.5
Arabs	4.5	4.0	4.5	4.8

In the Jewish sample, we explored whether affiliation with a particular political camp affects the sense of social solidarity, and found that the Left perceive the level of togetherness in Israel as much lower than do the Center or the Right, though the rating is not high in any of the groups. A breakdown by religiosity, again in the Jewish sample, shows that the sense of solidarity is lowest among the secular public. Respondents who identify with the stronger groups in Israeli society assess the level of social solidarity as higher than do those who associate themselves with the weaker groups. Interestingly, analysis by income level and by age group did not yield consistent differences.

Table 6.2 (average solidarity score)

Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	**4.6**
	Center	**5.35**
	Right	**5.75**
Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredi	**5.49**
	National religious	**6.02**
	Traditional religious	**5.94**
	Traditional non-religious	**5.69**
	Secular	**5.06**
Sense of belonging to stronger or weaker groups (total sample)	Strong	**5.33**
	Fairly strong	**5.83**
	Fairly weak	**4.86**
	Weak	**4.44**

Among the tangible signs of social solidarity is the willingness to contribute to the public good, for example, by paying higher taxes in order to narrow socioeconomic gaps. We wished to know if the Israeli public is willing to do so at this time, when the crisis generated by COVID-19 has led to a steep rise in unemployment and major loss of income for large swaths of the Israeli public, causing a heightened sense of economic insecurity coupled with lower levels of trust in most of the institutions that represent, formulate, and implement government policy. Perhaps due to the impact of the pandemic, we found that one-half of the Israeli public are not ready to take on a greater tax burden even if they could be certain that the additional funds would be directed toward reducing socioeconomic disparities. Slightly over one-third might agree to such a move depending on the size of the additional tax, and only a small minority would be willing to pay more with no preconditions.

Figure 6.1 / "Would you agree to pay higher taxes if you could be certain they would go toward reducing socioeconomic gaps?" (total sample; %)

A breakdown by nationality shows a higher proportion of respondents in both the "agree" and the "disagree" categories in the Arab public than in the Jewish one; however, the share in the Arab sample who conditioned their consent on the size of the tax increase is lower. In fact, in the Arab sample as a whole, the trend is clearly toward unwillingness to pay higher taxes, which may be connected with the alienation that this population feels toward the state system. In the Jewish sample, the largest share would not agree to pay higher taxes, but a sizeable proportion would make their willingness contingent on the size of the increase; in other words, they do not reject the notion out of hand.

Table 6.3 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Agree	Depends on size of increase	Do not agree	Don't know	Total
Jews	11	41	46	2	100
Arabs	23	18	58.5	1	100

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that interviewees on the Left, who are the most vocal in their commitment to reducing socioeconomic gaps, are twice as willing to pay higher taxes as those from the Center or the Right. Similarly, an especially high proportion of respondents on the Left are willing to consent to such a move, contingent on the size of the tax increase. The distribution of responses in the Center and on the Left is virtually identical.

Figure 6.2 / "Would you agree to pay higher taxes if you could be certain they would go toward reducing socioeconomic gaps?", by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

A breakdown of the total sample by income level indicates that those with above-average incomes are slightly more willing than others to pay higher taxes for the purpose of reducing socioeconomic gaps. They are also more inclined than lower-earning respondents to condition their consent on the size of the tax increase.

Table 6.4 (total sample; %)

	Agree	Depends on size of increase	Do not agree	Don't know	Total
Below-average income	13	35	50	2	100
Average income	11	38	50	1	100
Above-average income	15	42	41	2	100

Social solidarity also means taking care of disadvantaged groups, including finding them employment. We asked the interviewees if, in their opinion, large private-sector companies should be legally obligated as a matter of policy to hire individuals from the following groups: people over 50, people with physical disabilities, people with mental health disabilities, Arab citizens of Israel, women, and Haredim. For most of the groups, we found a majority in favor of making this a legal requirement, despite the fact that it would constitute intervention in the management of human resources in the private sector. The idea garnered more support in the Jewish sample than in the Arab sample, except with regard to Arab Israelis and women, where the proportion of Arab interviewees who support such an obligation exceeds that of Jews. Of particular interest is the relatively low share among both Jewish and Arab interviewees who favor mandating the hiring of people with mental health disabilities. Likewise, it should be noted that a comparatively small share of Jewish interviewees support a legal requirement to hire Arabs.

Obligation to hire members of disadvantaged groups

Questions 57–62

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Figure 6.3 / Think or are certain that large private-sector companies should be required by law to implement a policy of hiring people from these groups (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Women — Jews 77, Arabs 81
People with physical disabilities — Jews 78, Arabs 69
People over 50 — Jews 77, Arabs 69
Haredim — Jews 69, Arabs 59
Arab citizens of Israel — Jews 56, Arabs 85
People with mental-health disabilities — Jews 52.5, Arabs 37

■ Jews   ■ Arabs

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, with respect to all groups except the Haredim, those who identify with the Left are more strongly in favor of a hiring requirement than those who associate themselves with the Center, or even more so, the Right.

Table 6.5 Think or are certain that large private-sector companies should be required by law to implement a policy of hiring people from these groups, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Women	86	81	73.5
People with physical disabilities	88	84.5	73
People over 50	83	81	74
Haredim	69	70	70
Arab citizens of Israel	81	68.5	45
People with mental health disabilities	64	57	48

Once again this year, tensions between the political Right and Left are seen as the greatest source of friction in Israeli society. The share who hold this view is higher this year than in previous surveys. As shown in the figure below, the rise in prominence of this source of tension comes mainly "at the expense of" a decline in the severity of the tensions between religious and secular Jews as perceived by the respondents—a situation that can be explained by the high degree of congruence between religiosity and self-defined political orientation (see appendix 3). In second place again this year are relations between Jews and Arabs, which, until several years ago, were seen as the primary focal point of tension. The two remaining areas of friction—between rich and poor, and between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim—are still considered the most severe by only a minority of respondents. It is worth noting that, while the tension between rich and poor is still considered to be negligible at this point (only 8.5% of the total sample identify it as the primary source of friction in Israeli society), this share is noticeably higher than it has been over the past two years (5%), which was a period of relative economic prosperity.

Figure 6.4 / Groups with the highest level of tension between them, 2012–2020 (total sample; %)

Legend:
- Right and Left
- Jews and Arabs
- Religious and secular Jews
- Rich and poor
- Mizrahim and Ashkenazim
- Don't know

Below, we examine the links between the ranking of sources of tension and various relevant variables. In all three political camps in the Jewish sample, we found that the tension between Left and Right heads the list; however, the share who hold this view is clearly higher among those who identify themselves with the Left than it is among those from the Center or the Right (Left, 55%; Center, 45%; Right, 38%).

Figure 6.5 / Left-Right tensions are the strongest source of friction in Israeli society, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)

Examining perceptions of the tension between Jews and Arabs, we found that only one-quarter of the Jews surveyed see it as the primary source of friction in Israeli society. Among Arab respondents, however, the tension between the two national groups ranks highest on the list, with roughly one-half seeing it as the most serious.

Figure 6.6 / Jewish-Arab tensions are the strongest source of friction in Israeli society (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A highly interesting finding relates to how the various political camps in the Jewish sample perceive the level of tension between Jews and Arabs. Whereas on the Left and in the Center, a relatively small share see this as being the greatest area of tension in Israeli society (18% and 19%, respectively), on the Right a much larger share (30%) take this view.

And what of tensions between religious and secular Jews? It seems that the Haredim are unique in this regard: They see this as the primary point of tension in Israeli society today, while all the other religious groups place it third on the list, below tensions between Right and Left and between Jews and Arabs.

Figure 6.7 / Religious-secular tensions are the strongest source of friction in Israeli society, by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)

With respect to tensions between rich and poor, though we expected that the abysmal economic situation caused by the pandemic would have a major impact in this case, we did not find any real differences between income levels on this question: Of those respondents who reported below-average earnings, 11% categorized this as the area of greatest tension, and among those with average or above-average incomes, 7%.

We examined if ethnic origin plays a role in perceptions of the level of tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, and found that it was ranked in last place by all the groups surveyed: Among Ashkenazim, only 5% defined Ashkenazi-Mizrahi tensions as the most severe, with the corresponding finding among Mizrahim at 2%; those of mixed ethnicity, 2%; and FSU immigrants, 3%.

Effect of the coronavirus pandemic on relations between groups

Questions 53–56

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We wished to know how the pandemic has affected relationships between Jews and Arabs, Haredim and non-Haredim, the public and the government, and the public and the police. It appears that, in the eyes of the public, only Jewish-Arab relations have seen improvement as a result of the crisis. According to most of the interviewees, the three other relationships studied have been harmed by the pandemic.

Figure 6.8 / Effect of the coronavirus pandemic on relations between the following groups in Israeli society (total sample; %)

As stated, the prevailing feeling among Jews and Arabs alike is that the pandemic improved relations between the two groups. Nonetheless, the share of "don't know" responses in the Jewish sample is particularly high—in fact, double that in the Arab sample.

Table 6.6 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Relations between Jews and Arabs:	Improved	Harmed	Don't know
Jews	49	15	36
Arabs	55	26.5	18.5

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that in all groups (with the exception of the traditional religious), a majority hold that the coronavirus pandemic harmed relations between Haredim and non-Haredim in Israel. This assessment is especially prevalent among Haredim.

Figure 6.9 / Think that the coronavirus pandemic has harmed relations between Haredim and non-Haredim, by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)

The relatively high share of respondents who hold that the crisis has damaged relations between the government and the people is not surprising, given the tide of public criticism of the country's political leadership in the wake of the pandemic.

Figure 6.10 / Think that the coronavirus pandemic has harmed relations between the public and the government, by vote in 2020 Knesset elections (total sample; %)

It is particularly interesting to note the shift in thinking about relations between the public and the police. In April 2020, at the height of the first wave of the pandemic, the prevailing opinion (50%) was that the crisis had improved this relationship; but, apparently due to the many recordings circulating of police conduct on various occasions, this percentage dropped to 36% in the present survey, which was conducted less than two months later. The highest share of interviewees (47%) indicated in the second survey that the crisis had damaged relations between the public and the police. This finding is consistent with the low level of trust in the police in the total sample (see chapter 2).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the group that believes most strongly that the pandemic has harmed the relationship between the public and the police are the Haredim.

Table 6.7 (Jewish sample; %)

	Think that the coronavirus pandemic has harmed relations between the public and the police
Haredim	**52**
National religious	**47**
Traditional religious	**42**
Traditional non-religious	**47**
Secular	**44**

Part Two

Israeli
Democracy—
An International
Comparison

Chapter 7 / International Indicators

Assessing the state of democracy is not a concern that is unique to Israel. Throughout the world, the quality of government is a pressing issue, preoccupying decision-makers and the general public alike. Numerous research institutes analyze various aspects of democracy and publish a host of indicators that enable comparisons between countries using professional surveys, public opinion polls, and official statistics. In this chapter, we examine several of these indicators, and present Israel's standing relative to other countries based on findings from the past year. It is important to emphasize that the indicators published this year relate to the countries' status in 2019.

This year, we review 15 indicators in six areas:

1. Democratic rights and freedoms (political rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press)

2. The democratic process (voice and accountability, political participation, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, democratic political culture)

3. Governance (functioning of government, rule of law)

4. Political corruption (control of corruption, perception of corruption)

5. Regulatory quality

6. Equal distribution of resources

We engage in two types of comparison: first, Israel's performance relative to other countries; and second, Israeli democracy today compared with its standing in previous years. For each indicator, we present three ratings: (1) Israel's **score** this year; (2) Israel's **global ranking** in relation to all the other countries included in the indicator; and (3) Israel's **ranking** relative to the other 36 member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In addition, we show the distribution of scores in each indicator for all the countries surveyed.[14]

> **A note on methodology:** Each of the research institutes uses its own scale to present its scores: 0–10, 0–40, 0–60, 0–1, and so on. To make it easier to compare Israel's scores in the various indicators, we standardized all the scores, ranking them on a uniform scale from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the better the democratic performance of a given country. The table below presents Israel's scores and its ranking in the various indicators.[15]

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14   The scores are rounded up in order to produce clearer graphic representations.

15   A detailed compilation of Israel's scores, the original rankings in the various indicators, and a full description of the sources, can be found at the IDI site. .

Table 7.1 / Israel's ranking in international indicators

		Global ranking*	Percentile—all countries surveyed	OECD ranking (out of 37 countries)	Percentile—OECD countries	Israel's standardized score (0–100)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	65–72/210	66–69	31–33	11–16	82.5
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	78–84/210	60–63	33–34	8–11	71.7
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	88/180	51	34	8	69.2
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	61/204	70	33	11	63.7
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	2–6/167	96–99	2–6	84–95	88.9
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	43/179	79	30	19	80.3
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	65/179	64	33	11	57.8
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	59/179	67	29	22	79.9
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	17–28/167	83–90	15–22	41–59	75.0
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	19–27/167	84–89	16–22	41–57	78.6
	Rule of law (World Bank)	38/209	82	25	32	71.0
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	45/209	78	23	38	66.1
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	35–38/180	79–81	24–26	30–35	60.0
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	28/209	87	21	43	75.6
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	54/179	70	30	19	82.5

∗ The number following the slash indicates the total number of countries surveyed in the indicator.

Israel's **highest** score this year is in political participation (88.9), as it was last year. Its score in the political rights indicator, which was previously high, dropped considerably this year, and the country no longer stands out favorably in this regard. The **lowest** score, in a repeat of last year, is in participatory democracy (57.8), despite some improvement in Israel's performance in this area.

Figure 7.1 / Israel's ranking in international indicators (percentile)

Democratic rights and freedoms

11–16 66–69	Political rights (Freedom House)
8–11 60–63	Civil liberties (Freedom House)
8 51	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)

Democratic process

11 70	Voice and accountability (World Bank)
84–95 96–99	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)
19 79	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem Institute)
11 64	Participatory democracy (V-Dem Institute)
22 67	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem Institute)
41–59 83–90	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)

Governance

41–57 84–89	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)
32 82	Rule of law (World Bank)

Corruption

38 78	Control of corruption (World Bank)
30–35 79–81	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)

Regulation

43 87	Regulatory quality (World Bank)

Economic equality

19 70	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem Institute)

0
Lowest ranking

100
Highest ranking

■ Percentile among all countries surveyed

■ Percentile among OECD countries

Figure 7.2 / Israel's scores in the various indicators

Indicator	Score
Political participation	88.9
Equal distribution of resources	82.5
Political rights	82.5
Egalitarian democracy	80.3
Deliberative democracy	79.9
Functioning of government	78.6
Regulatory quality	75.6
Democratic political culture	75.0
Civil liberties	71.7
Rule of law	71.0
Freedom of the press	69.2
Control of corruption	66.1
Voice and accountability	63.7
Perception of corruption	60.0
Participatory democracy	57.8

7.1 Democratic Rights and Freedoms

Freedom in the World, a report published annually by Freedom House based on expert assessments, examines two indicators that show changes in countries' performance in the areas of political rights and civil liberties.

Political rights

Institution: Freedom House

Israel's score: 82.5

No. of countries included in indicator: 210

Israel's quartile among all countries surveyed: 2 (66th–69th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (11th–16th percentile)

Figure 7.3 / Distribution of scores in political rights indicator

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The political rights indicator examines whether a given country meets the following criteria: free and fair elections; open competition among political parties; actual power of elected representatives; a strong and influential opposition; a low level of corruption; and the safeguarding of minority rights. In addition, it assesses whether the country is subject to military rule and whether there is foreign intervention in its affairs.

Israel's score this year in the political rights indicator is 82.5, marking a second consecutive annual decline and a drop of 20 places within two years. This slump stems from a worsening perception of government performance, two rounds of elections that failed to produce a government, the indictment hanging over the prime minister, and his efforts to obtain immunity from prosecution. This year's score is the lowest that Israel has received since 2002, when this indicator was first compiled in its present form. It places Israel in the 66th–69th percentile, alongside Tunisia, South Africa, and India. Compared with the OECD states, Israel ranks in the lowest quartile (11th–16th percentile), above Colombia, Mexico, Hungary, and Turkey.

Figure 7.4 / Israel's score in political rights indicator, 2002–2019

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

Civil liberties

Institution: Freedom House

Israel's score: 71.7

No. of countries included in indicator: 210

Israel's quartile among all countries surveyed: 2 (60th–63rd percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (8th–11th percentile)

Figure 7.5 / Distribution of scores in civil liberties indicator

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **civil liberties indicator** assesses the extent to which a country upholds freedoms of expression, the press, religion, association, and academic freedom, along with an independent judicial system, rule of law, personal security, equality before the law, absence of political violence, freedom of movement, property rights, gender equality, and marital and family rights.

Israel's score in the civil liberties indicator has remained unchanged for the last two years, at 71.7. Of the countries included in this indicator, Israel ranks in the 60th–63rd percentile, that is, the second quartile. Among OECD members, Israel places in the 8th–11th percentile, in the fourth and lowest quartile, ahead of only Turkey, Mexico, and Colombia.

Figure 7.6 / Israel's score in civil liberties indicator, 2002–2019

Freedom of the press

Institution: Reporters Without Borders

Israel's score: 69.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2 (51st percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (8th percentile)

Figure 7.7 / Distribution of scores in freedom of the press indicator

● Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The *World Press Freedom Index*, published by Reporters Without Borders, assesses reporters' freedom of activity in 180 countries around the globe. It is calculated based on an analysis of quantitative data—for example, the number of incidents of abuse or acts of violence against journalists over the past year—combined with the opinions of media experts in such areas as media independence, pluralism, censorship, and transparency.

Israel's score in this indicator is 69.2, a grade that has remained virtually unchanged since 2012. In comparison with all other countries surveyed, Israel places in the second quartile, ranking 88th out of 180. Relative to the OECD states, however, it is positioned extremely low, in the fourth and lowest quartile (8th percentile), topping only Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey—countries that are hardly known for safeguarding human rights. This low score is due to military censorship in Israel; government hostility to journalists; difficulties of foreign journalists in renewing their permits to work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and infringement on the rights of Palestinian journalists, including firing on reporters covering demonstrations and administrative detentions.

Figure 7.8 / Israel's score in freedom of the press indicator, 2002–2019

7.2 Democratic Process

Voice and accountability

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 63.7

No. of countries included in indicator: 204

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2 (70th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (11th percentile)

Figure 7.9 / Distribution of scores in voice and accountability indicator

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **voice and accountability indicator** of the World Bank is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics. It examines the extent to which citizens can participate in determining the composition and policies of the government, as well as levels of freedom of expression, association, and the press, which are obviously prerequisites for free elections.

Israel's score this year in voice and accountability is 63.7, nearly unchanged from last year. Its global ranking is in the second quartile (70th percentile). In comparison with the OECD states, Israel places near the bottom of the ranking, in the fourth quartile (11th percentile), above only Colombia, Hungary, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 7.10 / Israel's score in voice and accountability indicator, 2003–2019

Political participation

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit

Israel's score: 88.9

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1 (96th–99th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 1 (84th–95th percentile)

Figure 7.11 / Distribution of scores in political participation indicator

● Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **political participation indicator** of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that consider the following parameters: voter turnout; voting rights and right of association for minorities; proportion of women in parliament; party membership rates; citizens' level of political engagement and interest in current events; citizens' readiness to participate in legal demonstrations; and government encouragement of political participation.

Israel continues to score extremely highly in political participation (88.9), the sixth consecutive year it has done so. This score positions it in second place globally (96th–99th percentile), alongside Iceland, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Finland. In other words, Israel surpasses most of the established democracies in its level of political participation. It also ranks high among OECD countries, placing in the top quartile (84th–95th percentile).

Figure 7.12 / Israel's score in political participation indicator, 2006–2019

Egalitarian democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 80.3

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1 (79th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (19th percentile)

Figure 7.13 / Distribution of scores in egalitarian democracy indicator

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **Egalitarian Component Index**, one of several democracy indicators compiled by the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute, is based on a worldwide survey of experts. It examines the extent to which all groups in a given society are able to play an equal role in the political sphere, run for office, express their opinions, and influence decision-making.

Israel's current score in this index is 80.3, somewhat higher than last year's grade of 73.3. Its global ranking rose as well, and is now in the 79th percentile (versus the 70th percentile last year). Israel's ranking also improved in comparison with the OECD states, though it remains low (in the bottom quartile, 19th percentile).

Figure 7.14 / Israel's score in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2002–2019

Participatory democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 57.8

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2 (64th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (11th percentile)

Figure 7.15 / Distribution of scores in participatory democracy indicator

● Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

V-Dem Institute's **Participatory Component Index** (PCI) is based on the premise that in a substantive democracy, citizens' political involvement is not confined to voting in elections every few years but must also include active, ongoing participation in various spheres of political activity. Thus, the PCI measures citizens' participation in civil-society organizations as well as in regional and local government.

Israel's score this year is 57.8, marking a decline from last year. Despite this, Israel improved in its global ranking, reaching the 64th percentile (compared with the 56th percentile last year). This is due to an overall decline in the scores of the other countries surveyed. In the list of OECD states, Israel ranks near the bottom, in 33rd place out of 37, positioning it in the 11th percentile, ahead of only Turkey, Luxembourg, Mexico, and Japan.

Figure 7.16 / Israel's score in participatory democracy indicator, 2002–2019


Deliberative democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 79.9

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2 (67th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (22nd percentile)

Figure 7.17 / Distribution of scores in deliberative democracy indicator

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **Deliberative Component Index** (DCI) of the V-Dem Institute centers on the political decision-making process. A deliberative democracy is one in which decisions are made in a transparent process focused on the common good, as opposed to being shaped by partisan or political interests or imposed from the top down. Democratic deliberation is measured by the extent to which political elites share with the public the reasoning behind their positions on key issues under discussion, acknowledge opposing views, and respect those who disagree with them.

Israel's score this year in the DCI is 79.9, reflecting an improvement over last year. In the global ranking, Israel places in the second quartile (67th percentile). Compared with the OECD states, however, it is in the lowest quartile, ranking 29th out of 37 (22nd percentile).

Figure 7.18 / Israel's score in deliberative democracy indicator, 2002–2019

Democratic political culture

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit

Israel's score: 75

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1 (83th–90th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 2–3 (41st–59th percentile)

**Figure 7.19** / Distribution of scores in democratic political culture indicator

⊙ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **democratic political culture indicator**, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is based on expert assessments and public opinion polls. It includes the following parameters: the degree of citizens' support for a democratic system, and their opposition to a "strong leader," a military regime, or technocratic leadership; the perception (or lack thereof) that democracy is beneficial to public order and economic prosperity; and the separation of church and state.

Once again this year, Israel's score is 75, a grade that has remained unchanged since this indicator was first compiled in 2006. Globally, Israel ranks in the top quartile, in 17th–28th place out of 167 countries (83rd–90th percentile). In the OECD ranking, Israel falls near the midpoint, on a par with Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

Figure 7.20 / Israel's score in democratic political culture indicator, 2006–2019

7.3 Governance

### Functioning of government

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit

Israel's score: 78.6

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1 (84th–89th percentile)

**Israel's quartile among OECD members:** 2–3 (41st–57th percentile)

Figure 7.21 / Distribution of scores in functioning of government indicator

⦿ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The Economist Intelligence Unit's **functioning of government indicator** is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that reflect the level of democratic functioning and the effectiveness of government institutions in numerous areas: for example, the government's ability to set policy, free of pressure from vested interests; separation of powers among the three branches of government; parliamentary oversight of government; involvement of the military or other extra-political entities in politics; the degree of government transparency and accountability; the extent of government corruption; and the level of public trust in government institutions.

Israel's score of 78.6 represents an improvement over last year, and is the highest grade it has received since this assessment was initiated in 2006. This score places Israel in the highest quartile in the global rankings (19th–27th place out of 167). Among the 37 OECD member states, Israel is situated near the middle of the list, sharing the same score as Austria, Ireland, France, Portugal, and South Korea.

**Figure 7.22** / Israel's score in functioning of government indicator, 2006–2019

Rule of law

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 71.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

**Israel's quartile among all countries:** 1 (82nd percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3 (32nd percentile)

Figure 7.23 / Distribution of scores in rule of law indicator

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The World Bank's **rule of law indicator**, based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and statistical data, measures the extent to which citizens and government bodies have confidence in, and abide by, the country's laws. It also examines the areas of contract enforcement, property rights, functioning of the police force and the legal system, and prevention of crime and violence.

Israel's score this year was 71, marking a slight improvement over last year; nonetheless, its ranking has not changed, and it remains in 38th place out of 209 countries (first quartile, 82nd percentile). Among OECD states, it is in the 25th slot out of 37, placing it in the third quartile (32nd percentile).

Figure 7.24 / Israel's score in rule of law indicator, 2002–2019

7.4 Corruption

### Control of corruption

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 66.1

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1 (78th percentile)

**Israel's quartile among OECD members:** 3 (38th percentile)

Figure 7.25 / Distribution of scores in control of corruption indicator

● Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **control of corruption indicator**, issued annually by the World Bank, reflects citizens' perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. A wide range of variables are examined, from the incidence of corruption at the local and regional level to the influence of elites and private interests on the conduct of the state and its leaders. The data, which are drawn from various sources (research institutes, NGOs, international organizations, and private companies), are combined with the opinions of experts in assorted fields and a survey of the general public. The higher the score in this indicator, the lesser the extent of corruption.

Israel's score this year in the control of corruption indicator stands at 66.1, a slight shift from last year's rating (65.7). Israel slipped from the 79th to 78th percentile in the global ranking, but is still in the highest quartile. In the OECD ranking, it remains in 23rd place (38th percentile), near Portugal and South Korea.

Figure 7.26 / Israel's score in control of corruption indicator, 2002–2019

Perception of corruption

Institution: Transparency International

Israel's score: 60

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1 (79th–81st percentile)

**Israel's quartile among OECD members:** 3 (30th–35th percentile)

Figure 7.27 / Distribution of scores in corruption perceptions indicator

◉ Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **Corruption Perceptions Index**, produced by Transparency International, is drawn from expert assessments of the extent of corruption in the public sector in the countries surveyed, with an emphasis on abuse of power for personal gain.

Israel's score this year was 60, reflecting a continuing downward trend for the third consecutive year. In the global ranking as well, Israel experienced a decline; while it is still in the second quartile, it is now in the 79th–81st percentile (after placing in the 84th percentile three years ago). In comparison with the OECD states, Israel dropped from the 36th percentile to the 30th–35th, on a par with Lithuania and Slovenia.

Figure 7.28 / Israel's score in perception of corruption indicator, 2002–2019

7.5 Regulation

### Regulatory quality

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 75.6

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1 (87th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3 (43rd percentile)

Figure 7.29 / Distribution of scores in regulatory quality indicator

● Israel　● OECD　● Other countries

One of six indicators produced by the World Bank, the regulatory quality indicator assesses the extent to which the government formulates and implements policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector development. It does so by examining various aspects of regulation, such as price controls, discriminatory taxation, efficiency of tax collection, ease of doing business, and competitiveness of the local market.

Israel's score in the **regulatory quality indicator** is 75.6, a slight increase over last year, while its global ranking remains the same, in 28th place (first quartile, 87th percentile). Israel is ranked 21st out of the 37 OECD member states, in the third quartile (43rd percentile), between the Czech Republic and Belgium.

Figure 7.30 / Israel's score in regulatory quality indicator, 2002–2019

7.6 Economic Equality

Equal distribution of resources

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 82.5

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2 (70th percentile)

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4 (19th percentile)

Figure 7.31 / Distribution of scores in equal distribution of resources indicator

● Israel   ● OECD   ● Other countries

The **equal distribution of resources index** is a democracy indicator of the V-Dem Institute. It examines, among other parameters, levels of poverty and economic disparities; equality of access to food, education, and healthcare; the distribution of sociopolitical power between different population groups; and the correspondence between these power differentials and economic gaps.

Israel's score this year in the equal distribution of resources index is 82.5. This marks a significant increase over last year, restoring Israel to its "natural place" at its usual average for most of the last decade, following two years of decline. In the global ranking, it is situated in the second quartile (70th percentile), but among OECD states, Israel is only in the lowest quartile (19th percentile).

Figure 7.32 / Israel's score in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2002–2019

7.7 Overview of International Indicators

On the whole, we see mixed trends this year: on the one hand, some loss of ground in democratic rights and freedoms and in corruption, and on the other, gains in democratic process, governance, and economic equality. There was a downturn in three out of 15 indicators, improvement in five, and no significant change in the remaining seven.

Table 7.2 / Israel's global ranking in 2019 indicators compared with 2018

	Indicator	2019 standardized score	2019 ranking	2019 percentile	2018 ranking	2018 percentile	Change
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	82.5	65–72 (out of 210)	66–69	54–59 (out of 209)	72–74	⌄
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	71.7	78–84 (out of 210)	60–63	80–84 (out of 209)	60–62	=
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	69.2	88 (out of 180)	51	88 (out of 180)	51	=
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	63.7	61 (out of 204)	70	61 (out of 204)	70	=
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	88.9	2–6 (out of 167)	96–99	2–4 (out of 167)	98–99	=
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	80.3	43 (out of 179)	79	53 (out of 179)	70	⌃
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	57.8	65 (out of 179)	64	78–81 (out of 179)	55–56	⌃
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	79.9	59 (out of 179)	67	76–77 (out of 179)	57	⌃
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75.0	17–28 (out of 167)	83–90	18–26 (out of 167)	84–89	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	78.6	19–27 (out of 167)	84–89	27–32 (out of 167)	81–84	⌃
	Rule of law (World Bank)	71.0	38 (out of 209)	82	38 (out of 209)	82	=
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	66.1	45 (out of 209)	78	43 (out of 209)	79	⌄
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	60.0	35–38 (out of 180)	79–81	34–35 (out of 180)	81	⌄

	Indicator	2019 standardized score	2019 ranking	2019 percentile	2018 ranking	2018 percentile	Change
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	75.6	28 (out of 209)	87	28 (out of 209)	87	=
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	82.5	54 (out of 179)	70	60 (out of 179)	66	⌃

⌃   improvement in Israel's ranking compared with 2018

=   no change in Israel's ranking compared with 2018

⌄   decline in Israel's ranking compared with 2018

If we compare Israel's scores this year with the average of its scores over the past decade in each of the 15 indicators (Table 7.3), a similar picture emerges, with improvements in democratic process, governance, economic equality, and regulation, contrasted with a decline in the areas of corruption and democratic rights and freedoms. Only in the deliberative democracy indicator is there a mixed trend, with an upswing this year over 2018's findings despite a decline compared with the previous decade. Thus, in six indicators, Israel's score this year is lower than its average for the preceding ten years; in eight, its score is higher than the decade average; and in one, its score is the same as the ten-year average.

Table 7.3 / Israel's scores in 2019 indicators compared with average over the previous decade

Indicator		2019 score	Average score, 2009–2018	Change
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	82.5	89.8	⌄
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	71.7	74.3	⌄
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	69.2	69.4*	⌄

Indicator		2019 score	Average score, 2009–2018	Change
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	63.7	63.4	⌃
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	88.9	86.4**	⌃
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	80.3	78.8	⌃
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	57.8	57.7	⌃
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	79.9	80.7	⌄
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75.0	75.0**	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	78.6	74.1**	⌃
	Rule of law (World Bank)	71.0	70.1	⌃
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	66.1	67.6	⌄
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	60.0	60.9	⌄
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	75.6	74.6	⌃
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem Institute)	82.5	81.5	⌃

*   In the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders, the average shown is for a period of nine years, as no score was published in 2010.

**   In the Economist Intelligence Unit indicators, the average shown is for a period of nine years, since these scores were not published in 2010.

⌃   improvement in Israel's score compared with average of previous decade

=   no change in Israel's score compared with average of previous decade

⌄   decline in Israel's score compared with average of previous decade

Summary

A review of the international indicators over time yields a mixed picture, with improvement in some areas and decline in others. In all the indicators studied, Israel is situated in the upper half of the scale in the global rankings, and in eight of them, it is even in the highest quartile. Nonetheless, a comparison of Israel's democratic standing relative to the other 36 OECD states shows that it is generally at the lower end of the list. Only in one indicator, that of political participation, is Israel in the upper half of the OECD ranking; by contrast, in eight other indicators, it is situated at the very bottom, in the lowest quartile.

Thus, although Israel once again meets the basic prerequisites of a democratic state with respect to the international indicators, it continues to grapple with major problems: In the three indicators belonging to the democratic rights and freedoms category, its score this year is lower than its average over the previous decade, with a particularly worrisome trend in the area of political rights. Israel's unfavorable standing is especially noticeable when compared with its fellow members of the OECD, where it is situated in the lowest quartile throughout this category.

On the positive side, the areas in which Israel earns the highest global ranking are political participation of its citizens (voter turnout, membership in political parties, civil/political engagement, and so on); democratic political culture (level of support for the democratic system); and functioning of government (ability of a democratic government to implement policy).

And finally, this year we once again examined indicators of regulatory quality and equal distribution of resources. In the former, Israel's position is very good, relatively speaking, and we can even point to a slight upswing in its ranking over the past decade. While the distribution of resources indicator yields a less favorable picture, with Israel in the lowest quartile of the OECD states, there is a clear upward trend in relation to both the past year and the previous decade as a whole.

Appendix 1

Appendix 1
Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses
(Total Sample, Jewish Sample, Arab Sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very Bad	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	6.7	32.3	40.9	14.0	5.5	0.6	100
Arabs	8.0	21.2	37.0	17.6	16.1	0.1	100
Total Sample	6.9	30.6	40.3	14.5	7.1	0.6	100

2. And what about your personal situation?

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very Bad	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	14.6	47.4	30.9	5.2	1.5	0.4	100
Arabs	21.5	32.5	27.6	12.9	5.5	–	100
Total Sample	15.7	45.1	30.4	6.4	2.1	0.3	100

■ Throughout the survey, this response was recorded if the respondent replied "I don't know," or was unwilling to select one of the options offered.

■ In certain cases, the "don't know/refuse" value was rounded up by 0.1% in order to bring the total to 100%.

3. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	34.5	50.4	11.7	2.3	0.6	100
Arabs	17.6	25.7	39.1	17.0	0.5	100
Total Sample	31.9	46.6	15.8	4.5	1.2	100

4. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1=no solidarity at all and 10=a high level of solidarity?

	1 – No solidarity/ sense of togetherness at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – High level of solidarity/ sense of togetherness	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	4.8	4.9	11.5	10.0	16.3	15.8	17.1	12.7	3.7	1.9	1.3	5.46	100
Arabs	12.4	6.7	9.1	14.2	26.1	9.5	9.5	4.3	2.4	5.4	0.4	4.76	100
Total Sample	5.9	5.2	11.1	10.7	17.8	14.9	16.0	11.4	3.5	2.4	1.2	5.35	100

5. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

	Strong group	Quite strong group	Quite weak group	Weak group	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	9.3	53.4	22.3	6.5	8.5	100
Arabs	19.3	20.4	23.3	36.0	1.0	100
Total Sample	10.8	48.4	22.5	11.0	7.3	100

6. In your opinion, which of the following groups have the highest level of tension between them?

	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	Religious and secular Jews	Right and Left	Rich and poor	Jews and Arabs	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	3.7	18.6	41.5	7.9	24.8	3.5	100
Arabs	2.1	11.1	22.1	11.9	48.4	4.4	100
Total Sample	3.4	17.5	38.6	8.5	28.4	3.6	100

7. How would you rate Israel's current leadership in terms of corruption, where 1=very corrupt and 5=not at all corrupt?

	1 – Very corrupt	2	3	4	5 – Not at all corrupt	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	30.6	27.3	25.1	12.0	2.9	2.1	2.29	100
Arabs	44.2	13.7	19.1	6.6	14.7	1.7	2.33	100
Total Sample	32.6	25.2	24.2	11.2	4.7	2.1	2.29	100

8. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	22.3	41.5	25.1	11.1	100
Arabs	8.5	76.4	13.8	1.3	100
Total Sample	20.2	46.8	23.4	9.6	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

9. It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	12.8	32.5	25.5	27.9	1.3	100
Arabs	30.4	16.8	11.7	39.6	1.5	100
Total Sample	15.4	30.1	23.4	29.7	1.4	100

10. The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	21.4	28.3	26.2	22.4	1.7	100
Arabs	49.7	23.3	9.6	15.7	1.7	100
Total Sample	25.7	27.5	23.6	21.4	1.8	100

11. Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	21.0	32.8	29.0	14.5	2.7	100
Arabs	35.2	23.3	13.0	27.0	1.5	100
Total Sample	23.1	31.4	26.6	16.4	2.5	100

12. Israel is a good place to live.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	35.7	40.4	17.7	5.2	1.0	100
Arabs	43.6	34.6	14.3	7.5	–	100
Total Sample	36.9	39.6	17.2	5.6	0.7	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

13. The media

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	26.1	39.2	27.5	5.7	1.5	100
Arabs	28.3	37.0	25.6	9.1	–	100
Total Sample	26.5	38.9	27.2	6.2	1.2	100

14. The Supreme Court

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	21.4	24.2	28.2	24.2	2.0	100
Arabs	18.0	19.5	32.1	28.2	2.2	100
Total Sample	20.9	23.5	28.8	24.8	2.0	100

15. The police

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	15.4	39.1	35.8	8.4	1.3	100
Arabs	40.3	26.2	20.4	12.5	0.6	100
Total Sample	19.2	37.1	33.5	9.1	1.1	100

16. The President of Israel

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	13.1	20.5	33.0	30.0	3.4	100
Arabs	44.2	23.3	16.1	13.3	3.0	100
Total Sample	17.8	20.9	30.5	27.4	3.1	100

17. The Knesset

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	21.0	45.5	26.0	6.2	1.3	100
Arabs	35.1	32.0	17.2	14.1	1.6	100
Total Sample	23.1	43.5	24.7	7.4	1.3	100

18. The IDF

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	3.7	10.2	29.6	52.3	4.2	100
Arabs	36.5	23.5	19.5	15.4	5.1	100
Total Sample	8.7	12.2	28.1	46.7	4.3	100

19. The government

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	30.7	39.4	23.0	5.7	1.2	100
Arabs	46.1	28.4	13.5	11.3	0.7	100
Total Sample	33.1	37.8	21.6	6.5	1.0	100

20. The political parties

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	35.5	45.0	15.1	2.0	2.4	100
Arabs	36.7	30.5	21.7	8.3	2.8	100
Total Sample	35.7	42.8	16.1	3.0	2.4	100

21. The attorney general

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	26.9	25.4	28.3	15.2	4.2	100
Arabs	23.6	34.3	19.1	15.0	8.0	100
Total Sample	26.4	26.7	26.9	15.2	4.8	100

22. The National Insurance Institute

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	20.2	32.4	34.4	9.9	3.1	100
Arabs	14.7	24.7	36.1	22.2	2.3	100
Total Sample	19.3	31.2	34.7	11.8	3.0	100

23. Your municipality or local authority

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	10.8	24.2	43.6	19.3	2.1	100
Arabs	34.4	17.9	30.8	16.8	0.1	100
Total Sample	14.3	23.3	41.6	19.0	1.8	100

24. Your health fund

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	2.8	17.5	47.6	29.3	2.8	100
Arabs	4.6	10.7	36.9	46.6	1.2	100
Total Sample	3.1	16.5	46.0	31.9	2.5	100

25. Would you agree to pay higher taxes if you could be certain they would go toward reducing socioeconomic gaps?

	I would agree	It depends how much higher	I would not agree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	11.0	40.8	45.6	2.6	100
Arabs	23.4	18.0	58.5	0.1	100
Total Sample	12.9	37.4	47.6	2.1	100

26. In general, how would you rate Israel's public healthcare system on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=very poor and 5=excellent?

	1 – Very poor	2	3 – Fair	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	4.9	9.4	37.3	37.0	10.8	0.6	3.40	100
Arabs	3.4	10.9	25.9	26.9	32.3	0.6	3.74	100
Total Sample	4.7	9.6	35.6	35.5	14.1	0.5	3.45	100

27. In your opinion, does the public healthcare system in Israel provide equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors?

	I'm certain it does	I think it does	I think it does not	I'm certain it does not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	11.5	44.0	27.6	14.1	2.8	100
Arabs	39.6	27.7	15.0	17.7	–	100
Total Sample	15.8	41.5	25.6	14.6	2.5	100

How satisfied are you with the following:

28. Quality of medical care at your health fund

	Very satisfied	Quite satisfied	Not so satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	22.7	59.9	13.9	2.1	1.4	100
Arabs	50.0	37.7	7.8	4.5	0.1	100
Total Sample	26.8	56.5	13.0	2.5	1.2	100

29. Attitude toward patients at your health fund

	Very satisfied	Quite satisfied	Not so satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	25.2	56.7	12.7	2.9	2.5	100
Arabs	57.8	31.2	6.6	4.3	–	100
Total Sample	30.1	52.8	11.8	3.1	2.2	100

30. Quality of medical care in public hospitals

	Very satisfied	Quite satisfied	Not so satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	9.6	44.6	31.2	8.1	6.6	100
Arabs	31.6	42.9	18.4	6.4	0.7	100
Total Sample	13.0	44.3	29.2	7.8	5.7	100

31. Attitude toward patients in public hospitals

	Very satisfied	Quite satisfied	Not so satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	8.2	40.1	34.0	10.9	6.8	100
Arabs	35.1	41.0	15.1	6.8	2.0	100
Total Sample	12.3	40.2	31.2	10.3	6.0	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

32. The government should increase the health budget even if this means reducing budgets for other ministries.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	43.1	41.7	10.1	1.6	3.4	100
Arabs	72.1	19.4	3.3	4.5	0.6	100
Total Sample	47.5	38.4	9.1	2.0	3.0	100

33. Senior doctors should be paid more but be barred from accepting private patients.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	21.0	27.4	31.5	14.4	5.7	100
Arabs	35.6	18.7	14.6	27.8	3.3	100
Total Sample	23.2	26.1	28.9	16.4	5.4	100

34. Citizens should pay more for health insurance, and the additional funds should be invested in improving the public healthcare system.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	6.0	19.3	36.5	34.8	3.4	100
Arabs	26.0	25.2	12.2	36.6	–	100
Total Sample	9.0	20.2	32.8	35.0	3.0	100

35. The healthcare system is corrupt.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	7.0	19.5	42.6	24.2	6.7	100
Arabs	14.0	17.3	16.6	49.9	2.2	100
Total Sample	8.1	19.2	38.6	28.1	6.0	100

36. It's understandable when people lash out at medical personnel.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	4.8	15.0	21.3	54.5	4.4	100
Arabs	9.5	15.2	6.7	68.6	–	100
Total Sample	5.5	15.1	19.1	56.6	3.7	100

37. Assuming that the health budget is increased, what are the three most important areas to which the additional funds should be directed? (up to 3 choices)

	Preparing for epidemics such as the coronavirus	Increasing the number of hospital beds	Adding positions for doctors and nursing staff	Opening hospitals in outlying areas	Shortening waiting times at hospitals	Purchasing advanced medical equipment	Improving conditions for hospitalized patients	Don't know / refuse to answer / Other	Total
Jews	5.5	17.4	19.4	13.0	16.8	13.6	13.1	1.2	100
Arabs	14.3	11.9	14.0	23.4	7.8	20.9	7.7	–	100
Total Sample	6.9	1.5	18.5	14.7	15.4	14.7	12.3	1.0	100

38. When you need medical care, do you prefer being treated by a Jewish doctor or an Arab doctor, or are you indifferent?

	Jewish doctor	Arab doctor	Impartial	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	27.0	0.4	70.9	1.6	100
Arabs	1.1	2.8	95.6	0.6	100
Total Sample	23.1	0.8	74.7	1.5	100

39. In your opinion, to what extent does the State of Israel ensure the security of its citizens?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	17.2	62.8	16.7	2.5	0.8	100
Arabs	22.8	32.9	31.0	11.7	1.6	100
Total Sample	18.1	58.2	18.9	3.9	0.9	100

40. And to what extent does it ensure the welfare of its citizens?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	2.9	24.8	55.0	15.7	1.6	100
Arabs	14.8	34.9	39.4	9.7	1.2	100
Total Sample	4.7	26.3	52.6	14.8	1.6	100

In your opinion, how helpful would the following be in protecting the rights and interests of the Arab population in Israel?

41. Appointing a professional Arab minister who would be responsible for safeguarding the rights and interests of the Arab population

	I'm certain it would help	I think it would help	I don't think it would help	I'm certain it wouldn't help	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	17.0	41.8	21.2	12.0	8.0	100
Arabs	48.0	19.4	11.2	20.9	0.5	100
Total Sample	21.7	38.4	19.7	13.3	6.9	100

42. Enacting a law requiring ongoing government consultations with Arab civil-society organizations

	I'm certain it would help	I think it would help	I don't think it would help	I'm certain it wouldn't help	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	10.9	36.3	27.0	16.2	9.6	100
Arabs	61.5	20.5	6.2	11.2	0.6	100
Total Sample	18.5	33.9	23.9	15.4	8.3	100

43. Including Arab Knesset members in the development of any legislation that affects the Arab public

	I'm certain it would help	I think it would help	I don't think it would help	I'm certain it wouldn't help	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	15.1	41.4	20.5	15.2	7.8	100
Arabs	64.6	13.3	7.8	13.6	0.7	100
Total Sample	22.6	37.1	18.6	14.9	6.8	100

44. Bringing Arab parties into the governing coalition

	I'm certain it would help	I think it would help	I don't think it would help	I'm certain it wouldn't help	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	10.6	25.8	25.5	27.9	10.1	100
Arabs	55.6	14.8	7.5	18.8	3.3	100
Total Sample	17.4	24.1	22.8	26.5	9.2	100

45. Enacting a law that requires Arab representation at all levels and in all institutions in proportion to their percentage of the country's population

	I'm certain it would help	I think it would help	I don't think it would help	I'm certain it wouldn't help	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	9.4	28.6	25.2	25.5	11.3	100
Arabs	63.7	19.2	3.6	11.3	2.2	100
Total Sample	17.7	27.2	22.0	23.4	9.7	100

46. In your opinion, what is the primary reason for the low number of Arabs in high-ranking positions in Israel's civil service?

	Shortage of qualified Arab candidates	Desire of the Jewish majority to keep Arabs out of positions of power	Limited political power of the Arab public in Israel	Lack of desire of Arab citizens to be part of the Israeli civil service	Other	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	18.8	31.5	12.4	21.3	12.1	3.9	100
Arabs	9.3	52.4	20.5	13.4	4.5	–	100
Total Sample	17.3	34.7	13.7	20.1	10.9	3.3	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

47. Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	14.4	42.2	28.8	10.2	4.4	100
Arabs	49.1	32.1	12.7	5.6	0.5	100
Total Sample	19.7	40.7	26.4	9.5	3.7	100

48. To preserve Jewish/Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	18.3	23.2	35.8	18.0	4.7	100
Arabs	11.4	10.5	9.1	68.5	0.5	100
Total Sample	17.2	21.3	31.7	25.6	4.2	100

49. The regime in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens as well.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	23.9	41.6	23.9	6.6	4.0	100
Arabs	14.9	19.8	24.8	38.6	1.9	100
Total Sample	22.6	38.3	24.0	11.4	3.7	100

50. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	45.0	30.3	14.5	5.9	4.3	100
Arabs	11.9	10.7	15.3	59.9	2.2	100
Total Sample	40.0	27.4	14.7	14.1	3.8	100

51. (Jewish respondents) Assuming that the working conditions and salary met your expectations, would you be willing to take a job in an Arab community?
(Arab respondents) Assuming that the working conditions and salary met your expectations, would you be willing to take a job in a Jewish community?

	I'm certain I would	I think I would	I think I would not	I'm certain I would not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	13.5	28.0	25.9	28.0	4.6	100
Arabs	83.0	10.4	1.7	5.0	–	100
Total Sample	24.0	25.3	22.2	24.5	4.0	100

52. (Jewish respondents) Would you be willing to work under an Arab boss?
(Arab respondents) Would you be willing to work under a Jewish boss?

	I'm certain I would	I think I would	I think I would not	I'm certain I would not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	27.0	40.3	15.0	13.7	4.0	100
Arabs	81.5	10.3	––	8.2	–	100
Total Sample	35.3	35.8	12.7	12.9	3.4	100

In your opinion, how has the coronavirus pandemic in Israel affected each of the following relationships:

53. Between Jews and Arabs

	Greatly improved it	Moderately improved it	Moderately harmed it	Greatly harmed it	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	4.6	44.3	12.8	2.0	36.3	100
Arabs	15.1	39.6	17.4	9.1	18.8	100
Total Sample	6.2	43.6	13.5	3.1	33.8	100

54. Between non-Haredim and Haredim

	Greatly improved it	Moderately improved it	Moderately harmed it	Greatly harmed it	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	5.8	24.5	37.9	20.8	11.0	100
Arabs	5.0	13.4	30.1	25.2	26.3	100
Total Sample	5.7	22.8	36.7	21.5	13.3	100

55. Between the public and the government

	Greatly improved it	Moderately improved it	Moderately harmed it	Greatly harmed it	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	3.0	28.1	37.0	20.2	11.7	100
Arabs	5.8	28.5	29.6	25.7	10.4	100
Total Sample	3.4	28.1	35.9	21.0	11.6	100

56. Between the public and the police

	Greatly improved it	Moderately improved it	Moderately harmed it	Greatly harmed it	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	3.8	31.9	32.6	13.1	18.6	100
Arabs	4.9	31.7	27.7	26.3	9.4	100
Total Sample	4.0	31.9	31.9	15.1	17.1	100

In your opinion, should large private-sector companies be required by law to implement a policy of hiring people from the following groups:

57. People over 50

	I'm certain they should	I think they should	I think they should not	I'm certain they should not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	42.4	34.8	13.6	5.7	3.5	100
Arabs	45.6	23.5	10.2	20.1	0.6	100
Total Sample	42.8	33.1	13.1	7.9	3.1	100

58. People with physical disabilities

	I'm certain they should	I think they should	I think they should not	I'm certain they should not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	39.9	37.8	13.9	5.2	3.2	100
Arabs	52.4	16.9	8.4	22.3	–-	100
Total Sample	41.8	34.6	13.0	7.8	2.8	100

59. People with mental health disabilities

	I'm certain they should	I think they should	I think they should not	I'm certain they should not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	22.0	30.5	30.1	11.3	6.1	100
Arabs	25.8	11.1	20.1	41.1	1.9	100
Total Sample	22.6	27.6	28.6	15.8	5.9	100

60. Arab citizens of Israel

	I'm certain they should	I think they should	I think they should not	I'm certain they should not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	24.2	32.1	24.2	15.1	4.4	100
Arabs	70.5	14.3	5.3	9.9	–	100
Total Sample	31.2	29.4	21.4	14.3	3.7	100

61. Women

	I'm certain they should	I think they should	I think they should not	I'm certain they should not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	49.2	28.0	13.0	6.7	3.1	100
Arabs	70.1	11.3	6.8	11.8	–	100
Total Sample	52.4	25.5	12.0	7.5	2.6	100

62. Haredim

	I'm certain they should	I think they should	I think they should not	I'm certain they should not	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	36.8	32.3	19.1	8.4	3.4	100
Arabs	45.9	12.8	11.5	24.1	5.7	100
Total Sample	38.2	29.4	17.9	10.8	3.7	100

63. Do you agree with the claim that the police make more effort to address crime in Jewish communities than in Arab ones?

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	28.3	38.3	18.8	5.0	9.6	100
Arabs	68.3	13.4	7.7	10.6	–	100
Total Sample	34.4	34.5	17.1	5.8	8.2	100

64. How would you rate overall police performance in Israel on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=very poor and 5=excellent?

	1=Very poor	2	3=Fair	4	5= Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	8.4	14.5	46.9	26.2	1.8	2.2	2.99	100
Arabs	27.3	18.1	35.7	9.4	9.5	–	2.56	100
Total Sample	11.3	15.0	45.2	23.7	3.0	1.8	2.92	100

How would you rate police performance in Israel in each of the following areas, where 1=very poor and 5=excellent?

65. Combatting drug use

	1=Very poor	2	3=Fair	4	5= Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	9.7	12.5	27.9	25.6	8.3	16.0	3.12	100
Arabs	25.5	15.9	29.4	14.0	13.2	2.0	2.73	100
Total Sample	12.1	13.0	28.2	23.8	9.1	13.8	3.06	100

66. Combatting organized crime

	1=Very poor	2	3=Fair	4	5= Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	15.7	18.6	27.7	21.1	5.3	11.6	2.79	100
Arabs	40.1	20.2	20.0	9.3	7.2	3.2	2.21	100
Total Sample	19.4	18.8	26.5	19.3	5.6	10.4	2.70	100

67. Combatting domestic violence

	1=Very poor	2	3=Fair	4	5= Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	24.1	27.5	29.0	10.2	2.7	6.5	2.36	100
Arabs	30.4	14.8	18.2	18.2	16.6	1.8	2.75	100
Total Sample	25.0	25.5	27.4	11.5	4.8	5.8	2.42	100

68. Preventing road accidents

	1=Very poor	2	3=Fair	4	5= Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	13.9	22.7	35.3	19.2	4.1	4.8	2.76	100
Arabs	19.2	16.4	27.3	21.0	15.5	0.6	2.97	100
Total Sample	14.7	21.7	34.1	19.5	5.8	4.2	2.79	100

69. Exposing corruption

	1=Very poor	2	3=Fair	4	5= Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	17.9	23.2	29.3	17.2	5.4	7.0	2.67	100
Arabs	33.0	18.0	22.5	14.4	7.4	4.7	2.42	100
Total Sample	20.2	22.4	28.3	16.7	5.7	6.7	2.63	100

70. Combatting cybercrime

	1=Very poor	2	3=Fair	4	5= Excellent	Don't know / refuse to answer	Average	Total
Jews	8.7	14.7	26.6	24.4	8.4	17.2	3.11	100
Arabs	20.9	25.0	20.3	15.7	11.4	6.7	2.70	100
Total Sample	10.6	16.3	25.6	23.1	8.9	15.5	3.04	100

Do you agree with the claim that Israel's police force "over-polices" the following groups?

71. Arab Israelis

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	13.2	28.2	32.6	18.9	7.2	100
Arabs	47.9	25.2	10.6	14.6	1.7	100
Total Sample	18.5	27.7	29.3	18.2	6.3	100

72. Mizrahim

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	5.9	17.8	42.0	27.1	7.2	100
Arabs	18.3	32.1	21.4	20.1	8.1	100
Total Sample	7.8	20.0	38.9	26.0	7.3	100

73. Ethiopian Israelis

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	25.1	37.4	22.3	10.6	4.6	100
Arabs	32.5	23.7	18.8	18.6	6.4	100
Total Sample	26.3	35.3	21.8	11.8	4.8	100

74. Haredim

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	12.8	23.3	37.2	21.4	5.3	100
Arabs	20.9	22.2	21.1	29.5	6.3	100
Total Sample	14.0	23.1	34.8	22.6	5.5	100

75. Foreign workers

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	12.8	29.3	29.8	18.7	9.4	100
Arabs	21.7	22.0	19.7	23.1	13.5	100
Total Sample	14.2	28.2	28.3	19.3	10.0	100

76. Illegal Palestinian workers

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	17.5	25.9	26.6	21.0	9.0	100
Arabs	59.1	12.6	7.7	17.7	2.9	100
Total Sample	23.8	23.9	23.8	20.5	8.0	100

77. In your opinion, to what extent do the police take criticism of their performance seriously?

	To a very large extent	To a large extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	2.1	21.6	51.0	18.8	6.5	100
Arabs	11.5	12.6	35.9	37.4	2.6	100
Total Sample	3.5	20.3	48.7	21.6	5.9	100

78. In your opinion, what are the most important <u>economic</u> issues facing Israel today? (up to 3 choices)

	Improving the healthcare system	Improving the education system	Bringing down the cost of living and housing prices	Reducing economic gaps, and looking out for weaker groups (the elderly, the sick)	Strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities	Improving police performance	Reducing traffic congestion	Lowering unemployment rates	Don't know / refuse to answer / Other	Total
Jews	18.2	13.6	20.6	17.2	5.7	3.4	6.1	14.4	0.8	100
Arabs	16.6	18.9	15.2	10.1	5.9	8.2	4.4	20.6	0.1	100
Total Sample	17.9	14.4	19.8	16.1	5.7	4.2	5.8	15.4	0.7	100

[For each of the 3 issues cited by the respondent in the previous question] How well is the state handling each of these issues? [79-81]

79. Issue 1 (out of the following 8)

80. Issue 2 (out of the following 8)

81. Issue 3 (out of the following 8)

a. Improving the healthcare system

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	2.6	25.6	52.6	18.0	1.2	100
Arabs	22.0	50.0	15.0	13.0	–	100
Total Sample	5.5	29.3	47.0	17.3	1.0	100

b. Improving the education system

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	1.0	11.6	54.2	32.4	0.8	100
Arabs	18.5	45.1	21.7	14.8	–	100
Total Sample	4.5	18.4	47.7	28.8	0.6	100

c. Bringing down the cost of living and housing prices

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	0.8	4.0	37.3	57.0	0.9	100
Arabs	8.4	22.5	24.1	43.7	1.3	100
Total Sample	1.7	6.2	35.8	55.4	0.9	100

d. Reducing economic gaps, and looking out for weaker groups (the elderly, the sick)

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	0.6	5.7	45.4	47.6	0.7	100
Arabs	9.2	47.3	22.6	21.0	–	100
Total Sample	1.4	9.6	43.2	45.0	0.8	100

e. Strengthening the IDF's operational capabilities

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	13.0	67.1	12.8	4.1	3.0	100
Arabs	66.2	24.9	–	9.0	–	100
Total Sample	21.8	60.1	10.7	4.9	2.5	100

f. Improving police performance

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	1.8	11.8	37.6	45.8	3.0	100
Arabs	27.9	18.6	14.4	36.8	2.3	100
Total Sample	9.4	13.8	30.8	43.1	2.9	100

g. Reducing traffic congestion

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	0.6	12.6	48.6	38.2	–	100
Arabs	17.4	40.4	8.2	34.1	–	100
Total Sample	2.5	15.9	43.8	37.7	–	100

h. Lowering unemployment rates

	Very well	Quite well	Not so well	Not at all well	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Jews	1.9	20.7	49.3	24.6	3.5	100
Arabs	9.0	46.4	18.7	25.9	–	100
Total Sample	3.3	26.0	43.0	24.9	2.8	100

Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research – Research Team

Prof. Tamar Hermann, academic director of the Viterbi Center, is a Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute and a full professor of political science at the Open University of Israel. Her fields of expertise include public opinion research, civil society, and extraparliamentary politics.

Dr. Or Anabi is a researcher at the Viterbi Center. His doctoral dissertation, written at Bar-Ilan University's Department of Sociology and Anthropology, dealt with paternal involvement, the new masculinity, and the work-family interface.

Dr. Ayelet Rubabshi-Shitrit is a researcher at the Viterbi Center and a post-doctoral fellow at University of California Irvine (UCI). She holds master's and doctoral degrees in political science, and a master's degree in criminology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her doctoral dissertation addressed constructive votes of no confidence as an instrument of parliamentary oversight and a means of increasing government stability.

Avraham (Rami) Ritov is a researcher at the Viterbi Center. He holds a bachelor's degree in computer science, and a master's degree in political science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJI). He is presently completing his doctoral dissertation at HUJI's Department of Political Science on issues in electoral politics.

Ella Heller is an expert on public opinion polls and surveys. She served previously as research director at the Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, and as a senior researcher at the Knesset's Research and Information Center and at the IDI's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research (now known as the Viterbi Center).

The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the Institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation, and public opinion. The Institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research conducts rigorous empirical research on the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding the functioning of the country's democratic system and the commitment of Israeli society to core democratic values. Data Israel: The Louis Guttman Social Research Database, maintained by the Center, presents current and historical survey data and other materials collected since 1949 by the Center for Applied Social Research founded by Prof. Guttman, which have been donated to the Israel Democracy Institute. The Viterbi Center strives to enrich the public discourse in Israel on social and policy issues by generating, analyzing, and publicizing authoritative information, and placing it at the disposal of researchers, journalists, and interested members of the public in Israel and around the world.

The Israeli Democracy Index offers an annual assessment of the quality of Israeli democracy. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. The project aims to explore trends in Israeli society on fundamental questions relating to the realization of democratic goals and values, and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of the survey results is intended to enhance public debate on the status of democracy in Israel, and create a comprehensive source of relevant information.